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Abstract 
The politics of oil will remain a central element of international economics and security for 
years to come despite the current falling prices. This is especially true in the Asia Pacific 
where oil self-sufficiency is the lowest among all regions of the world. This thesis develops 
a deductive vulnerability-interaction theory to answer two major research questions: (1) 
What explains variations in the levels of strategic oil supply measures adopted by Asian net 
oil importing economies between 1994 and 2013; and (2) what explains the adoption of a 
high level of such measures by at least some of those economies during this period? This 
study hypothesises that the actual level of strategic oil measures decision-makers would 
adopted at any given time is the result of the interaction among the economy’s oil 
vulnerability (OV) and three key factors: (1) The level of decision-makers’ trust that oil 
markets can ensure reliable and affordable oil supply to the economy; (2) the economy’s 
overall implementation capability of strategic supply measures; and (3) the strength of 
private capital versus that of state capital in the economy. According to this reasoning, 
strategic oil supply measures would be higher if there is higher OV; or lower level of trust 
in oil markets; or higher overall implementation capability; or if private capital is stronger 
than state capital.  
The vulnerability-interaction model develops here predicts the comparative levels of 
strategic oil supply measures adopted by two net oil importing economies at the same period 
or by the same economy in two distinct periods under two situations. It also specifies the 
results of the interaction of the explanatory variables in four cases. These include the two 
“extreme cases”: (1) a net oil importing economy with a low OV, high trust, low capability, 
and high-strength private capital would adopt a low level of strategic oil supply measures or 
none at all; (2) one with a high OV, low trust, high capability, and low-strength private 
capital would adopt a high level of such measures. Short of these “extremes,” the model 
further hypothesises two pathways for the adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply 
measures, the three-high type and the non-three-high type. This thesis conducts a 
preliminary assessment to test the vulnerability-interaction model with nine net oil 
importing economies in the Asia-Pacific, which establishes the model’s validity. This initial 
evaluation’s results also provide the basis for selecting two paired comparisons, India and 
Thailand and China and India, and one of the economies that adopted a high level of strategic 
oil supply measures, Taiwan, for more in-depth investigation. The study concludes that the 
vulnerability-interaction model compares well to the major alternative explanation of the 
adoption of interventionist oil supply measures – that of the Realist/geopolitical approach. 
Not having a high level of trust is found to be the most important a priori condition that 
causes net oil importing economies to adopt a high level of strategic oil supply measures.   
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Chapter One 
Interventionist Oil Supply Strategies in Asia-Pacific 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
In 2017 news headlines speculated about whether global oil prices would stabilise 
or slump further. Asian, and especially Chinese, national oil companies’ (NOCs) overseas 
oil investments do not generate as much media attention as was previously the case. This 
does not mean that net oil importing states in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere suddenly stop 
intervening in how oil is supplied to their economies all together. It does mean that due to 
lower oil prices, the rhetoric linking oil supplies to national and international security 
calculations has temporarily abated. History and economics, however, suggest that the 
current situation only means oil is experiencing a declining phase in what is historically an 
oscillating price cycle. Prices will eventually rise again unless sufficiently disruptive 
technological innovations emerge and are widely disseminated to alter longer-term patterns. 
The zero-sum worldview that is often promoted by those who “securitise oil supply” issues 
would likely return with a vengeance when and if oil prices rise again. 
 
1. Discerning a Puzzle 
Even the dominant academic literature on state intervention in oil supply has 
clustered around periods of high oil prices: between the mid-1970s and early 1980s, and 
again between 2008 and 2013.1 The global “oil gut” that ended in the early 2000s prompted 
the establishment of an international oil pricing regime and the exchanges of this vital 
commodity that are more transparent and supply-and-demand driven than in previous eras. 
Over the past four decades, we have seen the exponential growth in the volume and 
sophistication in international oil trading.2 The oil sectors in many advanced industrialised 
nations have also by and large been liberalised and deregulated.3  
The Asia-Pacific has been consuming the biggest share of oil among all the 
regions in the world since around 2007.4 Yet the pace of oil sector liberalisation appears to 
                                                          
1 Llewelyn Hughes and Phillip Y. Lipscy, “The Politics of Energy,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 16 (2013), 453. 
2 The trading volume of the Intercontinental Exchange, one of the three major international exchanges 
of oil, for example, grew more than 65 times between 1995 and 2016 alone. Data for the calculation 
is from “Historical Monthly Volumes – ICE Futures Europe,” ICE Report Center. Accessed 2 March 
2017, https://www.theice.com/marketdata/reports/7.  
3 Llewelyn Hughes, Globalizing Oil: Firms and Oil Market Governance in France, Japan, and the 
United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
4 This is based on the data of various years of The BP Statistical Review of World Energy. If we 
adhere strictly to BP’s definition of regions, “Asia Pacific” first surpassed “North America” as the 
region that consumed the biggest share of oil in the world in 2006 (29.5% versus 28.9% respectively). 
If we exclude Australia and New Zealand from the calculation as part of “Asia Pacific,” the rest of 
the region surpassed the oil consumption share of North America around 2007. Both the Asia-Pacific-
minus-Oceania region and North America consumed 28.7% of the world total that year. 
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be slower in the Asia-Pacific as a whole. However, there have been obvious variations in 
this region relative to how much the governments of individual net oil importing Asian 
economies have intervened in the oil supply to their respective economies. Besides, some 
economies appeared to adopt different levels of interventionist measures at different periods 
of time. This simultaneous existence of thriving international oil markets and continued but 
varying degrees of state intervention in the oil sectors present the puzzling phenomenon this 
thesis endeavours to understand and explain. As further discussed in the literature review 
section in Chapter Two, neither studies based on the neoliberal economic approach nor those 
on the Realist or geopolitical perspective satisfactorily explain these empirical observations. 
The state or any government in fact is not so much an antithetical institution to 
the market as playing an instituting and maintenance role to it. In addition, the state can also 
make “affirmative use of market instrument,” meaning changing the more “market-
displacing” status quo to one more closely adhering to those commonly understood as free 
market principles. Strictly speaking, therefore, state intervention in oil supply may be 
concordant with letting the open international oil markets supply and the domestic market 
system distribute the oil needed in the economy in an unfettered manner. That is why the 
term used in the research questions generated by the puzzle discussed here is “strategic oil 
supply measures” instead, which excludes any affirmative use of market instruments by the 
state or the government.5 Nonetheless, similar to many other studies on the politics of oil, 
this study often uses the term “state intervention” as a shorthand for market-displacing 
measures adopted by the state. 
 
2. The Scope of this Study 
The puzzling behaviour of the government of a net oil importing economies 
continuing to adopt varying levels of strategic oil supply measures simultaneously with 
fully-functioning oil markets, at least internationally, has not been confined to polities in the 
Asia-Pacific region.6 The Asia-Pacific, however, appears to have a high concentration of 
                                                          
5 For a detailed discussion of the concept of strategic oil supply measures, see Section Two in Chapter 
Two of this thesis. The term “affirmative use of market instrument” is used by G. John Ikenberry in 
“The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in the 1970s,” International 
Organization, 40-1 (1986): 132. An example of such usage is in the article is the decontrol of oil 
prices in the United States in the early 1980s (132-133). The term “market-displacing” is used in 
Richard J. Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and 
Historical Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 13, 17. 
6 The United States, for example, maintains a strategic petroleum reserve that held the equivalent of 
about 137 days of oil it imported as of 2014. See “SPR Quick Facts and FAQs,” U.S. Department of 
Energy website, accessed 1 August 2015, http://energy.gov/fe/services/petroleum-reserves/strategic-
petroleum-reserve/spr-quick-facts-and-faqs. It also only lifted a four-decade ban on the export of oil 
and gas in December 2015. See “America Lifts its ban on oil exports,” The Economist, December 18 
2015. Accessed 11 November 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-
economics/21684531-light-sweet-compromise-puts-end-crude-market-distortions-america-lifts. 
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states that adopt various types and levels of such measures. China, India, and numerous 
other polities in the region, for example, have NOCs, even if these companies’ standing in 
their respective economies’ oil supply differs greatly. In addition, price control of some oil 
products was still common in the region as of 2013, the last year of the most recent price-
rising cycle.7  
More centrally, four of the world’s top five crude oil importers have been 
countries in this region in recent years: China, India, Japan, and South Korea.8 Since April 
2015, China has overtaken the United States as the world’s top crude oil importing country.9 
Nations that are not members of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in Asia, most prominently China and India, will account for more 
than three-quarters of the net global increase in oil demand by 2030.10 Indonesia, the fourth 
most populous country in the world, will also be integral to this exponential increase.11 It 
switched from being the only member of the Organisation of Petroleum Export Countries 
(OPEC) in the Asia-Pacific to a net oil importer in 2004.12 The emergence of heavyweight 
Asian energy consumers and related issues such as climate change and energy poverty, have 
begun and will continue to create seismic shifts in the energy policy agenda and governance 
pattern in the world.13  
Exactly how this shift will unfold and what the implications are remain unclear. 
Due to the increasing oil self-sufficiency in the United States caused by the “shale 
revolution,”14 and the either higher population or economic growth rates in major Asian 
                                                          
7 The Indian government, for example, only decontrolled the price of diesel at the end of 2014. The 
price of kerosene is still under control, but has been allowed to track more closely with pricing in the 
open market. See Saurabh Chaturvedi and Prasanta Sahu, “India Frees Diesel Prices From 
Government Control,” The Wall Street Journal, 20 October 2014, accessed 15 August 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/india-frees-diesel-prices-from-government-control-1413648469 and 
“Govt allows oil companies to raise kerosene price by 25p/month,” The Indian Express 13 July 2016. 
Accessed 1 March 2017, 
 http://indianexpress.com/article/business/commodities/govt-allows-oil-companies-to-raise-
kerosene-price-by-25pmonth-2911699/.  
8 “Country Comparison: Crude Oil – Imports,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency website, accessed 
3 July 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2243rank.html.  
9 Kevin McSpadden, “China Has Become the World’s Biggest Crude Oil Importer for the First Time,” 
Time, 10 May 2015. Accessed 4 February 2016, http://time.com/3853451/china-crude-oil-top-
importer/.  
10 Mark Finley, “The Oil Market to 2030—Implications for Investment and Policy,” Economic of 
Energy & Environment Policy (Vol. 1, No. 1) 2012: 29, 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-review/The_Oil_Market_2030.pdf. 
11 “Countries/Indonesia – Overview,” The World Bank, last updated 22 September 2016. Accessed 
1 March 2017, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/overview.  
12  Donald I. Hertzmark, “Pertamina – Indonesia’s State-Owned Oil Company,” Joint Baker 
Institute/Japan Petroleum Energy Center Policy Report (March 2007), 2-3.  
13 Andreas Goldthau, "From the State to the Market and Back: Policy Implications of Changing 
Energy Paradigms," Global Policy, 3:2 (May 2012), 198-210. 
14 “The U.S. Shale Revolution,” University of Texas at Austin website. Accessed 1 March 2017, 
https://www.strausscenter.org/energy-and-security/the-u-s-shale-revolution.html.  
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countries, the centre of gravity of oil consumption politics is re-orienting from the United 
States and Europe toward Asia in the 21st century. This shift continues in spite of the falling 
oil prices in the last two to three years as oil producing countries have been even more eager 
to maintain their market shares in this region with still growing, if slowing, demands.15 The 
unusual month-long tour of the Saudi King in the Asia-Pacific in early 2017 is emblematic 
of this continuing shift.16 
The temporal scope of this study (1994 to 2013) is determined by two key factors. 
First, although spot trading in crude oil began in the early 1980s, it took almost a decade for 
it to become really widespread or in one commentator’s word, “truly viable.”17 Second, 
these two decades saw big swings in oil prices from the low of US$12.21 to the high of 
US$109.08 per barrel at the dollar value of 2013.18 This provides the opportunity to observe 
any impact oil prices may have on the levels of strategic oil supply measures adopted by net 
oil importing economies over time. 
 
3. Research Questions 
With the geographic and temporal scope of this study designated, the following 
two major research questions of this thesis can be identified:  
 (1)  What explains variations in the levels of strategic oil supply measures 
adopted by Asian net oil importing economies between 1994 and 2013; and  
 (2)  What explains the adoption of a high level of such measures by at least 
some of these economies during this period? 
Quantitative researchers who engage in regression analysis may query the validity 
of designating a geographic scope that exhibits a concentration of the presence of the 
dependent variable (DV) of the research questions: adoption of strategic oil supply measures 
                                                          
15 Of the major net oil importing regions of the world, only the Asia-Pacific maintained slight 
increases in both crude oil and oil product imports as percentages of the global total from 2014 to 
2015. The U.S. imported over 2% less crude and its product import remained the same over the same 
period; Europe’s crude import increased about 1% while its product import dropped very slightly. 
Data of the calculation is from BP Statistical Review of World Energy June  2016, 19. BP website, 
accessed 1 December 2016, 
 https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2016/bp-statistical-
review-of-world-energy-2016-full-report.pdf.  
16 For an analysis of the implications of the tour, see Ankit Panda, “What King Salman seeks in Asia,” 
Al Jazeera website, 1 March 2017. Accessed 12 March 2017, 
 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/02/saudi-king-salman-seeks-asia-
170228095334605.html.  
17 Izabella Kaminska, “The Decline of the Oil Spot Market?” FT Alphaville, 24 April 2013, accessed 
2 July 2014, http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/04/24/1469422/the-decline-of-the-oil-spot-market/. 
18 BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014, 15. The prices quoted are for Dubai dated, the 
major reference crude for physical deliveries to Asia refineries. 
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by net oil importing states.19 I respond by clarifying that although this study endorses the 
view that a generalised theory to explain interventionist measures in the oil sectors adopted 
by the government of net oil importing economies will eventually materialise, a case-
oriented approach is privileged here. In addition, the first research question already 
presumes that the DV encompasses a range of possibilities among the cases. Yet, it does not 
assign bias towards any particular level. 
The deductive model put forward in this thesis to answer these research questions 
is based on set-theoretic methods and logic in social science, not on probability or regression 
analysis.20 For research that is predicated on such tools as set theoretic methods or process-
tracing, selecting cases on the DV is not only acceptable, but is in fact expected.21  
 
4. Answering the Puzzle 
The vulnerability-interaction model posits that net oil importing economies are 
motivated to adopt strategic oil supply measures because they have a noticeable level of oil 
vulnerability (OV). The actual level of these measures that any such economy adopts at any 
given time, however, is the result of the interaction of three intervening factors: (1) its 
decision-makers’ trust in the oil markets; (2) the overall implementation capability of the 
economy; and (3) the overall strength of private capital in the economy during the same 
period. The levels of all the variables of the model may change both across economies and 
over time.  
This model further hypothesises that if all other things remain equal, the DV 
would be higher if: (1) there is higher OV; or (2) a lower level of trust that oil markets can 
provide adequate, reliable, and affordable supply of oil to the economy; or (3) a higher 
overall capability to implement the measures; or (4) private capital overall is stronger than 
state/government capital in the economy.  
The vulnerability-interaction model specifies four pathways that would lead to the 
adoption of specific levels of strategic oil supply measures upon interaction of specific levels 
of the four explanatory variables at this stage:  
(1) Low OV, high trust, low capability, and high-strength private capital would 
lead to the adoption of a low level of strategic oil supply measures (low DV); 
(2) High OV, low trust, high capability, and low-strength private capital would 
lead to the adoption of a high level of such measures (high DV);  
                                                          
19 This objection has been raised by a number of IPE and IR methodologists. See for example, Gary 
King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 129-132. 
20 For a discussion of the difference between these two very different approaches, see Gary Goertz 
and James Mahoney, A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social 
Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), Chapter 1 - Introduction, Kindle edition. 
21 Ibid., Chapter 14 – Case Selection and Hypothesis Testing. 
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(3) High OV, medium trust, high capability, and high-strength private capital 
would lead to the adoption of a high level of such measures (high DV); and  
(4) Noticeable OV, NOT high trust, high capability, and NOT high-strength 
private capital would also lead to the adoption of a high level of such measures 
(high DV). 
 
5. The Study’s Roadmap 
Chapter Two of this thesis details the reasoning and formulation processes 
underlying the vulnerability-interaction model, explains the niche it occupies among 
existing literature in the politics of oil consumption, and maps out the empirical strategy to 
test the model. Chapter Three presents a plausibility probe of the entire model because it has 
not been tested elsewhere. This preliminary study establishes the validity of various 
dimensions of the model and provides initial results for the selection of appropriate cases 
for more in-depth case-study investigation of the model in Chapters Four and Five. These 
preliminary results support the validity of the vulnerability-interaction model. It compares 
well overall to the major alternative explanation of the adoption of interventionist oil supply 
measures – that of the Realist/geopolitical approach. Chapter Four compares the cases of 
India and Thailand and China and India with 2013 data; Chapter Five examines Taiwan’s 
path to the adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply measures. Chapter Six concludes 
with a brief assessment of the vulnerability-interaction model’s overall validity and 
theoretical insights gleaned from the empirical data used to test and refine the model.     
 
6. Contributions     
This thesis makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of the 
politics of oil consumption, and the two types of contributions reinforce each other. First, it 
puts forward a model to explain why Asian net oil importing polities as a whole continued 
to adopt strategic oil supply measures in two recent decades while simultaneously using the 
markets to supply oil to their economies to different degrees. It also hypothesises the 
combinations of factors that would result in the adoption of a high level of these measures, 
the most puzzling behaviour against the backdrop of thriving international trade of oil.  
Second, state mandated, administered, or funded oil supply measures across the 
whole region have rarely been systematically examined, and so have not been adequately 
theorised. Existing theories that underpin studies on the international politics of oil tend to 
be structural or economic in nature. Decisions to adopt strategic oil supply measures by net 
importing states involve complex domestic and external economic and political 
considerations, and have not been well explained by sweeping grand theories. The 
vulnerability-interaction model provides an initial but more specific framework to 
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understand actual events and their implications. The typologies developed in this study can 
potentially expand the model’s applicability to a larger scope with further research.  
Finally, the data gathered in the nine-economy plausibility probe add breadth to 
the knowledge in strategic oil supply measures adopted by net oil importing economies in 
the region, and in major factors that would lead to their adoption. Two important strategic 
oil supply measures are used to uniformly gauge the DV of all nine economies. This 
facilitates meaningful comparison and interpretation, and contributes to the systematic 
accumulation of empirical evidence of state actions related to oil supply. China has been the 
focus of attention of studies on state intervention in oil supply in the last decade. India, Japan, 
and South Korea have made “occasional appearances,” but not much has been known about 
the oil supply measures of other major Asian net importing polities and how they have 
evolved over time. A model that examines the facts as they were, not what they should have 
been, across the region is the first step in providing solid policy recommendations in subjects 
ranging from oil sector governance, climate change mitigation, poverty alleviation and 
economic development, as well as traditional security politics in the Asia-Pacific and 
beyond. 
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Chapter Two 
Theorising State Intervention in Oil Supply 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
Some net oil importing states continue to play a relatively large role in the oil 
supply of their economies despite the increasing sophistication and trading volume in the 
international oil markets and the general global trend of oil market deregulation and 
liberalisation over the last three decades. Indeed, the level and nature of state intervention 
appear to vary both across economies and over time. This chapter develops a model to 
answer the two major research questions of this thesis, derived from the apparent puzzle 
posed by these trends: (1) What explains variations in the levels of strategic oil supply 
measures adopted by Asian net oil importing economies between 1994 and 2013; and (2) 
what explains the adoption of a high level of such measures by at least some of those 
economies during this period?  
In the rest of the chapter, I will first explain the set-theoretic methods that 
underpin the deductive reasoning of the vulnerability-interaction model. I will then explicate 
the concepts and rationales behind strategic oil supply measures - the dependent variable 
(DV) of the proposed model, - and those of the explanatory variables. I then formally state 
the causal relationships among the variables and the hypotheses generated by the model. I 
also review the literature on oil importing states’ intervention in oil supply and pinpoint how 
this study relates to the existing literature. The chapter concludes by setting out an empirical 
strategy used to examine the validity of the hypotheses generated from the proposed model. 
 
1. Necessary, Sufficient, and INUS Causes 
The vulnerability-interaction model advanced in this study is formulated 
according to the qualitative logic behind set-theoretic methods, and with the help of 
typological techniques.1 As shown in subsequent chapters, however, many, but not all, the 
data used to substantiate the claims of the model and the tools used to analyse them is 
quantitative.  
In set-theoretic methods of social sciences, a necessary cause or condition is one 
that must be present when an outcome is present.2 An example of this is not having the 
                                                          
1 For a brief comparison between the causal models based on the frequentist logic and on set-theoretic 
ideas, see Gary Goertz and James Mahoney, A Tale of Two Cultures – Qualitative and Quantitative 
Research in the Social Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 55 – 60. For an 
introduction to explanatory typological techniques employed in this project, see Colin Elman 
“Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics,” International Organization 
59 (2005): 293-326. 
2  Carsten Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3.2.1.1, Kindle Edition.  
10 
 
citizenship of a state is a necessary condition for being deported from it. A sufficient cause 
or condition is one that is enough to cause the outcome (Y), but is not necessarily present 
when Y is present. This is due to equifinality, meaning the existence of “many alternative 
causal paths to the same outcome.”3 An example of a sufficient cause for being sentenced 
to imprisonment is being convicted for robbing a bank. People serve time in prison for a 
myriad of other causes, and robbing a bank is one of them.  
Few, if any, social phenomena can be fully explained by either a necessary or 
sufficient cause alone. Therefore, methodologists have derived at least two more types of 
set theoretic causes that are more often used in social science research.4 The one applied in 
this thesis is the INUS cause. ‘INUS’ is an acronym derived from a quote by J.L. Mackie 
that explains the term as “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself 
unnecessary but sufficient for the result.”5 James Mahoney gave the following example of 
an INUS cause:6  
 A building can burn down (Y1) either because of a short circuit (A1) combined 
with wooden framing (B1) or because of a gasoline can (C1) combined with a 
furnace (D1). 
 
In this example, Y1 can be caused by either A1 and B1 or C1 and D1. Each group 
is an INUS cause of Y1 as neither A1 nor B1 can sufficiently cause a building to burn down 
by itself, but both must be present (necessary) to do so. At the same time, either group is 
sufficient but not necessary to cause the outcome.  
 
2. Strategic Oil Supply Measures 
The level of strategic oil supply measures adopted is the DV of the vulnerability-
interaction model proposed in this thesis. These measures are defined as those mandated, 
administered, or funded by the government that may have a direct effect on the oil supply 
to the economy. They may include state-to-state and state-to-other-entity military, political, 
diplomatic, as well as economic policies. Opaque arrangements made between the Chinese 
state or companies owned by or closely connected with the state and major oil producing or 
transiting nations or their national oil companies NOCs under the auspice of the “One Belt, 
One Road” initiative [一带一路] are examples of strategic oil supply measures.7 
                                                          
3 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 9. 
4 James Mahoney, “Toward a Unified Theory of Causality,” Comparative Political Studies 42:4/5 
(2008), 417-418.  
5 Ibid., 418. 
6 Ibid. 
7 For an example of such arrangements, see Elena Mazneva, Stephen Bierman, and Javier Blas, 
“China Deepens Oil Ties With Russia in $9 Billion Rosneft Deal,” Bloomberg Market, last updated 
September 8, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-08/china-s-cefc-buys-stake-
in-rosneft-from-glencore-and-qatar.  
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The concept of strategic oil supply measures is inextricably linked with the role of 
the government in the economy, particularly within the oil sector of net oil importing 
economies. Therefore, understanding what those roles are is a pre-requisite to understanding 
what is counted as such a measure in this study.  
After the end of the Cold War, almost all polities in the world have a mixed 
economy. A “mixed economy” is defined in this study as one that has “both a private and a 
public sector, linked through the operation of markets.”8 This means the state does play 
some role in the provision of goods and services in most economies.9 Four major roles of 
the state are conceptualised in this study, in ascending levels of direct involvement in a 
sector or industry concerned: facilitator, regulator, investor, and direct provider.10 
Using the oil sector and oil supply as an example, all net oil importing states 
facilitate oil supply to their economies by setting up a legal framework and by enforcing 
signed contracts between parties. Many others also build transportation infrastructure for oil 
and oil products to be moved around the country. Tax incentives to stimulate investments in 
the oil sector are also considered manifesting the facilitative, not the regulatory, role of the 
state because these incentives ultimately rely on the willingness of private firms to achieve 
the goals. As regulators, some governments, such as South Korea, mandate the minimum 
amount of oil stock private or public oil firms operating in their economies must have. 
Others, such as China, stipulate which companies are authorised to import crude oil and oil 
products. Environmental laws that may cause an increase or decrease in oil production in 
importing economies that still have indigenous resources are not considered in this study. 
This is because these laws usually have only second-order and indirect effects on oil supply.  
                                                          
8 Michael T. Peddle, Does Government Need to Be Involved in Primary and Secondary Education: 
Evaluating Policy Options Using Market Role Assessment (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000), 8.  
9 The most common example, as Peddle suggests (ibid.) is primary and secondary education. This 
may be understood as “merit goods” which are provided by both the government and the private 
sectors in most economies. For discussions on the definition, rationales, and impact of public 
provision of merit goods, see Riccardo Fiorito and Tryphon Kollintzas, “Public goods, merit goods, 
and the relation between private and government consumption,” European Economic Review 48 
(2004), 1367-1398; John G. Head, “On Merit Goods,” FinanzArchiv, New Series, Bd. 25, H. 1 (1966), 
1-29; and see James M. Poterba, “Government Intervention in Markets for Education and Health 
Care: How and Why?” in Individual and Social Responsibility: Child Care, Education, Medical Care, 
and Long-Term Care in America, ed. Victor R. Fuchs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 
285. 
10 Peddle (ibid.) suggests three major functions of the government in a mixed economy: establishment 
and enforcement of a legal framework; adjust market outcome for collective notion of fairness; and 
mitigate market failures. John Zsyman suggests the three roles of the state in economic policymaking 
as regulator, administrator, and player. See Government, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems 
and the Politics Industrial Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 75-78. Ikenberry uses 
the facilitator, negotiator, and producer roles of the state to describe what he sees as increasingly 
interventionist energy adjustment strategies of the United States, Japan/Germany, and France 
respectively during the oil crises of the 1970s (The “Irony” of State Strength,” 112). The four roles 
in this study are adapted from all these works.  
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As investors, some governments fund, own shares, or oversee NOCs with a 
mandate to produce or acquire oil for their economies, including many in the Asia-Pacific. 
Some sovereign wealth funds, including those operating in China and Singapore, also invest 
in oil and other energy firms or projects. The mandate and mechanism to supply the oil 
produced from these funds to the home countries, however, is unclear in many cases and so 
their participation is not counted as a strategic supply measure in this study. As direct 
providers, government ministries, occasionally sign contracts with counterparts in oil 
exporting states to supply oil to their economies directly. Some governments also administer 
strategic petroleum reserves (SPRs) either directly through a government agency or through 
their NOCs. The vulnerability-interaction model only takes into consideration the regulator, 
investor, and direct provider roles, but not the facilitator role of the state in evaluating its 
degree of intervention in the oil sector. This last role only has an indirect and diffuse impact 
on the economy’s oil supply. Besides, even economies most observers would consider as 
adhering to free-market principles to a very high degree play the role of the facilitator. 
The basic unit of analysis of this study is the state, personified by national level 
decision-makers in net oil importing economies. The national governments of net oil 
importing economies are seen as occupying a position in the international economic system 
that would generate similar preferences on how to realise the major goal of their oil policies: 
ensuring oil supply security, which is perceived to be vital to the wellbeing and survival of 
the economy. The different roles played by the state, however, also bring forth other actors 
that may also have a direct impact on national oil policies and the different levels of analysis 
of this study. Analysing a state’s regulator role involves examining state-to-firm interactions, 
and these interactions would only be domestic.  
The investor role of the state also involves state to firm interaction. The state has 
a principal-agent relationship with publicly-owned and/or administered firms, which are 
competitors of private oil firms. When NOCs engage in oil projects, they may interact with 
domestic and overseas public entities, private firms, and foreign governments. Therefore, 
these interactions can be both domestic and international in nature. This is especially true if 
the NOC(s) pursue exploration and production or other oil related projects overseas. 
Moreover, when the state acts as a direct provider of oil, it would have both state- to-state 
and state-to-firm interactions. Last, but not least, all these actors have to interact with the 
diffuse, uncoordinated, yet powerful transnational forces of the international oil markets. 
The relationship between the state and its NOC(s) is the subject of a number of 
studies in recent years due partly to the increasing prominence of some NOCs internationally. 
These studies mostly adopt a principal-agent framework to understand this relationship and 
highlight the simultaneous mutual support and tension between the two, as well as their 
sometimes divergent motivations. In short, the state and its NOCs are treated as separate 
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units of analysis. While acknowledging the valuable insights provided by these studies, this 
thesis treats oil supply-related actions by both the state and its NOCs as strategic oil supply 
measures. After all, the state is the principal actor and it ultimately decides to keep the agent 
(in this instance, NOCs) and the proportion of control over it, instead of letting the private 
sector freely handle the supply of this particular commodity. A key objective of this study 
is to investigate what causes this outcome as manifested by the actual level of these actions 
(strategic oil supply measures) taken by both principals and agents. 
A related point about government roles in the provision of goods and services is 
that the state and the market are not necessarily diametrically opposing concepts. To begin 
with, the state is understood as the institutor and maintainer of any domestic market. Even 
“international markets” abide by the rules and regulations, if not norms, in countries where 
they are physically located. 11  How “market-oriented” a particular strategic oil supply 
measure is has to be judged by the extent to which it permits, distorts, or promotes the 
functioning of a pricing mechanism based on demand and supply, and open and fair 
competition. Richard J. Samuels, for example, labels the two major categories of state 
intervention in the energy sectors as “market-displacing” and “market-conforming.”12 The 
former obviously is less “market-oriented” or more distorting than the latter. As further 
discussed in subsequent chapters, strategic oil supply measures creating varying degrees of 
market distortion are taken into consideration in this project. 
To sum up, the proposed vulnerability-interaction model tries to explain 
variations of the levels of measures adopted by net oil importing states that have a direct 
impact on their economies’ oil supply, especially in the Asia Pacific, over the last two 
decades. It also hypothesises pathways that would lead to the adoption of a high level of 
such measures. It does not, however, try to evaluate the effectiveness of these measures in 
achieving oil supply security. That said, this study does make the assumption that a price 
mechanism that is based on supply and demand fundamentals and free and open markets for 
oil, both domestic and international, would on average achieve the best economic efficiency, 
especially over the long run.13 Otherwise, the puzzle of this thesis would not be puzzling 
any more.  
 
                                                          
11 This is at least the Polanyian understanding of the market. For a discussion of the Polanyian and 
the very different Schumpeteran understanding of what the market is and a synthesised understanding 
of the two, see Harvey and Metcalf, “The Ordering of Change: Polanyi, Schumpeter and the Nature 
of The Market Mechanism,” CRIC Discussion Paper 70, March 2005. 
12 The Business of the Japanese State, 13. 
13 Even if such a pricing mechanism may not exist perfectly in the real world yet. For a critique of 
the current “market-related” pricing regime in the international oil markets and how it appears to be 
still some way from this ideal, see Robert Mabro, “The International Oil Price Regime – Origins, 
Rationale and Assessment,” The Journal of Energy Literature, Volume XI, No. 1 (June 2005): 3-20. 
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3. Explanatory Variables 
 The vulnerability-interaction model has two layers, each targeting one research 
question in this project. The first is designed to answer the first research question, which 
seeks to explain the variations in the levels of strategic oil supply measures adopted in 
different net oil importing economies and the same economy at different periods. The 
second layer tries to understand the major causes for some net oil importing economies to 
adopt a high level of these measures. 
 The model specifies four explanatory variables: 1) oil vulnerability (OV); 2) the 
level of decision-makers’ trust that oil markets can supply reliable and affordable oil to the 
economy; 3) the economy’s overall implementation capability of strategic supply measures; 
and 4) the overall strength of private capital versus that of state capital in the economy. 
These variables are initially chosen through observations of measures adopted by various 
net oil importing economies as well as through deductive reasoning.  
 OV is conceptualised as the variable that initiates the desire to adopt strategic 
supply measures and therefore is the independent variable (IV) of the model. The actual 
level of strategic oil supply measures adopted or not adopted - the DV of the model under 
consideration here - would be the result of the interaction among these four factors. No 
hierarchy of importance of the four explanatory variables is assigned in the first layer of the 
model as it tries to explain the adoption of different levels of the DV. As detailed in Section 
4 below, the model specifies the results of the interaction of these variables in four cases by 
applying set theoretic methods and typologising techniques.    
 In the second layer of the model, not having a high level of trust in the oil market 
and having a high implementation capability are initially theorised as a priori conditions to 
adopting a high level of strategic oil supply measures. In this sense, these two explanatory 
variables at the level specified are privileged as being more important in causing the 
adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply measures than the other two variables. As 
detailed in the concluding chapter, after the testing of the model with empirical data 
presented in this thesis, trust in the oil market appears to have a greater impact than 
implementation capability on the adoption of strategic oil supply measures, especially at a 
high level.  
 The rest of this section explains these four explanatory variables in greater details 
one by one, justifies their selection over other possible contenders, and specifies their 
theorised relationships with the adoption of strategic oil measures. Factors affecting the level 
of strategic oil supply measures adopted by net oil importing economies other than the four 
advanced by the vulnerability-interaction model likely exist. The proposed model only 
argues that the hypothesised explanatory variables are among the most important sufficient 
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and necessary causes to the DV and they provide a systematic framework to understand this 
study’s designated research questions.14  
 
3.1  Oil Vulnerability 
The vulnerability-interaction model conceptualises OV as a sufficient but not 
necessary condition that motivates the desire to adopt or continuing to adopt strategic oil 
supply measures.15  This does not mean that OV by itself is a sufficient cause for the actual 
adoption of such measures. It is argued here that the desire to adopt these measures is 
conditioned by the three major factors listed in the previous sub-section. If all other factors 
remain equal, the proposed model hypothesized that the higher a net oil importing’s 
economy’s OV is, the greater its desire to adopt strategic oil supply measures would be.  
What constitutes OV and what is the reasoning behind such a conceptualisation? 
In line with this study’s focus on measures adopted by the state to ensure oil supply security, 
OV is used in this model to mean ‘oil supply vulnerability.’16 Parallel to the two key 
components of oil supply security, physical availability and affordability, the components 
of OV formulated in this model are supply risks and market risks. “Supply risks” mean the 
likelihood that a country’s oil supply would not be physically available at any given time. 
“Market risks” mean the likelihood that the prices and the costs associated with oil imports 
become unaffordable to an economy.  
Details of how OV is operationalised and measured will be provided in later 
chapters. It suffices to note here that since market risk is only one of the two components of 
OV, the fact that all economies in the same region pay more or less the same per barrel price 
for imported crude does not mean all have the same OV during the same period. For instance, 
different geographical locations, even within the same region, may cause noticeable 
differences in the risk of interruption of physical supply of oil over a relatively short period 
of time.17 Besides, the same price in absolute terms is not the same cost to all economies. 
There is a large body of literature that endeavours to measure OV, most encompass the 
concepts of the two types of risks adopted in this study even if the terminologies used may 
not be exactly the same.18  
                                                          
14 For a discussion of the trivialness of sufficient and necessary causes, see Goertz and Mahoney, A 
Tale of Two Cultures. (“Assessing Importance: Coverage and Trivialness” Kindle version).  
15 It is sufficient, but not necessary because some states, for example, may want to adopt strategic oil 
supply measures purely for political or other reasons. 
16 This dissertation adopts the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) definition of energy security as 
“the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.” See IEA website, accessed 
1July 2014, http://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/.  This is extended to define oil security to mean 
oil supply security - the uninterrupted supply of crude oil and oil products at an affordable price. 
17 Oil from the Middle East, a major common source of supply to Asia, for example, does not need 
to go through the chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca to get to India. 
18 See for example, European Commission, Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy 
Supply Green Paper COM(2000) 769.  Accessed 10 August 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
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A noticeable level of OV is theorised as a sufficient but not necessary condition 
that motivates net oil importing states to adopt strategic oil supply measures because of the 
continued importance of oil security to any economy. In spite of concerted efforts to develop 
diverse sources of energy after the oil crises of the 1970s, oil remains the most important 
primary energy source of the world, and the second most important one in the Asia Pacific, 
after coal. In 2013, it accounted for about 27.5% of the total primary energy consumed in 
the Asia Pacific,19 and is projected to remain the most used primary energy source in the 
world in 2035, even under the most optimistic scenario.20  
The transportation sector is heavily dependent on oil with no mass-scale substitute 
fuel for passenger cars or trucks in sight. This sector accounts for over half of global oil 
consumption.21 The expected high growth in the number of these vehicles with the rise of 
the middle class, particularly in China and other countries in Asia that are not members of 
the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), is likely to further 
exacerbate the problem. This no doubt contributes to the low price and income demand 
elasticities on oil.22 The almost exclusive status of oil to enable rapid mobility has made it 
the lifeblood of military operations since World War I. Although the contemporary period 
is supposed to be the most peaceful in human history,23 states do not appear to have relaxed 
their military preparedness, including those in the Asia Pacific region.24  
While the impact of oil price volatility on an economy is less clear, the adverse 
effect would be more pronounced in poorer countries and those with higher oil intensities, 
both elements are formulated in the calculation of OV in this study. 25  Therefore, the 
                                                          
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0769 and Robert Bacon and Masami Kojima, “Oil Price 
Risks,” Public Policy Journal 320 (June 2008), accessed 15 August 2015, 
http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/zhang/Energy/World%20Bank%20-%2017%20June%202008.pdf. 
In her study “Oil Vulnerability Index of Oil-Importing Countries,” Energy Policy 36 (2008): 1197, 
Eshita Gupta devises a composite OV index taking into account supply risks and market risks, as well 
as environmental risks. 
19 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2014, 41. 
20 International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2011 (Paris: IEA, 2011), 71. 
21 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2012 (Paris: IEA, 2011), 4. 
22 One study puts the long-term price and income demand elasticities on oil for OECD countries as -
0.6 and 0.55 respectively, and those for non-OECD countries as -0.18 and 0.53 respectively. See 
Dermot Gately and Hillard G. Huntington, “The Asymmetric Effects of Changes in Price and Income 
on Energy and Oil Demand,” The Energy Journal 23-1 (2002), 52. 
23 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. (London: Penguin 
Books, 2012). 
24 Five polities in the Asia-Pacific are among the top 10 recipients of arms transfer in the developing 
world between 1998 and 2005: India, China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Pakistan. See Bruce Vaughn, 
“U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region” CRS Report for Congress 
January 22, 2007, 3. 
25 One estimate suggests that a 10% increase in crude oil prices will cause the gross domestic product 
to lower by 0.2 to 0.5 % after six quarters. The economic impact of oil price volatility also seems to 
vary according to the speed of the price change and the background macroeconomic environment at 
the time of price change. See Hillard G. Huntington, “The Oil Security Problem,” Stanford University 
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uninterrupted supply of oil at an affordable price has substantial economic as well as military 
utility and hence national security significance. It follows that a reliable oil supply is also 
politically important to any state, regardless of its regime type.  
The vulnerability-interaction model argues that an uninterrupted supply of 
affordable oil is perceived to be so critical to the normal functioning of net importing 
economies and the survival of the state that a noticeable level of OV is sufficient to 
generating the desire for adopting some level of strategic oil supply measures. The higher a 
net oil importing’s economy’s OV, the greater its desire to adopt strategic oil supply 
measures would be, ceteris paribus. The actual level of these measures adopted, however, 
would be conditioned by intervening variables (ITVs). Whether and at what level such 
measures are ultimately adopted depends on the result of the interaction among the 
economy’s OV and all the proposed conditioning factors, which are examined in the 
following sub-sections.  
 
3.2  Trust in Oil Markets 
The first ITV that boosts or restrains a state’s desire to adopt strategic oil supply 
measures is the decision-makers of the polity’s trust that oil markets can adequately provide 
oil security to the economy. The overall level of this trust is theorised here to be negatively 
correlated to the DV. This means the higher the level of overall trust, the lower the level of 
strategic oil supply measures would be adopted if all other factors remain the same. It is 
further theorised that the absence of a high level of trust in the oil markets is an a priori 
(necessary but not sufficient) condition for the adoption of a high level of strategic oil 
measures by a net oil importing economy.  
There is no consensus on the definition of “trust” despite the increasing number 
of research on the topic in economics and international relations in the last two decades.26 
This project defines trust in the oil markets as states’ belief that the private sector operating 
freely through the existing international markets and a domestic market with minimal 
government participation is the most efficient, reliable and affordable way to ensure supply 
to the economy.  
                                                          
Energy Modelling Forum Working Paper, EMP OP 62 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, 
February 2008), 21-22. 
26 Some examples of the research involving trust include Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienaza, and Luigi 
Zingales, “Trusting the Stock Market,” The Journal of Finance Vol. LXIII, No. 6 (2008), 2557-2600; 
Todd H. Chiles and John F. McMackin, “Integrating Variable Risk Preferences, Trust, and 
Transaction Cost Economics,” The Academy of Management Review, 21-1 (Jan 1996), 73-99; 
Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2005); Ernst Fehr, “On the Economics and Biology of Trust,” Journal of European Economic 
Association, 7-2-3 (2009), 235-266.  
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This definition is based on the behavioural definition of trust, which incorporates 
belief with actions. This belief is manifested by a lack of state intervention in those markets 
and procedures.27 On the intertwining nature of trust as a belief and as behaviour, Ernst Fehr 
says: “If trust is a behaviour involving trusting acts, then it is shaped by our beliefs about 
others’ trustworthiness as well as our willingness to accept the risks involved in trusting 
acts.”28 The vulnerability-interaction model posits that trust in the oil markets has both 
“objective” and “subjective” components.29 Another way of understanding trust is that it 
embodies both behavior and belief, and the two may not be easily teased out in practice.30 
Although these two sets of concepts are only loosely related, both the behavior and belief 
and the objective and the subjective elements of trust appear to be mutually-reinforcing.31 
The situational precondition of when trust is even called for is the existence of risk or 
uncertainty. Paraphrasing Chiles and McMackin, without vulnerability to risk, “there is no 
need to trust.”32  
Since the existence of risks is the precondition of trust, it is worth examining the 
concept of risk preference.33 Risk preference refers to whether a party is risk averse, risk 
neutral, or risk-seeking. In neoclassical economics literature, “a party which is risk averse 
will always prefer a certain profit to the prospect of fluctuating profits.”34 Adopting this 
view, it is proposed in this study that a state is risk averse if its default position on oil supply 
prefers certainty in availability and price to the prospect of fluctuating availability and prices 
through the open market systems. A risk neutral state is, conversely, indifferent to a prospect 
of short-term uncertain oil availability and price, if the expected average of the prospective 
fluctuating availability and prices through the open market systems match in the long run 
oil availability and price through methods that provides greater certainty.35 Finally, a risk-
seeking state will always prefer fluctuating availability and prices if the expected average 
                                                          
27 Fehr: 238. 
28 Ibid. 
29 In the case of investing in the stock market, for example, the objective component is “risk-return 
trade-off given the existing data” and the subjective element is the “faith (trust) that the data in our 
possession are reliable and that the overall system is fair.” Guiso et al call these “characteristics” 
instead of components. See “Trusting the Stock Market,” 2557. 
30  Fehr, 236-238. Chiles and McMackin used the term “trust-like behaviour” to pinpoint the 
behavioural aspect of trust, 86. 
31 On this point, Zand, as quoted in Chiles and McMackin, “described a spiral reinforcement process, 
in which one’s inner state of trust (mistrust) becomes transformed into behaviour that is trusting 
(mistrusting).” 87.  
32 85. This precondition is also made clear in Guiso et al’s exposition of the objective and subjective 
characteristics of trust quoted in footnote 29. 
33 Fehr highlights risk as a major component of the behavioural definition of trust, 236-37. 
34 Chiles and McMackin: 81. 
35 This is based on Aoki’s explication of risk neutrality which reads, “… a risk neutral party is 
‘indifferent between a prospect of uncertain profits and a certain profit, provided that the expected 
average of prospective fluctuating profits is equal to the certain profit.” Ibid.  
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of these fluctuations via the open market system results in greater oil availability and lower 
prices than certainty in availability and price provided by other methods.36  
One subjective factor that is likely to affect decision-makers’ level of trust in the 
existing oil markets is their polity’s historical experiences with dominant market players, 
usually the hegemonic power(s) and their allies or close associates. Markets of different 
periods and products are organised with varying degrees of openness, transparency, and 
different price-setting mechanisms.37 Since hegemonic power(s) of successive periods are 
likely to be the creator, rule and agenda setter, and underwriter of major international 
economic systems, polities’ experiences in these markets would form the basis of decision-
makers’ current trust in what Guiso et al call “the fairness of the game.”38 
The history of the inextricable link between the hegemonic power(s) of the day 
and firms originated in those powers and the development of oil and the oil markets has 
been well chronicled by Daniel Yergin’s monograph The Prize.39 The various price-finding 
and determination mechanisms throughout the century of oil’s preeminence appear to reflect 
more closely the power relationships between the major players of different periods than the 
fundamentals of demand and supply.40 Even if the “market-related” pricing regime adopted 
since the mid-1980s is more open and transparent than previous ones, I argue that 
experiences and impressions from bygone eras would continue to impact on policymakers’ 
decision-making. This is because the hegemonic powers and many of their international oil 
companies (IOCs) that were closely linked to the various past pricing regimes are still active 
in the international oil markets, even if to different degrees of dominance and in different 
permutations.  
Another subjective component of trust in the oil markets is political entities’ 
cultural or ideological attitudes towards profit-making and the expected responsibilities of 
the government towards the underprivileged. I argue that these components would combine 
                                                          
36 Chiles and McMackin’s definition of risk-seeking reads: “A party that is risk seeking will always 
prefer a fluctuating profit to the prospect of certain profits, provided the expected average of the 
fluctuating profit is greater than the expected value of the certain profit.” Ibid. 
37 For an insightful examination of the changing nature of the market mechanism, see Harvey and 
Metcalf, “The Ordering of Change. It demonstrates two different theoretical interpretations of the 
changing organisations of the Covent Garden food market in the UK throughout its 800 years of 
existence.   
38 “Trusting the Stock Market,” 2557. This reasoning that the preconception of the fairness of the 
international oil markets would impact decision-makers’ overall trust in oil markets and hence affects 
the level of strategic oil supply measures adopted is partly developed from the Peter Gourevitch’s 
idea of the international sources of domestic politics. See “The Second Image Reversed: The 
International Sources of Domestic Politics.” International Organization, 32-4 (1978): 881-912. 
39 The Prize, (New York: Touchstone Book, 1993). For a more contemporary and concise study, see 
Paul Stevens, “The History of Oil,” POLINARES working paper n. 3 (September 2010). 
40 For studies on these various mechanisms, see Bassam Fattouch, “An Anatomy of the Crude Oil 
Pricing System,” WPM 40, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (January 2011) and Mabro, “The 
International Oil Price Regime.” 
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to form unique frames of reference of decision-makers in different polities in interpreting 
even the same “objective” facts about the existing international oil markets and the 
allocative efficacy or justice of open markets in general.41 In this sense, “trust” is still a form 
of rational calculations, but this rationality is bounded by the unique history, culture, and 
experiences of decision-makers of individual polities.42 
The focus of this project does not highlight the deep historical and cultural factors 
that affect the risk preferences and beliefs of decision-makers due to the immense task of 
convincingly operationalising and comparing them across political entities. Instead, to 
indirectly gauge states’ levels of trust in the oil markets, the vulnerability-interaction model 
applies loosely Thierry Balzacq’s “pragmatic” or “sociological” approach to 
securitisation.43 This approach sees successful securitisation as requiring more than just a 
“speech act” emphasised by the Copenhagen School. It also hinges on the status of the 
securitising agent and the external social contexts of the act.44  
In particular, the theoretical component to be applied here emphasises the 
presence and coherence of the securitising agent in the form of NOC(s) and the relevance 
of the context of the securitisation in the discourse on oil security.45 According to Balzacq, 
the capacity of securitising agents lies in their use of appropriate “words and cogent frames 
of reference in a given context, in order to win the support of the target audience for political 
purpose.” 46  The vulnerability-interaction model focuses on an internal context and an 
external context, relating to decision-makers’ trust in the efficacy of the domestic and the 
international oil market respectively. It hypothesised that the geographic evenness and the 
degree of economic development of a polity form the internal context affecting decision-
                                                          
41 This is similar to the concept of “determinants of risk preferences,” which include both “situational” 
and “constant” factors, such as problem framing, reference points (situational) and individual 
dispositions, national culture, and organizational cultural (constant).  See Chiles and McMackin: 81. 
42 For a discussion of how variants of rationalist models applied in studies in international relations 
and their critics, see Miles Kahler, “Rationality in international relations,” International Organization 
52-4 (Autumn 1998): 919-941. For how bounded rationality helps decision making in real life 
situations, see Gerd Giegerenzer and Daniel G. Goldstein, “Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: 
Models of Bounded Rationality,” Psychological Review 103-4 (1996): 650-669. For basic concepts 
of bounded rationality, see Herbert A. Simon, “Theories of Bounded Rationality,” in Models of 
Bounded Rationality, Volume 2 – Behavioral Economics and Business Organization (Cambridge: 
Mass: MIT Press, 1982), 408-423. 
43 See “Constructivism and securitization studies,” in The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies, 
ed.  Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer (New York: Routledge, 2010), 57. Balzacq also calls 
this the “strategic approach” to differentiate it from the “speech act view” of securitization of the 
Copenhagen School. See “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and 
Context,” European Journal of International Relations 11-2 (2005): 171-172, 192.  
44 Balzacq, “Constructivism and securitization studies,” 63. Also see “The Three Faces,” 173.  For 
the Copenhagen School’s emphasis of the speech act in securitization, see Holger Stritzel, “Towards 
a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” European Journal of International Relations, 
13-3 (Sep 2007): 360-361.  
45 The third factor Balzaq highlights is the audience. “The Three Faces,” 192.  
46 Ibid. 
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makers’ trust in adopting an unfettered oil market domestically. Given the historical role of 
the United States in establishing the international oil markets and its continued preeminence 
in it, the proposed model hypothesised polity’s relationship with the United States as the 
most important external context to decision-makers’ trust in the international oil markets.  
 
3.2.1 Securitising Agents 
The blurred line between facts and their interpretations in risk assessment and 
belief formation puts NOCs in a unique position to be the prime securitising agent in the 
discourse of oil security. Balzacq highlights the “power positions,” “social identity,” and the 
“capacity of the target audience, and…alternative voices within the relevant social field” as 
aspects impacting on agents’ persuasiveness.47 Once created, NOCs are likely to justify their 
continued existence, if not further expansion. In addition, they usually have a high 
concentration of technical and organisational expertise in oil supply issues, which endows 
their “security utterances” with apparent authority to both decision-makers and the public 
alike.48 Of course, NOC executives are not only people who may be motivated to securitise 
oil supply, as the “Unocal affair” in the United States has dramatically illustrated.49  
NOCs certainly have the motive as well as the status to do so. This does not mean 
that NOCs themselves have not been active participants and indeed beneficiaries of the 
existing international markets at some point since their establishment in the 1980s. Most 
NOCs of net oil importing economies without a liberalised domestic oil market likely have 
profited from the differences in prices between the international oil markets and their 
respective domestic market. 50  Another way they may have benefited is the de facto 
monopoly many of them enjoy in the domestic market. In general, the more controlled the 
domestic market is, the more NOCs would lose from it being liberalised, and hence the more 
reason for them to strategically securitise aspects of the international or domestic oil 
market.51 The particular aspects chosen for securitisation are likely the most pertinent to the 
contexts for their home countries and the most pivotal to their profitability or survivability 
or both.   
                                                          
47 “Constructivism and securitization studies,” 64. 
48 Ibid., 173. These are the audience of securitization, the third factor that may impact the effect of 
securitization in Balzacq’s earlier formulation (2005). In his later formulation (2010), he discusses 
more about the type of “heuristic artefacts” used as the third decisive factors. See Constructivism, 64. 
49 For a detailed examination of how China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation’s bid for Unocal Oil 
Company of California was securitised by American political elites such as representatives to the U.S. 
Congress with a securitisation approach, see Joanna Nyman, “’Red Storm Ahead’: Securitization of 
Energy in US-China Relations,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43-1 (2014): 43-64. 
50 This is especially true for countries still have substantial indigenous oil resources and when the 
international prices are much higher than domestic prices.  
51 This is no different from a private firm which has been operating in a monopolised and highly 
regulated market.  
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I argue here that even if the risk assessment and “facts” of the polity’s oil supply 
situations NOCs promote do not always amount to actual securitisation as understood in 
securitisation theories, these assessments and representations would at least be equivalent 
to powerful lobbying or politicisation.52 As such, they would still skew decision-makers’ 
trust level in oil markets. That is why I mention earlier this analysis only loosely adopts the 
pragmatic approach of securitisation. Following this line of reasoning, the presence of 
cohesive NOC(s) is theorised to be negatively correlated with the level of trust in the oil 
markets. 
 
3.2.2 Internal Context of Securitisation 
I argue that the evenness and degree of economic development of a political entity 
provides an important internal context NOCs may readily exploit in their 
securitising/lobbying effort. These two aspects can combine to affect decision-makers’ 
calculation of the risk of only relying on private firms and the market mechanism to supply 
oil to most customers at an affordable price in the domestic market. In a continental size 
country with a large rural and poor population, private oil firms would likely concentrate on 
supplying oil to the more profitable urban areas, thus leaving the majority of people 
underserved. This would have a negligible impact on economies that are more evenly 
developed and/or whose population mostly has reached a high standard of living and hence 
oil products only take up a relatively smaller percentage of their income. 
These supply security issues, of course, may be alleviated to a certain extent by 
measures such as oil or other energy credits for low-income residents, not to mention the 
development of renewable or other forms of energy sources. They can, however, also easily 
be framed by NOCs as an existential threat to a regime, especially one that rules over a 
polity with a strong expectation of the government as a provider of basic necessities. 
Intuitively, not attending to the basic needs of a large vulnerable population is conducive to 
electoral setbacks in democracies and unrest in non-democracies. NOCs can then justify 
their existence as providers of the required oil supply to this population. Framed in this way, 
decision-makers’ risk preference can easily be pushed from neutral to adverse. Ultimately, 
all regimes try to survive as long as possible and trust is difficult to come by when the stake 
is or is believed to be as high as survival. Domestic oil supply security would be especially 
applicable to the geographic scope of this study as many economies in the Asia Pacific are 
                                                          
52 An issue would need to be labelled as an “existential threat” that calls for extraordinary measures 
(“above politics”) to reach the level of securitization according to securitization theories. The lower 
level of the securitisation process is called politicisation. See Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The 
Evolution of International Security Studies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 214. 
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still relatively poor, underdeveloped, and tend to have more paternalistic cultures than those 
in the West. 
 
3.2.3 External Context of Securitisation 
Polities’ relationships with the United States during the period studied is 
hypothesised in this study to be the context that NOCs and other interested parties may 
exploit to lower decision-makers’ trust in the international oil markets. First, oil is very 
unevenly distributed geographically and the bulk of it delivered to Asia-Pacific polities 
relies on a few shipping “chokepoints.” 53  Although most Asia-Pacific oil importing 
economies are heavily dependent on oil that has to be shipped through at least some of these 
same maritime chokepoints, they are not subjected to the same degree of potential threat of 
having their oil supply physically cut off. The United States possesses concentrated naval 
power to control the physical flow of oil along key regional maritime shipping routes.54 
Llewelyn Hughes and Austin Long conclude this may be “the most important long-term 
security problem in the international oil market,” especially for non-U.S. ally oil importing 
countries in the Asia Pacific, such as China.55 The international oil markets would fail to 
provide oil supply security if maritime oil transportation security cannot be assured, 
especially for the Asia-Pacific. 
Second, U.S. oil firms and those originated in countries that are close U.S. allies 
are still among the biggest and most profitable in the world even if NOCs control most of 
the world’s oil reserves and production.56 The United States is also the leader in advanced 
                                                          
53 Almost 48% of the world’s proven oil reserves as of 2013 were found in the Middle East (BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 Workbook, 6. Accessed 22 August 2014, 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Energy-economics/statistical-review-2014/BP-statistical-
review-of-world-energy-2014-full-report.pdf). For an analysis of maritime oil shipping “chokepoints,” 
see “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA), accessed 10 August 
2015,   
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=WOTC.  
54 Llewelyn Hughes and Austin Long, “Is There an Oil Weapon?” Security Implications of Changes 
in the Structure of the International Oil Market,” International Security, 39-3 (Winter 2014/2015), 
173-180. 
55 Ibid., 188. Of course, if hydrocarbons of marketable quality and prices can be produced in the 
South China Sea, a new dynamic may develop. This development, however, appears to be rather 
distant in the future and its effect cannot be accurately estimated at this juncture.  
56 Two of the world’s top 10 publicly traded oil companies on the 2013 Forbes Global 2000 list are 
U.S. oil corporations and four of them originated in close U.S. allies. They are (in descending order 
of their rank on the list): Exxon Mobil (5), Shell (7), Chevron (13), BP (18), Total (23), and ENI (30). 
The remaining three are NOC spinoffs or NOCs: China Petrochemical Corporation (4), China 
National Petroleum Corporations (5), and Petrobras (25). This skips over OAO Gazprom (21) since 
it only engages in the natural gas, not oil, sector. Accessed 10 September 2016, 
http://www.economywatch.com/companies/forbes-list. According to the World Bank’s estimate as 
of 2010, NOCs controlled 90% of the world’s oil reserve and 75% of the production. See Silvana 
Tordo et al, National Oil Companies and Value Creation, Volume I (Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank, 2011), xi. 
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oil production technologies and equipment, such as hydraulic fracturing and horizontal 
drilling, which may prove a game changer in global oil productivity.57  
Objectively, these facts should not have a direct bearing on decision-makers’ trust 
in the existing international oil markets. I argue, however, they can provide the needed 
external context for persuasive NOCs and other interested parties of net oil importing 
countries to sow doubts in the wisdom of solely relying on these markets or the fairness of 
the system.58 This external context is especially pertinent in a region that appears to be still 
traumatised by colonialism, mostly inflicted by the dominant market players as recently as 
the first half of the last century.59 One way to exploit this external context for securitisation 
is to promote a zero-sum view of the international political economy and to project the same 
intentions onto other nations, especially the United States, the dominant power of the 
existing international political and economic systems.    
If decision-makers take it for granted that leaders of the United States also adopt 
this zero-sum worldview, the risk of over-reliance on the international oil markets for supply 
during any confrontational situations with it can credibly be securitised. The United States 
and companies originated there can be portrayed as trying to perpetuate their historical 
dominance by whatever means possible, especially toward political entities not having a 
friendly relationship with them. NOCs in these political entities can indirectly justify their 
existence, both to make alternative arrangements in preparation for any future 
confrontations and to participate in the international markets to reap the benefits for the 
nation while the “good time” lasts. In short, this is an aggressive zero-sum form of economic 
nationalism.60  
                                                          
57 This has rapidly increased the global share of the United States’ oil production from 8.98% in 2010 
to 13.86% in 2015. The calculation is made from data on BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 
2016, 8. The lifting of export ban on oil and gas by the U.S. government in December 2015 allows 
resources extracted with that technology in the United States be directly supplied to external buyers. 
BP also predicts that the United States will be “energy self-sufficient by 2021” and “oil self-sufficient 
by 2030.” See Bob Bryan, “BP: The US will be energy independent in 5 years,” Insider Australia, 25 
March 2016. Accessed 12 December 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com.au/bp-us-energy-self-
sufficient-in-5-years-2016-3?r=US&IR=T.  
58 An official Indian think-tank report, for example, makes the argument that America’s energy 
independence resulting from its advanced hydrocarbon E&P technologies has different implications 
for China, India, and the world at large. See Shebonti Ray Dadwal, The Geopolitics of America’s 
Energy Independence: Implications for China, India and the Global Energy Market (Delhi, Institute 
for Defense Studies & Analyses, 2013). In addition, Defense establishments are possible “interested 
parties” since playing up the likeliness of the United States using its superior naval capability to block 
maritime oil transportation would be one way to justify and increase their budget shares.  
59 For the lingering impact on the perception and foreign policies of two major powers in Asia, see 
Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Wronged by Empire: post-imperial ideology and foreign policy in India 
and China. Stanford, California, 2013. 
60 Some studies use the term “mercantilist” or “neomercantilist” to describe some countries’ energy 
acquisition behaviour, which mostly mean a state-led versus market-led strategy with a zero-sum 
mentality. Economic nationalism is more appropriate to describe the situation wherein nations 
employ a diverse array of economic policies to achieve the underlying goal of “bolstering power, 
prestige, or the prosperity of the nation.” Economic nationalism is not necessarily zero-sum in 
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The coherence of oil supply securitising agents and the relevance of the internal 
and external contexts of securitisation in individual net oil importing economies are 
theorised to be the most pertinent in contributing to decision-makers’ overall trust level in 
the oil markets.  The coherence of securitising agents is theorised here to be positively 
correlated to the level of trust in the oil markets, while the relevance of securitising contexts, 
both internal and external, is negatively correlated.  
 
3.3  Implementation Capability  
The second intervening variable (ITV) that conditions the actual level of strategic 
oil supply measures adopted is a polity’s capabilities to implement such measures. The 
vulnerability-interaction model theorises this explanatory factor to be positively correlated 
to the actual level of strategic oil measures adopted by a net oil importing economy. This 
means that the higher the economy’s implementation capability, the higher the level of these 
measures would be adopted if all other explanatory factors remain the same.     
 Implementation capability refers to material capabilities and capabilities that can 
directly facilitate the adoption of strategic oil supply measures. These include an economy’s 
financial, technical, diplomatic, and bureaucratic capabilities. Many of these measures, such 
as establishing or administering NOCs or strategic petroleum reserves (SPR), are capital-
intensive, and require technical as well as organisational skills. Some others, such as backing 
a pariah oil producing state at the United Nations, call for considerable political or 
diplomatic capital. 
An equally important factor that would affect states’ capability to mobilise and 
use these resources is the degree of centralisation of state authority. Samuels has studied the 
effect of both the horizontal and vertical concentration of state authority on the extent of 
state intervention in various energy sectors in Japan. The vulnerability-interaction model 
accepts Samuels’ proposition that a highly centralised state would intervene in what he calls 
a more “market-displacing” manner if all other factors remain equal. For the sake of 
simplicity, however, this study mostly focuses on how consolidated the capabilities and 
authority of national governments are (horizontal concentration). The balance of power 
                                                          
orientation, but it is much easier to securitise oil supply to promote and project both economic 
nationalism and a zero-sum understanding of the international political economy. For a discussion of 
the historical origin and contemporary understanding, including the definition quoted earlier, of 
economic nationalism, see Eric Helleiner, “Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic 
Liberalism? Lessons from the 19th Century,” International Studies Quarterly, 46-3 (September 2002): 
307-329 (definition on page 310). For examples of studies using “mercantilism” or “neomercantilism” 
to describe countries’ energy acquisition strategies, see Jeffrey Wilson “Northeast Asian Resource 
Security Strategies and International Resource Politics in Asia,” Asian Studies Review 38:1 (2014): 
15-35 and Charles E. Ziegler and Rajan Menon, “Neomercantilism and Great-Power Energy 
Competition in Central Asia and the Caspian,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Summer 2014): 17-41.  
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between the national and the local or regional governments (vertical concentration) should 
be less important as oil supply measures in most net oil importing economies are to a great 
extent externally-oriented. Foreign economic policymaking, especially in the oil sector, is 
mostly the domain of the national government. 
There are subtle but important differences between implementation capability and 
the concept of the strength of state capital, which is an important component of the last ITV 
of the proposed model. As further explained in the next sub-section, the strength of state 
capital includes material capability. More critically, however, it refers to the institution-
endowed authority to implement economic policies at will in the domestic domain 
unencumbered by private capital interests. Some examples of institutions that are pivotal to 
the strength of state capital are property rights laws, environmental regulations, and the 
judicial system in general. Logically the degree of centralisation of state authority would 
have an impact on both implementation capability and strength of state capital. 
Centralisation of authority is only factored in this second ITV for parsimony. The third ITV 
would only concentrate on issues related to the overall economic freedom and openness, not 
the concentration or the exercise of political power, in the polity. Finally, the emphasis of 
the next IVT is the strength of the private capital in relation to that of the state, especially in 
the various petroleum sectors. 
In short, a net oil importing economy’s capability to implement strategic oil 
supply measures has a very tight focus. Only the “resource supplier” role of the state is 
investigated. 61  The capability to implement these measures is deduced here to be so 
important that having a high capability is theorised as the other a priori condition for the 
adoption of a high level of DV. This is because capability is the requisite material conditions 
to realise any desire to adopt strategic oil supply measures and it is relatively immutable 
over the short to medium term. 
Adopting strategic oil supply measures is to some extent a “non-financial” hedge 
against market failure and physical supply risks. Hedging may provide security, but it does 
incur costs. Only those who are capable can bear the costs, thus the necessity of having a 
high capability to actually adopt a high level of these measures. The vulnerability-interaction 
model, however, does not suggest all economies that are capable would engage in this type 
of hedging, especially not to a degree proportionate to their capabilities.62 An economy with 
                                                          
61 The term “resource supplier” is borrowed and adapted from Jonas Meckling, Bo Kong, and Tanvi 
Madan, Meckling, Jonas, Kong, Bo, and Madan, Tanvi. “Oil and state capitalism – government-firm 
coopetition in China and India.” Review of International Political Economy 22-6 (2015):1159-1187. 
62 Again, this is concordant with the notion of asymmetry in set theoretic methods: “insights on the 
causal role of a condition are of only limited use for the causal role of its absence.” See Schneider 
and Wagemann, 3.3.3. 
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a high capability as well as a high level of trust in the oil markets, for example, may not 
adopt a high level of strategic oil measures according to the logic of the proposed model. 
 
3.4  Strength of Private Capital  
The last ITV that interacts with OV to determine the actual level of strategic oil 
measures adopted is the overall strength of private capital versus that of the state. The 
vulnerability-interaction model theorises that this factor negatively correlates with the DV. 
This means that the greater the overall strength of private capital is in a net oil importing 
economy, the lower the level of strategic oil supply measures would be adopted if all other 
factors remain the same.  
The model proposed here posits that the relative strength of private capital in an 
economy has two major sources: historical-institutional and actor-specific. The strength of 
private capital in any particular industry is conditioned by both the long-term institutional 
configurations of the economy, as well as the more immediate actor-specific configurations 
of that industry. 
A polity’s level of overall economic freedom summarises its institutional and 
historical limits on the strength of private capital versus that of the central government. The 
proposed model posits that the freer and more open a polity’s overall economy is at any 
given time, the more resistance to the adoption of strategic oil supply measures would be. 
This would in turn result in fewer such measures actually being adopted or a lower DV, if 
all other factors remain equal.  
The actor-specific source’s impact on the private-state-capital-strength balance 
focuses on the power of both domestic and international private capitals have versus that of 
the state in the form of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in different sectors of the oil supply 
chain. This balance simultaneously contributes to and is impacted by the overall strength of 
private capital in the economy. This is an expansion of the concept of “state capacity” or 
“state structure” in independent economic and other policymaking expounded in earlier 
studies in two ways.63 First, it explicitly factors in the relative strength of private capital and 
state capital in the form of SOEs, particularly NOCs, in the economy. Second, it 
disaggregates private capital into international capital and domestic capital because the two 
may not have the same preferences on domestic market governance at all times. 
Historically, U.S. and European firms were the only international oil companies 
and indeed other types of multinational firms. SOEs have not been very prominent in 
Western Europe and almost non-existent in the United States in the last couple of decades. 
                                                          
63 See for example The Business of the Japanese State, 5-7; Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the 
National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 55-57; and Ikenberry, “The Irony of State Strength,” 122, 133-135.  
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The dramatic “rise” of non-Western economies and the partial liberalisation of global capital 
movement during the period covered by this study justify a more detailed understanding of 
these dynamics on the adoption of strategic oil supply measures. This is because SOEs in 
general are still commonly found in many net oil importing economies in the Asia-Pacific 
and domestic capital in this region can hardly be equated with international capital as in the 
case of the United States, and to a lesser degree Western Europe, in the last century.64  
Private investments in most economies during the period examined in this project 
came from both international and domestic capitals in a number of sectors, often including 
those responsible for directly supplying oil to the economy. 65  The preference of 
international capital is hypothesised to be freedom of actions from state intervention or 
competition.66 Its strength in an economy, therefore, is theorised here to have a negative 
correlation with the level of strategic oil supply measures adopted by the state. The 
relationship between domestic private capital and the state is more complicated. There are 
four possible scenarios regarding the strength of domestic private capital vis-à-vis those of 
international capital as well as SOEs at any particular point in time.  
First, if domestic private capital is stronger than or at parity with both international 
capital and NOCs in absolute terms, it would have a similar preference regarding state 
intervention and the same correlation with the DV as those of international capital as 
specified earlier. This is because not only would domestic oil firms feel confident in 
competing with multinational companies or SOEs, they would also prefer a liberal trade 
regime at home so they can more convincingly push for the opening of overseas markets.67  
                                                          
64 Nanà de Graaff goes so far as to explain the current “global energy order” as a result of the 
“hybridization” of two underlying driving dynamics: the relentless “widening and deepening” of the 
“transnational dimension” of the more liquid global capital and the “continuation and rearticulation 
of state power” in the current era. Her study inspires the overall private capital-state strength 
conceptualization in this section. See “The Hybridization of the State-Capital Nexus in the Global 
Energy Order,” Globalizations 9:4 (2012): 531-545.  
65 Private capital refers to relatively bigger businesses in this project versus small businesses and 
household production. The reason for this is twofold. First, almost all international capital (inflow 
foreign direct investments) comes in the form of larger businesses or institutional financial portfolio 
investors in most sectors, including and especially in the oil supply sector. Second, the small size and 
diffuse nature of small business owners and household producers often render them not very coherent 
or consistent. They also are in competition with larger businesses for capital and labour and in general 
almost never engage in the oil supply sectors. 
66 Illegal and other dubious acts to gain special access, such as bribery and corruption, are excluded 
in the consideration here, even if multinational corporations are far from immune to such acts. For a 
discussion of multinational firms engaging in corrupt practices, see Joel S. Hellman et al, “Far from 
Home: Do Foreign Investors Import Higher Standards of Governance in Transition Economies?” The 
World Bank 2002, accessed 1 September 2016, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/farfromhome.pdf. Again, 
state/polity intervention is used here in the sense that excludes the affirmative use of market 
instruments by the state. 
67 This is a simplified and partial application of the logic Hughes uses to explain the different degrees 
of openness of oil market governance in France, Japan, and the United States. See Hughes, 
Globalizing Oil.   
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Second, if domestic private capital is weaker than international capital in either 
absolute terms or only in the domestic market, but stronger than or at parity with NOCs, it 
would try to “capture” or “influence” the state to implement preferential policies in its 
favour. 68  These policies would include but not limited to setting up entry barriers to 
international firms and capital to the domestic market so domestic corporations can buy time 
to grow stronger to compete with international capital. In this scenario, it is possible that the 
actor-specific source may have a positive correlation with the DV. This suggests that a 
greater domestic capital strength versus that of the state (but weaker than that of international 
capital) may result in a higher level of strategic oil supply measures adopted. Whether this 
positive correlation would realise and the extent of it depend on the degree of success of the 
capturing effort. The situation will only change when and if domestic capital grows to the 
point of having equal or greater strength than international capital and NOCs in absolute 
terms.69 At that point, the correlation with the DV would revert to the same as the first 
scenario, resulting in a negative correlation.  
The third scenario is domestic private capital being weaker than both international 
capital and NOCs. In this case, the correlation of this source of the ITV with the DV would 
depend on the orientation of the state. The orientation of the state in the oil supply sectors 
is hypothesised as being predicated on the economy’s OV and decision-makers’ trust in the 
oil markets. 70  As these are already factored in two other explanatory variables of the 
vulnerability-interaction model, their effects will be counted as neutral in this ITV. Unless 
international capital is totally absent in an economy, in this scenario, the correlation of this 
source of the ITV with the DV would also be negative. This is because with the effect 
between domestic private capital and NOCs neutralised, the always negative correlation of 
international capital with the state becomes the overall private capital-state strength balance. 
In general, the greater the presence of international capital already has in the domestic 
                                                          
68 I use the terms “capture” and “influence” in a broad sense which would include a wide range of 
tactics such as lobbying, electioneering, securitising, or appealing to the nationalistic sentiments of 
existing governing elites and/or the public. The term “capture” is used in a narrow sense to mean 
corruption in the state capture literature. For an example of equating state capture with corrupt 
practices, see Joel S. Hellman et al, “Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in 
transition economies,” Journal of Comparative Economies 31(2003), 751-773. Of course, this 
“capture” would only be necessary if the state does not already have a pro-domestic businesses 
orientation or agenda already.  
69 Hypothetically, there is another way the situation may change, but it is has yet to be observed in 
reality: the state grows stronger and its orientation changes from championing domestic capital to 
being totally even-handed towards both domestic and international capital or even favouring 
international capital.  
70 The orientation of the state towards its adherence to free market principles for the economy as a 
whole is a complex interaction of factors such as the ideological legacy of the ruling elites and the 
experience the economy has with the free market as a mode of organisation of exchange both 
internally and externally.  
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market of an economy, versus those of the domestic private capital and NOCs, the more 
pronounced the negative correlation would be. 
The fourth scenario - domestic private capital being stronger than international 
capital but weaker than NOCs in absolute terms - is logically possible but empirically 
improbable. This is especially true in the region and timeframe that are reviewed in this 
thesis. If the situation does emerge, domestic private capital again would behave in a way 
that is negatively correlated with the DV. The contest for control or freedom of action 
essentially would be simplified from a three-way to a two-way dynamic. The situation is 
similar to that of scenario 1 above. Figure 2.1 below summarises the hypothesised 
relationships between domestic private capital and the DV: 
 
Figure 2.1 Actor-specific component correlation with DV, depicted as domestic private 
capital’s relationship vis-à-vis strength of international capital and NOCs 
 
The analysis above shows that in at least three out of the four scenarios, the actor-
specific source of the overall private capital strength would have a negative correlation with 
the DV. The historical-institutional source of this ITV, as manifested in the degree of overall 
economic freedom and openness, is theorised to always have a negative correlation. 
Therefore, the cursory understanding of this explanatory factor is that the stronger private 
capital is in an economy, the lower the level of strategic oil supply measures would be 
adopted. Figure 2.2 below summarises the overall correlation of this explanatory variable 
with the DV of the proposed model and the component parts of the variable: 
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Figure 2.2 Relationship Between Overall Private Capital Strength and DV 
 
Having examined all the explanatory variables, I will next  delineated the causal 
relationships among these variables and formally state the hypotheses generated from the 
reasoning of the vulnerability-interaction model. 
 
4.  Beyond Vulnerability 
The vulnerability-interaction model argues that a noticeable level of OV is a 
sufficient but not necessary condition that motivates decision-makers of net oil importing 
economies to adopt some level of strategic oil supply measures.71 Having the motivation to 
adopt such measures does not necessarily translate into the actual adoption of them. It is 
argued here that the desire to adopt these measures is conditioned by three major factors: 
decision-makers’ level of trust that oil markets can adequately provide oil security; the 
capability of the state to implement such measures; and the relative strength of private 
capital versus that of the state in an economy. The actual level of strategic oil supply 
measures adopted - the DV of the model under consideration here - would be the result of 
the interaction among these four factors: OV as the independent variable and the three 
conditioning factors as ITVs. Specifically, the vulnerability-interaction model posits that all 
other factors being equal, the DV would be higher if: (1) there is higher OV; or (2) a lower 
level of trust that oil markets can adequately provide oil security; or (3) a higher overall 
                                                          
71 A “noticeable level” is defined here as having an OV score of 10 and above out of a maximum of 
100. Economies known to be on the verge of turning into net oil importers, such as Malaysia, have 
an OV score around 10 using the computation methods adopted in the preliminary study in this project 
and data from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014.  
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capability to implement the measures; or (4) Private capital overall is stronger than state 
capital in the economy. 
At this stage of its development, the vulnerability-interaction model can only 
specify the result of the interaction of these explanatory variables in four cases.72 The two 
hypothetical “extreme cases” according to the reasoning above are: (1) a net oil importing 
economy with a low OV, high trust, low capability, and high-strength private capital would 
adopt a low level of interventionist or strategic oil supply measures or none at all; and (2) 
one with a high OV, low trust, high capability, and low-strength private capital would adopt 
a high level of such measures. Each of the four explanatory variables at the stipulated level 
in each case is by itself a necessary but not sufficient condition to the designated level of 
strategic oil measures adopted. To put it slightly differently, each of these extreme cases or 
groupings of explanatory variables as a whole forms an unnecessary but sufficient pathway 
or an INUS cause to the adoption of respectively a low and a high level of strategic oil 
supply measures. The other two pathways are discussed in Section 4.2. Figure 2.3 below 
provides a graphical representation of these four cases: one pathway leading to the adoption 
of a low level of DV and the three pathways to a high DV that are proposed: 
 
Figure 2.3 Causal Pathways to Adoption of Strategic Oil Supply Measures 
The vulnerability-interaction model applies the logic stated earlier to seek 
answers to the two research questions of this thesis and hence has two distinct layers. The 
                                                          
72 To facilitate deduction and render hypothesising manageable, all explanatory factors as well as 
the DV, originally conceptualised as continuous, are converted into trichotomous ordinal variables 
in the discussions of both layers of the model. 
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first layer tries to explain variations in the level of strategic oil supply measures adopted by 
net oil importing economies. The second layer tries to understand what causes the adoption 
of a high level of such measures by some of these economies. The next two sub-sections 
present two hypotheses for each of these two layers to be tested in the empirical chapters. 
4.1 Explaining Variations 
The first layer of the vulnerability-interaction model explains variations in DV 
levels among or within cases with two hypotheses: 
H1: If the levels of all four explanatory factors (IV & ITVs) are similar in 
two cases, the value of their DV should be similar; and  
H2: If the levels of three factors are similar in two cases, their DV levels 
should be congruent with the result caused by the difference in their fourth factor as 
predicted by the model. 
If the only substantive difference in the levels of the four factors between two 
cases is their OV, for example, the case with the higher OV should have a higher DV. If the 
only substantive difference is the economies’ trust in the oil markets, the one with an overall 
higher trust should have a lower DV. 
The relational nature of the logic enables the testing of hypotheses without setting 
fixed thresholds of the levels of the variables a prior arbitrarily. This means that whether an 
economy is designated as having adopted a high, medium, or low level of strategic measures 
at a certain period during the empirical test of this layer of the model depends on the cohort 
of economies being tested. This has the benefit of not having first to determine and justify 
the category thresholds and presumably is less bias-prone.  
This layer of the model also has a cross-temporal dimension, meaning H1 and H2 
are supposed to be applicable to comparisons between meaningfully different periods within 
the same economy in addition to among different economies. What constitutes meaningfully 
different periods is debatable. As further explained in the empirical strategy in the last 
section in this chapter, it is argued that the two-decade period of this study can be 
meaningfully divided into two equal-length periods to test this cross-temporal dimension of 
the model, one representing a decade of low and the other high oil prices in the international 
markets respectively. 
 
4.2 Explaining High Level of Intervention 
The second layer of the model investigates the most puzzling cases of a high level 
of state intervention in oil supply against the background of thriving international oil trade 
and increasingly liberalising domestic oil sector governance. Apart from the “extreme” case 
stated earlier, the vulnerability-interaction model proposes two causal pathways or 
combinations of specific levels of the four explanatory factors that would result in the 
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adoption of a high level of strategic oil measures. These two hypotheses are generated with 
the help of typologising techniques.73 Each of the hypotheses below corresponds to the 
pathway of the same number in figure 2.3 earlier. 
H3: A net oil importing economy that has adopted a high level of strategic oil 
supply measures would have a high capability, high OV, high-strength private capital, 
and a medium level of trust in oil markets (three-high case). 
H4: A net oil importing economy that has adopted a high level of strategic oil 
supply measures would have a high capability, a noticeable OV, and must NOT have 
high trust in oil markets, nor high-strength private capital (non-three-high case). 
 
4.2.1  Typologising Adoption of High Level of Strategic Oil Supply Measures 
Typologising is used to help the generation of hypotheses pertaining to pathways 
leading to the adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply measures, which resulted in 
H3 and H4 stated above.74 While the validity of H3 and H4 will be examined with cases in 
this thesis, their applicability is also open to the possibility of being generalised to other net 
oil importing economies. Typologising is an appropriate tool to achieve both goals as 
typological theories are designed to identify “both actual and potential conjunctions of 
variables, or sequences of events and linkages between causes and effects that may recur” 
[emphases added].75  
The vulnerability-interaction model posits two a priori necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for a net oil importing economy to adopt a high level of strategic oil 
supply measures: (1) a high capability to implement strategic oil measures by the state or 
polity under review; and (2) decision-makers of the state or polity not having a high level 
of trust in oil markets. Therefore, there are only three variables that need to be taken into 
consideration: OV, strength of private capital versus that of the state, and trust in oil markets. 
Figure 2.4 below shows all 18 mathematically possible configurations or pathways leading 
to a high level of DV with the capability being fixed at a high level:  
                                                          
73 Pathways to low DV in absolute terms cannot be meaningfully generated at this time because I 
cannot specify at least one a priori necessary condition (a specific level of one of the four factors) 
for a low DV. Therefore, there are too many mathematically possible pathways even in trichotomous 
(34=81) configurations to make testing them practical. For an explanation of how this number comes 
about and the process of how to construct an explanatory typology in general, versus more descriptive 
typologies, see Elman “Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics,” 293-
326. 
74 Typologies do not handle well variables without fixed boundaries, like the relative logic used in 
H1 and H2. This is because the “property space” or visual presentation of any explanatory typology 
is made of rows and columns, each representing a certain value of a discreet ordinal IV or ITV of the 
theory. Ibid, 296. 
75 George and Bennett, 236. 
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Figure 2.4 Pathways to High Level of Strategic Oil Supply Measures With High 
Capability  
 
Explaining any phenomenon with eighteen different causal pathways is neither 
satisfactory nor practical even in a relatively large-N study.76 The typological technique of 
“logical compression” is therefore used to cut down the number of pathways leading to a 
high level of DV. This technique can be used when “there may be a connection between two 
or more of the typology’s dimensions such that some combinations are logically impossible 
or highly improbable.”77 I submit that it is highly improbable that an economy in which 
private capital has a high strength versus state capital in the overall economy would have a 
low level of trust in oil markets at the same time. Therefore, those three combinations or 
cells can be logically eliminated (cell group 1). Following the deductive reasoning 
underpinning the vulnerability-interaction model, I also argue that it is highly improbable 
that an economy in which private capital has high strength overall, has a medium level of 
trust in oil markets AND low or medium OV would adopt a high level of strategic oil supply 
measures, even with high capability. Therefore, the two cells representing these 
combinations can be logically eliminated (cell group 2) as illustrated in Figure 2.5 below:   
 
Figure 2.5 Pathways to High Level of Strategic Oil Supply Measures With High 
Capability and Logical Compression  
                                                          
76 In statistical studies, this causes the degrees of freedom problem. In case studies, this causes the 
problem of “indeterminacy.” For a discussion of these two issues, see George and Bennett, 26-30. 
77 Elman, “Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics,” 305. 
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Five pathways or cells are deleted and 13 pathways leading to a high level of DV 
remains after applying this compression technique. All these pathways are detailed in 
Appendix A. The technique of “pragmatic compression,” which means collapsing 
“contiguous cells if their division serves no useful theoretical purpose,”78 is applied next. 
After all the compression is done, two pathways remain: the conditions stipulated as H3 and 
H4 earlier.79 Each explanatory variable at its specified level is a necessary condition for each 
pathway or INUS cause. These pathways are also the “types” of conditions that the 
vulnerability-interaction model hypothesises that would lead to the adoption of a high level 
of strategic oil supply measures by net oil importing economies. They are labeled the Three-
High type (H3) and the Non-Three-High type (H4).  
This concludes the reasoning underlying the vulnerability-interaction model 
developed in this study. The following section reviews what this author contends to be the 
most germane literature explaining oil importing states’ intervention in their economies’ oil 
supply and how this study relates to the literature. 
5. Literature on State Intervention in Oil Supply 
The literature on state intervention in oil supply in net oil importing most relevant 
to this study can be roughly divided into two categories. The first is mostly normative: why 
states should or should not intervene and how. The other is mostly positive: focusing on 
explaining states’ actions and inaction from observations, evidence and logical deductions.80  
 
5.1 Normative Literature 
There are two main strands of prescriptive literature: those based on neoliberal 
economic theories and those taking the Realist or geopolitical perspective. The first strand 
asserts that governments generally should refrain from intervening in their economies’ oil 
supply except to liberalise the oil sector or to use “market instrument” affirmatively,81 such 
as lowering tariffs on imported oil or subsidies to domestic oil production.82 Even if there 
are some negative externalities associated with oil consumption and import, individual 
governments cannot do much to effectively ameliorate the situation, especially from the 
                                                          
78 Elman, 301. 
79 See Appendix A for details of the pragmatic compression process.  
80 For discussions of the difference between normative and positive theories in economics, political 
science and other disciplines, see Manuel Velasquez, “Normative Theory Versus Positive Theory,” 
in Encyclopaedias of Business Ethics and Society, ed. Robert W. Kolb (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2015), 1524-1525.  
81 Ikenberry, “The Irony of State Strength,” 132.                
82  William Nordhaus, “The Economics of an Integrated World Oil Market” (keynote address, 
International Energy Workshop, Venice, Italy, June 17-19, 2009), 12-13. Also see M. A. Adelman, 
The World Petroleum Market (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972). 
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supply side and in the short run. 83  This is especially true now that oil is a fungible 
commodity traded in an integrated market.84  
Neoliberal institutionalist ideas also underpin research related to oil and energy 
policies and these writings are at least implicitly prescriptive. They expound the superior 
allocative power of the market relative to the state, the positive role played by domestic and 
transnational “market ordering institutions,”85 and the positive-sum nature of international 
trade and cooperation, including oil. 86 Therefore, these writings provide similar 
“prescriptions” as those suggested by neoliberal economists. 
The Realist or geopolitical perspective normative literature does not offer a 
unified conclusion on how states should intervene in their economies’ oil supply, but its 
focus on the connection between dependency on imported oil and national security means 
state intervention in oil and energy supply is taken for granted.87 These writings do not focus 
on the need to elaborate what cause oil importing states to adopt measures that would 
enhance their economies’ oil supply. Market measures are accepted as an expedient rather 
than actively pursued as a matter of principle. Energy is viewed as “a subset of global power 
politics and a legitimate tool of foreign policy, and [energy security realists] are skeptical of 
the current energy market’s ability to guarantee long-term supply.”88  
                                                          
83 One negative economic externality is inflationary pressure for the whole economy. Bohi and Toma 
think the development of SPR would only be effective with the coordinated stock drawdown of 
numerous countries. They also suggest that the only government measure that can address “numerous 
market failures” is supporting energy research and development that would increase the “price 
elasticity of either world oil supply or demand.” (“Energy Security: Externalities and Policies,” 1107). 
Leiby dismisses import tariff as an effective measure to increase energy security as it does not address 
“the root market failures,” which is “non-competitive global oil supply” and “failure of long-term 
private oil market transactions to foresee and account for the economy-wide macroeconomic 
dislocation.” See Paul N. Leiby, “Estimating the Energy Security Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil 
Imports,” Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, February 28, 2007, 12. Also see 
Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren, “The Energy Security Obsession,” The Georgetown Journal of 
Law and Public Policy 6-2 (2008): 475-485. 
84 Nordhaus, “The Economics of an Integrated World Oil Market,” 2; David G. Victor, “What 
Resource Wars?” The National Interest, 92 (Nov/Dec 2007), 49.  
85  This term is used by Edward Stoddard in “Reconsidering the Ontological Foundations of 
International Energy Affairs: Realist Geopolitics, Market Liberalism and a Politico-Economic 
Alternative,” European Security 22-4, 445. 
86 Examples of such works include:  Dries Lesage et al., Global Energy Governance in a Multipolar 
World (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2010); Andreas Goldthaus and Jan Martin Witte ed. Global Energy 
Governance – The New Rules of the Game (Berlin: Global Policy Institute, 2010). 
87 Examples of such works include: Joan Edelman Spero, “Energy Self-Sufficiency and National 
Security,” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 31-2: 123-136; Charles K. Ebinger, The 
Critical Link: Energy and National Security in the 1980s (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 
1982); and Bruce Andre Beaubouef, Strategic Petroleum Reserve: U.S. Energy Security and Oil 
Politics (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2007). 
88 Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Realism and Idealism in the Energy Security Debate,” in Energy 
Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook, ed. Gal Luft and Anne Korin (Santa 
Barbara, Calif: Praeger Security International, 2009): 340. Some examples of the realist views of the 
state’s role in acquiring natural resources, especially oil, can be found in Robert Gilpin, War and 
Change in World Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 224. For more 
contemporary exposition of such approach, see Guo Xuetang, “Energy and Geopolitics in Eurasia,” 
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A variant of the second strand of normative literature describes one or more states’ 
oil supply related activities and then prescribe how other state(s) should respond. China and 
sometimes India or Asia at large is the usual subjects that have their overseas oil supply 
enhancing activities examined and the United States and occasionally the European Union 
are the ones receiving the “advice.” These works typically proffer comprehensive measures, 
such as cooperation in developing alternative energy sources and helping China and other 
major emerging oil consumers to reduce their demand on hydrocarbons.89 Michael Klare’s 
works exemplify this variant of literature despite their very Realist-oriented warnings of 
conflicts over resources, especially oil, if the eclectic measures prescribed are not taken 
seriously. 90 
Normative studies based on neoliberal economics can hardly explain why some 
states continue to intervene in their economies’ oil supply at a high level in the last two 
decades, nor do they explain the cross-economy variations in the levels of state intervention. 
Those with a Realist perspective theoretically would explain the high level of state 
intervention with the strategic importance of oil. It would explain the cross-economy 
variations in the levels of intervention mainly with the differences in material capabilities 
among states. In any event, explaining variations in the levels of intervention among states 
and across time is not the emphasis of this normative literature, but is exactly what the 
vulnerability-interaction model proposes to explain. The next category of literature reviewed, 
similar to this thesis, is more interested in understanding the cause(s) of these variations.  
 
5.2 Positive Literature 
The positive literature on oil policies has a wide range of scopes and emphases on 
its explanatory function. Some, especially writings on net oil importing economies in Asia, 
                                                          
China Military Science, 19-3 (2006), 74-81[郭学堂，中欧亚地区的能源与地缘政治《中国军事
学术》], Robert A. Manning, “The Asian Energy Predicament,” Survival 42-3 (Autumn 2000): 73-
88, and Brent Boekestein and Jeffrey Henderson, “Thirsty Dragon, Hungry Eagle – Oil Security in 
Sino-US Relations,” IPEG Papers in Global Political Economy No. 21 (November 2005). 
89 See John V. Mitchell, “Asia’s New Role in Global Energy Security,” Oil and Gas for Asia – 
Geopolitical Implications of Asia’s Rising Demand, NBR Special Report#41 (September 2012):7-18; 
William T. Tow, “Strategic Dimensions of Energy Competition in Asia,” in Energy Security in Asia, 
ed. Michael Wesley (New York: Routledge, 2007):161-173; Flynt Leverett and Jeffrey Bader, 
“Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle East,” The Washington Quarterly 29-1 
(2005), 187-201; Frank Umbach, “Competing for Caspian Energy Resources: China’s Energy 
(Foreign) Policies and the Implications for the EU’s Energy Security,” in Secure Oil and Alternative 
Energy: The Geopolitics of Energy Paths of China and the European Union, ed. M. Parvizi Amineh 
and Yang  Guang (Netherlands: Brill Publishers, 2012), 75-114; and Michael May, “Energy and 
Security in East Asia,” Asia/Pacific Research Center (January 1998), accessed 20 February 2014, 
http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Mayfront.PM.pdf. 
90  See Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
2001); Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on 
Imported Petroleum (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The 
New Geopolitics of Energy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008); and The Race for What’s 
Left: The Global Scramble for the World’s Last Resources (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012). 
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remain largely descriptive.91 These writings are invaluable and form a substantial portion of 
the empirical foundation for this project. This section, however, focuses on research that 
puts forward explanations of the levels of state intervention in the oil supply sectors of net 
oil importing economies, especially at the high level.  
Phillip Andrews-Speed, Xuanli Liao, and Roland Dannreuther’s The Strategic 
Implications of China’s Energy Needs explains that China adopted a more “strategic” than 
“market-oriented” approach to ensure its oil supply since it became a net oil importer in the 
mid-1990s (up to when the study was published in 2002) because of rising oil insecurity, 
the “predominantly ‘strategic’ orientation” of multiple key energy policymaking actors 
without a coherent strategy, and a lack of interest groups that promote “market-driven” 
solutions to energy insecurity.92 The strategic orientation in turn was boosted by a lack of 
understanding of how energy markets function, technical and institutional obstacles to 
energy sector liberalisation, and NOCs’ preference for the status quo and the strategic 
approach. 93  Top party and government leaders, the military, relevant government 
departments, and NOCs are considered the key players, while provincial governments and 
think tanks are designated as subsidiary ones.94  
Published in 2011, Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther’s China, Oil and Global 
Politics is essentially an updated and more elaborate version of The Strategic Implications. 
The authors still try to explain China’s energy policy, especially international oil policy, by 
examining the interactions among domestic players who were conditioned by the “wider 
context.”95 This context is supported by a myriad of historical, ideational, institutional, and 
external factors, which tend to create a path dependency and feedback effects on each other. 
The explanatory function is only one of the two major objectives of both studies. The other, 
probably more central, objective is to assess the “political and foreign policy implications” 
of the policy and “the challenges this potentially poses for China’s integration into the 
international system.”96 In the latter study, this objective is realised by relating international 
relations theories to three possible scenarios that China’s international oil policy could 
evolve to more conflictual situations with the West, each taking up a full-length chapter. 
The authors are convinced that China’s core objective is still to integrate with the global 
                                                          
91 Some examples of this literature include: Kang Wu et al, “The Asia-Pacific Energy Dilemma,” in  
Asia’s Energy Future – Regional Dynamics and Global Implications, ed. Kang Wu et al, Honolulu: 
East-West Center, 2007:1-14;Tanvi Madan, “India’s ONGC: Balancing Different Roles, Different 
Goals,” Joint Baker Institute/Japan Petroleum Energy Center Policy Report (March 2007); Mikkal E. 
Herberg, “The Rise of Asia’s National Oil Companies,” NBR Special Reports#14 (December 
2007):1-7; and Ashok Sharma, “India and Energy Security,” Asian Affairs 38:2 (2007):158-172. 
92 Andrews-Speed et al, The Strategic Implication, 69. 
93 Ibid., 43. 
94 Ibid., 46-47. 
95 Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther, China, Oil and Global Politics, 36. 
96 Ibid., ix. 
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economic and political systems, but at its own pace and manner, while acknowledging that 
the outlook for such integration is less sanguine than a decade before.97 
Øystein Tunsjø’s Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy: Hedging Against 
Risk argues that the Chinese state adopts a mix of market and strategic oil supply strategies 
to insure against and manage supply disruption and price volatility risks. It does so because 
it is uncertain which of these two strategies best enhances its energy security. He introduces 
the concept of “hedging” akin to the use in finance to explain China’s array of oil supply 
measures. “Longs” are measures associated with cooperation or positive developments, such 
as profiting from the market or preventing crises; ‘shorts’ are those “tied to strategic and 
security considerations,” such as pipelines projects.98 As in financial management, when the 
economic or political costs of either type of measures become excessive, fewer of that type 
of measure would be adopted. Tunsjø believes Chinese NOCs are generally driven by profit 
motive while the government is motivated by security considerations. Therefore, Chinese 
international oil policy, as suggested in the title of his book, is believed to be driven by both 
(oil) security and profits. He also differentiates between peacetime risks and wartime threats 
to oil security and he believes China’s energy security policy “predominately addresses 
peacetime risks.”99  
The first cross-economy comparative study on state intervention in oil supply is 
Llewelyn Hughes’ Globalizing Oil: Firms and Oil Market Governance in France, Japan, 
and the United States. It explains changes in the degrees of oil market liberalisation in 
France, Japan, and the United States between 1980 and 2005 by the differing “demands of 
firms make on governments, and the incentives governments have to meet these 
demands.” 100  Oil firms with different characteristics had different preferences on host 
economies’ domestic oil market governance against the background of the emergence of the 
international oil markets. These characteristics were in turn shaped by the industrial 
compacts negotiated between the firms and the government in an earlier period. The 
restructuring of the international oil markets in the 1980s is pinpointed as the critical 
juncture that shaped the current diverging degrees of liberalisation in all three subsequent 
cases.101  
Jeffrey D. Wilson’s Northeast Asian Resource Security Strategies and 
International Resource Politics in Asia does not try to explain the difference in the level of 
state intervention, but what is instead seen as more or less the same “mercantilist” resource, 
including oil, security strategies employed by China, Japan, and South Korea over the last 
                                                          
97 Ibid., 169-190, 2-3. 
98 Øystein Tunsjø, Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy, 27. 
99 Tunsjø, Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy, 223. 
100 Llewelyn Hughes’ Globalizing Oil, 16. 
101 Ibid., 68 and 41. 
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decade. Wilson’s study sees these economies as all adopting a high level of state intervention 
to ensure oil supply security. The manifestations of this strategy include such measures as 
investments in “equity resources” by national firms, providing financial and regulatory 
assistance to national firms, and “resource diplomacy.”102 In the context of oil, these would 
all be strategic supply measures as conceptualised in this project. While China’s approach 
is characterised as the most aggressive, all three countries are seen as motivated by “a deep 
scepticism in the liberal belief that international markets provide the best guarantee of 
resource security.”103 Once triggered by this sense of insecurity, the process of “competitive 
policy emulation” took over, resulting in the region-wide adoption of this mercantilist 
strategy.104 
“Oil & State Capitalism – Government-Firm Coopetition in China and India,” 
endeavours to understand who exactly are driving China and India’s overseas hydrocarbon 
investments and what motivate them. 105  In their effort to untangle this puzzle, Jonas 
Meckling, Bo Kong, and Tanvi Madan adopt the concept of the “polymorphous state” to 
separate the state from the NOCs - those actually execute and are directly impacted by the 
investments.106 The study explains variations in the extent of Chinese and Indian NOC 
internationalisation by the combined effects of two processes: privatisation/marketisation of 
these NOCs, and NOC governance reforms in overseas investments.107  
Privatisation is said to inject NOCs with the entrepreneurial spirit to engage in 
overseas investments,108 and the specifics of the governance reform in each country resulted 
in differences in procedural rules and the bureaucratic capacity of the state to monitor and 
control its NOCs.109 The state is conceptualised as playing the roles of both resource supplier, 
thus providing different levels of cooperation, and veto player, thus creating a certain level 
of competition to NOCs in the two causal processes. 110 The study concludes that the larger 
internationalisation scale of Chinese NOCs is due to the Chinese state simultaneously 
providing high cooperation or being a strong resource supplier and low competition or being 
a weak veto player to its NOCs111 The almost reverse positions of the Indian state in these 
                                                          
102 Wilson, “Northeast Asian Resource Security Strategies and International Resource Politics in 
Asia,” Asian Studies Review 38:1 (2014): 17. 
103 Ibid, 17. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Jonas Meckling, Bo Kong, and Tanvi Madan, “Oil State Capitalism – Government-Firm 
Coopetition in China and India,” Review of International Political Economy 22-6 (2015), 1159-
1187. 
106 Ibid., 1164, 1181. 
107 Ibid., 1164-1165. 
108 Ibid., 1162-1164. 
109 Ibid., 1166-1167. 
110 Ibid., 1162-1163. 
111 Ibid., 1177-1180.  
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two roles (moderate resource supplier and stronger veto player) is offered to explain Indian 
NOCs’ relatively smaller internationalisation scale.112  
 
5.3 Contribution 
The literature review on the politics of oil above suggests that this thesis has a 
broader scope than most existing studies on the subject. This study puts forward an explicit 
analytical framework to explain variations in the levels of intervention in the oil supply 
across importing economies, as well as within them over different periods. This is not 
always found in the existing literature. 
In the preliminary cross-economy study in Chapter Three, two major strategic oil 
supply measures are uniformly examined across nine net oil importing economies stretching 
from East to Southeast and then to South Asia. This is intended to expand our empirical 
understanding of oil supply strategies of importing states beyond OECD countries. Data of 
these economies are collected at 2013 and 2003 to evaluate the cross-temporal dimension 
of the proposed model. Each data collection point represents roughly a decade of high and 
low oil prices respectively when the international oil markets have already been well 
established. The two in-depth paired comparisons presented in Chapter Four and the single-
economy investigation presented in Chapter Five of this thesis provide both quantitative and 
qualitative data on India, Thailand, China, and Taiwan’s oil sectors. The chapters also 
analyse the strategic oil supply measures these government adopted, especially in the decade 
preceding 2013.  
Tunsjø puts forward a clear analytical framework – that of hedging between risks 
associated with the market and the strategic approaches to energy/oil security. He suggests 
that states other than China may also have used the hedging strategy to manage their energy 
security risks, but investigating that possibility is beyond the scope of his study. Putting 
aside its scenario-projection and implication section, Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther’s 
study loosely adopts a historical and institutionalist approach, with the emphases on the role 
of ideas and perception, contingency, and feedback effects. 
None of the single-country studies reviewed here explicitly explains the temporal 
variations in the levels of state intervention within the economy studied. The two studies by 
Andrews-Speed et al suggest such variations by stressing the evolving and contingent nature 
of China’s oil policy. The earlier study, however, only covers less than a decade of that 
policy since China became a net oil importing country, and so there may not be, in any case, 
enough changes of the factors involved. The latter study covers a period just two years 
shorter than that examined in this thesis. The authors note that they were surprised by the 
                                                          
112 Ibid. 
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simultaneous fast economic growth of China and the steep rise in oil price between 2002 
and 2011, the magnitude of the effect of the former on the latter, and the resulting increased 
“global salience” of energy security. They insinuate China’s oil supply strategy has been 
less coherent and less market-driven than they anticipated because of greater constraints 
from domestic interest groups. 
Tunsjø’s study is vague in teasing out any temporal variations of the overall mixes 
of the strategic and market approaches. For example, Tunsjø says China scaled back 
diplomatic support to Sudan around 2007 when the political costs of its oil diplomacy 
towards the country became too high. 113  He focuses the attention on the “hedging” 
dimension of the incident – reducing the magnitude of the strategic approach or the “short” 
position - not the temporal variation in the level of strategic measure adopted. Hughes’ is 
the only study of which I am aware that explicitly examines both temporal and cross-country 
differences in oil market governance with a clear analytical framework – that of “historical 
institutionalism.”  
The vulnerability-interaction model proposes four major explanatory variables. 
This means most explanations put forward in the existing literature are not seen as truly 
alternative causes to state intervention in oil supply. Instead, some of them are at least 
partially factored in the IV and ITVs of the proposed model. The simultaneous fast economic 
growth and the steep rise in oil price between 2002 and 2011 in China, and the bargaining 
strength of domestic interest groups (mostly NOCs) - the “neglected” factors mentioned in 
Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther’s study - for example, are incorporated into the 
vulnerability-interaction model. The former may be summarised as changes in OV. The 
latter is factored in two of the four explanatory variables: as a major component of the 
overall strength of private capital in the economy and as a securitising agent impacting on 
decision-makers’ trust in oil markets. If all other factors remain constant, therefore, both a 
higher OV and the presence of coherent NOCs would result in the adoption of a higher level 
of strategic oil supply measures according to this study’s model. This appears to be 
consistent with the observations made by Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther in the case of 
China during the period of their study. Some exceptions are Wilson’s “competitive policy 
emulation,” and Tunsjø’s financial-management-style hedging.  
This brings up the issue of how unitary and autonomous the state is conceptualised 
in the existing literature and in this project. Wilson appears to be on the most unitary and 
autonomous end of the spectrum, from which mercantilist policies can be pursued. Hughes 
would be on the other end of the spectrum. State/polity actions or inactions are seen as 
resulting from negotiations with private firms, which in turn were conditioned by the 
                                                          
113 Tunsjø, Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy, 17. 
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structure or restructuring of the international oil markets. The fact that the vulnerability-
interaction model consists of one IV and three ITVs means the state’s autonomy is 
understood as rather circumscribed. Unlike Andrew-Speeds et al, Tunsjø, and Meckling et 
al, who all highlight the divergence between the state and its NOCs, this thesis does not 
differentiate the actions taken by them. At the same time, the state/polity is not 
conceptualised to be as coherent as being able to conscientiously carry out a hedging oil 
supply management strategy as Tunsjø asserts. It may, of course, scale back or even scrap 
some measures after it becomes apparent that they have generated undesirable consequences 
for the polity.  
On the other hand, the applicability of industrial compacts between the 
government and private oil firms as the central explanatory variable in Hughes’ studies is 
questionable within the scope of this thesis. While IOCs dominated the relatively small oil 
sectors of some Asian economies during the colonial days and the early years after 
independence, NOCs had already been established and in some cases entrenched in many 
of these economies by the time open trading in the international oil markets began in the 
1980s. 
Meckling et al’s study has a narrow focus – trying to understand the motivation 
and the scale of NOC internationalisation only. That provides excellent insights into the 
bifurcation of the state and its NOCs and the dynamics impacting NOC internationalisation 
in China and India. It is not totally clear, however, if or how the processes described would 
ultimately affect the overall extent of state intervention in their economies’ oil supply.  
I argue that the resource supplier concept in Meckling et al’s study may be loosely 
understood as the implementation capability ITV in the vulnerability-interaction model, 
regardless of how that supply of resources was initiated. If we accept that premise as “a 
close enough” analogy, the prediction of the vulnerability-interaction model actually 
corresponds to Meckling et al’s conclusion: greater “cooperation” results in larger scale 
internationalisation. The wider scope covered by the model proposed in this thesis precludes 
a close equivalent of the veto player concept which specifically refers to the results of NOC 
governance reforms only.    
A pre-requisite of specifically explaining the cross-temporal and the cross-
economy variations of strategic oil supply measures adopted is to devise a generally uniform 
and systematic way of comparing the different levels of them. Among the literature 
reviewed, Hughes’ is the only study that provides such an indicator. As detailed in Chapter 
Three, the plausibility probe refines one of the two measures used in Hughes’ study. In spite 
of this and the shared goal of explaining cross-temporal and cross-economy variations of 
the degrees of state intervention in oil supply with Hughes’ study, this study theorises 
perception and ideas as an important intervening variable to the more materialist variables. 
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In fact, embedded in the ITV of trust in the oil markets, this ideational variable is 
hypothesised as an a priori necessary condition for the adoption of a high level of strategic 
oil supply measures.  
In this regard, Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther’s explanations of China’s 
energy/oil policy are closer to the essence of the vulnerability-interaction model. This thesis, 
however, formalises the interaction between these two types of variables to facilitate 
comparison and testing of hypotheses. In addition, two elements among the variables of this 
study’s model also mimic the feedback loop and path dependency ideas in their study. First, 
the presence and coherence of NOCs is theorised as having an impact on trust and hence 
ultimately on the level of strategic oil supply measured adopted. At the same time, their 
presence and coherence directly determines the level of strategic oil supply measures. 
Whether they are present or coherent, therefore, the impact is magnified. Moreover, once 
they were created, their impact on the DV would be hard to be eliminated. Second, in the 
scenario where domestic private capital is weaker than both international capital and the 
state or SOEs (scenario 3), the state/polity’s orientation, meaning the economy’s OV and 
level of trust in the oil markets, would become more salient. All these elements are organised 
in a way that facilitates comparison, both across economies and over time. Ultimately, this 
may be the biggest “innovation” of the vulnerability-interaction model. 
 
6. Constructivist Approach to State Intervention in Oil Supply? 
The vulnerability-interaction model presented in this chapter emphasises the effect 
of interaction among four explanatory variables on the level of state intervention in the oil 
supply in net oil importing economies. Two of these variables, trust in oil markets and 
strength of private capital, incorporate some non-material elements in their formulation. For 
this reason, this section tries to clarify the extent the model can be viewed as having a 
constructivist approach to state intervention in oil supply. The discussions below suggest 
that the model in its entirety, as currently conceptualised, situates closer to the conventional 
realist than the constructivist end of the theoretical spectrum.           
The different strands of the constructivist approach to international relations 
converge on the following commonalities:114 They see agents and structures as mutually 
constitutive; the consequences of anarchy as socially constructed instead of preordained; 
state identities and interests as variables, not as fixed givens; and both material and 
                                                          
114 See, for example, John Kurt Jacobsen, “Duelling Constructivisms: A Post-Mortem on the Ideas 
Debate in Mainstream IR/IPE,” Review of International Studies, 29-1 (January 2003): 39-60. Ted 
Hopf groups these strands under the banners of “critical constructivism” and “conventional 
constructivism.” See “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 
International Security, 23-1 (Summer, 1998): 171-200.  
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discursive capabilities as sources of power.115 These four major features of the approach are 
used to focus the discussion on how constructivist the vulnerability-interaction model is. 
Mutually Constitutive Agents and Structure. The most important agents examined 
in the proposed model are net oil importing economies as personified by national-level 
decision-makers in their economies’ oil supply, and more broadly, economic policymaking. 
The most pertinent structures include the international oil market, the power distribution in 
the international system, and existing domestic oil market governances during the period 
studied. The independent variable of OV as currently conceptualised offers only little to 
moderate room for mutual constitution between these agents and structures. It is in the 
concept of market risks that very large net oil economies would have noticeable impact on 
the international oil market, and more indirectly and less certainly, on the overall power 
distribution in the international system. These economies would be vulnerable to market 
risks when global oil supply is tight but also wield market shaping power when there is an 
oil glut. 
At the domestic level of analysis, the agents of large private oil firms and NCOs 
and the structures of both the domestic oil markets and the national governments of 
economies generally have more mutual influence on each other’s behaviour than at the 
international level. The explanatory factors of decision-makers’ trust in their domestic oil 
markets and private capital strength in their economies are predicated on this domestic level 
mutual constitution. Agent-structure mutual constitution does not directly concern the 
variable of OV or implementation capability.     
Socially Constructed Consequences of Anarchy. The price-setting mechanism of 
the international oil market is “governed” by demand and supply dynamics, not anarchy. 
Just as many other markets in the real world, however, it is far from having “textbook” 
perfect market conditions, such as being populated by a large number of buyers and sellers 
of similar sizes with perfect information. Besides, the current international oil market has 
been adopted as the primary mode of exchange of oil across national borders relatively 
recently and is still evolving. The vulnerability-international model argues that more opaque 
modes of international oil exchange that were more directly tied to the power distribution in 
the international system, therefore, still cast a shadow over decision-makers’ trust in the 
current international oil market. This doubt could be exploited and magnified with effective 
securitisation of oil supply – a concept closely associated with the constructivist approach.116  
Unlike the constructivist approach, however, the proposed model sees the impact 
anarchy has on decision-makers’ trust in the international oil market as springing from only 
                                                          
115 Hopf, ibid, 185. 
116 Balzacq, “Constructivism and securitization studies,” 56 – 57. 
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one understanding of anarchy – the realist or Hobbesian understanding.117 Their trust in the 
international market is predicated on the quality of their relationship with the presumed 
system leader, and hence how acute the political entity’s competition for survival or 
leadership with this “hegemon” is. Yet, this understanding of the consequence of anarchy is 
not seen as preordained as realism postulates. Indeed, it has been tinkered by rule-based and 
transparent regimes as postulated by neoliberalist theorists, especially in economic domains. 
The vulnerability-interaction model is formulated with the observation that a widely shared 
understanding of anarchy that is vastly different than the realistic one, has not emerged and 
the assumption that it would not emerge in the near future in the Asia Pacific. The nature of 
anarchy does not really concern the other explanatory factors.      
Variable State Identities and Interests. Following the reasoning of the mutual 
constitution between agents and structures and the power of discourse, the constructivist 
approach sees that states may have multiple and changing identities and hence interests and 
behaviour that are associated with the various identities through intersubjectivity. Overall, 
the vulnerability-interaction model assigns relatively fixed identities and interests to 
political entities regarding their oil supply policies. A political entity is conceptualised to 
identify itself as a net oil importing or net exporting economy largely based on the material 
factor of whether it produces more oil than it consumes during a given time period.118 The 
interests generated from the identity of being a net importing economy are also largely the 
same: to secure the most affordable, efficient, and stable supply of oil to the economy. More 
perceptual elements, however, are involved in determining the best course of actions to 
safeguard these interests.  
The proposed model suggests decision-makers’ different understandings of the best 
combination of market and non-market measures to realize the same interest and identity as 
net oil importing economies in addition to individual economies’ implementation capability 
and OV translate into the different levels of strategic oil supply measures an economy adopts 
at any given time. These understandings may be skewed by securitisation of oil supply to 
lower decision-makers’ trust in the effectiveness and/or fairness of oil markets, but they 
would not be totally divorced from the material, institutional, and historical realities of the 
                                                          
117 Alexander Wendt, considered a “standard bearer” of conventional constructivism, for example, 
suggests that actors (states) may understand anarchy as Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian depending 
on how they see themselves and others in the international system. These different approaches to 
anarchy would generate very different consequences even when the international system remains 
anarchic. See Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press Virtual Publishing, 
2003), 246-312. 
118 As discussed in Chapters Three and Six in this thesis, a perceptual lag to this material rule is likely 
to linger in cases when an economy has recently transitioned from a net producer to a net consumer, 
as in the case of Indonesia during the period studied.  
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economies. This leads to the assessment of how much power the vulnerability-interaction 
model assigns to discourse and through which type of securitisation.    
Sources of Power. The constructivists approach sees material and discursive 
capabilities as intertwining sources of power, more so than the realist school of thoughts.119 
This relative emphasis on the power of discourse contributed to the conceptualisation of 
securitization theory, first developed by a group of scholars commonly referred to as the 
Copenhagen School (CS).120 According to this often cited formulation of securitization 
theory, an issue may be securitized as an existential threat that calls for extraordinary 
measures simply by the “speech act” of proclaiming and presenting it as such. 121  As 
discussed in Section 3.2 earlier in this chapter, the vulnerability-interaction model proposed 
in this study, however, has adopted a more recently developed approach to securitisation 
theory put forward by Balzacq. This approach emphasises the impact of external contexts 
and the status of securitising agent(s) vis-à-vis the targeted audience on successful 
securitisation, in addition to the performative act of speech. This approach is one of the more 
“practice-based” strands versus the more “linguistic” approach to securitisation as 
represented by the original CS formulation. 122  
For the explanatory factor of trust in oil markets, therefore, the model proposed in 
this thesis takes a largely constructivist approach that discursive and material capabilities 
are equally important sources of power. This combined power is channelled through 
securitisation to cause different levels of trust among decision-makers as the success of this 
process is contingent as much on external contexts as the power relations between agents 
and audience of securitisation, as the speech act of uttering the supposed threat itself. 
Securitisation theory, particularly the more practice-based strand adopted in this thesis, is 
suited to such an application as it 
… claims that the intersubjective representation of reality (constructivitism 
about facts) is not necessarily incompatible with the possibility that some 
                                                          
119 There are important exceptions to mainstream approaches’ “neglect” to ideational or perceptual 
variables to international relations. Examples include Robert Jervis’ study on the role of perception 
in decision-making in Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2015); Joseph Nye’s examination of soft power in Soft Power: The Means 
to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); and Judith Goldstein and Robert 
Keohane’s discussion and compilation of works on how ideas shape foreign policymaking in the 
volume they edited: Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
120  Securitization theory incorporates elements of realism and poststructuralism as well as 
constructivism and has developed into a number of strands, even if “linkages between securitization 
theory and other theoretical enterprises remain largely under-studied and under-specified.” Thierry 
Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, and Jan Ruzicka, “’Securitization’ revisited: theory and cases,” 
International Relations, 30-4 (2016), 518.  
121 Ole Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), 46–86. 
122 For a discussion of the categorization and its limit of various strands of securitization theory, see 
Balzacq et al “Securitization revisited” 498-499. 
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features of the world, independent from people and their beliefs about those, 
are capable of explaining why a community holds that something is a threat 
(objectivism about rational explanations) … [and it] relate[s] language and 
mind to the impact of the external world on regulating the content of the 
two.123  
 Overall, the vulnerability-interaction model shares more features with the realist 
than the constructivist approach. Not much mutual constitution is conceptualised to take 
place between individual net oil importing economies (agents) and the international oil 
market or the international system at large (structure). In the case of the few very large net 
oil importing economies, the influence they have on the structure is understood as materialist 
rather than ideational in origin. There would be more mutual constitution at the domestic 
level, but the oil supply strategy of net oil importing economies are usually more externally-
oriented.     
The proposed model also assumes net oil importing economies as having similar 
realist understanding of the consequences of anarchy as well as the same interests and 
identities in formulating their oil supply strategies. Decision-makers’ trust in the oil markets’ 
capability in ensuring their economies’ oil supply security is the only explanatory variable 
that has a significant perceptual or ideational element factored in it. Discourse is 
conceptualised to manifest its power through a process more akin to the pragmatic than the 
linguistic approach of securitisation theory put forward by the CS to determine the ultimate 
trust level. 
The empirical chapters of this study, previewed in the next section, suggest that this 
variable played a critical role in eventuating the level of strategic oil supply measures Asian 
net oil importing economies adopted during the period studied. Still, the vulnerability-
interaction model takes a more “fleshed-out” or “realistic” realist approach à la Jervis and 
Goldstein and Keohane than an outright constructivist approach with its preponderance of 
materialist variables and its presumption of the mostly realist understanding of anarchy 
among the economies examined.124  
 
7. Empirical Strategy 
 This section maps out the empirical strategy to test the validity of the four 
hypotheses generated by the vulnerability-interaction model. The model is largely deductive 
and has not been tested with empirical cases. This thesis will, therefore, first conduct a 
                                                          
123 Ibid, 519. 
124 See footnote 119 above. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics and 
Goldstein and Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in Ideas and 
Foreign Policy, 3-13. 
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plausibility probe to verify its plausibility with a relatively larger number of cases, but less 
in-depth data. This helps to determine if “more intensive and laborious testing is 
warranted.” 125  Plausibility probe is one of the six theory-building case study research 
objectives George and Bennett identify.126 Given the Asia-Pacific focus of this study as 
discussed in Chapter One, the first step towards testing the model is to determine economies 
to include in the plausibility probe in Chapter Three.  
What constitutes a “region” has always been a contested concept and what 
constitutes the Asia-Pacific is no exception.127 This thesis takes a pragmatic approach in 
case selection by trying to include as many net oil importing economies as possible in the 
plausibility probe where relatively reliable data on energy and oil production, consumption, 
and supply are available. The BP Statistical Review of World Energy, published annually 
during the two decades covered by this project and beyond, therefore, becomes the starting 
point. Data of 16 economies are grouped under “Asia Pacific” in the June 2014 edition of 
the review, which covers data up to year 2013.128 Of the 16, Malaysia and Vietnam are 
eliminated because their status as net oil importers as of 2013 is ambiguous.129 Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, and China Hong Kong SAR, are eliminated due to the relative lack of data upon 
initial research. Finally, Australia and New Zealand are also excluded. These two economies 
are more geographically remote and distinct from the rest of the group. Besides, although 
Australia is a net oil importer, it is also a net energy exporter.130 This may give decision-
makers a different perspective on oil supply security issues. In the end, nine economies, 
which are what remain from the original 16 after these adjustments are made, are sufficiently 
large scale for this project to assess.  
                                                          
125 George and Bennett, 75. 
126 The other five objectives they identify are: atheoretical/configurative idiographic, disciplined 
configurative, heuristic, theory-testing, and “building block” studies of particular types or subtypes. 
See Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 74-75.  
127 For discussions of the many ways the concept of Asia and Asia-Pacific may be defined and what 
these different definitions imply, see David Shambaugh, “International Relations in Asia,” in 
International Relations of Asia, ed. David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2014), Kindle Edition; and Arif Dirlik, “The Asia-Pacific Idea: Reality and 
Representation in the Invention of a Regional Structure,” Journal of World History, 3-1 (Spring 1992): 
55-79. 
128  BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2014, 9. The 16 economies are: Australia, 
Bangladesh, China, China Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
129 Cecilia Kok, “Govt reveals M'sia net importer of crude oil, petroleum products since 2014,” The 
Star,  21 January 2015, accessed 11 August 2015, http://www.thestar.com.my/Business/Business-
News/2015/01/21/Clearing-the-air-Treasury-sec-gen-Malaysia-net-importer-of-crude-oil-
petroleum-products-since-2014/?style=biz.. Also see “Overview” U.S. Energy Information Agency 
webpage on Vietnam, last updated in November 2014, accessed 20 August 2015,  
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=VNM. 
130 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2014, 8-9. Also see “Key Facts – Australia’s 
Energy Sector,” Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics, Australian Government Department 
of Resources, 2012. 
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The method of structured and focused comparison is used to make pairwise 
comparisons among the chosen nine economies in the plausibility probe to examine the 
validity of H1 to H2: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Year 2013 data are used to test the cross-economy dimension 
of these two hypotheses. The same data are compared with year 2003 data of each economy 
to test the cross-temporal dimension of the hypotheses. These two years each presents 
roughly a decade of high oil prices (2004-2013) and a decade of low oil prices (1994 – 2003) 
that cover the entire period of this study.  
Nine “within-case comparisons” are made with the levels of the explanatory 
variables in these two years to see if they are congruent with the levels of the DV as predicted 
by H1 and H2. According to George and Bennett, “there is a growing consensus that the 
strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of 
within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study.”131 Due to time and 
length restraints, however, the cross-temporal dimension of the vulnerability-interaction 
model is investigated only in the plausibility probe.  
Structured and focused comparison involves finding answers to standardised 
questions pertinent to the research objective.132 Two major strategic oil supply measures are 
used to comprise an indicator to uniformly assess the levels of these measured adopted, the 
DV, in each of the nine cases with 2013 and 2003 data. Two market and two supply risks 
make up another indicator for OV, the IV of the vulnerability-interaction model. In the 
plausibility probe, only the historical-institutional source of the overall private capital 
strength is investigated. Two “off-the-shelf” indicators are used to evaluate the degrees of 
overall economic freedom and openness of the cases. The exact sources and methods of 
these indicators are discussed in the Chapter Three, but it suffices to say here that the 
creation of these indicators amounts to answering the same questions in the most 
standardised way possible. 
All the data are reviewed and cross-compared to evaluate the prima facie validity 
of H1 to H4 and to choose the best cases for further investigation. H2 means that candidates 
for further investigations of the hypothesis would fall into a loose definition of the most 
similar cases - all explanatory factors of interest being similar except the theorised ones but 
with different outcomes (DV).133  
Once the best candidates are chosen from the plausibility probe, the same 
structured and focused comparison method is used to conduct more in-depth examination of 
                                                          
131 George and Bennett, 18. 
132 George and Bennett, 70. 
133 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research,” 
Political Research Quarterly 61-2 (June 2008): 298-304. 
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the cross-economy validity of H1 and H2. Measures and evidence that are more unique to 
the cases and are difficult to quantify, but are consistent with the logic of the model are taken 
into consideration in these comparisons. These include speeches of decision-makers and 
stakeholders concerned, information on government ministry and NOC websites, policy 
directives and guidelines, media reports, and existing scholarly and policy studies. Simple 
content analyses of the annual reports of the relevant NOCs in the relevant years are 
conducted to investigate the NOCs’ securitising effort or lack thereof. 
Before H3 and H4 or the second layer of the vulnerability-interaction model can 
be tested, economies that have adopted a high level of strategic oil supply measures must 
first be located. Data generated in the plausibility probe serve as the basis for the search. 
This is justified as even casual observers would agree that economies that have adopted a 
high level of strategic supply measures among a cohort of nine Asian net oil importing 
economies are likely to be qualified as adopting a high level among any cohort of net oil 
importing economies in the world. Once a case is found to have a high DV in the plausibility 
probe, the levels of all its explanatory variable are examined to see if they correspond to 
those specified in either H3 or H4.      
The plausibility probe located China with 2013 data as having the exact 
configuration as stipulated by H4. None of the cases, however, matches the configuration of 
H3. Among the three closest contenders, Taiwan is chosen for an in-depth case study to 
investigate the validity of H3. Since one of the purposes of this study is to “probe new 
explanation for Y,”134 the pathway leading to the adoption of a high level of strategic oil 
supply measures, Taiwan is examined as a deviant case study.  
No further investigation is conducted on China for H4 since it is already compared 
with India for the in-depth study of H2 in Chapter Four. As the literature review above 
suggests, many aspects of China’s oil supply strategy in the last two decades have been 
examined within existing relevant literature, even if they apply a different analytical 
framework.  
This concludes the empirical strategy to test the validity of the vulnerability-
interaction established. The next chapter will present the plausibility probe of the entire 
model.  
 
 
 
                                                          
134 Ibid., 297. 
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Chapter Three 
Plausibility Probe of Vulnerability-Interaction Model 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This thesis proposes the vulnerability-interaction model to explain the puzzling 
phenomenon of net oil importing states’ continued but different levels of intervention in 
how oil is supplied to their economies. In this chapter, I measure the key independent (IV), 
intervening (ITV), and dependent variables (DV) for nine Asian net oil importing economies, 
and use these measures to probe the plausibility of the layers and dimensions of the model.  
As noted in Chapter Two, the first layer is designed to examine what caused Asian 
net oil economies to adopt different levels of strategic oil supply measures from each other, 
and across time, within the period of 1994 to 2013. The second layer of the model explores 
factors driving some of these economies to adopt a high level of such measures during the 
same period.  
H1 states that if the levels of all four explanatory factors are similar in two cases, 
the value of their DV should be similar. H2 states that if the levels of three of these factors 
are similar in two cases, their DV levels should be congruent with the result caused by the 
difference in their fourth factor as predicted by the model. These hypotheses are tested using 
two empirical strategies. First, they are tested for their cross-case validity with pairwise 
comparisons among the nine economies of China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand with 2013 data. Second, these two 
hypotheses are subsequently tested for their cross-temporal validity with the same nine 
economies. Each of the nine within-case studies compare the 2003 data and the 2013 data 
longitudinally, representing a decade of relatively low and high oil prices respectively. 
This enables me to achieve two goals. First, the testings of H1 and H2 probe the 
explanatory power of my model. Second, they assist in my case selection strategy, by 
helping me identify which economies have adopted a high level of strategic oil supply 
measures. These cases are then used to gauge the validity of H3 and H4. Then the best cases 
to conduct in-depth studies on the cross-case dimension of H1 and H2 and on H3 are 
identified. 
The following section in this chapter presents data to facilitate cross-case 
comparisons related to H1 and H2. Section 3 presents the preliminary results of the cross-
case study in Section 2, which provide good support to the vulnerability-interaction model. 
Section 4 presents nine within-case studies related to the cross-temporal dimension of H1 
and H2. Section 5 examines the overall validity of all the dimensions and layers of the model 
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and justifies the selection of cases for more in-depth investigation of the model in Chapters 
Four and Five. Section 6 concludes with discussions on how the vulnerability-interaction 
model compares with applicable alternative theories and initial observations gleaned from 
this plausibility probe. 
 
2. Measuring Key Variables, Testing H1 and H2 Through Cross-Case 
Comparison 
 
This section weighs the same set of questions of each of the nine Asian net oil 
importing economies with 2013 data. Each of the following questions probes a key variable 
of the vulnerability-interaction model and thus helps determining the cross-case validity of 
H1 and H2.1  
The questions asked of each case are:  
1. What was the level of strategic oil supply measures adopted by the state in 
2013? (i.e. measure DV) 
2. What was the economy’s oil vulnerability (OV) in 2013? (i.e. measure IV) 
3. What was the strength of the private capital in the economy, in the form of its 
degree of overall economic freedom and openness in 2013? (i.e. measure ITV1) 
4. What was the decision-makers’ level of trust that oil markets can adequately 
provide oil security?  (i.e. measure ITV2) 
5. In 2013 what was the state’s overall capability to implement strategic oil 
supply measures? (i.e. measure ITV3) 
Each of these questions aims at measuring the level of one variable (DV, IV, and 
ITVs respectively) within the overall model. Sections 2.1 to 2.5 below justify and apply a 
series of measures that are used for variables in the order of the questions listed above.2 
Then preliminary tests of hypotheses 1 to 4 developed in Chapter Two are carried out. 
The year 2013 is chosen as a critical benchmark because it ended a decade of 
mostly rising oil prices.3 Many strategic oil supply measures, including those used to gauge 
                                                          
1 George and Bennett describe the essence of structured, focused comparisons as being uniform and 
theory-centric. 68. 
2 This study uses the “indicator approach” to provide preliminary answers to the first three questions. 
The indicator approach tries to operationalise and measure the latent variables or the “constructs” 
representing the real phenomena of interest. The sections providing answers to the last two questions 
take an approach closer to what Gary Goertz and James Mahoney call the “semantic approach.” 
Goertz and Mahoney, A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social 
Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 127-128. For a discussion of latent variables, 
see Kenneth A. Bollen, “Latent Variables in Psychology and the Social Sciences,” Annual Review of 
Psychology (2002) 53, 607-608. 
3 For graphs showing the dramatic drop of the prices of both the Brent crude and the West Texas 
Intermediate crude in 2014, especially in the fourth quarter, see “Crude oil prices down sharply in 
fourth quarter of 2014,” U.S. EIA website, assessed 1 April 2016, 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=19451. For an annotated graph showing the 
history of crude oil prices, including the twenty-year period covered in this study, see “An Annotated 
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the measures adopted in this project, have a relatively long lead time. Therefore, data for 
2013 is an appropriate representation of oil supply security decision-making during a period 
of high oil price. 
 
2.1 Dependent Variable: Strategic Oil Supply Indicator 
The strategic oil supply indicator has been created here to assess the level of 
strategic oil supply measures adopted by the state in question. Two measures make up this 
composite indicator: 1. percentage of government control of the economy’s crude oil supply; 
and 2. size of the economy’s strategic petroleum reserves (SPR).  
2.1.1 Justification 
A composite indicator is used in this study to allow for the consideration of diverse 
manifestations of the key concept to be measured: state intervention in oil supply. Two 
measures are chosen in this plausibility probe because both are relatively easy to quantify 
and normalise, and are widely adopted in the Asia-Pacific region.  
The most common way for a state to control the crude oil supply to its economy 
is through control of its NOC(s) by holding shares of it. It may be true that some NOCs are 
sometimes driven more by profit-seeking than ensuring their host countries’ oil security 
since most NOCs are theoretically responsible for balancing their own finances. 4 
Nonetheless, NOCs are still rivals to private oil firms often operating in the same country, 
which are unlikely to have the same level of access to policymakers. In fact, senior managers 
and board of directors of some NOCs also formally or informally help formulate the 
country’s oil supply policies. SPRs and oil stockpiling of NOCs are less obviously market-
displacing. The drawdown procedures of some countries’ SPR, such as those of the United 
States, appear to be mostly market-conforming.5 The adoption of these two strategic oil 
supply measures, however, does reflect a certain degree of state intervention oil markets. It 
is argued here that a composite indicator resulting from these measures captures different 
forms of state intervention in oil supply in different economies. 
An alternative measure is oil diplomacy which is defined as “using preferential 
and politically-negotiated relationships” in the hope of increasing the oil supply security of 
                                                          
History of Oil Prices Since 1981,” 20 December 2014, Business Insider Australia website, assessed 
1 April 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com.au/annotated-history-crude-oil-prices-since-1861-
2014-12?r=US&IR=T.  
4  See, for example, Valérie Marcel and John V. Mitchell, Oil Titans (Baltimore: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2006), 190-200; Erica S. Downs, “Who’s Afraid of China’s Oil Companies?” in Energy 
Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies and Implications, ed. Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind 
(Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 77-79. 
5  See Anthony Andrews and Robert Pirog, “The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Authorization, 
Operation, and Drawdown Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, June 18, 2013, accessed 20 August 
2014, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42460.pdf. 
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the initiating state.6 Data on how many incidents of such policy actually took place and 
when is scarce, however. In addition, simply tallying up incidents of oil diplomacy 
manoeuvres can only measure their frequency but not “magnitude.” Overseas equity oil 
exploration and production (E&P) projects by NOCs is a second potential measure. Some 
studies point out that NOCs of Asian net oil importing economies engaging in these projects 
are motivated by profits, not geopolitical or strategic concerns.7 Regardless of the motives 
of these pursuits, they still fall within the definition of strategic oil supply measures in this 
study.  
 
2.1.2 Component 1: Government Control of Crude Oil Supply 
The first component of the strategic oil supply indicator is the percentage of state 
control of crude oil supplied to an economy. This analysis considers a government as 
controlling a particular amount of crude oil if that amount is developed or procured by a 
company in which the state has majority ownership. Alternatively, crude oil is developed 
by an oil E&P project the government has funded directly or indirectly by guaranteeing the 
loan for its financing. The first of these measures appears to be the most market-displacing 
of strategic oil supply measures except for military interventions. The second one is slightly 
less distorting as private oil firms, instead of NOCs, are the instruments that actually bring 
in the oil.8   
The easiest cases to determine this percentage are economies not having any NOCs 
nor funded oil E&P projects. Singapore was the only case-study economy reviewed here 
that did not have a NOC of any form in 2013, nor did it fund or guarantee funds to such 
projects by private oil companies as in Japan.9 The Philippines does have a Philippine 
                                                          
6 This definition is adapted from the definition of “resource diplomacy” used in Jeffrey D. Wilson, 
“Northeast Asian Resource Security Strategies and International Resource Politics in Asia,” Asian 
Studies Review (2014) 38:1, 24. 
7 See for example, Julie Jiang and Jonathan Sinton, Overseas Investments by Chinese National Oil 
Companies: Assessing the Drivers and Impacts - Information Paper Prepared for the Standing 
Group for Global Energy Dialogue of the IEA, February 2011; Erica S. Downs, “The Fact and 
Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations,” China Security, No. 3 (Summer 2007), 42-68. 
8 In compiling the percentage of government control, however, this slight difference in of the 
degrees of market-distortion is not differentiated in this indicator.   
9 Despite its NOC-sounding name, the Singapore Petroleum Company (or more commonly known as 
SPC) was no longer owned by the government of Singapore in the decade leading to 2013. Instead, 
its 45% shareholder is PetroChina, an oil firm majority-owned by the largest Chinese NOC, China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). See “PetroChina Acquires Keppel’s Entire Stake in 
Singapore Petroleum Company,” accessed 19 August 2015,  
http://www.petrochina.com.cn/ptr/xwxx/201404/b5b2d5b3773c4fe49d06294928a0c366.shtml.  
It should also be noted that oil produced by companies that sovereign wealth funds invested in are 
not counted in this first component as typically investment decisions of these funds are not made by 
national decision-makers. Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund Temasek did and does invest in 
upstream oil firms, but “[u]nder Singapore’s Constitution and laws, neither the President of the 
Republic of Singapore nor the Singapore Minister for Finance, our shareholder, is involved in our 
investment, divestment or other business decisions,” “Corporate Governance,” Temasek, accessed 
20 September 2015,  
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National Oil Company (PNOC), but it did not produce or procure any crude oil for the 
country in 2013.10 Oil exploration service contracts the Philippine government signed with 
E&P companies to develop the country’s small but still available indigenous resources, 
however, stipulate a 60/40 ratio of division (after costs) in the government’s  favour.11 That 
is how the Philippine government still has a certain control over the country’s crude oil 
supply.12 
China and Indonesia are also relatively easy cases. In China, the state still controlled 
almost 100% of the country’s crude oil supply in 2013. NOCs were almost the only 
companies granted import licenses to import crude oil to the country.13 Indigenous oil E&P 
was overwhelmingly dominated by 100% state-owned NOCs and their subsidiaries. 14 
Although three such subsidiaries have been publicly traded since the turn of this century, 
the parent NOCs still held between 65 to 86% of these companies’ shares and had a tight 
grip on their management.15 In addition, all five companies that held licenses to import crude 
oil into China were 100% state-owned and the situation only began to change in 2014.16  
In Indonesia, the state can be said to control 100% of the crude supply to the economy. 
Although the 100% state-owned NOC Pertamina only produced about 17% of the 
                                                          
http://www.temasek.com.sg/abouttemasek/corporategovernance. 
10 The exploration entity of the company only conducted seismic data acquisition and other studies 
“in preparation for well drilling activities.” Philippine National Oil Company 2013 Annual Report, 
4.  
11 Teodoro M. Santos, “Philippine Energy Policy and Problems in a Changing World,” in Energy 
Market and Policies in ASEAN, ed. Shankar Sharma and Fereidun Fesharaki (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 142. 
12 The default option is for the government to take the oil developed in proceeds from the 60% of oil 
developed and marketed by the oil firm, but it can also elect to receive its share in kind, too. It is 
through this way that the Philippine government can control the supply of the crude oil in the country. 
See a model oil service contract on the Philippine Department of Energy website, accessed 30 March 
2016,  
http://www.doe.gov.ph/pecr5/index.php/petroleum/petroleum-model-contracts. 
13 The first private energy firm that applied for and obtained a relatively small crude oil importing 
license in China was Guanghui Energy in 2012. See Tim Daiss, “China State-Owned Oil Monopoly 
System to Slowly Change,” The Energy Tribune website, 4 July2013, accessed 12 August 2015, 
http://www.energytribune.com/77959/china-state-owned-oil-monopoly-system-to-slowly-
change#sthash.o2zlnfLm.dpbs. Also see “China Opens up crude oil import to private refineries,” 
Xinhua News Agency website, 24 July 2015, accessed 11 August 2015, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-07/24/content_21393937.htm. 
14 CNPC, the biggest 100% state-owned NOC, and its 86% owned subsidiary PetroChina together 
account for about 54% of China’s crude oil output and IOCs are only taken on as minority partners 
in offshore oil and gas E&P projects. See U.S. Energy Information Administration report on China, 
last updated 14 May 2015, 5.  
15  According to the 2013 annual reports of these three subsidiaries, the shareholdings of these 
companies by their 100% state-owned parents were (listed in descending order of the companies’ 
crude production): PetroChina - 86.51% (page 15), Sinopec Corp. – 73.96% (page 6), and CNOOC 
Ltd. – 64.66% (page 57).  
16 “China Approves Crude Import Licenses for Two Independent Refineries,” Platts 25 August 2015, 
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/singapore/china-approves-crude-import-licenses-for-two-
27740362. 
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indigenous crude through 2012,17 Pertamina “owns and operates eight of the country’s nine 
oil refineries (the ninth is owned by the Research and Development Agency of the Agency 
of Department of Energy and Mineral Resources).”18 This refining capacity only covers 
about 64% of the country’s consumption needs and so the shortfall is covered by imported 
oil products.19 Therefore, all the crude oil supply to feed the refineries in Indonesia (from 
either domestic or overseas sources) was acquired by state-controlled or funded entities. 
The calculation of the first component of the strategic oil supply indicator for five of 
the remaining six case study economies conforms to a two-step process. These five 
economies are India, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Japan is the other remaining case 
study and will be addressed below. First, the percentage(s) of shares the state owns in NOC(s) 
is obtained (a). Then the crude oil produced and imported by these compan(ies) in 2013 as 
a percentage of total oil consumption of the economy in the same year is calculated (b).20 
The final figure of the percentage of state control of the economy’s crude oil supply is 
obtained by multiplying (a) with (b). The Philippines’ NOC did not produce or procure any 
crude oil in 2013, but the government’s share of oil developed by private firms in the country 
is used to do the computation instead.21 Details of calculation are listed in Table 3.1 below: 
India % of 
Government  
Share of 
NOCs 22 
Oil 
Consumed 
Oil Produced 
or Procured 
(million 
tonnes) 
% of 
control of 
oil 
consumed  
% of 
state 
control 
                                                          
17 For the shareholding percentage of the state, see Pertamina EP Integrated Annual Report 2013, 14. 
For the company’s domestic crude production share, see “Indonesia Country Report,” U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) website, last updated March 5, 2014. 
18  “Oil and Gas in Indonesia – Investment and Taxation Guide May 2014 – 6th edition” 
Pricewaterhouse Cooper Indonesia (page 13), assessed 10 August 2015, 
http://www.pwc.com/id/en/publications/assets/oil_and_gas_guide_2014.pdf 
19 “Indonesia,” U.S. EIA website, last updated March 5, 2014.  
20 The oil and consumption and production figures of all case-study economies in this study come 
from BP Statistical Review of World Energy of various years of except otherwise noted. These 
figures may have slight discrepancies from national figures, but having the consistency of all data 
available in the same units of measurement is a major benefit that greatly facilitates comparisons 
across nine economies.  
21 PNOC’s 2013 annual report does not mention any actual oil produced or procured by itself or its 
upstream subsidiary, PNOC EC. It only mentions the production of natural gas. See page 6 of the 
report. 
22 The five companies included in this study are the biggest NOCs and their subsidiaries or affiliates 
that produce or procure crude oil in India. The Gas Authority of India Limited, which only engaged 
in the production and distribution of gas, is not included. All five are central-level public sector 
enterprises (CPSEs). For a list of such CPSEs as of 2014, see “List of Maharatna, Navratna and 
Miniratna CPSEs,” Department of Public Enterprises of India, accessed 20 April 2016, 
http://dpe.nic.in/publications/list_of_maharatna_navratna-and_miniratna. The first three listed are 
mostly oil marketing companies (OMCs), meaning mid- to downstream oil firms, but control crude 
oil supply in India by procuring it from various sources to feed their refineries. For these companies, 
only the crude they import is counted in this study to avoid double counting, unless evidence clearly 
shows otherwise. This is because their domestic crudes are likely supplied by Oil India or ONGC 
since these two integrated firms do not have much refinery capacity of their own. Oil India only holds 
26% equity in Numaligarh Refinery Limited. See “Profile,” Oil India Limited website, accessed 20 
April 2016, http://www.oil-india.com/Profile.aspx.  
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(million 
tonnes)23 
of oil 
supply 
Bharat 
Petroleum  
55.7924 
175.25 
22.7925 9.70 7.26 
Hindustan 
Petroleum 
51.1126 15.4127 8.79 4.49 
Indian Oil 
Corporation Ltd. 
(IOCL) 
78.9228 42.5329 24.27 19.15 
Oil India 68.4330 3.6631 2.09 1.43 
ONGC & 
ONGC Videsh 
68.9432 31.4933 17.97 12.39 
    Total: 44.72 
Philippines % of 
Government 
Share of Oil 
Developed34 
Oil 
Consumption 
in 2013 
(thousand 
barrels daily)35 
Oil Produced in 
2013 (thousand 
barrels daily)36 
% of state 
control of oil 
supply 
60 298 26 5.23 
South Korea % of 
Government 
Share of 
Oil 
Consumption 
in 2013 
Oil Produced 
by KNOC in 
% of state 
control of oil 
supply 
                                                          
23 BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014. 
24  Bharat Petroleum Annual Report 2013-14, 77. Only the shares held by the Government or 
President of India and the State Government (in this case the Government of Kerala) are counted, not 
other CPSEs. Many CPSEs are not 100% government-owned. More importantly, if they are not 
related to the oil sector, they are just passive investors, unlikely to interfere with the management 
decisions. If they are oil sector CPSEs, such as the Indian Oil Corporation in the case of ONGC, 
counting them would be tantamount to double counting. The same rule will be applied to all the 
companies listed here. 
25 Ibid., 52. This includes both its domestic production from Mumbi High and its crude import in year 
2012-13. 
26 Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Annual Report 2012-13, 73. 
27 Ibid., 36. This includes both imported crude and domestic crude Hindustan Petroleum “uplifted” 
in three specific fields. 
28 Indian Oil 2013-14 Annual Report, 87. According to the note on this page, up to 13 March 2014, 
the President of India was holding 78.92% of the company’s shares. Then on 14 March 2014 he 
divested 10% of the shares in favour of ONGC and 5% to Oil India Ltd.  The 78.92% figure for year 
2013 is used in this study. 
29 This is the amount of crude imported by the company in 2012-13, which is not from domestically 
produced oil and most likely not bought from ONGC. The company’s crude throughput for its 
refineries during the same period is 54.65 million tons. The difference of these two figures is likely 
from domestic production or bought from ONGC. In using the smaller of the two amounts, there is 
not any double counting. The sources of the two figures are from page 38 and 44 respectively of the 
India Oil 2013-14 Annual Report. 
30 Oil India Limited 2013-14 Annual Report, 70. 
31 Oil India Limited 2013-14 Annual Report, 11. 
32 Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited Annual Report 2013, 136. 
33 Ibid., 53. 
34 Teodoro M. Santos, “Philippine Energy Policy and Problems in a Changing World,” in Energy 
Market and Policies in ASEAN, ed. Shankar Sharma and Fereidun Fesharaki (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 142. Also see a model oil service contract on the Philippine 
Department of Energy website, accessed 30 March 2016, https://www.doe.gov.ph/model-petroleum-
service-contract-0. 
35 BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014. 
36 U.S. E.I.A. website, accessed 10 April 2016, http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/. 
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KNOC – the 
only NOC of 
the country37 
(thousand 
barrels daily)38 
2013 (thousand 
barrels daily)39 
100 2,460 220 8.94 
Taiwan % of 
Government 
Share of 
CPC Corp. – 
the only 
NOC of the 
country40 
Oil 
Consumption 
in 2013 (million 
tonnes)41 
Oil Imported 
by CPC Corps 
in 2013 (million 
tonnes)42 
% of state 
control of oil 
supply 
100 43.4 19.08 43.97 
Thailand % of 
Government 
Share of 
PTT – the 
only NOC of 
the country43 
Oil 
Consumption 
in 2013 
(thousand 
barrels daily)44 
Oil Produced 
and Procured 
by PTT in 2013 
(thousand 
barrels daily)45 
% of state 
control of oil 
supply 
51.11 1,21146 1,004 42.37 
Table 3.1 State Control of Crude Supply in India, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan 
and Thailand in 2013 
 
The case of Japan is somewhat different and therefore, the method of ascertaining the 
state control of the country’s crude oil supply is also different. In 2013, Japan did not have 
a “traditional” NOC comparable to those of its Asian peers. Japan Oil, Gas and Metals 
National Corporation (JOGMEC), a public entity tasked to “ensure a stable, inexpensive 
supply of oil”47 does not engage in oil E&P or procurement directly. Instead, it provides 
financial assistance to oil E&P projects of Japanese oil firms in the form of equity capital 
and liability guarantees.48 Therefore, literature on Japanese oil security normally uses the 
term “self-developed oil” or “equity oil” to describe oil produced as a result of such financial 
assistance. The amount of this self-developed oil “has hovered between 10 and 15 per cent 
                                                          
37 “Moody’s assigns A1 to Korea National Oil Corp’s MTN drawdown,” 15 Jan 2014, Moody’s 
Investor Service website, accessed 30 August 2015, https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-
assigns-A1-to-Korea-National-Oil-Corps-MTN-drawdown--PR_290612.  
38 BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014. 
39 KNOC Annual Report 2013, 18. 
40 “Fitch affirms CPC Corporation, Taiwan at ‘A+’; outlook stable,” 22 May 2012, Reuter’s website, 
accessed 30 August 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSWLB014020120522.  
41 BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014. 
42 The CPC Corporation imported 139.9 million barrels of crude oil into Taiwan for refining in 2013. 
See CPC 2014 [Annual Report], 12. This number is converted into tons by using the BP conversion 
formula of one barrel equals 0.1364 ton. See BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014, 44. 
43 PTT Annual Report 2013, 130. 
44 BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014. 
45 PTT Annual Report 2013, 37. 
46 BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014. 
47 “History of JOGMEC,” JOGMEC website, accessed 20 September 2015,  
http://www.jogmec.go.jp/english/about/about003.html. 
48 The other three main roles of JOGMEC listed on its website are: Technology Development, 
Gathering/Providing Information, and Geological Surveys. Accessed 20 September 2015, 
http://www.jogmec.go.jp/english/oil/index.html. 
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[of Japan’s total import] over the past decade.”49As Japan practically imports all of its crude 
oil, this also equals the percentage of its consumption. Using the historical figure for the last 
decade as a guide, this project will adopt 11% as the amount of crude oil supply “controlled” 
by the state.  
Table 3.2 below recaps the results of the first component of the strategic oil supply 
indicator of all nine case study economies: 
Economy % of government control of crude oil supply in 2013 
China 99 
India 45 
Indonesia 100 
Japan 11 
Philippines 5 
Singapore 0 
South Korea 9 
Taiwan 44 
Thailand 42 
Table 3.2  State Control of Crude Oil Supply in Case-Study Economies in 2013 
 
2.1.3 Component 2: Size of Strategic Petroleum Reserves 
 The second component of the strategic oil supply indicator is the size of countries’ 
SPR. As mentioned earlier, generally maintaining an SPR is more market-conforming than 
the first component. Even the major oil consuming organization of the more liberal OECD 
economies, the International Energy Agency (IEA), approves of this measure as a way to 
achieve oil supply security. 50  Using this strategic supply oil to compile the indicator, 
therefore, provides a more nuanced understanding of the overall level of strategic oil supply 
measures adopted by economies at different stages of development.        
Unlike the method used by the IEA, this indicator only counts the days of net oil 
import equivalent of SPR held by the state through a public entity or oil stocks held by 
NOC(s). The minimum stocks private oil firms in the country are mandated to hold, and 
commercial stocks voluntarily maintained by private firms are excluded.51 Establishing and 
                                                          
49 Vlado Vivoda, Energy Security in Japan: Challenges After Fukushima (Farnham, Surrey, GBR: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2014), 59. The 11% used in this study is also based on the 10.5% of such 
“self-developed oil” by Japanese oil firms in 2005. See Masanari Koike, Gento Mogi, Waleed H. 
Albedaiwi, “Overseas oil-development policy of resource-poor countries: A case study from Japan,” 
Energy Policy 36 (2008), 1765. 
50 It does not mean that, however, there is a consensus among economists of its effectiveness or 
necessity. For example, Giacomo Luciani argues for their ineffectiveness in “Geopolitical Threats to 
Oil and the Functioning of the International Oil Market,” Centre for European Policy Studies Policy 
Brief No. 221/November 2010. 
51 The IEA requirement is as follows: “This commitment can be met through stocks held exclusively 
for emergency purposes and stocks held for commercial or operational use, including stocks held at 
refineries, port facilities and in tankers in ports.” Energy Supply Security 2014 (Paris: IEA, 2014), 30. 
For a discussion distinguishing between the two and related issues, see Giacomo Luciani and 
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maintaining an SPR as strategic insurance calls for considerable material capability and 
commitment from the state involved. Therefore, using this criterion is more parsimonious 
as well as more in line with the puzzle underlying this study – what compelled states to 
intervene directly in the economy’s oil supply at all? Of course, as detailed in Table 3.3 
below, some countries have both an SPR and mandatory requirements for oil firms; some 
only the latter, and some neither. This gradation appears to imperfectly fit the assumption 
of the correlation between the type of oil stockpiling measure adopted and the state’s 
material capability.  
Economy Number of oil import equivalent of days of SPR & NOC stock 
in 2013 
China 1752 
India 153 
Indonesia 4754 
Japan 8455 
Philippines 056 
Singapore 057 
                                                          
François-Loïc Henry, Strategic Oil Stocks and Security of Supply, CEPS Working Document, No. 
353, June 2011. 
52 According to a report in the South China Morning Post, around 2013 and 2014, China’s SPR 
totalled 12.43 metric tons. Using the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 Workbook’s 2013 
import figure to make the calculation, this is the equivalent of about 16 days of oil imported. One day 
is needed to this figure as the amount of stocks held by NOCs is unclear. See Angela Meng, “China 
reveals size of strategic oil reserve for first time,” the South China Morning Post, 21 November 2014, 
accessed 28 July 2015,  
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1644890/china-reveals-size-strategic-oil-reserve-first-
time. 
53 Various media reports point out that India only made the first crude purchase for its SPR in 2015 
and so it did not have one in 2013. One day is put in here, as in the case of China, to represent the 
stock Indian NOCs might be holding. See “Exclusive: India makes first crude oil purchase for 
strategic reserve,” Reuters, March 30, 2015, accessed 3 August 2015, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/03/30/india-energy-spr-idINKBN0MQ1N220150330. 
54 Indonesia did not have a SPR as of 2013. See Montty Girianna, “The need for a national strategic 
petroleum reserve,” The Jakarta Post, February 13, 2013, accessed 23 August, 2015, 
 http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/02/13/the-need-a-national-strategic-petroleum-
reserve.html. However, the 100% state-owned Pertamina is expected to hold between 18 to 22 days 
of demand. The mean of this range, 20 days of demand, equals to about 47 days of import with 
Indonesia’s oil self-sufficiency rate of about 58% in 2013, calculated with the BP Workbook 2014 
figures. See “Indonesia seeks to mandate oil stocks amid rising demand,” Platts website, 18 Jun 2015, 
accessed 5 August 2015,   
http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/jakarta/indonesia-seeks-to-mandate-oil-stocks-amid-rising-
27522846.  
55 Energy Supply Security – Emergency Response of IEA Countries 2014 (Paris: IEA, 2014), 281. 
56 According to the IEA, since 2002, the Philippine “government requires oil refiners to maintain a 
minimum inventory level of 15 days, while oil importers are obliged to hold 7 days of domestic 
supply.” See Energy Supply Security – Emergency Response of IEA Countries 2014, 510. PNOC, the 
Philippines’ NOC, did not engage in either oil refining or importing  any more in 2013. See Philippine 
National Oil Company 2013 Annual Report. Therefore, the Philippines did not maintain any SPR 
according to the definition of this study. 
57  “…there is no mandatory stockholding requirement for refineries or private oil companies 
operating in Singapore and obligatory crude oil stockpiling was abolished in 1983. Operational stocks 
in refineries are estimated at around 50 days.” Energy Supply Security – Emergency Response of IEA 
Countries 2014, 510. However, since there is no NOC in Singapore in 2013, the refinery stock 
requirement is not counted as a strategic oil supply measure according to the definition of this study. 
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South Korea 12258 
Taiwan 9059 
Thailand 2360 
Table 3.3 Number of oil import equivalent of days of SPR & NOC stock in 2013 
 
The numbers of days of SPR above are converted to percentages by using the IEA 
90-day figure as 100%. Economies that have more than 90 days of SPR score over 100% as 
the two components of the indicator are compensatory to each other. These percentages are 
aggregated with the first component of the indicator with a 50% weighting to reflect its 
higher degree of market-conformity. 61  Table 3.4 below summarises the scores of the 
strategic oil supply indicator of all nine case-study economies in 2013, 100 being the highest 
level of strategic oil supply measures adopted and 0 the lowest. They are used to calculate 
the corresponding trichotomous levels of strategic oil supply measures adopted by these 
economies, that is, their DV levels, in 2013:62 
Economy Strategic Oil Supply Indicator 
Scores, SPR 50% weight 
Trichotomous Strategic Oil Supply 
Measure (DV) Level 
China 54.22 High 
India 22.64 Medium 
Indonesia 63.06 High 
Japan 28.83 Medium 
Philippines 2.50 Low 
Singapore 0.00 Low 
S. Korea 38.39 Medium 
Taiwan  47.00 High 
Thailand 27.39 Medium 
                                                          
58 Energy Supply Security – Emergency Response of IEA Countries 2014, 296. 
59  Although there have been disputes the actual amount of SPR maintained by the Taiwanese 
government over the years, the 90 days of supply (basically the same as import) figure (comprising 
of 30 days of SPR and 60 days of NOC emergency stockpile) for 2013 is adopted in this study 
according to the following two sources. Rosemary A. Kelanic, “Oil Security and Conventional War 
– Lessons From a China-Taiwan Air Scenario,”  Council on Foreign Relations Energy Report, 
October 2013, 7; and Huei-Chu Liao and Sih Ting Jhou, “Taiwan’s Severe Energy Security 
Challenges,” Brookings Institute website, September 2013, accessed February 27, 2016, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/09/12-taiwan-energy-security-liao.  
60 In 2013, the Thai Ministry of Energy stipulated oil companies to hold 36 days of reserves. The 
NOC PTT controlled about 42% of the country’s crude supply (see Table A1), and Thailand’s oil 
self-sufficiency rate that year was about 33% (calculated with the BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2014 Workbook figures). Therefore, the number of days of government controlled days of 
imported oil equivalent figure is (36 x 0.42) /0.67 = about 23.  
61 See Table A1 in Appendix B for the results of aggregation with different weightings and with and 
without capping this component at 100% (meaning conceptualised as non-compensatory to the first 
component). 
62 See Table A2, Appendix B for the DV levels generated with the results of different weightings and 
with and without capping of SPR at 100% in Appendix B. As a rule, for all weighting methods, DV 
scores within one standard deviation of the average (falling within 0.5 above and 0.5 below the mean 
DV score of the nine in the weighting method in question) are considered having a medium level. 
DV Scores more than 0.5 standard deviation above the average are considered having a high level 
and 0.5 or more below are considered having a low level. 
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Table 3.4 Nine-Economy Strategic Oil Supply Indicator Scores and DV Levels in 
2013 
2.2 Independent Variable: Oil Vulnerability Indicator 
The OV indicator is made up of market and supply risks.63 Market risks relate to 
the effect of fluctuations of oil prices on national economies, such as inflation. In this project, 
they are measured by: (1) per capita cost of imported oil as a percentage of the economy’s 
per capita GDP (all in US$); and (2) oil consumption as a percentage of the total primary 
energy consumption. Supply risks relate to an economy’s vulnerability to oil supply 
disruptions. The supply-risk measures chosen are: (1) oil self-sufficiency rate; and (2) the 
amount of crude an economy imported as a percentage of the global crude imported of the 
same period. The logic for this second measure is that the higher this percentage is, the more 
difficult it would be to acquire the amount needed due to market liquidity issue during 
supply disruption situations. Equal weights are given to all four measures, which are 
normalised so that a higher overall score means a higher OV.64 Table 3.5 below summarises 
the 2013 OV of all nine case-study economies, 100 being the highest and 0 being the lowest. 
The right hand column shows their corresponding trichotomous OV, that is the IV levels in 
this study:65 
Country Oil Vulnerability  Trichotomous OV (IV) Level  
China 23.18 Low 
India 28.15 Low 
Indonesia 21.90 Low 
Japan 38.80 High 
Philippines 33.91 Medium 
Singapore 47.66 High 
South Korea 36.44 Medium 
Taiwan 35.36 Medium 
Thailand 28.11 Low 
Table 3.5 Oil Vulnerability of Nine Asian Net Importing Economies in 2013 
 
2.3 Intervening Variable 1: Strength of Private Capital 
 In this section, I examine the strength of private capital by investigating the overall 
economic freedom in the nine case studies in 2013. The results of two “off-the-shelf” 
indicators are averaged to obtain the readings used in this study. The proposed model 
                                                          
63 The OV index developed by Eshita Gupta, which the OV indicator in this project is simplified and 
adapted from, has four different measures or each of the two types of risks. See “Oil Vulnerability 
Index of Oil-Importing Countries,” Energy Policy 36 ((2008); 1198-1200. 
64 In a natural setting, the higher the value of the first supply risk measure (oil self-sufficiency rate), 
the lower the OV. So this indicator will be normalised to reflect the same direction as the other three 
indicators: Higher values indicate higher OV.  
65 For details of the calculation of countries’ OV in 2013, see Table A3, Appendix B. The same 
principle of how the trichotomous levels are devised described in footnote 62 also applies here and 
in the rest of this chapter except noted otherwise. 
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expects that the freer and more open an economy is at any given time, the stronger private 
capital in it would be versus the state.  
 I use the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) put out by the Heritage Foundation 
and the Wall Street Journal and the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Annual Reports 
released by the Fraser Institute. Both assign an annual overall score of economic freedom to 
each economy surveyed. For the IEF, 10 components in the four major categories of rule of 
law, limited government, regulatory efficiency, and open markets;66 the five components of 
the EFW are size of government, legal system and property rights, sound money, freedom 
to trade internationally, and regulation.67 Both of these indexes take into consideration a 
wide range of economic and legal/regulatory status quo that reflect the power equilibria of 
major stakeholders in an economy. They are, therefore, fair representations of the spirit of 
the reasoning of the proposed model. 
 The IEF scores range from 0 to 100, 100 being “the freest” while the EFW spans 
from 0 to 10. Since the scores of the other two indicators in this project range from 0 to 100 
(and to facilitate comparison), the EFW scores are adjusted to the same scale. The two scores 
of each economy are then averaged to gauge the overall economic freedom of the nine case 
studies in this project.68 Table 3.6 below presents these scores and the trichotomous levels 
of economic freedom, which are also the historical-institutional strength of private capital 
of the case-study economies in 2013: 
Economy 
IEF with 
2013 Data 
EFW with 
2013 Data 
(adjusted) 
Combined Average 
Economic Freedom 
Scores 
Economic Freedom 
(Private Capital 
Strength) Level 
China 52.5 64.4 58.45 Low 
India 55.7 66.1 60.90 Low 
Indonesia 58.5 71.7 65.10 Medium 
Japan 72.4 75.0 73.70 High 
Philippines 60.1 70.7 65.40 Medium 
Singapore 89.4 83.9 86.65 High 
S. Korea 71.2 71.9 71.55 Medium 
                                                          
66 “About the Index,” accessed 14 May 2014, http://www.heritage.org/index/about. On the website, 
it says 12 factors are taken into consideration, but for 2013 data, only 10 are used for calculation on 
the spreadsheet for downloading on its site, which is the source for the analysis in this study: 
 (http://www.heritage.org/index/download ). 
67 James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, and Joshua Hall, Economic Freedom of the World 2014 Report 
(Fraser Institute, 2014), 231-243. 
68 This means I simply multiply the original EFW scores by 10. The IEF scores are from the 2014 
index, which covers data from the second half of 2012 and the first half of 2013. See “About Index” 
and “Explore the Data” pages, accessed 10 November 2014, http://www.heritage.org/index/about. 
For the actual IEF scores, see Terry Miller, Anthony B. Kim, and Kim R. Holmes, “Highlights of the 
2014 Index of Economic Freedom,” accessed 1 December 2015, 
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/Index2014_Highlights.pdf. The EFW scores are 
drawn from the 2015 report which covers 2013 data. See James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, and 
Joshua Hall Economic Freedom of the World 2015 Report (Fraser Institute, 2015), 17-20. 
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Taiwan 73.9 78.4 76.15 High 
Thailand 63.3 65.9 64.60 Low 
Table 3.6    Economic Freedom Scores and Private Capital Strength Levels of Nine 
Case-Study Economies in 2013 
 
The results show that in 2013 China, India, and Thailand had a low trichotomous 
level of overall economic freedom among the cohort of nine Asian-Pacific economies 
examined in this plausibility probe. China scored the lowest in both indicators overall, but 
it actually only scored the lowest in three of the 10 components that make up the IFE 
indicator for that year. These three components are “property rights,” “investment freedom,” 
and “financial freedom.” India scored the second lowest on the IFE index and also ranked 
the bottom in three components: “business freedom,” “monetary freedom,” and “trade 
freedom.” Thailand did not rank the lowest in any of the IFE index components, but ranked 
lower than both China and India in one of the five categories investigated by the EFW 
indicator: “Legal System and Property Rights.” 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea had a medium trichotomous level of 
overall economic freedom. The scores of Indonesia and South Korea were very similar, but 
South Korea’s was noticeably higher, meaning it enjoyed a freer economy and private 
capital there was stronger than in the other two medium-level countries in 2013. 
Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan had a high level of overall economic freedom, with 
Singapore scored much higher than the other two in both indicators. In fact, Singapore 
received the highest scores in nine out of the 10 components of the IEF indicator. It only 
scored lower than Japan for “Monetary Freedom.” Japan, however, scored the lowest among 
all nine case studies in 2013 for “Fiscal Freedom” in the IEF indicator. This component 
compares individual income and corporate tax rates among economies to judge the “freedom” 
the public had in spending their income or revenues after fulfilling their tax obligations. 
Taiwan ranked the second highest in both indicators and received higher scores in four of 
IEF’s 10 components than Japan: “Investment Freedom,” “Trade Freedom,” “Business 
Freedom,” and “Fiscal Freedom.” Singapore received the highest scores in four of the five 
categories investigated by the EFW indicator, but scored lower than Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan in “Sound Money,” which measures “money growth,” inflation, and freedom to 
own foreign currency bank accounts. 
 
2.4 Intervening Variable 2: Trust in Oil Markets  
 This section examines decision-makers’ overall trust that oil markets can 
adequately provide oil security to the economy. The three major components making up the 
trust variable are investigated separately. They are (1) the presence/absence of NOCs and 
their coherence as securitising/lobbying agents, (2) the domestic context; and (3) the 
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external context that can be used by NOCs for securitization or lobbying. Each of these 
contexts impacts on decision-makers’ risk preferences and belief formation related to the 
trust in the domestic and the international oil markets respectively. At the end, results of 
trust levels generated by these three components are combined to measure the case studies’ 
overall trust levels in the oil markets.  Figure 3.1 below summarises how these three 
components contribute to the overall trust level of an economy in oil markets as detailed in 
the next four sub-sections: 
  
Figure 3.1 Construction of overall trust level in oil markets 
 
2.4.1 Component 1: Securitising Agents  
 NOCs are hypothesised to securitise oil supply issues to justify their existence and 
expand their operations. The more “present” and coherent they are, therefore, the stronger 
their securitising strength is supposed to be. This is hypothesised to lead to a lower the level 
of trust if the contexts of securitising remain constant. According to this reasoning, 
economies with at least one “traditional” NOC are more prone to securitization and are 
generally assigned the lowest score for this component of trust in the market. A traditional 
NOC is defined as one that has been functioning reasonably well in at least one of the major 
sectors of the oil supply chain in that economy in the decade being studied. Economies with 
an untraditional “NOC” or NOCs that were incoherent or inept in securitising receive a 
middling score. Economies without any form of NOCs receive the highest trust score. Table 
3.7 below summarises the securitising agent scores of the nine case-study economies in 2013: 
Political Entity 
Presence of Coherent 
Securitising Agent  
NOC Securitising 
Strength/Trust Score 
China Multiple powerful traditional 
NOCs 
Low/1 
India Multiple powerful traditional 
NOCs 
Low/1 
Indonesia Single powerful traditional NOC Low/1 
Japan Non-traditional NOC Medium/2 
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Philippines Single Weak traditional NOC Medium/2 
Singapore No NOC High/3 
South Korea Single powerful NOC Low/1 
Taiwan Single powerful NOC Low/1 
Thailand Single powerful NOC Low/1 
Table 3.7 NOC Securitising Coherence-Strength and corresponding Trust Core of 
Nine Case-Study Economies in 2013 
 
Most of the contents of the above table should be self-explanatory with the 
discussions detailing these economies’ NOCs or lack thereof in Section 2.1.1 above. Japan 
is assigned the middling score because it had not had a traditional NOC since 2004.69  While 
the Philippines had a traditional NOC PNOC in 2013, it did not produce or procure any 
crude oil.70 
Two thirds or six of the nine case studies received the low trust score for this 
component because they had at least one powerful NOC as of 2013. Japan and the 
Philippines received the middle score because of the reason explained in the last paragraph. 
Singapore was the only one that received a high trust score because it no longer had an NOC 
in the years leading to 2013.  
 
2.4.2 Component 2: Domestic Securitising Context 
 In this section, I measure the evenness and level of economic development of the 
case studies. This is justified because these two aspects together form a major context NOCs 
could use to securitise or lobby their importance in the domestic oil market. Without using 
the terminology, NOCs could co-opt the economic concept of merit goods. According to 
this concept, government provision of these goods, such as primary education, generates 
positive externalities to the whole society.71 The more unequal and poorly developed an 
economy, the more persuasive this argument would be. This is because positive externalities 
are much needed when the basic oil supply needs of a large segment of the population might 
not be adequately served by private oil firms due to lack of profitability. NOCs could easily 
seize the salience of the context to perpetuate their existence. NOC securitisation would be 
especially plausible in societies more used to state intervention in other aspects of public 
lives and more open to non-neoliberalist economic measures.    
 The percentage of the polity’s urban population is used as a proxy for the 
geographical evenness of development. A larger urban population usually indicates a more 
even economic development across the country. While there are urban slums with great 
poverty, the concentration of people itself would facilitate ready markets for private firms. 
This means that it would be easier for the masses to access the oil they need without 
                                                          
69 See footnotes 47 and 48.  
70 See footnote 21. 
71 See footnote 8 and 9 for references of the concept of merit goods.   
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government intervention. Per capita gross domestic products (GDP) are measured to gauge 
the level of economic development. The scores polities receive for these two aspects are 
averaged to generate an overall domestic context trust score. 
 The vulnerability-interaction model predicts that an objective domestic 
environment of relatively even and high level of economic development would make NOCs’ 
attempts to trump up their importance in ensuring supply oil to the poor and/or rural 
population more difficult. This would in turn generate a higher trust level in the functioning 
of a free domestic oil market and a correspondingly high trust score. Conversely, polities 
with a large rural population and/or a low GDP receive a low trust score due to the relevance 
for NOC securitising. Table 3.8 below summarises the domestic securitising conditions and 
resulting trust scores of the nine case studies in 2013. A higher overall domestic context 
trust score denotes a higher level of trust in the functioning of a free domestic oil market.  
 Polity 
Percentage 
of Urban 
Population 
201372 
Level of 
Urbanization/ 
resulting 
trust score73 
Per 
Capita 
GDP 
(PPP) 
2013 in 
US$74 
Level of 
Economic 
Development/ 
resulting trust 
score 
Overall 
Domestic 
Context 
Trust 
Score 
China 53 Medium/2 12,211 Low/1 1.5 
India 32 Low/1 5,268 Low/1 1.0 
Indonesia 52 Low/1 10,011 Low/1 1.0 
Japan 92 High/3 36,618 Medium/2 2.5 
Philippines 45 Low/1 6,588 Low/1 1.0 
Singapore 100 High/3 80,780 High/3 3.0 
South 
Korea 82 High/3 32,664 Medium/2 
2.5 
Taiwan 70 Medium/2 43,600 High/3 2.5 
Thailand 48 Low/1 15,437 Low/1 1.0 
Table 3.8 Urban Population Percentage, Per Capita GDP, and corresponding trust 
scores of Nine Case-Study Economies in 2013 
 
The results show that India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand had the most 
salient overall domestic context for NOCs to securitise their role in their respective domestic 
                                                          
72 The data source, except that of Taiwan, is from the World Bank website, accessed 11 November 
2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS. The data for Taiwan is the latest I 
can find (year 2010). See Social Indicators 2012 (Taipei, Taiwan: The Chinese Statistical Association, 
2013), 280. 
73 The levels of urbanization, economic development, and overall domestic context trust level are 
compiled by using the same method of averaging and standardising the results of all case study 
countries as specified in footnote 62 above. The same is true in all comparative levels thereafter 
unless noted otherwise. 
74  The data source, except that of Taiwan, is from the World Bank website, accessed 10 October 
2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?order=wbapi_data_value_2012+wbapi
_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=desc. The data source for Taiwan is from “The World 
Factbook,” CIA website (estimated 2014 figure),accessed 8 October,  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.  
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oil markets. These four economies, therefore, received the lowest overall domestic context 
trust score. China was a little more urbanised and received a slightly higher overall domestic 
context trust score than those four. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all received the same 
overall domestic score of 2.5 out of the highest possible of 3, signifying they reached a rather 
high level and even economic development. Singapore had the highest domestic context 
trust score because its economic development was at such a high level that securitising about 
the untrustworthiness of the domestic oil markets would be difficult. 
     
2.4.3 Component 3: External Securitising Context 
 This sub-section assesses the overall relations between the case-study polities and 
the United States in 2013. The vulnerability-interaction model hypothesises that these 
relations form the major external context that NOCs and other interested parties could use 
to securitise to lower decision-makers’ trust in solely relying on the international markets to 
fuel their respective economies. The United States has been a hegemonic power and 
dominant player in most international institutions for about 70 years. The most important 
international oil exchanges (markets) and oil price reporting agencies, which have been an 
integral part of the functioning of the current oil-pricing regime, are American firms.75 In 
addition, it is still the only country that has overwhelming naval power to impede the 
physical flow of maritime oil supply to the Asia Pacific.76 If these facts are securitised to be 
                                                          
75 Two of the three major international oil exchanges are U.S. companies. They are the New York 
Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), owned by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group and the 
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), listed on the New York Stock Exchange and headquartered in 
Atlanta, Georgia. See Alex Longley, “In Battle of World’s Biggest Oil Exchanges, One Gets Turbo 
Charge From Export,” Bloomberg website, 7 November 2016. Accessed 27 December 2016, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-08/in-battle-of-oil-exchanges-nymex-gets-
turbo-charge-from-exports.  
The Dubai Mercantile Exchange (DME), where Oman crude oil futures contract, a major 
benchmark for crude oil price in Asia, is owned and operated by Dubai and Oman companies. The 
DME, however, has a “strategic partnership” with the CME to extend its clearing services. This 
likely provides further “proof” of the great reach of American power and doubts of these 
exchanges’ fairness to U.S. adversaries. See “CME Group Strategic Partnership with Dubai 
Mercantile Exchange,” DME website, accessed 27 December 2016, 
http://www.cmegroup.com/international/partnership-resources/dme-resources.html. 
Of the two most important oil reporting agencies, one is U.S. (Platts) and the other is a U.K.-based 
company (Argus Media). For more about the roles played by these agencies and issued associated 
with them in international oil transactions, see “Oil Price Reporting Agencies – Report by IEA, 
IEF, OPEC and IOSCO to G20 Finance Ministers, October 2011.” Website of The International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Accessed 10 October 2016,  
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD364.pdf.  
76 Hughes and Long, “Is There an Oil Weapon?” 173 – 180. China’s naval capability has improved 
dramatically since the 1990s and is described as being able to “conduct high intensity operations” in 
its immediate periphery and “carry out low intensity operations around the world” as of 2013. China 
may possess the naval power to effectively counter any interdiction of maritime oil shipment to China 
in the future, but such capability has not been realised yet. See Craig Murray, Andrew Berglund, and 
Kimberly Hsu, “China’s Naval Modernization and Implications for the United States,” U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Backgrounder August 26, 2013. 
Accessed 20 February 2017,  
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viewed through a zero-sum aggressive economic nationalist lens, they would impact on 
decision-makers’ risk preferences and belief formation on the trustworthiness of the 
international oil markets. This would be especially pertinent for those with negative relations 
with the United States.  
  The case-study polity’s relations with the United States are categorised in three 
descending levels of “closeness” as: formal or de facto allies, friendly-neutral, and neutral-
conflictual in this study. The “closer” or better the relationship was, the higher the trust in 
the international oil markets.  
 China is coded the third category. There has been cooperation between China and 
the United States in such policy areas as reduction in carbon emission and diplomatic 
pressure on the North Korean regime on anti-nuclear proliferation in the last two decades. 
The repeated incidents of military tension between China and the United States or its allies 
during the same period, however, were much more prominent.77 Furthermore, the prospect 
of resolving a number of contentious issues appears dimmer over the years, such as the status 
of Taiwan and claims to sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and other island reefs 
in the South China Sea. Therefore, the relationship between China and the United States is 
classified as the least close of the three categories in this preliminary study. 
 India is only coded as having an overall friendly-neutral relationship with the 
United States between 1994 and 2013. While it signed the “Agreed Minute on Defence 
Relations” in 1995 and the “New Framework for the U.S.-India Defence Relationship” in 
2005,78 these agreements indicate friendly relationships in the military and other domains, 
but are qualitatively different than actual mutual defence treaties some Asian countries have 
with the United States. The latter entail concrete obligations and benefits, not just voluntary 
defence or strategic cooperation. 
 Indonesia and Singapore are also coded as friendly-neutral. Like India, the United 
States considers these two countries “strategic partners,” but not “major non-NATO allies 
(MNNAs).” 79  U.S. relationship with Indonesia has “improved dramatically” since its 
democratic developments in the early 2000s, while the “working defence relationship” with 
                                                          
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Backgrounder_China's%20Naval%20Mode
rnization%20and%20Implications%20for%20the%20United%20States.pdf.  
77 Examples of such incidents during the period studied in this thesis include the Taiwan Strait Crises 
of 1995-96, the EP-3 incident in 2001, and quasi-military forces of China and Japan, Philippines 
confronting and harassing each other in East China Sea since early 2011.  
78 Chidanand Raighatta, “India, US Sign Defence Pact,” Times of India, 29 June 2005, accessed 5 
November 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/India-US-sign-defence-
pact/articleshow/1155838.cms. 
79 On U.S. “strategic partners” in the Asia-Pacific, see Bruce Vaughn, “U.S. Strategic and Defense 
Relationships in the Asia-Pacific Region,” CRS Report for Congress, January 22, 2007, accessed 20 
November 2015, 24, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33821.pdf.  On the list of U.S. major non-
NATO allies, see “22 CFR 120.32 - Major non-NATO ally,” Legal Information Institute, Cornell 
University website, accessed 20 November 2015, https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/22/120.32. 
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Singapore was “formalised” in 2005. 80  Both are put in the middling friendly-neutral 
category. Of course, this does not mean that India, Indonesia, and Singapore had exactly the 
same quality or closeness of relationship with the United States in the decade leading to 
2013. It just means that their relationships belong to the same trichotomous level. 
 Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea are both MNNAs and formal allies and enjoy 
the closest type of relationship with the United States in the Asia Pacific. The formal defence 
treaties between the United States and Japan and with the Philippines were both first signed 
in 1951, and the one with South Korea was signed in 1953.81 The relations between the 
Philippines and the United States seem to deteriorate rapidly after the President Duterte 
came to power in the Philippines in 2016, but that is beyond the scope of this study. Again, 
there was obvious difference in the quality of the relations these three countries had with 
the United State even before 2013, but it was small enough to group them within the same 
trichotomous level. 
 Thailand, too, is both a MNNA and a formal ally.82 Its relations with the United States, 
however, has drifted. This has become obvious even to casual observers after Thailand’s 
latest coup in May 2014, 83  but the decline of the relationship appears to have started 
gradually as far back as the final years of the Cold War.84 There were improvements during 
periods of civilian rule, but this study categorises Thailand as only having a friendly-neutral 
relationship with the United States as of 2013.  
 Taiwan is a special case. The United States is not a formal ally or has even maintained 
an official diplomatic relationship with Taiwan since 1979. In the same year, however, the 
Taiwan Relations Act was enacted, which assures no non-peaceful resolution of the future 
of Taiwan, and U.S. arms sales and defence services to Taiwan.85 In addition, the U.S. Code 
of Federal Regulations as is currently written, states that “Taiwan shall be treated as though 
                                                          
80 Vaughn, 24. 
81 Vaughn, 15. 
82 Ibid.  
83 For a quick review of the U.S.-Thai relationship after the 2014 coup, see Prashantha Parameswaran, 
“Exclusive: Managing the Strained U.S. Thailand Alliance – A look at ongoing efforts to manage 
Washington’s oldest Asian alliance,” The Diplomat, 16 December 2015, accessed 10 accessed 2016, 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/exclusive-managing-the-strained-us-thailand-alliance/.  
84 For a study on the beginning of the changing U.S.-Thai military and broader relationship at the 
beginning of the 1990s, see Kenneth Standley Harbin, “The Expanding Sino-Thai Military 
Relationship: Implications for U.S. Policy in Thailand” (Master Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
1990). For a report on the drift in the last years of the 2000s, see Shawn W. Crispin, “When allies 
drift apart,” 14 February 2009, The Asia Times, accessed 10 April 2016, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KB14Ae01.html. 
85 Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The United States and Taiwan’s Defence Transformation,” 
Brookings website, February 2010, accessed 20 November 2015, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/02/taiwan-defense-huang.  
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it were designated a major non-NATO ally.”86 Therefore, it too is put in the first category 
of relationship with the United States.87 Table 3.9 below summarises the relations between 
the case-study polities and the United States, their salience of the external securitising 
context, as well as the resulting trust level scores throughout the period studied: 
Polity Relations with the United States 
1994-2013 
External Securitising Context 
Salience/Trust Score 
China neutral-conflictual High/1 
India friendly-neutral Medium/2 
Indonesia friendly-neutral Medium/2 
Japan formal ally equivalent Low/3 
Philippines formal ally equivalent Low/3 
Singapore friendly-neutral Medium/2 
South Korea formal ally equivalent Low/3 
Taiwan formal ally equivalent Low/3 
Thailand friendly-neutral Medium/2 
Table 3.9 Relationships with the United States, Salience of External Securitising 
Context, Trust Level Scores of Nine Case-Study Polities 1994-2013  
 
2.4.4 Overall Trust in Oil Markets 
 Decision-makers’ overall levels of trust in oil markets are calculated by adding 
the three sets of trust scores measured above. Table 3.10 below summarises all these results, 
with each component weighted equally. A higher trust score denotes a higher level of overall 
trust, with “3” being the lowest and “9” the highest possible overall score respectively.  
Economy Securitising 
Agent 
Coherence 
Trust Score 
Domestic 
Securitising 
Context 
Trust Score 
External 
Securitising 
Context 
Score 
Overall 
Trust Score 
Overall 
Trust 
Level 
China 1 1.5 1 3.5 Low 
India 1 1.0 2 4.0 Low 
Indonesia 1 1.0 2 4.0 Low 
Japan 2 2.5 3 7.5 High 
Philippines 2 1.0 3 6.0 Medium 
Singapore 3 3.0 2 8.0 High 
S. Korea 1 2.5 3 6.5 High 
Taiwan 1 2.5 3 6.5 High 
Thailand 1 1.0 2 4.0 Low 
Table 3.10 Numeric Representation and Level of Trust in Oil Markets in years 
leading to 2013 
  
                                                          
86 “22 CFR 120.32 - Major non-NATO ally.” Accessed 20 February 2017,  
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/22/120.32.  
87 In spite of the fact that Vaughn’s CRF report only describes Taiwan as having a “key strategic 
relationship” with the United States like Singapore, India, and Indonesia. 
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 China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand had the lowest trichotomous overall trust in 
the oil markets in 2013 among the nine case-study economies. Among them, China had the 
lowest trust score. The Philippines had a medium level of trust and Japan, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan had a high level of trust, with Singapore again scoring the highest. The 
vulnerability-interaction model hypothesises that decision-makers’ level of trust in the oil 
markets is the central ITV that binds the IV and the other ITVs together. Once a trust level 
is formed, however, the corresponding level of strategic oil supply measures can only be 
materialised if the polity possesses the requisite implementation capability. This brings us 
to the last ITV of implementation capability. 
  
2.5 Implementation Capability 
 This section evaluates the case-study states’ capabilities to implement strategic oil 
supply measures in 2013. To do this, I examine three components that make up the case 
studies’ financial capabilities and one proxy presenting their diplomatic capability.88 Finally, 
the degree of centralization of central government authority to effectively make use of the 
implementation capability is factored into consideration. Each of these components are 
detailed in the following three sub-sections. Figure 3.2 below provides a schematic 
representation of the construction of the overall trichotomous implementation capability 
level of each case-study economy. 
 
Figure 3.2 Construction of Overall Implementation Level  
 
 
                                                          
88 In the current globalised and relatively liberalised era, this study simplifies this analytical task by 
not investigating polities’ technical capabilities separately as countries with enough financial 
capabilities would be able to acquire the technology needed through means such as hiring foreign 
experts or setting up joint ventures with foreign companies which possess the technology. 
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2.5.1 Financial Capability 
 States need financial capability to implement both market-displacing and market-
conforming strategic oil supply measures. Capital is needed to set up NOCs; overseas equity 
oil investments are capital-intensive and risky; constructing and filling up SPRs requires 
cash or cash equivalents. So how can states’ financial capability to implement these 
measures be judged? The per capita GDP examined earlier point more to the level of 
economic development of the polity than the actual size of financial resources a state can 
mobilise or the ease with which resources can be put to use at any given time. Since almost 
all international oil transactions during the period studied are denominated in U.S. dollars, 
the size of states’ foreign exchange reserves, especially those in U.S. dollars, would be a 
good way to gauge states’ financial capability to implement strategic oil supply measures in 
the short to medium terms.89   
 Table 3.11 below lists the foreign exchange reserves of the nine case-study economies 
and their trichotomous levels. The higher the level of reserves an economy held in 2013, the 
higher the corresponding implementation score it receives.90 
 Economy Foreign Exchange Reserves in 
201391 
Trichotomous Reserves 
Level/Score 
China $3,880,000,000,000 High/3 
India $298,092,000,000 Medium/2 
Indonesia $99,387,000,000 Low/1 
Japan $1,267,000,000,000 Medium/2 
Philippines $83,182,000,000 Low/1 
Singapore $277,798,000,000 Medium/2 
South Korea $345,694,000,000 Medium/2  
                                                          
89 China has settled oil transactions with Iran in renminbi before 2013, and both India and China 
acquired oil from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries that were not paid in U.S. dollars 
during the Cold War. However, the overwhelming majority of oil supplied to the case-study 
economies during the period studied, including 2013, was denominated in U.S. dollars. See “China 
Buying Oil from Iran with Yuan,” BBC website, 8 May 2012, accessed 10 February 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-17988142; Also see Alastair Crooke, “The Non-Dollar Trading 
Is Killing the Petrodollar – And the Foundation of U.S.-Saudi Policy in the Middle East,” The 
Huffington Post, 2 December 2014, accessed 10 February, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-
crooke/petrodollar-us-saudi-policy_b_6245914.html.  
90 “Hoarding” of foreign exchange reserves enables states to provide low-interest loans to NOCs or 
to implement other strategic oil supply measures effectively in the short to medium terms, which is 
the time horizon of this study and likely that of most decision-makers. Studies suggest that, however, 
such behaviour may weaken the overall financial sector of the economy in the long run. It may also 
engender “competitive hoarding” and lowering of exchange rates of economies, especially those with 
similar export markets. See Jaewoo Lee and Joshua Aizenman, Financial versus Monetary 
Mercantilism: Long-run View of Large International Reserves Hoarding IMF Working Papers 
2006/280 (International Monetary Fund December 2006). 
91The data source, except that of Taiwan, is from the World Bank website, accessed 11 December 
2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FI.RES.TOTL.CD. The data source for Taiwan is from 
“The World Factbook,” CIA website (estimated 2014 figure), accessed 11 February 2016, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2188.html. Both websites stay 
that they count “gold, special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held by the IMF, and holdings 
of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities” in “current U.S. dollars” in tallying 
the reserves amount.  
76 
 
Taiwan $423,900,000,000 Medium/2  
Thailand $167,230,000,000 Medium/2 
Table 3.11     Foreign Exchange Reserves of Nine Case-Study Economies in 2013 
  
 Short of quantitative easing or printing more money, two other common sources of 
financing a national government may draw on to implement strategic oil supply measures 
are various types of internal revenue and issuing sovereign bonds or borrowing.92 This 
project, therefore, also incorporates economies’ performance in these areas to measure their 
financial capabilities. The actual internal revenue available to a national government 
through taxation, fees, and even from its the sale of indigenous oil resources is closely linked 
to the actual size of the economy. The GDP of the case-study economies are used as a proxy 
of states’ financial capability through internal revenue. Table 3.12 below lists the nominal 
GDP of the case study economies and their trichotomous GPD levels and scores. A higher 
score denotes a higher GPD level.  
 Economy Nominal GDP in U.S. 
Dollars in 201393 
Trichotomous GPD Level/Score 
China $9,490,602,600,148 High/3 
India $1,861,801,615,478 Medium/2 
Indonesia $910,478,729,099 Medium/2 
Japan $4,919,563,108,373 High/2 
Philippines $271,927,428,133 Low/1 
Singapore $302,245,904,260 Low/1 
South Korea $1,305,604,981,272 Medium/2 
Taiwan $933,031,437,500 Medium/2 
Thailand $420,166,569,029 Low/1 
Table 3.12 Nine Case-Study Economies’ Nominal GDP in 2013 
 Apart from internal revenue and reserves, an economy can also issue sovereign bonds 
to raise funds. The absolute amount as well as the ease and cost a national government can 
borrow are contingent upon both the size of its economy as well as its credit worthiness, 
which is generated by taking into consideration a whole host of factors incorporated by a 
number of credit rating companies. 94  Table 3.13 below summarises the overall credit 
worthiness of the case-study economies by averaging the ratings given to them by three 
                                                          
92 Printing more money is likely to devalue the currency and discount the actual financial capability 
of the country down the road anyway.  
93 The data source, except that of Taiwan, is from the World Bank website, accessed 12 February 
2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. The data source for Taiwan’s  2013 
figure is from “Real GDP at Constant National Prices for Province of China Taiwan,” Economic 
Research of [U.S.] Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website, accessed 3 January 2017,  
 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RGDPNATWA666NRU.  
94  For a comprehensive understanding of these factors by major credit rating companies, the 
methodologies used, their pitfalls etc., see Ashok Vir Bhatia, “Sovereign Credit Ratings 
Methodologies: An Evaluation,” IMF PWP02/170, October 2002, accessed 12 February 2016,  
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02170.pdf.  
77 
 
major companies, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch.” 95  These ratings are then translated 
numerically according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 24-point “transposition 
scale,” with “1” denoting the most credit-worthy. 96 Therefore, the lower the IMF score an 
economy receives, the higher its trichotomous overall credit worthiness level and score will 
be.  
Economy 
S&P 
Rating 
Moody's 
rating 
Fitch 
Rating 
IMF 
Scale 
Score 
Trichotomous Overall 
Credit Worthiness 
Level/Score97 
China AA- Aa3 A+ 4.3 High/3 
India BBB- Baa3 BBB- 10.0 Low/1 
Indonesia BB+ Baa3 BBB- 10.3 Low/1 
Japan AA- Aa3 A+ 4.3 High/3 
Philippines BB+ Ba1 BB+ 11.0 Low/1 
Singapore AAA Aaa AAA 1.0 High/3 
S. Korea A+ Aa3  4.5 Medium/2 
Taiwan AA- Aa3 A+ 4.3 High/3 
Thailand BBB+ Baa1 BBB 8.3 Medium/2 
Table 3.13 Nine Case-Study Economies’ Credit-Worthiness as of 2013 
  
 The overall financial capabilities of economies are ascertained by combining their 
internal financial capability and the capability to obtain funds externally. Similar to the 
method used to obtain the overall trust in the oil markets’ capability to adequately supply 
oil to these same polity, the three components of the financial capability scores shown in 
Tables 3.11, 12, and 13 above are added up to create the overall financial capability scores, 
with “9” being the highest and “3” the lowest possible score respectively. Table 3.14 below 
summarises these scores the nine case-study economies receive and their respective 
trichotomous overall financial capability levels in 2013:  
Economy Forex 
Reserve 
Nominal 
GDP 
Credit 
Worthiness 
Overall 
Financial 
Capability 
Score 
Trichotomous 
Overall 
Financial 
Capability Level 
China 3 3 3 9 High 
                                                          
95 The source of credit ratings by the three major rating companies is from “Credit ratings: how Fitch, 
Moody’s and S&P rate each country,” The Guardian website, last updated 3 January 2013, accessed 
12 February 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/apr/30/credit-ratings-country-
fitch-moodys-standard.  
96 Bhati, 8. The table on this page gives a “translation” of the different letter grades with the – or + 
signs to 24 whole number grades. I have averaged out the grades if they are not totally equivalent to 
each other according to this IMF formulation, and hence resulting in some countries having a non-
whole number grade. 
97 While the same averaging and standardising procedure is followed to generate these comparative 
levels, the medium level covers those 0.6 instead of 0.5 standardise deviation above and below the 
average IMF scale score. If this minor adjustment is not made, none of the nine economies would be 
considered having a medium level of credit worthiness. 
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India 2 2 1 5 Low 
Indonesia 1 2 1 4 Low 
Japan 2 3 3 8 High 
Philippines 1 1 1 3 Low 
Singapore 2 1 3 6 Medium 
S. Korea 2 2 2 6 Medium 
Taiwan 2 2 3 7 High 
Thailand 2 1 2 5 Low 
Table 3.14 Nine Case-Study Economies’ Overall Financial Capabilities in 2013 
 
2.5.2 Diplomatic Capability 
 Diplomatic capabilities refer to the ability to achieve diplomatic or political 
objectives in major international or regional fora either by supporting or withholding support 
to resolutions or other collective decisions.98 The United Nations (UN) Security Council 
“rests at the heart of the international architecture.”99 It wields relatively great diplomatic 
power as it can impose sanctions, authorise the use of force to maintain or restore peace, 
make recommendation on the appointment of the UN Secretary-General, and elect judges 
of the International Court of Justice.100 There are other diplomatic fora involving political 
entities in the Asia-Pacific, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. None of them, 
however, covers the majority of exporting countries that supply oil to the region, which are 
supposedly the target recipients of diplomatic capability.  
UN Security Council (UNSC) membership is, therefore, used as a proxy of 
diplomatic capability. Countries which are permanent members of the UNSC stay on the 
council for the indefinite future and possess what is termed the “double the veto” power.101 
Therefore, they are deemed as possessing the greatest diplomatic capability. Countries that 
are non-permanent or rotating UNSC members only serve a term of two years at a time and 
they do not possess any veto power by themselves.102 During their tenure, however, non-
permanent member countries do possess more power over general members of the UN. 
Political entities which are not UN general members have the least diplomatic clout. Table 
                                                          
98 Some possible cases of such use of diplomatic capability in connection with Sudan and Iran that 
has been examined. Regardless the merit of individual claims, if an oil importing country is in 
possession of such diplomatic capability, there is always the possibility that it can use it accordingly 
upon consideration of the costs and benefits of its application.  
99 Fakiha Mahmood, “Power Versus the Sovereign Equality of States: The Veto, the P-5 and United 
Nations Security Council Reforms,” Perceptions, 18-4 (Winter 2013), 117. 
100 “The Security Council,” UN website, accessed 15 February 2016, http://www.un.org/en/sc/. 
101 This means they can both veto any “substantive” decisions discussed in the Security Council as 
well as determining which decisions are “substantive” or “procedural.” Ibid., 126. Also see Hans 
Köchler, “The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council – Examining a Normative 
Contradiction in the UN Charter and its Consequences on International Relations," 18-20. Accessed 
15 February 2016, http://www.i-p-o.org/Koechler-Voting_Procedure-UN_Security_Council.pdf.  
102 “Charter of the United Nations – Chapter V,” UN websites, accessed 15 February 2016, 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/.  
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3.15 below summarises the results for the nine case study polities in 2013, “4” denoting the 
greatest and “1” the least capability:  
Polity 
UNSC Membership in 
2013 
Diplomatic 
Capability 
Score 
Trichotomous 
Diplomatic Capability 
Level 
China Permanent 4 High 
India Non-Permanent103  3 High 
Indonesia None104 2 Medium 
Japan None 2 Medium 
Philippines None 2 Medium 
Singapore None 2 Medium 
S. Korea Non-Permanent105 3 High 
Taiwan Non-UN Member 106  1 Low 
Thailand None 2 Medium 
Table 3.15 Nine Case-Study Polities’ Diplomatic Capability in 2013 
 
2.5.3 Overall Implementation Capability 
 To ascertain the case studies’ overall capability to implement oil supply capabilities 
as of 2013, this sub-section first combines their overall financial capability scores with their 
diplomatic capability scores to generate the overall implementation scores. Table 3.16 below 
recaps these scores and shows each case study’s sum as its overall implementation capability 
score in 2013 and its corresponding overall implementation capability level, with “13” being 
the highest and “4” the lowest possible score respectively:  
Polity 
Overall 
Financial 
Capability 
Score 
Diplomatic 
Capability 
Score 
Overall 
Implementation 
Capability Score 
Overall 
Implementation 
Capability Level 
China 9 4 13 High 
India 5 3 8 Medium 
Indonesia 4 2 6 Low 
Japan 8 2 10 High 
Philippines 3 2 5 Low 
Singapore 6 2 8 Medium 
S. Korea 6 3 9 Medium 
Taiwan 7 1 8 Medium 
Thailand 5 2 7 Medium 
                                                          
103 It is not one of the five permanent members (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China), 
but it is a non-permanent member in 2011-12. The years are very close to 2013 and would have an 
impact on its oil diplomacy immediately preceding 2013. See “Members of the Security Council in 
2013,” UN website, accessed 15 February 2016, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp.  
104 Indonesia and the five “none” cases were either permanent nor non-permanent members around 
2013. Ibid.  
105 Ibid. 
106 Taiwan or the Republic of China has not been a UN member since 1971. For a history of its UN 
membership vis-à-vis that of China (People’s Republic) and its diplomatic consequences, see Sigrid 
Winkler, “Taiwan’s UN Dilemma: To Be or Not To Be,” Brookings Institute website, accessed 15 
February 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/06/20-taiwan-un-winkler.  
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Table 3.16 Nine Case-Study Polities’ Overall Implementation Capability in 2013 
 
 Finally, factoring in the concept of the centralization of authority to effectively 
mobilise the material capabilities an economy possesses, the nine case studies are 
categorised according to their regime types. The three designations of “autocracy,” 
“democracy,” or “anocracy” these polities received for 2013 are translated into trichotomous 
scores.107 I argue that it is generally easier and faster for central-level decision-makers in 
autocracies to implement executive decisions as they do not have to be directly or formally 
accountable to other branches of government, such as an elected legislature or an 
independent judiciary.108 Autocracies, therefore, receive the highest score that denotes the 
highest centralization of authority, “3.” On the other hand, due to the supposedly unstable 
and inefficient nature of anocracies,109 the opposite is true for them and they receive a 
centralization score of “1.” 110  Democracies fall between the two. This reasoning only 
suggests the greater short-term capability of autocracies to execute strategic oil supply 
measures. It does not imply that autocracies are inherently stronger or more stable. Table 
3.17 below shows the overall implementation scores after the degree of centralization of 
authority is factored in:  
Polity 
Overall 
Implementation 
Capability 
Score 
Regime 111 
Type 
Centraliz-
ation Score 
Overall 
Implementation 
Capability Score 
with degree of 
centralization 
Trichotomous 
Implementation 
Capability Level 
with degree of 
centralization 
China 13 Autocracy 3 16 High 
India 8 Democracy 2 10 Medium 
                                                          
107 On the “Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2013” webpage, polities are divided 
into seven regime types, but only four of them were assigned to the case-study polities in this project. 
They are: Full Democracy, Democracy, Closed Anocracy, and Autocracy. See 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm, accessed 13 February 2016. However, on the 
“About Polity” webpage, the Polity score regime types are categorised as “autocracies,” “anocracies,” 
and “democracies” only. This fits well with the trichotomous categorization of variables in this 
project and so are adopted. Basically, the categories of full democracy and democracy are merged. 
See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html, accessed 13 February 2016. 
108 This argument does not contradict Kong and Andrews-Speed et al’s findings that there are 
multiple sources of energy policy decision making bodies in China. It only argues that if all things 
remain equal, an autocracy like China should be able to execute its capability more efficiently than a 
democracy like India or Japan.  
109 For a discussion of the characteristics and characterization of these regime types by the Polity IV 
project, including anocracies, see Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, Global Report 2014 – 
Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2014). 20-22. 
110 Among the case-study polities, Singapore is the only one designated as an anocracy in 2013 by 
the Polity IV project. This appears to be contradictory to the common impression of the very high 
efficiency of the Singaporean government. Singapore is apparently an anomaly among anocracies in 
other regards as well. It is also the only non-democracy that receives a “fragility score” of 2 or lower, 
which speaks for its relative stability. Ibid., 49-51.   
111  Only three case-study countries’ regime types in 2013 are slightly simplified from their 
designation on the Polity IV website: both Japan and Taiwan are originally designated “Full 
Democracy,” while Singapore “Closed Anocracy.” See “Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 
1946-2013,” http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm.  
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Indonesia 6 Democracy 2 8 Low 
Japan 10 Democracy 2 12 High 
Philippines 5 Democracy 2 7 Low 
Singapore 8 Anocracy 1 9 Medium 
S. Korea 9 Democracy 2 11 Medium 
Taiwan 8 Democracy 2 10 Medium 
Thailand 7 Democracy 2 9 Medium 
Table 3.17 Case-Study Economies’ Overall Capability Incorporating Degrees of 
Centralization as of 2013 
 
A comparison between the far right columns of Tables 3.16 and 3.17 shows that 
the trichotomous implementation capability levels of the nine case-study polities remain the 
same with or without incorporating the centralization scores. This does not mean that the 
degree of centralization of authority is superfluous to states’ capabilities to implement 
strategic oil supply measures. The distribution of the attributes and capabilities of these nine 
case-study economies in 2013 just happens to render these comparative trichotomous levels 
the same with or without factoring in the degree of centralization of authority of their 
national governments.112  
China had the highest financial as well as diplomatic capabilities in 2013 among 
the nine case-study economies. It was also the only one coded as an autocracy and so 
received the highest centralization score. Therefore, it had a high overall implementation 
capability level and its overall implementation score was considerably higher than Japan’s, 
the only other case study that reached a trichotomously high implementation capability.  
India, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand all had a medium 
implementation level. South Korea had the highest overall implementation score among 
these five, with India and Taiwan following closely behind. Taiwan’s unusually low 
diplomatic capability score and Singapore’s relatively small economy in absolute terms 
prevented them from scoring higher, but even adding one more point to their respective 
overall scores would not have changed their trichotomous capability level. Indonesia and 
the Philippines had a low implementation capability level, mainly due to their unimpressive 
financial capabilities.   
The results of this ITV used to examine the validity of the H1 to H4 in this 
plausibility probe, as shown on Table 3.17, appear to match the general expectation of the 
actual capabilities of these polities as of 2013. China was the most powerful, followed by 
                                                          
112 Singapore’s trichotomous overall implementation capability level with the degree of 
centralization factored in would remain unchanged as medium among these same case-study 
polities, even if its centralization score is changed to that representing either democracy or 
autocracy. If Singapore is coded as either an autocracy or a democracy, however, Thailand’s overall 
implementation capability would be downgraded to “low,” but the levels of all the other polities 
would remain the same. See the calculation of all three scenarios in Table A4, Appendix B. 
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Japan, South Korea, and then India. The Philippines was the least capable among this cohort, 
followed by Indonesia. Evidence more specific to the implementation capability of strategic 
oil supply measures is analysed in cases chosen for in-depth investigations in Chapters Four 
and Five. 
 
3. Preliminary Results of Cross-Case Study 
 The results of the plausibility probe in the previous section show that the overall 
validity of H1 and H2 with 2013 data reaches 67%. These preliminary results show good 
support to the vulnerability-interaction. Section 5 as well as the concluding section of this 
chapter more comprehensively review the overall validity of the model and compares it to 
theories adopting the Realist/geopolitical perspective.  
 Table 3.18 below summarises the trichotomous levels of all the variables, that is 
DV, IV, and all three ITVs of the nine case-study economies in 2013:  
Economy DV Level  
OV (IV) 
Level 
Strength of 
Private 
Capital 
Overall 
Trust in Oil 
Markets 
Overall 
Implementation 
Capability 
China High Low Low Low High 
India Medium Low Low Low Medium 
Indonesia High Low Medium Low Low 
Japan Medium High High High High 
Philippines Low Medium Medium Medium Low 
Singapore Low High High High Medium 
S. Korea Medium Medium Medium High Medium 
Taiwan  High Medium High High Medium 
Thailand Medium Low Low Low Medium 
Table 3.18 Trichotomous Levels of All Variables for Nine Case-Study Economies 
in 2013  
 
 Among the 36 paired comparisons generated from the nine case-study economies, 
one pair, India and Thailand (bolded in Table 3.18), has the parameters of H1, that is, all 
four explanatory variables having the same level. Their DV levels are also the same, which 
is congruent with the expectation of H1.113  
The parameters of H2 call for different levels in one of the four explanatory variables 
only. Five pairs of economies emerge with this condition.114 Three out of these five pairs, 
that is 60% of the cases, are congruent with the expectation of H2: the only explanatory 
variable that had a substantive difference in level explained the substantive difference in the 
pair’s DV levels. Table 3.19 below summarises the data for these five pairs of economies:  
 
                                                          
113 For a complete list of all 36 pairs comparisons and the differences in their explanatory factors 
and DV levels, see Table A5 in Appendix B. 
114 Ibid. 
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Five Pairs of Economies Having Different Levels in One Explanatory Factor Only: 
Economies Difference in DV Congruent with model? 
China and India One Level Yes 
China and Thailand One Level Yes 
Japan and Singapore One Level  Yes 
Singapore and Taiwan Two Levels No 
South Korea and Taiwan One Level No 
Table 3.19 Economies Having Different Levels in One Explanatory Factor Only in 
2013 
 
 The only difference in the four explanatory variables between China and 
India is that China has a higher implementation capability. As predicted by H2, China indeed 
adopted a higher level of strategic oil supply measures than India in 2013. The same is true 
for the pair of China and Thailand. The only difference in the four explanatory variables 
between Japan and Singapore is that Japan had a higher implementation capability. 
Congruent with the expectation of H2, Japan adopted a higher level of strategic oil supply 
measures than Singapore in 2013. Taiwan had a lower OV level than Singapore as of 2013, 
but it adopted two levels higher of strategic of supply measures. Therefore, this pair of cases 
are incongruent with the expectation of the reasoning of the vulnerability-interaction model. 
In the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, the freer Taiwanese economy did not lead it to 
adopt to a lower level of strategic oil supply measures than South Korea did. The results of 
both pairs suggest that Taiwan is the source of incongruity to the model. It appears to have 
an unusually high DV level relative to the levels of its explanatory factors among the case-
study economies. 
The overall congruence rate of the cross-case dimension of the first layer of the 
vulnerability-interaction model reaches 67%. A total of six pairs of economies emerge with 
the parameters stipulated in H1 or H2. One pair, India and Thailand, has all variables at the 
same level and so is congruent with the expectation of H1. Five pairs fulfill the conditions 
of H2. Three of the five pairs, or 60% of the cases, are congruent with the expectation by 
H2.  
 
4. Cross-Temporal Comparisons of H1 and H2 
The first layer of the vulnerability-interaction model explains changes in outcomes 
both across economies and over time. Section 2 of this chapter presents a preliminary cross-
case study of H1 and H2. This section focuses on the cross-temporal dimension of these two 
hypotheses. Data for year 2003 is chosen for comparison with those in 2013. Oil prices were 
relatively low in the decade immediately preceding 2003. They trended upward in the next 
decade with only a slight dip during the great financial crisis of 2009 and 2010. Many 
strategic oil supply measures, including the two used to make up the DV value in this study, 
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have relative long time lags in implementation. Therefore, comparing the values of the 
variables in 2003 with those in 2013 offers an opportunity to observe the extent oil prices, 
factored in the OV calculations of economies, may impact on policymakers’ decision to 
implement strategic oil supply measures.  
Table 3.20 below summarises changes in the values as well as levels of all the 
variables in the nine within-case studies and the preliminary cross-temporal validity of H1 
and H2, using the same nine case-study economies in the cross-case study in Section 2. 
Changes to the values of the variables up to ±10% from 2003 to 2013 is considered having 
the same trichotomous level.115  
Economy DV Level  OV (IV) Level 
Private Capital 
Strength 
Trust in Oil 
Markets 
Implementation 
Capability 
China 2003 49.78 16.26 56.25 3.00 15.00 
China 2013 54.22 23.18 58.45 3.50 16.00 
% changed (+8.92%) 4.44  (+42.56%) 6.92  (+3.91%) 2.20  (+16.67%) 0.50 (+6.67%) 1.00 
Probably 
Congruent Same Higher Same Higher Same 
India 2003 24.15 27.17 57.75 4.00 9.00 
India 2013 22.64 28.15 60.90 4.00 10.00 
% changed  (-6.25%) -1.52 (+3.61%) 0.98  (+5.45%) 3.15  0.00 (+11.11%) 1.00 
Probably 
Congruent Same Same Same Same Higher 
Indonesia 2003 105.56 12.51 56.55 4.00 8.00 
Indonesia 2013 63.06 21.90 65.10 4.00 8.00 
% changed (-40.26%) -42.5  (+75.06%) 9.39 (+15.12%) 8.55  0.00 0.00 
Probably 
Incongruent Lower Higher Higher Same Same 
Japan 2003 28.83 40.80 68.15 8.00 12.00 
Japan 2013 28.83 38.80 73.70 7.50 12.00 
% changed 0.00 (-4.90%) -2.00  (+8.14%) 5.55  (-6.25%) -0.50 0.00 
Congruent Same Same Same Same Same 
Philippines 2003 1.28 38.82 62.55 5.50 7.00 
Philippines 2013 2.50 33.91 65.40 6.00 7.00 
% changed (+95.31%) 1.22  (-12.65) -4.91  (+4.56) 2.85  (9.09%) 0.50 0.00 
Incongruent Higher Lower Same Same Same 
Singapore 2003  0.00 48.04 86.95 8.00 10.00 
Singapore 2013 0.00 47.66 86.65 8.00 9.00 
% changed 0.00 (-0.79%) -0.38  (-0.35%) -0.30  0.00 (-10.00%)-1.00 
Congruent Same Same Same Same Same 
S. Korea 2003 14.48 39.18 68.90 6.50 11.00 
S. Korea 2013 38.39 36.44 71.55 6.50 11.00 
% changed (+165.12%) 23.91  (-6.99%) -2.74  (+3.85%) 2.65  0.00 0.00 
Incongruent Higher Same Same Same Same 
Taiwan 2003 64.00 37.59 71.30 6.50 10.00 
                                                          
115 I argue that a total 20% movement (±10%) within each trichotomous level on a 100% scale is 
reasonable since it is well within the 33% boundaries of three evenly distributed groups.  
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Taiwan 2013 47.00 35.36 76.15 6.50 10.00 
% changed  (-26.56%) -17.00  (-5.93%) -2.23  (+6.80%) 4.85 0.00 0.00 
Probably 
Congruent Lower Same Same Same Same 
Thailand 2003 44.39 31.89 64.85 4.50 8.00 
Thailand 2013 27.39 28.11 64.60 4.50 9.00 
% changed  (-38.30%) -17.00  (-11.85%) -3.78  (-0.39%)- 0.25 0.00 (+12.50) 1.00 
Probably 
Congruent Lower Lower Same Same Higher 
Table 3.20 Nine Within-Case Comparisons of DV, OV, and ITV Levels in 2003 and 
2013 
 
The table above shows that Japan and Singapore are congruent with the 
expectations of H1.  China, India, Taiwan, and Thailand are also likely to be congruent to 
the reasoning of the proposed model. Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea are 
incongruent, with South Korea being the truly deviant case. The results of each of these 
within-case studies are further discussed below. 
All four explanatory variables as well as the DV levels of Japan and Singapore 
between 2003 and 2013 remain unchanged. Therefore, their situations match the 
expectations of H1. Japan’s slightly lower “trust in oil markets” score in 2013 is the result 
of its slow per capita GDP growth compared to some of the fast rising ones among its Asian 
cohorts. Japan’s relatively lower GDP growth in turn lowers its domestic context trust score 
slightly. If this had any bearing on policymakers’ decision in intervening in the economy’s 
oil supply, the effect was likely neutralised by the greater economic freedom of the country, 
and hence the greater strength private capital attained. It appears that the aggressive energy 
conservation and energy efficiency measures implemented over the decade and especially 
after the shutdown of nuclear power plants in Japan after 2011 have successfully contained 
the potential rise in oil consumption caused by the nuclear disaster.116    
Singapore’s lower overall implementation capability (but still within the same 
trichotomous level as defined in this study) is due to a drop in its diplomatic capability score 
as it no longer held the UNSC rotating membership in the decade leading to 2013.117 The 
very high historical-institutional economic freedom built in the system of Singapore, as 
                                                          
116 There was a small spike in the oil consumed in Japan in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear 
disaster, that is from 2011 to 2012 (6.6% or from 203.6 to 217 million tons – MT). Japan’s oil 
consumption, however, continued to drop in the years since: 208MT in 2013, 197.3MT in 2014, and 
189.6MT in 2015. See BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016, 11. Accessed 10 December 
2016,  
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2016/bp-statistical-
review-of-world-energy-2016-full-report.pdf.  
117 It was a UNSC non-permanent member between 2001 and 2002. See “Countries Elected Members 
of the Security Council,” United Nations website. Accessed 2 December 2016, 
 http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp.  
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confirmed by the almost non-existent strategic oil supply measures it adopted by 2003,118 
renders this drop in potential oil diplomacy capability irrelevant.     
The 2003 and 2013 situations in China appear to be concordant with the reasoning 
of the vulnerability-interaction model. China’s OV increased considerably over the decade 
studied due to its rapid decline in oil self-sufficiency rate. The effect the increased OV had 
on the DV, however, would be somewhat tempered by the slightly greater economic 
freedom, and hence greater strength of private capital, and its higher trust level in oil markets. 
China’s higher urbanization rate and per capita GDP boosted its domestic context trust score, 
and hence its overall trust score. Of course, these increases are small compared to that of the 
OV. The DV value, therefore, did end up higher. The higher DV value was due to the larger 
size of its SPR over the decade. The high baseline control (100%) the Chinese state had over 
the oil supply to the economy in and before 2003 also contributes to the relatively small 
increase in its DV value in 2013. The slight increase in China’s implementation capability 
in this study was due to its improved credit-worthiness.  
At first glance, India’s situation is incongruent with the expectation of H2. The 
trichotomous levels of only one of the four explanatory factors, implementation capability, 
slightly increased over the decade. According to H2, the DV level should also change in the 
direction predicted by the reasoning of the vulnerability-interaction model. In this case, the 
DV level should have gone up, not remaining at the same level. Upon closer examination, 
India’s case is in fact congruent to the spirit, if not the letter, of the proposed model. The 
source of the slight increase in its implementation capability is its two-year UNSC rotating 
membership in the years leading to 2013.119 This is a relatively fleeting boost in diplomatic 
capability. In the meantime, its overall economic freedom, and hence private capital strength, 
increased slightly (but stay within the same trichotomous levels). The same is true for its 
OV. The fact that its DV value was slightly lower and again stayed within the same 
trichotomous level suggests that India’s freer overall economy had a greater impact on the 
strategic oil supply measures adopted. Indeed, the slightly lower DV value was due to the 
slightly lower percentage of government ownership in India’s NOCs. The divestment 
process was very slow, but did move forward. The more market-conforming strategic oil 
supply measure of building an SPR, which had been discussed for a long time, has not 
materialised by 2013, which is a testament to India’s relatively low overall implementation 
capability.   
The situation of Taiwan is similar to India, but in relation to H1. Its four explanatory 
variables remain at the same trichotomous levels, but its DV level was lower, apparently 
                                                          
118 It scored zero on the strategic oil supply indicator in 2003 as the state has already sold off its 
ownership in its NOC, the Singapore Petroleum Company, and did not hold any SPR.  
119 See footnote 102 above.  
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incongruent to the expectation of H1, which states that the DV level should remain the same 
under such a circumstance. Again, upon closer examination, the situation does not seem that 
incongruent any more. The vulnerability-interaction model posits that both the slight 
increase in economic freedom and decrease in OV would lower the strategic oil measures a 
state would adopt. The disproportionally large decrease in Taiwan’s DV value reflects its 
relatively fast downstream oil sector liberalization over the decade, thus lowering the 
percentage of crude oil supplied to the economy by its NOC, the CPC Corporation.  
In the case of Taiwan, neither its higher economic freedom nor its lower OV was 
large enough by themselves to change to a different trichotomous level. Since these two 
changes are both hypothesised to lead to the adoption of fewer strategic of supply measures, 
or a lower DV, together, the DV reading of Taiwan dropped enough to a trichotomously 
lower level. Taiwan’s case, therefore, is congruent to the spirit of the vulnerability-
interaction model and points to a way to refine its prediction. Taiwan’s case suggests that 
when two or more explanatory variables change in a direction that is supposed to contribute 
to the same direction of change in the DV, they would interact to produce a larger effect on 
the DV than the degrees of change in the individual explanatory variables. 
The liberalisation of the Thai oil sector also led to a considerably lower DV value 
of the country over the same period, but through a lower percentage of government 
ownership in the Thai NOC PTT. Two of Thailand’s explanatory factors changed levels and 
so the vulnerability-interaction model is not specified enough to predict the interaction 
effects of the changes. Still, it can be reasonably argued that Thailand’s situation appears to 
be congruent to the spirit of the model. Thailand’s lower OV is a combination of a 74% 
increase in indigenous oil production and its GDP rise, which lowered the per capita import 
cost of oil into the Thai economy. The impressive increase in oil production was at least 
partially caused by its oil sector liberalisation. Thailand’s implementation capability 
increased because its foreign exchange reserves almost quadrupled in 10 years. Similar to, 
but to a greater extent than, the case of India, a slight increase in capability without any 
change in the overall trust level in the oil markets, does not seem to have much impact on 
the Thai DV level. Consistent with the reasoning of the vulnerability-interaction model, in 
the case of Thailand, the drop in OV level is the decisive factor.120 
 
4.1 Within-Case Studies Inconsistent With Cross-Temporal Expectations of H1 
and H2 
A higher level of overall economic freedom should lower the country’s DV level 
while an increase in OV level should have the opposite effect. The effect on the DV when 
                                                          
120 In the case of India, the increase in OV is very small and there is a greater, although still small, 
increase in overall economic freedom which would have a countervailing effect.   
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both of these conditions occur at the same time cannot be specified at this point. Indonesia’s 
OV increased more than 75% over the decade. In fact, with an OV value of just over “12” 
in 2003, Indonesia had barely become a net oil importing economy as defined by this 
study.121 Such an increase should raise the DV level of the country, even with the country’s 
freer economy.122 Instead, there is a considerable decrease in Indonesia’s DV value. At first 
glance, therefore, it should be considered incongruent with the reasoning of the proposed 
model.  
The main source of the dramatic increase in Indonesia’s OV is its simultaneously 
lower oil production and higher oil consumption. Ironically, these same dynamics also lead 
to the decrease in the DV level in the unique case of Indonesia. The state continued to have 
a 100% control in the country’s crude oil supply through the state monopoly in refining 
capacity. Indonesia, did not have a separate SPR. Instead, the same operating stock of 20-
day oil demand kept by its NOC is counted as the country’s “SPR” in both 2003 and 2013. 
With the country’s much lower oil self-sufficiency rate in 2013, however, the same 20-day 
worth of demand stock was equivalent to only 47 days oil import amount versus the 200-
day equivalent in 2003.123 In fact, within the parameters of this preliminary study, the only 
way Indonesia could have increased its DV value would be to either build a large SPR or 
mandate a much higher operating stock of its NOC. It appears that neither was within the 
capability of the country.  
 On the surface, the case of the Philippines is incongruent with the expectation of 
H2. Among the four explanatory factors, only its OV level changed. Its lower OV level 
should result in a lower DV level according to the expectation of H2. Instead, it shot up over 
95%. As with Indonesia, this case is a little more complicated than it initially appears. First 
of all, the Philippines’ slightly higher trust score as well as its slightly higher economic 
freedom score should lower its DV value. The Philippines’ NOC became a less coherent oil 
securitising agent due to further liberalization of the Philippine oil sector, which has started 
in the 1990s when oil prices were low.124 This slightly increased the country’s overall trust 
score according to the reasoning of the proposed model. By 2009, after completely divested 
                                                          
121 A net oil importing state is defined as one having an OV value of over 10. See footnote 71 in 
Chapter Two. For the calculation of Indonesia’s and other case-studies’ 2003 OV, see Table A8, 
Appendix B. 
122 The vulnerability-interaction model does not predict proportional changes in explanatory factors 
and DV values to begin with.  
123 As explained in section 2.1 in this chapter, it is the equivalent number of days of oil import that is 
used to calculate the size of an economy’s SPR in this study as is also stipulated by the IEA. 
124 The privatization of major oil refining company in the Philippines, Petron Corporation started in 
1994 and by 2003, PNOC owned 40% of it, while Saudi-Aramco, the NOC of a major oil producer, 
Saudi Arabia, owned another 40% and the public owned the remaining 20%. See PNOC – The Energy 
Company – 1973 – 2003 30th Anniversary Report, 23. 
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its shares in the country’s major refinery, Petron, PNOC, the Philippine NOC no longer 
control the crude oil supply to the economy.125  
Ironically, the Philippines’ great increase in DV value was due to private oil firms’ 
development of the indigenous resources, not greater direct control of it by PNOC or its 
upstream subsidiary PNOC EC. The greater amount of oil produced over the decade 
indirectly increased the government’s theoretical “control” of them through the same 60% 
the government share of the oil developed.126 In reality, the government likely only collected 
60% of the proceeds from the oil developed, not take the oil in kind.127  This increased 
production together with a simultaneously lower consumption caused a drop in the 
economy’s OV.128  
The case of South Korea is definitely incongruent with the expectation of H1. All 
of its explanatory factors remained at the same level over the decade, and H1 predicts that 
its DV should also remain the same. Instead, it shot up over 165% during the timeframe 
reviewed here. Unlike the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines, the increase in Korea’s 
DV level appears to be due to active government actions to have greater control over the 
economy’s oil supply and its upstream oil sector.129 Both the oil developed by its NOC the 
KNOC and the size of its SPR, the two DV component measures used in this plausibility 
probe, increased considerably.130 In the meantime, its overall economic freedom increased 
slightly and its OV slightly decreased. Both of these conditions are supposed to lower the 
value, if not the level, of its DV. The situations of South Korea during the period studied, 
therefore, present a true deviant case not only to the cross-temporal applicability of H1, but 
also among the nine case-study economies.  
                                                          
125  “Our History,” Petron website. Accessed 12 October 2016,  http://www.petron.com/about-
history.html. Also see Elizabeth Sanchez-Lacson and Abigail L. Ho, “San Miguel tightens grip on 
Petron,” Philippine Daily Inquirer December 24, 2008. Accessed 12 October 2016,  
http://archive.is/IDGC.  
126 That is how the Philippines’ state control of oil supply was calculated in this study. See Table 3.1 
above and Table A8, Appendix B. 
127 See Section X of the Philippine Department of Energy model petroleum service contract, which 
discusses these two possibilities regarding the proceeds of oil production.  
128 It is unclear whether conservation measures, unaffordability or other unknown reasons caused the 
drop in oil consumption in the Philippines over the decade studied. 
129  This apparently is inconsistant with the “Low carbon, Green Growth” and “market-based” 
approach declared in South Korea first national energy plan in 2008. See Woo Jin Chung, “Update 
on ROK Energy Sector and Energy Policies,” Nautilus Institute and Korea Energy Economics 
Institute, 22 July 2014, 1. 
130 KNOC produced about 9% of oil consumed in South Korea in 2012-13 and about 1.7% in 2005, 
which is the closest year to 2003 figure located. See KNOC Annual Report 2013, 18 and KNOC 
Annual Report 2005, 15. The size of its SPR was equivalent to about 122 days of demand (which is 
almost the same as import in the case of South Korea) in 2013 and about 49 days in 2003. For the 
2013 figure, see Energy Supply Security – Emergency Response of IEA Countries 2014 (Paris: 
International Energy Agency, 2014), 296. For the 2003 figure, see Eui-Soon Shin, “Joint Stockpiling 
and Emergency Sharing of Oil: Update on Situations in the ROK and on Arrangements for Regional 
Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” (Powerpoint presented at the Asian Energy Security Workshop May 
13 -16, 2005, Beijing China), Slide 14. 
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This chapter’s concluding section applies alternative theories to see if any of them 
better explain the case of South Korea as well as other cases in the plausibility probe. The 
following section summarises the overall plausibility of the different dimensions and 
hypotheses of the vulnerability-interaction model. 
 
5. Overall Validity of Vulnerability-Interaction Model 
This chapter has employed structured and focused comparisons to examine all the 
variables of the vulnerability-interaction model in nine case-study economies to 
preliminarily probe its plausibility before exerting more intensive effort to investigate a few 
more promising cases relevant to further development of the model. The data show that 
overall the model is plausible and worthy of further investigation of its validity and 
refinement in the following chapters as described below.  
 
2.2 Validity of H1 and H2 
The first layer of the vulnerability-interaction model is designed to answer the first 
research question of what explains the variations in the levels of strategic oil supply 
measures adopted by the oil importing economies. The cross-case dimension of H1 and H2 
specifically tries to explain the variations among these economies at the same period of time. 
The overall cross-case validity of H1 and H2 is 67% with 2013 data.  
 As discussed in Section 3 above, the pair of economies that has all four 
explanatory factors (IV & ITVs) at the same levels in 2013 is India and Thailand. These two 
economies also have the same level of DV. Therefore, they match the parameters of H1 and 
are selected to conduct an in-depth investigation of the cross-case validity of H1 in Chapter 
Four of this thesis. There are great differences between India and Thailand, including the 
relative sizes of their populations, land areas, and economic conditions, as well as other 
possible factors that may explain the levels of strategic oil supply measures they adopted. 
The similar results of all the levels of all their variables as presented on Table 3.18, therefore, 
fits the requirements of the most different research design.131 
Five paired comparisons emerged with the parameters of H2, that is, only one pair of 
the four explanatory variables has different levels. Three of these five pairs, or 60% of the 
cases, have DV levels consistent with the reasoning of the vulnerability-interaction model 
as detailed Table 3.19 above. The cross-case dimension of H2 alone, therefore, has a 
congruence rate of 60%.  
                                                          
131  For a discussion of how the “most different” research design expands the applicability of 
controlled comparisons, see George and Bennett, 164-165. For a discussion of the “least likely” cases, 
see John Gerring, “Is There a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method?” Comparative Political Studies, 40-3 
(March 2007), 233-237. 
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Among these three pairs of candidates, China and India are the best cases to further 
investigate the cross-case validity of H2 in Chapter Four. First, as pointed out earlier, H2 
suggests the one differing explanatory factor would demonstrate the logic of the proposed 
model. Therefore, it would be easier to examine this if both the DV and explanatory factor 
levels of the economies concerned are greater. Although all candidate pairs listed in Table 
3.19 only have a one- but not two-level difference in their respective explanatory factor, the 
extents of the actual differences between the scores of the explanatory factor in question do 
vary. As indicated in Table 3.21 below, China and India have the greatest difference in their 
DV values among the three pairs of economies with outcomes that are congruent with the 
propositions of the vulnerability-interaction model, which are in boldface. Although the 
difference between the explanatory variable between China and Thailand is greater than that 
between China and India, China and India are more similar in a number of aspects than the 
other pairs. The absolute sizes of China and India’s economies, populations, and geographic 
areas, for example, are relatively similar. This would minimise the number of confounding 
factors that may have a bearing on their DV levels, which serves to further the conditions 
for a “most similar cases” comparison inherent in the logic of H2. 
Economies Having One-Level Difference in One Explanatory Factor Only: 
Economies Standard Deviation in DV Standard Deviation in 
Explanatory Factor 
China and India 1.46  2.25 
China and Thailand 1.24  2.63 
Japan and Singapore 1.33 1.23 
Singapore and Taiwan 2.17 1.51 
South Korea and 
Taiwan 
0.40 0.52 
Table 3.21 Difference in DV and Explanatory Factor by Standard Deviation 
Among H2 Candidate Pairs in 2013 
 
5.1.1 Cross-Temporal Validity of H1 and H2 
The vulnerability-interaction model posits that the same explanatory variables 
should also explain variations of the level of strategic oil supply measures adopted within 
the same economy over different periods. H1 and H2, therefore, also have a cross-temporal 
dimension. Section 4 tests this dimension with nine within-case studies with 2003 and 2013 
data. Four of the nine cases, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan emerge with H1 
parameters. Japan and Singapore had the same DV level over the decade studied and so are 
congruent with the expectation of H1. South Korea had a higher DV level and is a deviant 
case. Taiwan’s case appears to be consistent with the spirit, but not the strict conditions of 
H1 as it has a lower DV level. Even without counting Taiwan, the cross-temporal 
congruence rate of H1 is still 50%.  
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In contrast, India has a higher implementation capability in 2013, but its DV level 
remains the same. Therefore, it appears to be incongruent with the expectation of H2 as the 
vulnerability-interaction model suggests that a higher capability should result in a higher 
DV level if everything else remains the same. Similarly, the Philippines has a lower OV, 
but a higher DV in 2013. It is, therefore, incongruent with the expectation of H2 as the 
proposed model suggests a lower OV would lead to a lower DV. Overall, if we take the 
strict literal interpretation of H2, the cross-temporal dimension of it has a zero congruence 
rate. If a more relaxed view is taken, India’s case should easily be considered congruent to 
its expectation and hence 50% of the cases are congruent. Due to the constraints of time and 
space of this thesis, further examination of the cross-temporal validity of H1 and H2 will be 
left for future research. 
 
5.2 Validity of H3 and H4  
 The second layer of the vulnerability-interaction model addresses the second 
research question of what causes net oil importing states to adopt a high level of strategic 
oil supply measures during a period the international oil markets have been well established 
and domestic oil governance is generally being liberalised. This layer generates H3 and H4 
as re-stated below:   
H3: A net oil importing economy that has adopted a high level of strategic oil 
supply measures would have a high capability, high OV, high-strength private capital, 
and a medium level of trust in oil markets (three-high case) 
 H4: A net oil importing economy that has adopted a high level of strategic oil 
supply measures would have a high capability, a noticeable OV, and must NOT have 
high trust in oil markets, nor high-strength private capital (non-three-high case) 
Each of these hypotheses proposes a unique causal pathway (INUS cause) that 
would lead to the adoption of a high level of DV. As discussed in Chapter Two. The 
vulnerability-interaction model also hypotheses a “third” pathway that would lead to the 
adoption of a high DV. This pathway is the one of the two “extreme” cases discussed in 
Chapter Two.  An economy having a high OV, a low trust in the oil markets, a high 
capability, and that in which private capital is weak versus the state is hypothesised to also 
adopt a high level of strategic oil supply measures.132 In spite of the mostly comparative 
nature of the levels of variables generated in the first layer in this plausibility probe, the 
summary of the variable levels shown on Table 3.18 does provide a sound basis for the 
                                                          
132 A more careful examination of this “extreme” pathway shows that it is actually a variant of non-
three-high case as proposed by H4, but before all the compressions are made. The “extreme case” for 
the adoption of a low or no DV (low OV, high trust, low capability, and high-strength private capital) 
does not emerge with 2013 data of the nine case-study economies.  
93 
 
levels of these variables on a larger scale. Since the Asia-Pacific has a relatively low oil self-
sufficiency globally, we may modify the search of such “extreme cases” to include all the 
economies having both high and medium OV levels. 133  Still, none of them fit the 
descriptions of this third pathway. Therefore, we should proceed to search for cases that 
may fit the parameters of H3 and H4.  
There are three economies that are shown to have a high DV level in 2013 on 
Table 3.18: China, Indonesia, and Taiwan. We can safely assume that net oil importing 
economies having a DV in the Asia-Pacific would also have a high DV by global standards. 
Hughes’ Globalizing Oil documents the liberalising trend in oil governance in 15 advanced 
industrialised countries between 1985 and 2005. The average percentage of state ownership 
of oil firms compiled with those data is only about 19%.134 It is likely that this number has 
dropped further by 2013 with the continuing liberalisation trend in those countries. Besides, 
the United States is not included in that 15-country study. Otherwise, the overall result 
would be further lowered. The results of the similar, but not exactly the same, component 
of China, Indonesia, and Taiwan in this study in 2013, as shown on Table 3.1 above, are 
99%, 100%, and 44% respectively. They, therefore, can be considered having a high DV by 
almost any standards. 
 
5.2.1 Validity and Case Selection of H3  
Taiwan is selected to further assess the validity of H3 as a possible three-high case. 
The rest of this sub-section justifies this selection. To fit the criteria of H3 or the three-high 
cases, apart from having a high level of DV, economies also need a high OV, high capability, 
high-strength private capital as manifested as having a high degree of overall economic 
freedom, and a medium level of trust in oil markets. None of the nine case-study economies 
in this plausibility probe with 2013 data fits all four stipulations. In view of the generally 
high OV level among net oil importing states in the Asia-Pacific, the next logical step is to 
examine if any of the economies deemed to have a medium OV would satisfy the remaining 
criteria of H3. These three economies are the Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan. Taiwan 
has already been determined to have a high DV. Since the Philippines only had a low DV 
level, it is eliminated for consideration. South Korea, like Japan, which already had a high 
OV, only had a medium, not high DV. Table 3.22 below summarises the situation of these 
four candidates:135  
                                                          
133 The oil self-sufficiency rate of the Asia-Pacific in 2013 was 27.7%, versus North America’s 
76.26% and Europe and Eurasia’s 95.32%. See Table 5.1 in Chapter 5 for details. 
134 Hughes’ Globalizing Oil.  243-247. See Table A6, Appendix B for the calculation of the average 
of the 15 advanced industrialised countries. 
135 As further discussed below, the other high-DV economy China, fits the stipulations of H4 or the 
non-three high cases and hence is excluded from consideration as an H3 candidate here. 
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Economy 
DV 
Level  
OV (IV) 
Level 
Strength of 
Private 
Capital 
Overall 
Trust in Oil 
Markets 
Overall 
Implementation 
Capability 
Perfect Fit 
(Three-High Case) High High High Medium High 
Indonesia High Low Medium Low Low 
Japan Medium High High High High 
South Korea Medium Medium Medium High Medium 
Taiwan  High Medium High High Medium 
Table 3.22 2013 Variable Levels of Candidates for In-Depth Investigation of H3 
Against Perfect Fit 
 
The variables not concordant with the perfect fit of the criteria of H3, as listed on 
the second row of the table, are shaded in two different weights, signifying different degrees 
and aspects of incongruity. The darker shading represents further away from the expectation 
of H3. First, none of the four candidates had medium level of overall trust in oil markets as 
stipulated in H3. Trust in the oil markets is likely to encompass components beyond the ones 
used in this plausibility probe. Therefore, the level of trust is put aside for now to ascertain 
if one of the candidates is a better fit than the other two.  
Once the variable of trust is temporarily disregarded, Japan appears to be a 
promising candidate as the only other issue is that it had is having a medium, not a high DV. 
Can its medium DV among the other Asia-Pacific case-study economies be reasonably 
understood as a high level globally? As shown on Table 3.4, Japan’s DV score with the 
preferred weighting method is 28.83 in 2013. The lowest “high” level DV score of the same 
weighting method in this plausibility probe is 47, received by Taiwan.136 A yardstick that 
extends beyond the current study would be the score the United States would receive using 
the same proxies, which is about 38.137 While the DV score of the United States is not low, 
most would agree that it does not fit the profile of a state that implements a high level of 
strategic oil supply measures globally.138 Based on the lowest of the “High” category score 
received by Taiwan and the score of the United States, Japan cannot reasonably be said to 
have implemented a high level of strategic oil supply measures in 2013. Therefore, it is 
deselected as an in-depth case study to assess the validity of H3.  
                                                          
136 See Table 3.4. 
137 The percentage of government control of crude oil supply to the United States is 0. While the 
amount of SPR fluctuates somewhat, as of 2015, that amount is 137 days of import equivalent (See 
“SPR Quick Facts,” U.S. Department of Energy website, accessed 20 March 2016, 
http://energy.gov/fe/services/petroleum-reserves/strategic-petroleum-reserve/spr-quick-facts-and-
faqs). The resulting score is 38.06 if no cap is used for SPR over the 90 days IEA standard. The score 
would be 25 if the SPR is capped at 90 days as 100%. 31.5 is the average of these two scores. Japan 
has the same score whether the SPR is capped at 100% or not as it has 85 days of import equivalent 
of state administered SPR in 2013. China also has the same score with or without the cap. 
138 Adding the United States to the nine economies already in this plausibility probe to run the same 
averaging and standardising procedures, the United States receives the designation of” medium” 
while Japan’s designation remains unchanged as medium.  
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The choice thus narrows down to Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan. Like Japan, 
South Korea only has a medium, not high DV in 2013 among the nine case-study economies, 
but its DV score with the same weighting method is considerably higher at 38.39. If the 
same extended yardstick of the United States is used to run a 10-economy average, however, 
South Korea’s DV remains only at a medium level.139 Besides, South Korea has three other 
apparently incongruent variables versus Taiwan’s two, and the levels of the two common 
incongruent variables are the same for both economies. Since the whole raison d'être of this 
static layer is to investigate the causes that drive states to implement a high level of strategic 
oil supply measures, Taiwan is a better choice. Then what about the other high-DV economy, 
Indonesia? Like South Korea, none of its four explanatory variables match the levels 
stipulated by H3 and two of them, the ones with darker shading, had a two-, instead of one-
level difference from the perfect fit of H3. 
Taiwan’s DV level remains high after the United States is added to the averaging 
and standardising process. The lightly shaded cells in Table 3.22 indicate the apparently 
incongruent variables that may become congruent on a more global scale. Alternatively, 
these are truly incongruent variables that would lead to the refinement of the causal pathway 
leading to the adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply measures. In any event, Taiwan 
is examined in-depth in Chapter Five as a deviant case since it does not conform to all the 
stipulations of H3. Its investigation would point to better explanations of Y, the adoption of 
a high level of strategic oil supply measures. 
The validity of H3 cannot be determined at this point since none of the nine cases 
with 2013 data match the parameters of it. Taiwan is selected to further examine its validity 
as a deviant case in Chapter Five. 
 
5.2.2 Validity and Case Selection of H4 
China is selected as the best case to further assess the validity of H4 as a non-
three-high case. It is the only perfect fit for all the criteria of H4 among the nine case-study 
economies with 2013 data. Indonesia is close, but it only had a low capability. It is unlikely 
to be deemed as having a high capability by any other standards. Further, none of the other 
states in this preliminary study with a medium level of DV is pushed up to become one with 
high DV when the United States is added to the analysis.140  
 The rest of this section shows that by applying techniques recommended by leading 
qualitative methodologists, the result on H4 obtained by this preliminary study has a high 
level of substantive significance. The preliminary validity of H4 may be illustrated by using 
two-by-two tables, a common method used by qualitative scholars to demonstrate the 
                                                          
139 Ibid. 
140 See footnotes 137 and 138 above. 
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validity of the necessary or sufficient causes they propose.141 H4 is conceptualised as an 
INUS cause to a high level of strategic oil supply measures (DV) adopted, which is a form 
of sufficient cause.142 Each explanatory factor at its stipulated level is a necessary condition 
making up that particular pathway or INUS cause. Therefore, two-by-two tables for 
sufficient causes are suitable to examine the plausibility of H4. 
A blank two-by-two table for a sufficient cause looks like Table 3.23 below:143 
  X 
  0 1 
Y 
1 N1 N2 
0 N3 N4 
Table 3.23 Two-by-two Table for Sufficient Cause 
In Table 3.23, X is the sufficient cause being investigated. In this study, they are 
INUS causes. In this illustration, it entails the stipulated levels of the four explanatory 
factors in H4. Y is the outcome or DV studied, which is a high level of strategic oil supply 
measures adopted for H4. Zero means the absence of that outcome or cause and 1 the 
presence of it. The (X, -Y) cell at the bottom right hand corner of a sufficient cause table 
must have zero case for the sufficient cause to be established.144 
Table 3.24 below shows the sufficient cause table for H4 by using the levels of the 
variables show on Table 3.18: 
   X (H4 INUS) 
  Not having H4 configuration Having H4 configuration 
Y 
 
High DV 2 
(Indonesia, Taiwan) 
1 
(China) 
Not 
High 
DV 
6 
(India, Japan, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand) 
0 
Table 3.24 2 x 2 Table of H4 as Sufficient (INUS) Cause for Adopting High 
Level of Strategic Oil Supply Measures 
 
 A specific aspect to note about Table 3.24 above is that it has zero case in 
its (X, -Y) cell at the bottom right. This means that with the data in this chapter, the INUS 
cause of H4 proposed by the vulnerability-interaction model that would lead to the adoption 
of a high level of strategic oil supply measures is successfully established. Goertz and 
Mahoney point out that data on two-by-two tables may be “translated” into χ2 or correctional 
                                                          
141 For a good discussion and demonstration of the use of two-by-two tables in qualitative studies, 
see Goertz and Mahoney, A Tale of Two Cultures, 21-23. 
142 It is not possible to use two-by-two tables to evaluate the validity of H1 and H2 because of their 
relative logic and a relatively low degree of specificity.  
143 Goertz and Mahoney, A Tale of Two Cultures, 21. 
144 This cell is named the “sufficient condition cell.” Ibid., 22. 
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statistics, although somewhat unnaturally. More importantly, the odds ratio of logit analysis 
can be used to calculate the likelihood of the proposed sufficient cause being frivolous.145 
The odds ratio of the H4 INUS as presented in Table 3.24 is 0.13.146 This is a highly 
significant result as it is much smaller than ‘1,’ which indicates the odds of the outcome 
occurring are the same with or without the exposure to the proposed cause.147 Two-by-two 
tables ultimately, however, more strikingly illustrate the relationship of sufficiency in set 
logic, which underpins this project, not statistics.148  
Chapter Four will present more explicit data related to the explanatory variables 
and strategic oil supply measures adopted by China in years leading to 2013 as part of the 
in-depth investigation of the validity of H2 in the paired comparison of India and China. 
Many other aspects of China’s policies and measures related to state intervention in its oil 
sectors have also been extensively examined in related studies as discussed in the literature 
review of this thesis. The analysis in this sub-section shows that the case of China in 2013 
unequivocally confirms the reasoning behind the INUS cause of H4 to the adoption of a 
high level of strategic oil supply measures. Due to the need to limit the parameters of this 
study’s scope, therefore, this project will not further investigate the case of China to verify 
the validity of H4. 
How does the overall validity of the vulnerability-interaction model summarised 
in this section fare compared to alternative theories? The concluding section below weighs 
this question as well as summarising initial insights gleaned from the plausibility probe 
developed here. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The plausibility probe presented in this chapter shows that the vulnerability-
interaction model stands up well compared to the only applicable alternative approach at 
this stage – the conventional Realist/geopolitical explanation of why (net oil importing) 
countries intervene in their economies’ oil sectors.  
The structural Realist or geopolitical perspective attributes a high level of state 
intervention in the oil sector to a high implementation capability of the states and the 
strategic importance of oil to the security and material development of the country. 
According to this logic, only countries with high implementation capabilities would be able 
                                                          
145 Ibid., 23. 
146 Results obtained by using the odds ratio calculator on the “MedCalc” website, accessed 22 
February 2016, https://www.medcalc.org/calc/odds_ratio.php. Admittedly, the INUS does not have 
a high significance level with the p value at 0.25. This, however, should be expected with only nine 
cases, but the odds ratio suggests a substantive significance of the hypothesised pathway to the 
adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply measures. 
147 Goertz and Mahoney, 23.  
148 Goertz and Mahoney, ibid. 
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to adopt a high level of strategic oil supply measures. Table 3.18 shows that only one of the 
three high DV economies, China, had a high implementation capability in 2013.  
The vulnerability-interaction model also hypothesised a high implementation 
capability as an a prior condition for the adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply 
measures. In this regard, the proposed model as it is currently formulated fares no better 
than the conventional Realist perspective in explaining the two cases of high DV economies 
without a high capability. The vulnerability-interaction model, however, does specify three 
other major necessary conditions that are needed for the outcome of the adoption of a high 
level of strategic oil supply measures in each of the proposed causal pathways. Chinese 
conditions in 2013 match one of them, H4. Since the Realist perspective puts great 
importance in the strategic value of oil, one would expect a country with a high OV and 
high capability would be the top candidate to adopt a high level of strategic oil supply 
measures according to this perspective. China, however, in fact only had a low OV in 2013. 
In this regard, the vulnerability-interaction model has more precise predictability than the 
Realist approach. 
If we extend the conventional Realist logic further, countries are expected to adopt 
a level of strategic oil supply measures either comparable to their capability levels, their OV 
levels, or both, which appears to be closest to this perspective’s reasoning. If we apply the 
“capability yardstick” alone, according to the results shown on Table 3.18, five of the nine 
case studies have matching capability and DV levels: China, India, the Philippines, South 
Korea, and Thailand. This translates into a congruence rate of 56%. If we just apply the “OV 
yardstick,” only one of the nine case studies, South Korea, has matching OV and DV levels. 
If we apply both yardsticks together, four of the nine case studies, Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan, have matching OV and capability levels, but only one of the four, South 
Korea has the same DV level as those two explanatory variables – medium. The cases where 
these two explanatory factors are of different levels, the Realist theory is not specified 
enough to predict what the DV level would be. The overall cross-case congruence rate of 
H1 and H2 is 67% and that of H2 alone is 60% and so the vulnerability-interaction model 
has a better overall predictive power than the Realist approach in cross-case comparisons.  
Still, the Realist perspective, if formulated as predicting the level of strategic oil 
supply measures adopted by states to be the same as both their economies’ capability and 
OV levels, appears to better explain the case of South Korea in 2013. The conventional 
Realist perspective, however, cannot explain the vulnerability-interaction model deviant 
cases of Taiwan or Indonesia. 
How well does this Realist perspective explain changes in the within-case 
comparisons? If only the capability yardstick is used, it correctly explains three of the nine 
cases, meaning directions of these cases’ capability level change match those of their DV 
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level change (or lack thereof). Therefore, it has a congruence rate of 33%. China, Japan, and 
Singapore’s capability and DV levels remain the same over the decade. If the combined 
capability and OV yardstick are used, only the two no-change cases of Japan and Singapore 
are consistent with the prediction of the Realist perspective. Overall, therefore, the 
conventional Realist perspective does not have a greater validity than the cross-temporal 
dimension of the vulnerability-interaction model. Even the strict interpretation of this 
dimension of H1 has a 50% congruence rate, while the congruence rate of H2 in this 
dimension can be interpreted as either zero or 50%.  
Of course, the validity of the vulnerability-interaction model must be further 
verified with more fine-grained data in Chapter Four and its propositions refined or 
overhauled regarding H3 in Chapter Five before meaningful insights to the two research 
questions may be offered. Two observations do begin to emerge from this plausibility probe. 
First, the fluctuations in oil prices in the international oil markets over time do not contribute 
to changes in economies’ OV as much as changes to their oil self-sufficiency rates. China’s 
oil self-sufficiency rate, for example, dropped about 21% while India’s dropped slightly 
over 8% in the decade studied. In the same period, China’s per capita income grew faster 
than India’s, which should make the increase in oil prices in the decade more affordable to 
China.149 Instead, as shown on Table 3.22, China’s OV grew more than 10 times that of 
India’s. In economies as big as China and India’s, which consume large absolute amounts 
of the total oil consumed in the world, the effect of any change in their oil self-sufficiency 
rates is magnified by the effort needed to secure that amount in the market, which acts as a 
feedback loop. The same logic should apply both in a tight oil market and an oil glut situation, 
and to other major net oil consumers, such as the United States. This logic would, therefore, 
have repercussions to the global effects of the shale oil revolution in the United States, which 
will be further discussed in the concluding chapter. 
The disproportionally large effect of changes in oil-sufficiency rates or conversely 
the relatively small impact of fluctuations in oil prices on net oil importing economies’ OV 
is also observed in the case of Indonesia. Its oil self-sufficiency rate dropped from over 99% 
in 2003 to less than 58% in 2013 (an about 42% drop). As shown on Table 3.22, its OV, 
however, increased over 75% despite a 47% increase in per capita GDP in the same period. 
This skyrocketing increase in the country’s OV within a relatively short period may explain 
the outlier results of Indonesia as illustrated in Table 3.18. Indonesia has a high DV, yet a 
low OV and a low implementation capability among Asian net oil importing economies in 
2013. It is likely that decision-makers and the public there alike were still adjusting to the 
                                                          
149 China’s grew about 3.1% versus India’s about 2.2%. Source of calculation is from the World 
Bank. 
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country’s identity switch from a century-long net oil exporter to a net oil importing state a 
decade earlier. Indonesia’s 2015 request to reactivate its OPEC membership after a seven-
year suspension appears to support this proposition.150 Its economic nationalism over its still 
large, but fast dwindling, indigenous oil resources as of 2013 acted as a barrier to the 
country’s oil sector liberalisation.151 The resulting unusually high DV level compared to 
both the expectation of the vulnerability-interaction model and among Asian net oil 
importing economies is at least partially attributed to these unique circumstances.152 The 
Indonesian case, therefore, is truly an outlier and has confounding variables that are not 
applicable to most other net oil importing economies.  
Second, as alluded to earlier, it appears that the effect on the DV level of a higher 
implementation capability would not be “triggered” without a simultaneous drop in the 
economy’s overall trust in the oil markets. The cross-temporal cases of India and Thailand 
seem to attest to this. This is only a tentative observation since as discussed in Section 4.2, 
the levels or at least values of other explanatory variables change at the same time in these 
cases. Still, if this is confirmed to be true in further research, it is actually concordant with 
the reasoning of the vulnerability-interaction model, which sees trust in the oil markets as 
the central intervening variable in which the levels of other explanatory variables have to 
filter through before policy actions would be taken. This observation may also provide 
refinement to the vulnerability-interaction model, especially the hypothesised pathways to 
the adoption of a high level of high level of strategic oil supply measures.  
                                                          
150 Its OPEC membership was reinstated as of 1 January 2016. See Huileng Tan, “Could 
Indonesia’s Entry Complicate an OPEC Production Cut?” CNBC website, 3 December 2015, 
accessed 20 March 2016, http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/03/could-indonesias-entry-complicate-an-
opec-production-cut.html. Also see “Indonesia facts and figures,” OPEC website, accessed 20 
March 2016, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/3194.htm. 
151 Former OPEC Secretary-General Roberto Suburoto of Indonesia was quoted saying in 1994: 
“Although several decades have passed since the era of nationalization [of oil resources in producing 
countries], our national oil companies continue to possess a rather unique political status in the eyes 
of their respective nations. They are still regarded as the symbol of national sovereignty that controls 
the most important and the most valuable resource endowment in our countries.” See Marcel and 
Mitchell, Oil Titans, 2. 
152 It has the highest DV score, 63.06, among the nine case-study economies. See Table 3.4. 
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Chapter Four 
Explaining Cross-Case Variations in State Intervention 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter offers two pairwise comparisons to further examine the cross-case 
validity of the vulnerability-interaction model. The cross-case dimension of the proposed 
model explains variations in the levels of strategic oil supply measured adopted by net oil 
importing states at any given time. Two hypotheses - H1 and H2 – are generated here to 
explain the phenomena. The years immediately preceding 2013 are reviewed because they 
represent the end of roughly a decade of rising oil prices. 
The pairwise comparison between India and Thailand investigates if the 
trichotomous levels of the two economies’ four hypothesised explanatory variables as well 
as their dependent variable (DV) remained the same. If these conditions hold up under closer 
scrutiny with more data presented in this chapter, the similar levels of strategic oil supply 
measures India and Thailand adopted around 2013 can be explained by the similar levels of 
their oil vulnerability (OV), trust in the oil markets, private capital strength, and 
implementation capability. This is the essence of H1. 
The pairwise comparison between China and India determines if China’s 
implementation capability and DV levels were indeed considerably higher than India’s 
while the levels of their other three explanatory variables were similar. If these conditions 
do indeed emerge in this comparison, it would suggest that the higher level of strategic oil 
supply measures adopted by China around 2013 could be explained by its higher 
implementation capability. This would match the expectation of H2 and bolster the validity 
of that hypothesis. 
As was in Chapter Three, structured, focused comparison is again used to conduct 
these cross-case comparisons. The more in-depth investigation in this chapter provides 
better qualitative assessment of complex concepts as a robustness check of the vulnerability-
interaction model to the more quantitative assessment in the previous chapter. Content 
analysis of the annual reports of pertinent NOCs is also conducted to ascertain if there is 
any evidence of NOCs acting as securitising or powerful lobbying agents of oil supply 
security to the economies in questions. Using more “open-ended” qualitative data to 
supplement the more close-ended quantitative data used in the plausibility probe increases 
the credibility of the results.1   
                                                          
1 For a discussion of the use of closed-ended and open-ended data in research, see John W. Creswell 
and Vicki L. Plano Clark, Designing and conducting mixed methods research (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 2007), 6-7. 
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This chapter starts with a synopsis of the history of the politics of the oil industries 
in India and Thailand and a comparison of India and Thailand to examine the cross-case 
validity of H1. This structure is repeated in the second half of the chapter with the cases of 
China and India of the same period to examine the cross-case validity of H2. The concluding 
section summarises the results of these comparisons.  
 
2. Politics of Oil in India and Thailand 
India’s oil industry has shifted from being dominated by international oil 
companies (IOCs) in the first decade after its independence to being mostly government-
owned and operated by the late 1960s, to gradual liberalisation since the late 1980s.2 This 
meandering history of the politics of oil has been entwined with India’s larger post-colonial 
economic developmental experience and evolving ideological orientation and strategic 
alignment. During the period studied, efforts to liberalise the domestic oil product pricing 
structure and to divest national oil companies (NOCs) to increase efficiency were countered 
by bureaucratic red tape and inertia, the impulse of state control over indigenous natural 
resources, and fear of backlash against oil product price hikes, aided by the rhetoric of 
securitization.         
Thailand’s oil industry had also been dominated by IOCs until the last two decades 
of the 20th century when the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) was established as a 
response to the oil price shock in December 1978. 3 The PTT and its exploration and 
production (E&P) subsidiary were transformed into public limited companies and have 
remained majority-owned by the state. The overall government control of oil supply to the 
Thai economy, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, was very similar to that in India as of 
2013.4 Both the laws governing the E&P of indigenous petroleum resources and the oil 
product pricing structure were more market-conforming in Thailand during the period 
studied, but far from being unfettered. 5  This provided more room for the continued 
operation of IOCs in Thailand. 
Yet, further divestment of the Thai NOC and lowering of state intervention in the 
Thai oil sector appear to be hindered by similar factors and rhetoric as in India, even if the 
specifics and many other circumstances in the two countries were different. The relatively 
                                                          
2  “Burmah Shell, Standard Vaccum and Caltex (now merged into Shell, Exxon, and Chevron 
respectively)” dominated India’s oil market at the time of independence in 1947. See Ashok Desai, 
Laveesh Bhandari, Ramrao Mundhe, and Bhupindra Yadav, Public Enterprises, Government Policy 
and Impact on Competition – Indian Petroleum Industry, (New Delhi: Indicus Analytics, January 
2009), 9. 
3 “Background,” PTT website. Accessed January 12, 2018, 
http://www.pttplc.com/en/about/pages/background.aspx.  
4 See Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. One possible explanation of this is the relative efficiency of the PTT.  
5 See Section 2.1 in this Chapter for more details, especially footnotes 29-39. 
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low oil vulnerability (OV) of these two countries among Asian net oil importing economies 
does not result in a low level of strategic oil supply measures in either. The relatively low 
strength of private capital and trust in oil markets hampered oil sector liberalisation while 
moderate state capability put a check on any desire to augment these measures, resulting in 
an overall medium level of intervention in both. H1 of the vulnerability-interaction model 
states that if the four major proposed factors modulating intervention in two economies are 
at similar levels at any given time, the overall levels of state intervention in oil supply to 
their economies would also be similar. The in-depth pairwise comparison in the next few 
sub-sections confirms this sums up the situations of India and Thailand as of 2013. 
 
Comparison of India and Thailand in 2013: The variable levels of India and Thailand 
with 2013 data match the parameters and outcome stipulated in H1 in the preliminary study. 
This means that all the trichotomous levels of key explanatory factors and the levels of the 
strategic oil supply measures they adopted were the same. This is summarised below:  
 
Strategic Oil Supply 
Measures Adopted 
(DV Level)  
OV (IV) 
Level 
Strength of 
Private Capital 
Vs. State 
Overall 
Trust in Oil 
Markets 
Overall 
Implementation 
Capability 
Medium Low Low Low Medium 
Table 4.1 Trichotomous Levels of All Variables for India and Thailand in 2013 in 
preliminary study 
 
The levels of each of these variables in the two economies are reassessed with more 
precise data in this chapter, which also serves as a rationale for structured, focus comparison 
applied in this study. The results show that India and Thailand adopted an even more similar 
level of strategic oil supply measures in the years leading up to 2013. They also had a 
remarkably similar OV level. The overall strength of private capital in Thailand, however, 
appears to be stronger than that is suggested in the preliminary study, but not to the point of 
moving up one trichotomous level. The small difference in their overall trust in oil markets 
holds, and their overall capabilities to implement strategic oil supply measures also remain 
very similar. The cases of India and Thailand in 2013 reaffirm the validity of the cross-case 
dimension of H1, as formulated in Chapter 2. The similarity of their DV levels can be 
explained by the similarity of the levels of the four nominated explanatory variables.   
   
2.1 Strategic Oil Supply Measures Adopted by India and Thailand 
Two more strategic oil supply measures are taken into account in this chapter in 
addition to the two that make up the strategic oil supply indicator in Chapter Three. The first 
one is international oil supply investments engaged in (or not) by Indian and Thai NOCs in 
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2013.6 The second one is how much relative preference was given to NOCs in the E&P of 
indigenous oil resources.7 Overall, the levels of strategic oil supply measures adopted by 
India and Thailand in and around 2013 remain very similar after factoring in these two 
additional measures. 
 
2.1.1 India and Thailand’s International Oil Supply Investments  
The government of India continued to encourage its NOCs to “pursue equity oil 
and gas opportunities overseas”8 as a way of ensuring oil supply security in 2013 as it had 
since the 1990s.9 Up to 2013, India’s central public sector enterprises in the petroleum 
sectors or NOCs “acquired E&P assets in more than 20 countries” 10  with the total 
investment “in excess of US$21 billion.”11 The most prominent of these enterprises was Oil 
& Natural Gas Corporation Videsh Limited (OVL). It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Oil 
& Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC), the largest upstream oil and gas company in 
India.12 OVL produced “about 8.357 MMT [million metric tons] of oil and equivalent gas 
during the year 2013-14 from its assets abroad in Sudan Vietnam, Venezuela, Russia, Syria, 
Brazil, South Sudan and Colombia.”13 Expanding into overseas oil E&P projects is also a 
stated objective of India’s other major NOC, the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., (IOCL) in 
2013.14 It had 11 overseas E&P blocks15 in seven countries: the USA, Libya, Gabon, Nigeria, 
Yemen, Canada, and Venezuela.16 Not all of these were producing oil, but its share of a 
                                                          
6  Since both economies have prominent NOCs, comparing the extent of these investments is 
reasonable. Apart from the difficulty of quantifying this particular measure, it is not incorporated in 
the strategic oil supply indicator in the preliminary study because that would risk pushing the scores 
of economies that have NOCs unduly high. This is because the measure of government control of 
crude oil supply already factors in the dominance of NOCs. In addition, some of the economies do 
not have NOCs, which means they would not have any overseas equity oil E&P projects by NOCs. 
7 Again, this is a reasonable measure to compare between India and Thailand, but not among all nine 
preliminary study economies. Only four of these nine, among them India and Thailand, are known to 
have dwindling but still worth-producing indigenous oil resources and upstream NOCs.  
8 Government of India – Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas Annual Report 2012 – 2013, 7. 
Regardless of the motivation(s) behind this policy statement, the state is clear that is a measure to be 
encouraged. 
9 Shebonti Ray Dadwal and Uttam Kumar Sinha, “Equity Oil and India’s Energy Security,” Strategic 
Analysis, Vol. 29-3 (Jul-Sep 2005), 521. As discussed in Dadwal and Sinha and other studies, this is 
not to say the Government of India supports each and every proposed overseas equity oil project of 
its NOCs. I also acknowledge that the Indian government, and especially the NOCs, has goals other 
than ensuring oil supply security in supporting or implementing such projects. The assumption of the 
vulnerability-interaction model is still valid as long as securing oil supply is a major goal. For more 
discussions on this, see the OV (IV) section latter in this chapter.  
10 Government of India – Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas Annual Report 2012 – 2013, 7.  
11 Ibid., 6. 
12 Tanvi Madan, “India’s ONGC: Balancing Different Roles, Different Goals,” The Changing Role 
of National Oil Companies in International Energy Markets (Houston, TX: The Baker Institute, Rice 
University, 2007), 1. 
13 Government of India – Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas Annual Report 2012 – 2013, 7. 
14 IndianOil Annual Report 2013-14, 19. 
15 Ibid., 64. 
16 Ibid., 9. 
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project in the USA provided a gross production of about 160,000 barrels of oil.17 The 
smallest of the NOC involving in upstream oil E&P - Oil India Limited (OIL) - was also 
involved in 14 overseas blocks in eight countries as of 2013.18  
Developing international oil supply related projects, including oil E&P, was clearly 
the intention of both the Thai government and the PTT, the Thai NOC, in 2013. The 
Department of Mineral Fuels under the Ministry of Energy argues that “accelerated 
exploration and development not only of Thailand’s concession area but also of the 
Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area” would be one way to secure energy supply.19 
Regarding its upstream business, PTT indicates its “mission is to seek and secure 
competitively priced crude oil and natural gas to ensure Thailand’s energy security” by 
operating domestic and international petroleum E&P and investing in “associated 
businesses.”20 PTTEP, the upstream subsidiary of PTT and its partners, operated 42 projects 
in 10 countries in 2013, including Myanmar, Algeria, Kenya, and Australia.21 While many 
of these projects had not reached the production phase or did not produce crude oil, the 
average output of PTTEP’s 16-1 project in Vietnam in 2013 included 43,700 barrels per day 
(b/d) of crude. The PTTEP Australasia’s Montara project in the Timor Sea began producing 
10,000 b/d starting June 2013.22 
No information has been found by this author on the investment amount PTT and its 
subsidiaries have made in overseas oil and gas E&P. PTT’s oil production from such 
projects is likely somewhat higher than the two projects listed in the last paragraph, but 
probably would not be thousands of times higher as would be required to match India’s 
figures.23 In view of the long lead time from formulation to actual implementation of many 
strategic oil supply measures, however, it is contended here that it is reasonable to also 
include an international oil supply project actualised not too long after 2013. In June 2015, 
PTT signed an oil-for-loans agreement with Ecuador’s NOC, Petroecuador, to supply it with 
116.6 million barrels of oil for “an up-front payment of 2.5 billion.”24 No known comparable 
                                                          
17 The “participating interest” of IOCL in the Niobrara shale asset in the U.S. provided the “first ever 
revenue earnings from its E&P business.” Ibid., 64. 
18 Oil India Limited Annual Report 2012-13, 28. OIL was a joint venture partner in all these projects. 
IOCL was also partners to 12 of the 14 projects. Ibid., 29-30. 
19 [Thai] Department of Mineral Fuels under the Ministry of Energy Annual Report 2013, 6.  
20 PTT Public Company Limited Annual Report 2013, 45. 
21 Ibid., 68 - 69. 
22 Ibid., 70. 
23 53,000 b/d equal to a little over 1,078 metric tons a year. Even if only half of OVL’s overseas 
production in 2013 is actually crude oil, it would be almost 3,000 times higher than 1,078 metric tons. 
For the barrels oil per day to metric ton per year conversion rate, see BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy June 2014, 44. 
24 “Ecuador negotiated Thailand crude sales on favourable terms: Correa,” Reuters 5 August 2015, 
accessed 10 July 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/ecuador-thailand-
idUSL1N10G17N20150805. 
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deal with oil-producing states or their NOCs are known to be carried out by Indian NOCs 
during the same period.25 If the oil acquired through Thai-Ecuador deal is included, the 
amount of overseas oil acquired by the PTT and its subsidiaries would still be lower, but 
much closer to the amount acquired by Indian NOCs.26 After including this deal, the amount 
of oil either directly developed by NOCs or obtained through oil-for-loan programs overseas 
by India and Thailand was proportionally similar to their respective economies’ total oil 
consumption around 2013.27  
 
2.1.2 Preference to NOCs for Indigenous Oil Development in India and Thailand 
The second additional strategic oil supply measure taken into consideration in this 
paired comparison is the preference given to NOCs in developing indigenous oil resources. 
This measure is apt to be compared between India and Thailand at this stage since they, 
together with China and Indonesia, are the only four economies in this study’s preliminary 
survey of data that are known to still have substantial levels of indigenous oil resources. In 
addition, India and Thailand’s oil self-sufficiency rates as of 2013 were relatively similar.28 
Domestic oil E&P in India has been governed by the new exploration licensing 
policy (NELP) since 1999.29 NELP effectively ended five decades of state monopoly in oil 
E&P activities as both private and public entities and even 100% foreign-owned companies 
are now allowed to engage in open bidding for the right to explore and develop oil in India. 
                                                          
PTT EP also signed oil and gas E&P agreements with companies in Brazil and Myanmar in 2014, 
but it appears that oil has not been produced from these projects yet. For details of these agreements, 
see Henry K.H. Wang, Energy Markets in Emerging Economies – Strategies for Growth (Oxford: 
Taylor & Francis, 2016), 198-199. 
25 OIL did provide a $35 million loan to the private Dublin-headquartered oil firm PetroNeft to 
finance its project in Siberia in early 2016. However, it is asserted in this study that both the recipient 
of the loan and the timing (and scale) of the funding (for an exploration and development project in 
2016 and 2017) make this incident not comparable to the Thai-Ecuador deal. For a report on the loan, 
see Charlie Taylor, “PetroNeft says first tranche of Oil India loan executed,” The Irish Times, 23 
March 2016, accessed 1 August 2016, 
 http://www.irishtimes.com/business/energy-and-resources/petroneft-says-first-tranche-of-oil-india-
loan-executed-1.2584165. 
26 The term of this deal appears to stretch for five years (ibid.), which makes the yearly amount of oil 
supplied slightly less than 3.2 MMT per year (using the conversion rate in the BP Statistical Review 
referenced in footnote 23).  
27 If we use the 8.357 MMT produced by OVL as the base and round it up to 9 MMT as the total 
overseas equity oil produced by Indian NOCs in 2013, it would equal to about 5.1% of India’s total 
oil consumption that year. If we use 3.2 MMT (the yearly supply from the Thai-Ecuador oil-for-loans 
deal) as the base and round it up to 3.3 MMT, Thailand total overseas equity oil “produced” around 
2013 would be about 6.5% of the economy’s total consumption (calculated with 2013’s consumption 
figure). 
28 Using the data in the BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014 to do the calculation, India’s 
was 23.94% and Thailand’s was 33.78%. 
29 Muhammad Azhar, “New Exploration licensing policy (NELP) in India,” OPEC Energy Review 
35 (2011), 174. 
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30  While the policy’s role in achieving the goal of accelerating and more efficiently 
developing India’s hydrocarbon resources is open to debate,31 at least on a legal basis, no 
preference was given to NOCs in the bidding process, especially after the sixth round of 
NELP bidding in 2006.32 
Since 2007, the E&P of domestic hydrocarbon resources in Thailand has been 
governed by the Petroleum Act and the Petroleum Income Tax Act No. 6 under what is 
called the Thailand III terms.33 Under these new procedures, qualified foreign as well as 
Thai limited companies may be awarded indigenous oil E&P concessions. All applications 
were also partially graded by the provision of “scholarships, training, contributions to 
support petroleum development in Thailand…”34 The seemingly more restrictive new rules 
announced in relation to the latest concession rights bidding round in October 2014 were 
met with legal challenges. This led to the cancellation of the bidding in 2015.35 Besides, the 
changes were made beyond the temporal scope of this study and so are not considered here.  
                                                          
30  Ibid, 176. Also see Hydrocarbon Exploration and Production Activities, India 2012-13 
(Directorate General of Hydrocarbons Under Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, Govt. of India), 
6. 
31 According to Azhar, the policy led to “substantial discovery of oil and gas” and a “domestic 
duopoly” of ONGC, a NOC, and Reliance Industries Limited, a private firm. Ibid, 183-185. On the 
other hand, Carl, Rai, and Victor describe the performance of the NELP as “lackluster.” See Jeremy 
Carl, Varun Rai and David G. Victor, “Energy and India’s Foreign Policy,” Program on Energy and 
Sustainable Development Working Paper #75 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, 2008), accessed 
1 August 2016, 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1400184. 
32  According to Azhar’s study quoted above, the indigenous hydrocarbon E&P evaluation system 
before the sixth round of bidding under the NELP in 2006 was unduly, if unintentionally, favoring 
NOCs due to the weightings of the selection criteria. But the weighting and the system itself have 
been drastically changed since the sixth round and apparently the playing field has been leveled for 
both state and private bidders. In addition, after the ninth round of NELP bids were awarded in 2011, 
the Indian government has been moving towards a new system labeled the Open Acreage Licensing 
Policy that is more efficient and transparent. See Azhar, 181-183. For details on the evolution of the 
terms and conditions of the NELP rounds and their chronology, see Hydrocarbon Exploration and 
Production Activities, India 2012-13, 63. 
33 Ratana Poonsombudlert et al, “Thailand Petroleum Concessions,” Chandler & Thong-ek Law 
Offices Ltd., Bangkok, 14 December 2015, 2. Accessed 5 January 2016, 
http://www2.ctlo.com/mediacenter/whatsnew/2015-12-16-ThailandPetroleumConcessions-
13(14Dec.2015)_(1791069_1).pdf.  
34 Ibid., 5. 
35 The rule that is more pertinent to this discussion stipulates that “[a]fter discovery, a right by a Thai 
company (owned more than 50% by Thai nationals) approved by the Petroleum Committee, to farm 
in for not less than 5% undivided participating interest…” Ibid., 6. In June 2016, amended laws that 
enable the change of rules were passed by the Thai legislature, which will change the existing 
concession system to the more widely practiced profit sharing agreement system (as in India) and 
also the service contract system (as in the Philippines). See Aekarach Sattaburuth, “Petroleum bills 
pass amid opposition,” The Bangkok Post, 25 June 2016, accessed 10 August 2016, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/news/1019297/petroleum-bills-pass-amid-opposition. Also 
see David Beckstead, “Potential Amendments to Thailand’s Petroleum Act,” The Bangkok Post, 
Corporate Counsellor Column, 22 July 2016, accessed 10 August 2016, 
http://www.tilleke.com/resources/potential-amendments-thailands-petroleum-act.   
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On the surface, therefore, the Thai as well as the Indian governments did not assign 
any preference to their NOCs in bidding for indigenous oil E&P in 2013 or the years 
immediately before or afterwards. Below the surface, however, the playing fields were not 
as level as they looked and also not level to the same degree. First, both states reserved the 
right to keep indigenous resources home regardless if state or private companies developed 
them. The Indian Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MPNG) stipulated that until India 
becomes totally self-sufficient in crude oil, all companies must sell the crude they developed 
in India in the domestic market, even if this might not be strictly enforced.36 The Thai 
Petroleum Act, by contrast, allowed much greater leeway for the export of the crude 
developed in Thailand. The Thai Minister of Energy was only empowered to “temporarily” 
prohibit crude export “to ensure an adequate supply of petroleum to meet domestic 
demand.”37 
Second, although the prices of crude oil were not controlled, the prices of oil 
products were not allowed to float totally freely in the domestic markets in either economy, 
which indirectly affected private oil firms’ profit calculation. This was especially true in 
India. As of 2013, the price of kerosene, domestic LPG, and diesel were still subsidised by 
the Indian government, while the price of petrol was only decontrolled in 2010.38 Thailand’s 
policies have been more market-conforming in both cases and so should be understood as 
adopting a slightly lower level of the strategic oil supply measure of providing preference 
for NOCs in developing indigenous oil resources.39 To sum up, the levels of strategic oil 
supply measures adopted by India and Thailand remain very similar after examining both 
additional measures in this sub-section.    
 
                                                          
36 See Article 18.1, Model Production Sharing Contract, Ninth Offer of Blocks, MPNG, Government 
of India 2010, 46. Companies may apply for export licenses on a case by case basis with special 
conditions attached.  
37 See Thailand Petroleum Act No. 6, 2007, as translated by and is available on the ThaiLaws.com 
website, accessed 15 August 2016, http://thailaws.com/law/t_laws/tlaw0430.pdf.  In August 2014, 
the Minister did impose such a ban. See Yuthana Praiwan, “Wassana oil too crude for refining as 
export ban lifted,” Bangkok Post, 13 October 2015, accessed 15 August 2016, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/727392/.  
38 The subsidies the Indian government paid to NOCs, known as under-recoveries, made it difficult 
for private firms to market the oil they developed since they are not entitled to such subsidies. The 
price of diesel was finally decontrolled at the end of 2014, which suggests the playing field is slowly 
getting more level even in India. See Pravin Kumar Agarwal and Anmol Soni, Petroleum Product 
Pricing Reforms in India: Are We on the Right Track? The Energy and Resources Institute Policy 
Brief, March 2013; R. Jai Krishna, “Reliance Petrol Stations Are Back in Business in India,” The 
Wall Street Journal, 21 May 2015, accessed 15 August 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/reliance-
petrol-stations-are-back-in-business-in-india-1432210861.   
39 The oil product price subsidy in Thailand takes the form of levying taxes on oil products to fill the 
oil fund to cushion the impact of high oil price since 1991 (at least that is the original intention of the 
policy). The pricing of crude oil has largely followed the price of the international oil market. For 
discussion on the functioning of the oil fund, see Thiraphong Vikitset, The Role of Oil Fund in 
Thailand: Past, Present, and Future - Final Report Submitted to the Research Promotion Committee, 
National Institute of Development Administration, July 2013. 
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2.2 Oil Vulnerabilities of India and Thailand 
One oil market risk and one supply risk not considered in the plausibility probe 
are examined in this study to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the overall 
OV of India and Thailand around 2013. The additional market risk is the oil intensity of 
their respective economies. In this chapter, “oil intensity” is calculated as to how much gross 
domestic product (GDP) per ton of oil generates.40 Using this method of calculation, India’s 
oil intensity in 2013 was 0.027 while Thailand’s was 0.050. This means the Thai economy 
was more than 85% more vulnerable to oil price fluctuations that year if only this measure 
of comparison is used. 41  Thailand, therefore, would be more vulnerable to oil price 
fluctuations that year if only this measure of comparison is used. Regardless of the causes 
of the difference in the oil intensities of these economies, the fact remains that the higher 
that intensity, the more adversely affected the economy would be by fluctuations in oil prices. 
The additional oil supply risk examined here is the concentration of the sources of 
oil supply to India and Thailand and the overall risks associated with the concentration. A 
modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), weighted with the comprehensive risk of 
individual supplying countries, is developed to calculate the overall oil supply risks. 42 
Therefore, the economy scoring higher on this index would have a higher concentration of 
oil suppliers and hence a higher overall oil supply risk.43 India scored 87.24 while Thailand 
68.94 on this index in 2013. Therefore, India has a 26.54% higher oil supply risk by this 
measure alone.44 
                                                          
40 This is adapted from the measure of energy intensity of GDP. For a discussion of that and the 
importance of using a unified currency unit to calculate the index, see Shigeru Suehiro, “Energy 
Intensity of GDP as an Index of Energy Conservation,” August 2007, The Institute of Energy 
Economics website, accessed 15 August 2016, http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/data/pdf/400.pdf.  
41 The source of oil consumed is BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014, 11. The source 
of purchasing power parity in 2011 US$ is from the World Bank, accessed 15 August 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD. The results represent tonnes of oil 
consumed/thousand US$ of GDP. 
42 This indicator is roughly modelled after the one developed by Eshita Gupta in her 2008 study. For 
a discussion of how she calculates this indicator, see “Oil Vulnerability Index of Oil-Importing 
Countries,” Energy Policy 36 (2008): 1198-1200. The political risks in this study are also derived 
from the comprehensive risk rating in the Country Risk Guide produced by the PRS Group, but 
instead of regional risks, the risks associated with individual oil supplying countries are used here. 
This would differentiate high-risk countries such as Iran and Sudan, from OPEC and Africa 
respectively in general. 
The data for crude oil import sources are from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology website, 
Observatory of Economic Complexity: An Analytical Tool for Understanding the Dynamics of 
Economic Development. Workshops at the Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 
(2011), developed by Alexander Simoes and César Hidalgo. Accessed 2 October 2016,  
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/ind/show/2709/2013/ 
43 For a quick reference of the calculation and interpretation of the HHI, see Benjamin I. Cohen, “A 
Method for Analysing the Effect of Competition on Restricting Imports,” Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 5-3 (1983): 512-513. 
44 For details of the calculation of these scores, see Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix C. 
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India and Thailand’s. This remarkable similarity continues after two more risk factors 
are taken into consideration in this sub-section. India’s lower oil intensity is to an extent 
offset by the higher risk associated with its oil supply sources versus those of Thailand.  
 
2.3 Strength of Private Capital in India and Thailand 
In this paired comparison the historical-institutional source and the actor specific 
source that are hypothesised to contribute to the overall strength of private capital versus 
that of the state are disaggregated. Doing so would provide a clearer picture of the different 
origins of that overall strength as well as a more targeted understanding of where the 
domestic-international-state-capital equilibrium lies, specifically in the petroleum sectors. 
This equilibrium at once contributes to and is impacted by the overall strength of private 
capital in the entire economy.  
The combined scores of the two economic freedom indicators used in the 
preliminary assessment of this study to gauge the strength of private capital in the economy 
as a whole are only used to represent the historical-institutional source of it here. No new 
data are added as these indicators have already taken into consideration a wide array of 
pertinent institutional factors.45 India’s combined average 2013 score is slightly lower at 
60.9 than Thailand’s 64.6. 
The actor-specific source of India and Thailand’s private capital strength in their 
petroleum sectors is examined in this chapter to have a more complete picture of the where 
the private-state capital balance lies in their overall economies as of 2013. After this more 
targeted source is factored in, private capital appeared to be even stronger in Thailand in 
2013 than the result of the single-source preliminary study suggests. This greater strength, 
however, does not amount to an upgrade in Thailand’s trichotomous ranking of the overall 
strength of private capital versus that of the state. 
The framework with the four scenarios describing the domestic-international-
capital-state balance laid out in Chapter Two is applied in this chapter. The same graphic 
representation of this framework is reproduced below for easy reference: 
                                                          
45 The Index of Economic Freedom, for examples, examines the rule of law, government size, 
regulatory efficiency, and market openness of each economy, with a number of components making 
up these four major areas of investigation. See “Methodology – 2016 Index of Economic Freedom,” 
The Heritage Foundation website, accessed 20 December 2016, 
http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology. The Economic Freedom of the World index 
examines the size of government, legal system and property rights, “sound money,” such as the 
“freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts,” and freedom to trade internationally of each 
economy. Again, a number of components make up these four categories. See “Approach – Economic 
Freedom,” the Fraser Institute website, accessed 20 December 2016, 
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom/approach.  
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Figure 4.2  Actor-specific component correlation with DV, depicted as domestic 
capital’s relationship vis-à-vis strength of international capital and SOEs 
 
2.3.1 International-Domestic-Capital-SOE Balance in Indian Petroleum Sectors  
The Indian petroleum sector as a whole was dominated by IOCs in the first decade 
or so after independence, but by the 1970s, the situation was almost completely reversed.46 
The low efficiency of NOCs and other exogenous factors led to gradual liberalisation of the 
sector beginning in the 1980s, which cumulated to the adoption of the NELP in the upstream 
sector in 1999.47 Since then, private firm - even 100% foreign-owned oil firms - have been 
allowed to bid for indigenous oil E&P projects. In fact, the petroleum sector has been placing 
somewhere between the 9th and the 11th largest foreign-investment-receiving sector in India 
in recent years.48 This only translates into a little less than 3% of the total FDI inflow, but 
was already higher than that for the Indian economy as a whole. The five-year average of 
the overall inbound FDI between 2009 and 2013 accounted for 1.8% of India’s GDP of the 
same period. 49 For example, Cairn UK Holding, via its subsidiary Cairn India, made the 
second largest greenfield foreign investment project in value in India during the period 
                                                          
46 For the history of this reversal of fortune, see Biplab Dasgupta, The Oil Industry in India (London: 
Frank Cass & Company Ltd., 1971) and V. Vedavalli, Private foreign investment and economic 
development – A case study of petroleum in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 
47 Ashok Desai, Laveesh Bhandari, Ramrao Mundhe, and Bhupindra Yadav, Public Enterprises, 
Government Policy and Impact on Competition – Indian Petroleum Industry, (New Delhi: Indicus 
Analytics, January 2009), 12-14. 
48 The petroleum sector ranks the 9th for total accumulative FDI up to December 2010 and the 11th up 
to December 2013. See “Fact Sheet on Foreign Direct Investment From August 1991 to December 
2010,” (p2) and “Fact Sheet on Foreign Direct Investment From April 2000 to January 2013,” (p 8), 
Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Government of India, accessed 5 September 2016,  
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Publications/FDI_Statistics/FDI_Statistics.aspx.  
The data available does not specify whether it is referring to the upstream, midstream, or downstream 
petroleum sector, but in the case of India at least, judging by the existing configuration of the 
petroleum sector as a whole, international capital mostly only invests in the upstream sector. 
49  The source for the calculation is “Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% GDP),” World 
Development Indicators, The World Bank, accessed 5 September 2016,  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS.  
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between June 2006 and September 2009.50 Yet, major international oil companies such as 
Exxon, Shell, and Chevron have never participated in any of the NELP bidding to develop 
indigenous hydrocarbon resources, and the domestic upstream oil sector is a near duopoly 
between the major NOC ONGC and the domestic private firm Reliance.51  
Private oil firms, including international ones, have been present in the India’s mid- 
and downstream oil sectors, but their manoeuvring room in the domestic market was limited 
by the less than totally freely floating product prices in the decade leading to 2013. These 
firms, such as Reliance, Essar Oil, and Shell chose to “focus on either the lucrative export 
market or remain inactive in the absence of a level playing field.”52 Reliance, for example, 
was granted a 100% export-oriented unit status by the Indian government in 2007 to export 
the crude it developed in India provided that it “balanced its total imports and exports.”53 
In the petroleum sectors, domestic private capital was stronger than international 
capital in India’s domestic markets. Domestic oil firms, regardless of the source of their 
capital, however, were still far weaker than multinational corporations. For example, the 
biggest company by revenue in India according to the “Fortune India” 2013 list, the NOC 
IOCL, ranked 88th on the Fortune Global 500 2013 list.54 IOCL made just over 3% of the 
profits made by the company topping the list, which happened to be also an oil company, 
Royal Dutch Shell.55 The second, third, and fourth biggest companies in India that year 
according to this list were almost all oil firms, but they were smaller in size: Reliance 
Industries Limited, ranking 107th, Bharat Petroleum (NOC), ranking 229th; and Hindustan 
petroleum (NOC), ranking 260th. 56  The gaps of the absolute strengths between Indian 
corporations and international corporations in other sectors appear to be also very great. For 
example, the largest automobile manufacturer in India, Tata Motors, made less than 9% of 
the profits of Volkswagen, the world’s top-ranking automobile manufacturer in 2013.57 
                                                          
50 Premila Nazareth Satyan and Pramila Raghavendran, “Inward FDI in India and its policy context,” 
Columbia FDIProfiles, March 12, 2010, 10. Accessed 5 September 2016, Columbia University 
Academic Commons http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:8788. 
51 Azhar, 184.  
52 K. Ravichandran and Anjan Ghosh, “Industry Outlook: Challenging Times Ahead for the Indian 
Downstream Oil Sector,” ICRA Rating Features January 2009: 7. 
53 Desai et al, Public Enterprises, Government Policy and Impact on Competition, 20. 
54 See “Global 500 2013,” Fortune website, accessed 9 September 2016, 
http://fortune.com/global500/2013/ and “Fortune India 2013” Fortune website, 
http://fortuneindia.com/500/2013#details_1.      
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. According to the measure of market capitalization, however, Reliance was listed as a stronger 
energy company (ranking 25 in 2013 and 21 in 2012) than ONGC, the only other Indian energy firm 
on the list (ranking 30 in 2013 and 25 in 2012). See “IHS Energy 50 – The Definitive Annual Ranking 
of the World’s Largest Listed Energy Firms, January 2014.” 
57 These are according to the Forbes Global 2000 2013 list, which “uses an equal weighting of sales, 
profits, assets and market value to rank companies.”  Accessed 9 September 2016, 
http://www.economywatch.com/companies/forbes-list.   
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Domestic private oil firms were definitely still in a weaker position than public 
enterprises in all sectors of India’s oil supply chain as of 2013, more so than in the overall 
economy. In the upstream sector, up to the eighth round of NELP bidding in 2010, “ONGC 
held 57 per cent, RIL [Reliance] held 30 per cent and others, more than 50 companies, held 
just 13 per cent of the total NELP acreage.”58 The slow pace of oil product decontrol and 
the related complex under-recovery policies render the downstream sector still totally the 
domain of public enterprises.59  
To sum up, domestic private capital in the petroleum sectors of India was weaker than 
international capital in absolute terms and also weaker than NOCs by 2013. This puts the 
actor-specific source of the India’s domestic private capital vis-à-vis those of international 
and state capital in the third scenario or the bottom right quadrant of Figure 4.2 above.  
 
2.3.2 International-Domestic-Capital-SOE Balance in Thai Petroleum Sectors 
Foreign investments have long been a major funding source in Thailand’s 
petroleum sectors, much more so than in the overall Thai economy. 60  In particular, 
“Chevron is the largest oil producer in Thailand, accounting for nearly 70 per cent of 
Thailand’s crude oil and condensate productions.”61 It is also the majority owner of a major 
refining facility,62 and its Caltex brand operates about one-third of service stations in the 
country.63 In addition, a variety of other foreign-capital funded oil firms were awarded oil 
concessions in Thailand in the few years before 2013.64 
                                                          
58 Azhar, 184. 
59 The subsidies to NOCs, known as under-recoveries, made it difficult for private firms to market 
the oil they developed since they are not entitled to such subsidies. The price of diesel was finally 
decontrolled at the end of 2014, which suggests the playing field is slowly getting more level even 
in India. See Pravin Kumar Agarwal and Anmol Soni, “Petroleum Product Pricing Reforms in 
India: Are We on the Right Track?” The Energy and Resources Institute Policy Brief, March 2013; 
R. Jai Krishna, “Reliance Petrol Stations Are Back in Business in India,” The Wall Street Journal, 
21 May 2015, accessed 15 August 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/reliance-petrol-stations-are-
back-in-business-in-india-1432210861; and  Saurabh Chaturvedi and Prasanta Sahu, “India Frees 
Diesel Prices From Government Control,” The Wall Street Journal, 20 October 2014, accessed 15 
August 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/india-frees-diesel-prices-from-government-control-
1413648469.  
60 The five-year (2009-2013) average inbound FDI in the overall Thai economy is 2.86% of its 
GDP. This is calculated with the same World Bank data as in India. See footnote 49 above. 
61 Wang, 198.  
62 It owns about 60% of the share. Also note that the rest of the shares are owned by the NOC and its 
subsidiaries. See “Star Petroleum Refining Public Company Limited,” American Chamber of 
Commerce in Thailand website. Accessed 16 September 2016,  
http://www.amchamthailand.com/ACCT/asp/corpdetail.asp?CorpID=1606.  
63 Caltex operates about 370 out of the less than 1,200 service stations in Thailand. See “Thailand, 
highlights of operation,” Chevron website. Accessed 17 September 2016, 
 https://www.chevron.com/worldwide/thailand#highlightsofoperations. There were about 1,157 
service stations in Thailand as of 2010. See Silvana Tordo et al, National Oil Companies and Value 
Creation, Volume II (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2011), 97. 
64 Some examples include: Carnarvon Petroleum Limited (Australian-based) and Shaanxi Yanchang 
Petroleum (Group) (owned by the Shaanxi provincial government in China). See [Thai] Department 
of Mineral Fuels under the Ministry of Energy Annual Report 2013, 39. 
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As in India, domestic private corporations in Thailand were certainly weaker than 
international capital in absolute terms, even if they might be stronger in the domestic market 
in some sectors, such as banking and agribusiness. No Thai corporation was on the 2013 
Global Fortune 500 list. The top ranking Thai corporation on the 2013 Forbes Global 2000 
list was the NOC PTT PCL, and the profits it made was 7.57% of those made by the top oil 
firm on the same list, Exxon Mobil.65 The second largest Thai corporation on the list was 
the privately-owned Siam Commercial Bank (SCB).66 The profits it made were only 3.44% 
those of the bank topping the same list, the ICBC Bank of China.67 
In the petroleum sector as a whole, NOCs were definitely stronger than domestic 
private corporations in Thailand up to 2013. PTT’s monopoly in natural gas purchasing, 
wholesaling, and distributing in the domestic market make its overall position formidable 
even if it did not enjoy the same monopoly regarding crude oil or oil products.68 With the 
existing dominance of IOCs and NOCs in the oil sectors, there has not been much room left 
for domestic capital to participate in them, except through owning shares of PTT or its 
subsidiaries and affiliates.  
After examining the strength of domestic capital versus that of SOEs in Thailand’s 
overall economy and the oil supply sectors above, the conclusion is that the actor-specific 
source of Thailand’s domestic capital fits in the same bottom right quadrant of Figure 4.2 
as in India. Thai domestic private capital was no doubt weaker than international capital in 
absolute terms. It was also much weaker than state capital as of 2013. This means that in 
Thailand as well as in India, the effect of the actor-specific source on the overall strength of 
private capital is neutral. Its effect on the level of strategic oil supply measures adopted, 
therefore, hinges on the state’s orientation. 
The vulnerability-interaction model hypothesised that the state’s orientation in the 
oil supply sectors is predicated on the economy’s OV and decision-makers’ trust in the oil 
markets. Thailand’s slighter higher trust in the oil markets, as further explored in the next 
section, may have contributed to its relatively more liberalised petroleum sector governance 
and stronger positions of IOCs in Thailand in the decade leading to 2013. The greater 
historical-institutional support private capital in Thailand received as suggested by its 
slightly higher combined average overall economic freedom score would further bolster the 
                                                          
65 See “Forbes Global 2000: Thailand’s Largest Companies,”  
http://www.economywatch.com/companies/forbes-list/thailand.html and “Forbes Global 2000: The 
World’s Largest Companies in 2013,”Economy Watch website. Accessed 15 September 2016, 
http://www.economywatch.com/companies/forbes-list.  
66 Ibid. 
67  Accessed 15 September 2016, http://www.economywatch.com/companies/forbes-list. For the 
status of the bank as a private corporation, see “Our History,” SCB website. Accessed 16 September 
2016, http://www.scb.co.th/en/about-scb/our-history/weathering-the-storm.  
68 Tordo et al, 97. 
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overall strength of private capital in Thailand. All these differences, however, are still 
relatively small and would not amount to an upgrade of this ITV to a higher trichotomous 
level.  
 
2.4 India and Thailand’s Overall Trust in Oil Markets 
This section examines each component the vulnerability-interaction model 
proposes to make up decision-makers’ overall trust level in oil markets’ ability to ensure oil 
supply security in greater details in the cases of India and Thailand. The more cursory data 
examined in the plausibility probe of this thesis result in these two economies receiving the 
same trichotomous overall trust level. Based on analyses of annual report contents of 
pertinent NOCs and supported by facts related to the domestic and external contexts 
hypothesised to facilitate securitising, the conclusion is that the levels of these component 
parts accurately reflect the situations in each economy. Their overall levels of trust in the oil 
markets, therefore, should be similar, with Thailand’s a little higher than India’s. Thailand’s 
more liberalised, but not totally free, domestic oil market governance is concordant with this 
finding. 
 
2.4.1 Securitising Agents 
 In Chapter Three, both India and Thailand received the lowest trichotomous score 
for the securitising agent component, which is hypothesised to lead to the lowest level of 
trust in oil markets. This is based on the fact that the two economies each had at least one 
“traditional” NOC. In this comparative study, the relative coherence of these NOCs as 
securitising or lobbying agents and evidence of their securitising attempts are examined to 
ascertain if they are similar.  
 Unlike Thailand, India does not have a single vertically integrated NOC, but five 
central-level NOCs operating at different oil sectors.69 This, however, does not necessarily 
mean that their collective coherence as securitising or powerful lobbying agents would be 
lower than Thailand’s PTT. To investigate this further, and indeed, to see if there is actual 
evidence that NOCs routinely try to play up their importance in ensuring the oil supply 
security to the economy, a content analysis is offered here of annual reports of relevant 
NOCs in the five years leading to 2013.70  
The results of the analysis indicate that NOCs in both countries trumpeted the 
various important roles they play to ensure oil supply security to their respective economies 
                                                          
69 This excludes the Gas Authority of India Limited which is not related to crude oil supply. For the 
five Indian NOCs that do, see pages 47 and 48 in Chapter Three. 
70 The annual reports of years 2009 to 2013 are analysed when they are available (PTT). In cases 
when one of these years are not available (ONGC), those of earlier years are analysed. The earliest 
one examined is the ONGC 2007-08 Annual Report.  
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to comparable degrees overall.71 There are, however, noticeable difference in emphasis. 
Indian NOCs highlight their effort in ensuring oil supply and other basic services to India’s 
largely resource-deficient population in rural areas of the country, while Thailand’s PTT 
focused more on its pivotal role in ensuring oil supply security to the economy as a whole 
and as a “national champion” company. In addition, the securitising or lobbying effort as 
manifested in the language used in the annual reports of both countries’ NOCs appears to 
trend upward towards 2013.72    
For India, the annual reports of ONGC and IOCL, representing the largest 
upstream and mid- to downstream respectively, are examined. To gauge their overall 
securitising effort, each appearance of the terms “strategic” and “security” is assigned the 
score of zero, one or two. The score of zero is assigned to applications not related to 
securitising. In the case of the word “strategic,” a positive score is only assigned when it 
conveys meaning beyond being long-term and/or well-planned commonly used in 
commercial settings. The following applications, for example, receives the score of “two”: 
“The task [satisfying large projected increase in energy demand] is huge for Indian 
companies and even more significant for your company, ONGC being the flagship company 
of this highly strategic and nationally critical sector.”73  
The score of “one” is assigned when the meaning of the language used is more 
ambiguous. For the word “security,” a positive score is only assigned when it is used to 
highlight the company’s importance in ensuring oil or energy security to the country. The 
following usage only receives a “one” because of its multifaceted message: “Apart from our 
mission as the national oil company which is ensuring energy security by supply[ing] the 
energy to the country's demand, our responsibility as a corporate enterprise registered in the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand also include enhancing economic prosperity by delivering high 
income to the state.”74 The following two unequivocal usages, however, each receives the 
score of “two”: “With our footprint in 16 countries, we are geared to anchor India’s energy 
security”;75 and “The mission is to seek and secure competitively priced crude oil and 
natural gas to ensure Thailand’s energy security.”76  
The combined five-year average score of ONGC and IOCL for this general 
securitising agent category was 10.2 versus PTT’s 26. This was due to PTT’s very liberal 
                                                          
71 Thailand’s PTT receives a five-year average overall securitising score of 34.8 while India’s ONGC 
and IOCL (see explanation in the next paragraph) together receive a five-year average overall score 
of 37.2.  
72 The total score spikes in 2011 for the PTT as that report has an unusually frequent mentioning of 
the company’s effort to supply oil and other basic services to people affected by the great flood that 
devastated the economy, especially in the rural area, that year. 
73 ONGC 2013-14 Annual Report, 109. 
74 PTT Annual Report 2013, 16. 
75 ONGC 2013-14 Annual Report, inside cover. 
76 PTT Annual Report, 2013, 45. 
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use of the term “energy security” while emphasising its role in achieving it on behalf of the 
Thai nation. By contrast, the term “strategic” did not appear even once in all five years of 
PTT’s annual reports. Indian NOCs also mentioned their role in ensuring Indian’s energy 
security, but not as frequently. ONGC, India’s upstream leader, occasionally mentioned the 
strategic role it played as the quotation above demonstrates. The main downstream NOC, 
however, did not do so as it only recently began to engage in overseas upstream oil projects, 
which are seen as “strategic” in popular imagination.  
One possible explanation of PTT being apparently a more enthusiastic 
securitising/lobbying agent is that it faced greater competition from IOCs in the domestic 
market than its Indian counterparts. At the same time, Thailand’s oil product pricing regime 
was more liberalised in 2013, hence it was more difficult for PTT to highlight its role of 
catering for the needs of the poor. 77  The combination of a greater need to justify its 
continued existence and the constraint the Thai oil pricing regime placed on its securitising 
option could well have resulted in more effort being put on trumpeting its mission of 
ensuring the country’s energy security.  
None of the Thai or Indian NOCs analysed directly or explicitly links its raison d'être 
with military or geopolitical rationales. This does not, however, mean that they did not act 
or serve as securitising or powerful lobbying agents for their continued existence and 
expansion, as the examples quoted above demonstrate. The intention behind the relatively 
frequent usage of the terms analysed in pertinent ways is made even clearer if we compare 
the NOC results to those of Exxon Mobil. It scores zero for all three years the analysis is 
conducted on the same two terms.78 The contrast is less stark, but the result for Reliance 
Industries, the major Indian-based private oil firm, still shows a lower level of emphasising 
the concepts of “strategy” and/or “security.”79 In short, despite the difference in emphases, 
as further illustrated in the next sub-section, India and Thailand both deserve the same 
trichotomous score for their NOCs serving as strong and coherent securitising agents. 
 
2.4.2 Domestic Context 
Before delving into NOCs’ securitising effort related to entrusting oil supply and 
distribution within the economy entirely to private firms, I will examine more closely the 
                                                          
77 Thailand’s oil fund “subsidy” system is supposed to stabilise oil product prices, not directly 
lowering prices to make them more affordable to the poor population. See footnote 39 above for 
more discussions. 
78 For 2013, 2010, and 2009. A typical example of the its usage of the term “strategic” reads like this: 
“Our additions come from a combination of the development of new fields, extensions to existing 
fields driven by further development, effective reservoir management, and application of new 
technologies, as well as strategic acquisitions.” 
79 Reliance Industries’ 2013-14, 2012-13, and 2009-10 annual reports are analysed. The three-year 
average of their usages of these two terms is 8.67 versus the ONGC and IOCL’s combined score of 
10.2.  
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facts on India and Thailand’s evenness and levels of economic development, and the social 
context that would make such effort more persuasive if the conditions are relevant enough 
as described in Chapter Two.     
Thailand was noticeably more urbanised and “well off” on a per capita basis than 
India in 2013 according to the data collected in the preliminary analysis in Chapter Three.80 
By these two measures, the objective domestic context should allow decision-makers in 
Thailand to have fewer worries about trusting an unfettered domestic market or relying 
solely on private oil firms to ensure oil supply security. This in turn would also make 
persuasive securitising by PTT with this domestic context more difficult according to the 
logic of the vulnerability-interaction model.  
Per capita GDP, however, only shows the mean income of the population in an 
economy. Knowing how evenly the income is distributed among the population would 
provide a more accurate picture of the magnitude of poverty in the economy, which is more 
relevant to decision-makers’ level of trust as hypothesised by the vulnerability-interaction 
model. The income distribution of India appears to be more even than that in Thailand 
around 2013 according to the measure of the GINI index.81 At the same time, the difference 
between the two economies’ five-year average per capita GDP between 2009 to 2013 is 
more or less the same as that of 2013 alone: Thailand’s was almost exactly three times that 
of India’s. These two facts taken together would mean that even though there were real 
differences in India and Thailand’s urbanisation and prosperity levels, the gap in decision-
makers’ trust in the domestic market in the two economies would in fact be a little smaller.82  
Returning to the content analysis of the annual reports of Indian and Thai NOCs, 
three groups of words are used to verify if these NOCs emphasise their importance in serving 
the rural and needy population that tend to be underserved by private firms. The results 
corroborate with the different objective domestic contexts of these two economies as 
                                                          
80 Its urban population was 48% versus India’s 32% and its per capital GDP was $15,437 versus 
India’s $5,268. Data sources of these are from the World Bank website. See Section 2.4.2 in Chapter 
Three for details. 
81 The only GINI index data for India from the World Bank is for year 2011 and the reading was 35.2. 
See “GINI index (World Bank estimate) – India,” the World Bank website. Accessed 10 October 
2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=IN. The reading for Thailand in 
2011 is 39.26, and the five-year average reading between 2009 and 2013 is 38.74. In fact, this average 
already lower than the readings in the previous decades, which range from the low to mid-40s. See 
“GINI index (World Bank estimate) – Thailand,” the World Bank website. Accessed 10 October 
2016, 
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=TH. Putting these readings into context, 
Sweden, a net oil importing country reputedly with a relatively even income distribution has readings 
around between 26 and 27 during the same period. “GINI index (World Bank estimate) – Sweden,” 
the World Bank website. Accessed 10 October 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=SE.  
82 The degrees of urbanization in the decade leading to 2013 have risen steadily in both economies 
and so offers no further insight than that offered by the snapshot results of 2013. 
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discussed in the last paragraph. Indian NOCs, serving a less prosperous and more rural 
economy, highlighted their domestic distributive role much more forcefully than PTT. If we 
only focus on the group of words “poor, remote, or rural,” the difference in the five-year 
average scores of the two economies is stunning: India’s was 21 and Thailand’s was 0.8. A 
typical usage of these terms by Indian NOCs reads like this: “… IndianOil bagged the Asia 
Retail Congress Award for Retail Excellence for the 'Rural Impact' category for its 
innovative rural initiative… special format petrol/diesel stations in rural areas.”83     
Interestingly, the PTT used the second group of words more frequently. It scored 
a five-year average of 4.4 versus Indian NOCs’ combined total of 3 for the words “(self)-
sufficient/ sufficiency/reliant/reliance.” This may be impacted by the philosophy of self-
sufficiency preached by the popular late Thai monarch.84 A positive score is assigned to the 
application of the third term analysed, “serve,” when it emphasised the NOCs’ role in 
serving the underserved or the national interest as a whole. In this category, both countries’ 
NOCs scored very similarly: India’s 3 versus Thailand’s 3.6 (five-year average).  
In sum, India scored more than three times higher in the combined results of these 
three categories of words related to the domestic context of securitising, 27 versus 
Thailand’s 8.8 (five-year average). In addition to reflecting the greater pertinence of India’s 
objective environment to securitising in the domestic context as hypothesised by the 
proposed model, the results illustrate Indian NOCs’ eagerness, at least the downstream ones, 
to defend their “territory” by securitising. During the period studied, Indian downstream 
NOCs only shared a fraction of the costs related to maintaining the artificially low petroleum 
product prices called “under-recoveries.”85 In return, they gained an edge over private oil 
firms as these firms received little or no under-recoveries from the state as compensation.86 
The upstream leader ONGC, which did not enjoy such an advantage but had to share the 
burden of the costs, actually displayed even a lower overall domestic context score than 
PTT.87 ONGC, however, did attain a score more than three times higher than PTT’s for the 
                                                          
83 Indian Oil Corporation Annual Report 2011-12, 48. 
84 For a discussion of this philosophy, see Darren Noy, “Thailand’s Sufficiency Economy: Origins 
and Comparisons with Other Systems of Religious Economics,” Social Compass 58-4 (2011): 593-
610. 
85 For a discussion of under-recoveries and how the fiscal burden of them were shared, see Agarwal 
and Soni, Petroleum Product Pricing Reforms in India, 1-3. The burden borne by downstream NOCs 
appear to be getting larger over the years, but still less than a third of the total subsidies. See 
Petroleum Prices, Taxation and Subsidies in India (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2009), 6-10. 
86 Desai et al, Public Enterprises, Government Policy and Impact on Competition, 20. Also see 
Kieran Clarke, Shruti Sharma, and Damon VisDunbar, India Energy Subsidy Review – A biannual 
survey of energy subsidy policies (Geneva: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2014), 
19.  
87 ONCG’s five-year average of overall domestic context score is 3.6 versus PTT’s 8.8 and IOCL’s 
23.4.  
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group of words “poor, remote, or rural,” which in turn was only about one seventh of its 
downstream counterpart in India.88  
India’s lower trust score in the domestic oil market in the plausibility probe 
remains accurate after a more detailed examination of the evenness and level of economic 
development of India and Thailand as well as the securitising efforts of their NOCs in the 
domestic context. As suggested by the vulnerability-interaction model, Thailand did seem 
to trust the functioning of the domestic oil market more than India in the years leading to 
2013. It had a much more market-confirming domestic oil product price regime as it did not 
artificially set the prices of oil products.   
 
2.4.3 External Securitising Context 
India and Thailand both received the middle score for their level of trust in the 
international oil markets in the plausibility probe. In that preliminary study, this score was 
assigned to a polity that was neither a formal or de facto ally nor having a relationship that 
may be interpreted as “neutral-conflictual” with the United States around 2013. The 
vulnerability-interaction model hypothesises that a negative relationship with the United 
States would create an external context that can easily be exploited to securitise the 
untrustworthiness of the international oil markets than one that is close.  
The reasoning of the proposed model is based on the fact that the United States has 
been the hegemonic power of the international political and economic systems for decades. 
The United States has been the creator and rule and agenda setter in most international 
organizations, including the one that represents net oil importing advanced economies, the 
IEA. The United States is also the single country that had the naval power to underwrite the 
security of or block off sea lanes most oil shipped to Asia have to use. 89  U.S.-based 
corporations, including major IOCs, have been dominant players in the international oil 
markets. All these objective facts may be manipulated to sow doubts in the fairness of the 
existing international oil markets by lowering states’ trust in these markets. One way to do 
so is to play up the zero-sum economic nationalistic worldview, which assumes the United 
States would try by any means to hang on to its historical dominance. The goal is to bolster 
its “power, prestige, or the prosperity” at the expense of other nations, especially those 
having a conflictual relationship with it.90 
                                                          
88 ONGC’s five-year average for this group only is 2.6 versus PTT’s 0.8 and IOCL’s 18.4. 
89 Hughes and Long, “Is There an Oil Weapon?” 173-180. 
90 The quoted phrase was supposed to be the goals of economic nationalists, even if the means adopted 
to achieve these goals can be very diverse and not necessarily zero-sum in orientation. See Helleiner, 
“Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism?” 310 and footnote 59 in Chapter 
Two for more discussions. 
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India and Thailand’s middle score means this external context should not have 
much salience in securitising oil supply risks directly or indirectly related to the United 
States. Partly due to this lack of salience and partly due to the unlikelihood of discussions 
of the state’s bilateral relationships with the hegemonic power in NOC annual reports, no 
content analysis on them is conducted. 
Instead, in this pairwise comparison, Indian-U.S. and Thai-U.S. relationships are 
examined more closely to see if they are indeed very similar and if not, whether the 
difference would likely lead to a notable difference in decision-makers’ level of trust in 
these two economies concordant with the expectation of the proposed model. Indian-U.S. 
politico-strategic relations in the decade leading to 2013 improved tremendously compared 
to during the Cold War, or even the early post-Cold War years. Despite the talk about the 
two being natural allies in this decade, however, their relationships did not seem to have 
developed to the level of closeness of actual allies yet as of 2013. 
Since the signing of the “New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship” 
agreement in June 200591 and the issuance of the joint statement between President George 
W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh a month later,92 many commentators have 
noted the blossoming relationship between the two countries, especially as a contrast to the 
Sino-American relationship.93 Other commentators take a generally optimistic, but more 
neutral, view of the bilateral relationship between New Delhi and Washington. While 
acknowledging it to be at a historic high, they also call to attention lingering issues such as 
Indian-Pakistan animosity, India’s continuing arms acquisition from Russia,94 U.S. worries 
about “strategic autonomy” of India,95 U.S. demands for “Indian allegiance” and a faltering 
                                                          
91 “New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship,” June 28, 2005. The Rumsfeld Papers 
website, accessed 11 November 2016, 
 http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/3211/2005-06-
28%20New%20Framework%20for%20the%20US-India%20Defense%20Relationship.pdf.  
92 “Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh,” The 
White House website, accessed 11 November 2016, 
 https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html.  
93 See for example R. Nicholas Burns, “America’s Strategic Opportunity with India: The New U.S.-
India Partnership,” Foreign Affairs 86-6 (Nov – Dec 2007): 131-146; Robert D. Kaplan, “Power 
Plays in the Indian Ocean: The Maritime Commons in the 21st Century,” in Contested Commons: The 
Future of American Power in a Multipolar World, ed. Abraham M. Denmark and James Mulvenon 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2010), 185; Namrata Goswami, “The Logic 
of Closer US-India Relations,” The Diplomat, June 14, 2016. Accessed 11 November 2016, 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/the-logic-of-closer-us-india-relations/. Another example with a very 
different theoretical perspective and scope than the others but also sounds optimistic of this 
relationship is by Jarrod Hayes, Constructing National Security: U.S. Relations with India and China 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 91-98.  
94 John Pedro, “United States-India Defense Relations: A Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century,” 
Cornell International Affairs Review 9-1 (2016). Accessed 11 November 2016, 
 http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=1320. 
95 Tanvi Madan, “The U.S.-India Relationship and China,” January 20, 2015, Brookings Institute 
website. Accessed 11 November 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-u-s-india-
relationship-and-china/. 
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Indian economy making it a “less attractive strategic partner to the U.S.”96 Priya Chacko 
goes further by pointing out that the notions of American exceptionalism and “Indian 
civilizational exceptionalism” are fundamentally incompatible, which act as a “key barrier” 
to the two countries developing a truly “special relationship” even at a period of power 
transition fraught with “ontological insecurity” due to a rising China.97  
U.S.-Thai relations were heading in the opposite direction during the same 
timeframe. They continued to trend downward from its height during the Cold War, 
notwithstanding the temporary boost they received from the common goal of countering 
terrorism in the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks and the American invasion of 
Iraq in 2003.98 The two allies’ respective relationship with China also featured prominently 
in their relationship with each other, but also roughly having an opposite effect as in the case 
of Indian-U.S. relationship. In an observer’s words, “differing threat perceptions about 
China…contribute to a sense that the alliance, while institutionally sound, suffers from a 
lack of strategic alignment.”99 
The 2006 military coup that ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the 
political instabilities in the years leading to 2013, not to mention the military coup in 2014, 
have put further strains on the alliance. By the last few years of the first decade of this 
century, the two Cold War and counter-terrorism allies were on divergent paths again, even 
if the benefits of the alliance were still too great for either to rush for the exit.100 One such 
benefit is the annual Cobra Gold exercise that takes place in Thailand. It is the largest 
multinational military exercise in the Asia Pacific with the goal f advancing regional security 
and humanitarian operations. The exercise was only scaled down, but not cancelled even 
after the 2014 coup.101 Thailand was chosen as the first stop of President Obama’s first trip 
                                                          
96 S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations – An Explanation 
for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future,” Asian Survey 47-4 (July/August 2007): 653-
655. 
97 He explains American exceptionalism as entailing “the notion that American ideals and institutions 
are universal and that the United States has an obligation to exercise global leadership.” On the other 
hand, Indian civilization exceptionalism entails seeing “India as a responsible state with a non-
coercive, prudent, exemplar-style approach to moral leadership that seeks a better path to modernity.” 
A New ‘Special Relationship’?: Power Transitions, Ontological Security, and India-U.S. Relations,” 
International Studies Perspectives 15 (20154): 343.  
98 For a history of that relationship from its height in the Cold War, through the doldrums in the 1990s 
and its partial “revival” in the early 2000s, see Paul Chambers, “U.S.-Thai Relations after 9/11: A 
New Era in Cooperation?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26-3 (December 2004): 460-476. 
99  Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Thailand: Background an U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research 
Service Report RL32593, June 21, 2010, 10. 
100  Ibid. Also see Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Political Turmoil in Thailand and U.S. Interests,” 
Congressional Research Service Report R40605, May 26, 2009; Lewis M. Stern, “Diverging Roads: 
21st-century” Strategic Forum, No. 241, June 2009. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National 
Defense University. 
101 Richard S. Enrlich, “Obama Scales down annual Cobra Gold military exercise in protest of 
Thailand coup,” The Washington Times, February 9, 2015. Accessed 20 February 2015, 
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to Southeast after his re-election to shore up the already sagging relationship, even if his 
visit to Myanmar received the greatest attention for that trip.102 
I argue that the closer examination of India and Thailand’s relationships with the 
United States in this sub-section so far justifies the middling score they received, although 
they arrived there from very different starting points. The relationships have also been 
predicated on very different legal and institutional frameworks and appear to be trending in 
different directions.  
Were these differences large enough to impact on decision-markers’ calculations 
of the oil supply risks their economies faced around 2013 or did they make securitisation 
easier by NOCs and other interested parties in one of the countries? My assessment is “no” 
on both counts. First, as mentioned earlier, a middle score is not hypothesised to have much 
salience on decision-makers’ trust level in the international oil markets. In addition, 
improving India-U.S. relations in the last decade would make securitising American 
response to such developments as the Indian-Iranian oil trade and investment projects more 
difficult.103 In the case of Thailand, the prominent role played by American oil firms’ in the 
economy’s oil sectors also makes securitising oil supply with the country’s generally 
downward relations with United States in the last few decades less relevant. 
 
2.4 Implementation Capabilities of India and Thailand 
This section tests the proposition that India and Thailand had a similar level of 
overall capabilities to implement strategic oil supply measures in 2013. First, an additional 
implementation capability especially applicable to countries with traditional NOCs is 
examined with respect to India and Thailand’s situations. Then, the two countries’ 
diplomatic capability to render support to state intervention in oil supply is re-examined 
with greater specificity than the nature of their UN memberships, used as the proxy in the 
plausibility probe.  
                                                          
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/9/obama-protests-thailand-coup-scales-down-
annual-co/.   
102 For an analysis of the goal of that trip and issues on the U.S.-Thai agenda during Obama’s visit 
there, see Vikram Nehru, “Obama in Southeast Asia: Symbolism or Substance?” November 17, 2012, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website. Accessed 25 February 2017,   
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/11/17/obama-in-southeast-asia-symbolism-or-
substance/ejm8#thailand.  
103 Iran has long been a major supplier of crude oil to India. Before the U.S. sanction on Iran was 
lifted in January 2016, India’s opposition to the sanction at least put some stress on the Indian-U.S. 
relationship at times. See Chacko, “New ‘Special Relationship’?” 342; Tanvi Madan, “India and the 
Iran deal,” Brookings Institute website, July 20, 2015. Accessed 12 November 2016, 
 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/07/20/india-and-the-iran-deal/; and Armin Rosen, 
“Why India Is Finally Complying With Sanctions on Iran,” March 15, 2013 The Atlantic. Accessed 
12 November 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-india-is-finally-
complying-with-sanctions-on-iran/274063/.  
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Taking into account a more in-depth investigation, India and Thailand’s overall 
capabilities in implementing strategic oil supply measures appear to remain very similar. 
India appears to be slightly weaker than Thailand in one of the additional capabilities 
examined. Its NOCs were less profitable than Thailand’s and they also seemed to have less 
autonomy of how to use the profits.104 India, however, definitely had a greater capability 
and indeed more aggressively engaged in oil diplomacy than Thailand during the period 
studied.  
 
2.4.1 NOC Profitability 
The profitability of NOCs is examined here as an additional implementation 
capability. The logic is that since all central-level NOCs in India and Thailand are publicly 
traded domestically, to a large degree, they can use their net profits to sustain and expand 
their operations independent of the financial capabilities of the state.105 This in turn results 
in the adoption of higher levels strategic oil supply measures by their host economies as 
defined in this project. These may include more overseas equity E&P projects or NOCs 
controlling a higher percentage of the economy’s crude oil supply through either E&P or 
trading. Both the absolute amount and its ratio relative to the company’s assets or equity are 
taken into consideration to determine if the NOCs have similar capability in sustaining or 
expanding themselves with their net profits.   
The combined five-year average (2009-2013) of the net profits of India’s five 
NOCs 106 was a little more than twice that of PTT’s.107 By this measure, Indian NOCs 
appeared to be less profitable as the oil consumed in India in 2013 was almost 3.5 times that 
in Thailand.108 The same five-year averages of the net profits to equity or net worth ratios 
of Indian and Thai NOCs were similar. The four-NOC average of India’s was 12.77% versus 
PTT’s 13.98%. Data for the smaller upstream Indian NOC Oil India Limited is not available 
and hence is not factored into the calculation. Otherwise, the two ratios would be even closer 
                                                          
104 The generally higher ownership stakes the Indian government has in its NOCs than the Thai 
government on PTT (especially when the 15% owned by the Thai sovereign wealth fund is not 
counted) partly contributes to this statement. In addition, simply judging by the “NOC Corporate 
Governance” sections on ONGC and PTT in the World Bank study on NOCs, ONGC has less 
functional independence than PTT. See Tordo et al, National Oil Companies and Value Creation, 
Volume II, 29 and 103. 
105  There are other regulatory or political restrictions to NOC activities. Different corporate 
governance structures would also impact on NOCs’ financial autonomy as discussed in the last 
footnote. Still, everything being equal, the more funds NOCs have in the form of net profits from 
their operations, the greater capability they would have to maintain and expand their activities.    
106 The sources of the information are from the companies’ annual reports. IOCL and Hindustan 
Petroleum’s annual reports provide the profits in U.S. dollar. as well as in Indian Rupees (INR). The 
other three companies only provide the amount in INR and Conversion rates to US$ with the 
corresponding year are used to compute the US$ equivalent for comparison with PTT’s profits, which 
also need to be converted from Thai Bhat to U.S. dollar. See Table A12, Appendix C for details.  
107 Indian NOCs’ combined total net profit is US$6352.94 million and PTT’s is US$2,855 million. 
108 Calculated with BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014. 
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as upstream firms appear to be more profitable than downstream ones in India as oil products 
were still subjected to de facto price control during the period studied.109  
 
2.4.2 Oil Diplomacy Capability of India and Thailand 
Both the size and specialty of a country’s diplomatic establishment are important to 
carry out effective oil diplomacy. Political negotiations, which are inseparable from oil 
diplomacy, take time, resources, and skills. In this section, therefore, the specialty of and 
spending on India and Thailand’s foreign affairs and other pertinent ministries that can 
support their respective states’ and NOCs’ overseas oil supply activities are examined.  
India, with a GDP about four and a half times that of Thailand in the years leading 
to 2013, is expected to have a much larger diplomatic establishment in absolute terms.110 
The results of the comparison of the expenditures of the two countries’ respective ministries 
handling foreign affairs, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Thai 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) during the period studied, more than confirm this 
expectation. The Indian ministry spent almost six times more than its Thai counterpart.111 
Another way to express this difference is that India spent on average 0.08% of its GDP to 
run its MEA while Thailand spent 0.06% of its GDP to run its MFA.112  
This study refines these numbers by taking two actions. First, India’s substantial 
“loans and advances to foreign governments,” about 13% of the budget of its MEA,113is 
excluded from the calculation. Second, in Thailand, the Department of Mineral Fuels (DMF) 
under the Ministry of Energy has responsibilities of promoting hydrocarbon E&P in areas 
                                                          
109 The major Indian upstream firm ONGC’s five-year net profits/net worth ratio is 19.8% while those 
of the three downstream firms’ ratios are 11.6%, 11.14%, and 8.48%. 
110India’s five-year average GPD (2009-2013) is US$1,715,400 million and Thailand’s four -year 
average GDP (2010-2013) is US$382,178.25 million. See “GDP (current US$),” The World Bank 
website. Accessed 20 November 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. 
Only a four-year average is done on Thailand because data on the expenditures of its Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs are only available from 2010-14. See the next footnote. 
111 To be precise, it is 5.9 times more. The source of the MEA budgets of 2009-2013 is from the 
[Indian] Ministry of External Affairs Annual Reports 2013-14, 203; the sources of the Thai MAF 
expenditures of 2010-13 are from Thailand’s Budget in Brief Fiscal Year 2014, 75, Thailand’s Budget 
in Brief Fiscal Year 2012, 74, and Thailand’s Budget in Brief Fiscal Year 2011, 62.  
112 As a comparison, the U.S. State Department and foreign aid budget (including military aid) for 
2014 was estimated to be US$47.8 billion, but US$35 billion of that was for aids. After deducting 
that out, the U.S. spent about 0.073% of its GDP to staff its diplomatic establishments. For the total 
State Department and USAID budget, see Executive Budget Summary of the United States of 
America Department of State, Fiscal Year 2014, 2. Accessed 25 February 2017,  https://2009-
2017.state.gov/documents/organization/207305.pdf. For the total foreign aid budget, see Nick 
Thompson, “Seventy-five percent of U.S. foreign military financing goes to two countries,” 
November 11, 2015 CNN websites. Accessed 25 February 2017,  
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/11/politics/us-foreign-aid-report/. U.S. GDP data is obtained from 
the World Bank website,  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US.  
113 The recipients of the largest of these loans and advances were not oil producing countries, and 
hence these loans would not be related to oil diplomacy. See the complete list of recipients for fiscal 
year 2011-12 on page 209 of the MEA annual report of that year.  
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overlapping with neighbouring countries. This and related functions may reasonably be 
considered the implementation of oil diplomacy in some ways.114 Even generously adding 
half of the DMF expenditures onto that of the MFA to do the calculation, India still spent a 
slightly higher proportion of its resources on maintaining a diplomatic corps that can be 
mobilised to conduct oil diplomacy.115 In fact, another Indian government department also 
has a lot to do with the execution of oil diplomacy, as the discussions two paragraphs below 
illustrate. It is obvious that India devoted more resources to engaging in oil diplomacy than 
Thailand both in absolute and relative terms in the years leading to 2013 even without 
factoring in the budget of this department. 
India’s oil diplomacy also showed a greater concentration of effort and a tighter 
focus. In 2009, the Energy Unit within the Indian MEA, formed in 2007, was updated to a 
“full-fledged division.”116 This unit provides concerted effort to enhance India’s energy 
security by “making sustained diplomatic interventions on energy issues; assisting the 
government’s efforts to further diversify the country’s supply base for oil, gas…interfacing 
with nodal Energy Ministries; facilitating R&D tie-ups, and technology 
transfer…[emphases added]”117 Oil diplomacy appeared to be a major focus of this division, 
as well as the whole diplomatic corps. MEA annual reports of this period routinely 
documented dozens of oil supply cooperation projects Indian NOCs and government 
participated in overseas. As the Chairman of ONGC puts it, the company was “thankful to 
the diplomatic support from the Indian government for catalysing” its expansion and in 
establishing its overseas E&P subsidiary, OVL.118  
In fact, the practice of oil diplomacy, if less formally or professionally, entered the 
agenda of the Indian Ministry of Petroleum and Gas (MPNG) even earlier. In 2005, two 
years before the predecessor of MEA’s Energy Division was instituted, the MPNG formed 
an International Cooperation Division to facilitate “bilateral cooperation with foreign 
countries both in the upstream and downstream sectors [emphasis added],”119 the classic 
feature of oil diplomacy. This division employed mechanisms such as “meetings at the level 
of Heads of State/Government/Oil Minister of hydrocarbon-rich countries,” and “holding 
high-level conferences, such as the India-Africa Hydrocarbons Conference… to seek 
engagement with oil & gas producing countries/international oil companies” to achieve oil 
                                                          
114 One of DMF’s declared strategies reads: “Enhance national energy security through the pursuit 
and development of energy sources and power systems from both domestic and international 
sources…” [Thai] Department of Mineral Fuels, Ministry of Energy Annual Report 2013, 14 
115 India’s is 0.7 versus Thailand’s 0.6. Sources of the DMF expenditures for the pertinent years are 
from the same Budget in Brief reports as listed in footnote 111, but on pages 77, 76, and 67 
respectively. 
116 MEA Annual Report 2011-12, 15. 
117 Ibid. 
118 ONGC Annual Report 2013-2014, 4. 
119 MPNG Annual Report 2007-08, 117. 
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diplomacy objectives.120 MPNG officials no doubt provided much needed expertise on oil 
supply issues to the professional diplomatic corps.121  
By contrast, no such resources or focused effort were exerted within the Thai MFA 
or the DMF. There was no special division or unit on oil or energy diplomacy. This may be 
a reflection of Thailand’s smaller diplomatic clout in absolute terms outside of its immediate 
neighbourhood. Its oil or energy diplomatic efforts covered mainly the actual and potential 
hydrocarbon producing areas overlapping with its neighbours and energy cooperation 
among Southeast Asian economies. Accelerating hydrocarbon E&P in the Malaysia-
Thailand Joint Development Area through international cooperation and supporting the 
development of the Trans-ASEAN gas pipeline, for example, were the only two 
international projects mentioned in the DMF 2013 annual report.122 While energy security 
and cooperation has been mentioned a number of times, oil diplomacy or other oil related 
issues was not mentioned even once in the MFA’s 2012 annual report. The most pertinent 
description of related effort reads, “… ambassadors and consulates general were also able 
to discuss ‘new’ issues such as science diplomacy and energy diplomacy…”123 A likely 
contributing reason for this relative indifference is that Thailand had greater confidence than 
India in acquiring its oil supply through international markets with the prominence of IOCs 
in its petroleum sectors. 
 
3. Politics of Oil in China 
Sustained large-scale production of oil and gas emerged in China in the early 
1960s with the development of the Daqing oilfield even if oil and gas had been discovered 
and used for two millennia.124 In modern China, all major oil companies have been state-
owned and operated, from the 19th century Qing Dynasty bureaucracy, to the Nationalist 
government’s China Petroleum Corporation headquartered in Shanghai before moving to 
Taiwan in 1949, and on to the People’s Republic’s line ministries, which were transformed 
into national oil companies (NOCs) in the late 1980s.125 The corporatization and public 
offerings of stocks of subsidiaries of major Chinese NOCs around the turn of this century 
                                                          
120 MPNG Annual Report 2012-13, 143. 
121 Information on Meckling et al’s studies on Indian NOC internationalization also provides ideas 
for these two paragraphs, especially on page 17 of “Oil & State Capitalism.” 
122 Pages 6 and 16 respectively.  
123 MFA 2012 annual report, p93. 
124 Lianyong Feng, Yan Hu, Charles A. S. Hall, and Jianliang Wang, The Chinese Oil Industry: 
History and Future (New York: Springer, 2013), 3-6. 
125 Ibid., 3-8. Also see Wang Bo, “Historical Development and Characteristics of Taiwan’s Petroleum 
Industry before 1949,” Chinese Communist Party Fujian Provincial Committee Journal 12 (2000): 
72-76 [汪波，1949年以前台湾石油工业的发展历程与特点， 中共福建省委学报 2000年第 12
期]; Bo Kong, China’s International Petroleum Policy, 7-18, and CPC Corporation, Taiwan 2014 
Annual Report. 
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has yet to lead to the divestment of their parent companies or turn these subsidiaries into 
majority privately-owned. Private oil companies have been allowed to participate in the 
fringes, such as domestic firms operating small oil refineries and gas stations in rural areas, 
and IOCs partnering with NOCs in technologically challenging E&P projects and marketing 
oil products.  
Oil product pricing in China has gradually become more market-based since the 
mechanism created under the Oil and Oil Product Price Reform Plan of 1998 replaced direct 
government control and then the “dual-track system” of previous eras.126 While not totally 
free-floating as of 2013, this pricing system provided room for both domestic and 
international private oil companies to operate in China’s domestic retail market in the decade 
preceding 2013. Still, oil supply to the Chinese economy was firmly in the hands of the state 
with near total control of oil import and indigenous hydrocarbon resources during the period 
studied, more so than in India. 
On the other hand, with still considerable but dwindling hydrocarbon resources, 
China’s OV was actually relatively low among Asian net oil importing economies as in 
India. The strength of private capital and trust in oil markets appeared to be also low, again 
as in India. The implementation capabilities of the two countries, however, was noticeably 
different. H2 of the vulnerability-interaction model predicts that under such a circumstance, 
this factor would explain the difference in the level of state intervention according to the 
logic of the model. The sub-sections below show China’s higher capability appears to 
explain its adoption of a higher level of strategic oil supply measures than India in 2013.     
 
Comparison of China and India in 2013: The second pairwise comparison in this Chapter 
is between China and India. The goal of the comparative study in this section is to further 
investigate the cross-case validity of H2 of the vulnerability-interaction model, which strives 
to explain the causes of variations in the level of strategic oil supply measures adopted by 
net oil importing economies at any given time. The only substantive difference in the levels 
of the four explanatory variables between China and India with 2013 data is that China had 
a trichotomously higher overall implementation capability according to the results in the 
plausibility probe. If these initial results are confirmed in this study, they would also validate 
the proposition that a net oil importing economy with a higher overall implementation 
capability would adopt a higher level of strategic oil supply measures if everything else 
remains equal.  
                                                          
126 For a gist of this mechanism, see Jin Zhang and Mingjia Xie, “China’s oil product pricing 
mechanism: What role does it play in China’s macroeconomy?” China Economic Review 38 
(2016): 210-211. 
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The 2013 data of these two economies presented in the plausibility probe show 
that their conditions match those stipulated in H2. This means that only one of their four 
explanatory factors differ in trichotomous levels and their respective DV levels differ in a 
direction that fits the expectation of the reasoning of the proposed model. This is 
summarised below: 
Economy 
Strategic Oil 
Supply Measures 
Adopted  
(DV Level)  
OV 
(IV) 
Level 
Strength 
of Private 
Capital 
Overall 
Trust in 
Oil 
Markets 
Overall 
Implementation 
Capability 
China High Low Low Low High 
India Medium Low Low Low Medium 
Table 4.3 Trichotomous Levels of All Variables for China and India in 2013 in 
preliminary study 
 
After the levels of each of these variables in the two economies are reassessed with 
additional and more precise data in this comparative study, the cross-case validity of H2 is 
confirmed. China adopted a notably higher level of strategic oil supply measures than India 
in the decade leading to 2013. India’s slighter higher OV does not increase further. The 
strength of private capital in the Chinese petroleum sectors appears to further weaken, but 
the cause of that, state orientation, is already factored in the other explanatory factors.127 
China’s slightly lower overall trust level in the oil markets remains. In short, these three 
explanatory factors remain within the same trichotomously low level. By contrast, China’s 
overall capability to implement strategic oil supply measures appears to become even higher 
when the new measures are taken into account. Hence China’s capability was definitely one 
trichotomous level higher than India’s. 
 
3.1 Strategic Oil Supply Measures Adopted by China and India  
China adopted a higher level of strategic oil supply measures than India in 2013 
according to the two measures that make up the composite scores of the strategic oil supply 
indicator in Chapter Three. Both Chinese and Indian NOCs engaged in oil supply projects 
overseas and still possessed indigenous oil resources in the years leading to 2013. The same 
two additional measures used in the comparison of India and Thailand, therefore, are 
appropriate to more precisely ascertain China and India’s DV levels. The first is the overseas 
oil supply investments Chinese and Indian NOCs engaged in. The second is how much 
relative preference was given to NOCs in the E&P of indigenous oil sources. The next two 
sub-sections verify that the Chinese state indeed adopted a considerably higher level of 
strategic oil supply measures than India during the period studied.  
 
                                                          
127 The economy’s OV and decision-makers’ trust in oil markets make up the state’s orientation 
according to the vulnerability-interaction model. See section 3.4 in Chapter Two for more discussion. 
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3.1.1 Level of Chinese Overseas Oil Supply Investments 
Section 2.1.1 above provides the gist of Indian NOCs’ overseas oil and gas 
projects. How is the scale of those projects compared to the ones Chinese NOCs engaged in 
during the period leading to 2013? Recent studies on the subject all agree that Chinese NOCs 
have pursued these projects more energetically and successfully.128 One yardstick of the 
sizes of these investments is the value these companies spent on oil and gas company 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) globally. Between 2008 and 2013, Chinese NOCs spent 
US$127 billion cumulatively on these acquisitions compared to the US$10.8 billion spent 
by Indian NOCs.129 The size of Chinese NOC oil and gas transactions grew exponentially 
from a negligible share of all available oil and gas deals globally in 2007 to 4% in 2008 and 
to 16% in 2013.130 This timeline fits in with Meckling et al’s analysis that Chinese NOC 
“internationalization” entered a third phase since 2008 in which the Chinese state acted as a 
robust “resource supplier” of the process. The two motivations they advanced for Chinese 
state support of this process in this period are not related to oil supply security, but seem to 
be unique Chinese circumstances that do not contradict with the reasoning of the 
vulnerability-interaction model. First is Chinese state financial institutions responding to the 
Chinese government’s “going out” policy, which encourages all Chinese state-owned 
enterprises, not just NOCs, to expand overseas. Second is finding productive outlets for 
China’s “mammoth USD” foreign exchange reserves.131 Andrews-Speeds and Dannreuther 
describe Chinese NOCs’ overseas activities as a “resurgence” since 2009.132  
Another way to compare the scale of overseas oil and gas projects which is more 
pertinent to oil supply security in the more immediate term is the oil actually developed 
from those projects. The amount generated by the major Indian NOC that carried out such 
projects, the OVL, as noted in Section 2.1.1, was 8.357 MMT during the year 2013-14 in at 
least eight countries. All three major Chinese NOCs, China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), China National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and their publicly-listed subsidiaries, as well as some 
minor but also state-owned firms, such as the China National Chemicals Import and Export 
Corporation (Sinochem), engaged in these projects.133 CNPC has been the largest Chinese 
                                                          
128 See for example, Meckling et al, 1167; Carl, Rai, and Victor, 19; and Lydia Powell, “Geo-
politics of India’s equity investments in energy,” Energy Security Insights 7-3 (July – December 
2012): 3. 
129 Meckling et al, 1167.  
130 Brian Lidsky, “Global O&G Transactions Q1 2014 Review,” PLS Inc. and Derrick Petroleum 
Services, 24. Accessed 12 December 2016, 
http://www.plsx.com/ma/downloads/q1_2014_final_ma_27pgs.pdf.  
131 Meckling et al, 1170-1171. 
132 China, Oil and Global Politics, 73 – 75. 
133 For lists of different oil related overseas investments these companies engaged in between 1992 
to 2007, see Kong, China’s International Petroleum Policy, 170-189. 
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NOC and is used here to compare with its counterpart, OVL.134 It developed 59.20 MMT 
equivalent of “equity” oil and gas [权益当量油气] from projects in 34 countries in 2013.135 
If we go back five years to 2008, CNPC produced 35.5 MMT equivalent of equity oil and 
gas that year.136 While it is not clear how many countries CNPC developed oil in at the time, 
it signed 15 new oil and gas development contracts that year with countries including 
Venezuela, Niger, Qatar, Costa Rica, and Iraq.137 OVL produced oil and gas in 16 countries, 
and yielded 8.78 MMT equivalent of equity oil and gas in 2008-09.138  
In sum, China’s six-year accumulative overseas oil and gas M&A ending in 2013 
was more than eleven times that of India’s. The oil and gas produced from overseas projects 
by the biggest Chinese NOC was more than four times in 2008, and more than seven times 
in 2013 than that produced by the India’s major upstream NOC. This number would be at 
least doubled if we also count the amount developed by other Chinese NOCs.139 Judging by 
this additional measure alone, China’s strategic oil supply measure level was notably higher 
than that of India in the years leading to 2013, even if we factor in the almost three times 
higher oil consumption of China in 2013. 
 
3.1.2 Preference to NOCs for Development of Indigenous Oil in China 
China had a higher oil self-sufficiency rate than India in 2013, and both countries’ 
NOCs engaged in the E&P of indigenous oil resources.140 Examining the relative preference 
given to their respective NOCs in this domain is, therefore, an appropriate measure of the 
level of strategic oil supply measure they adopted. The Indian indigenous oil E&P regime 
in the years leading to 2013 was present in section 2.1.2 above. In short, the NELP that 
governed domestic oil and gas E&P in India did not give preference to state-owned or even 
domestic private oil firms on a legal basis.  
Chinese oil exploration laws were heavily tilted in favour of NOCs and other SOEs 
and more restrictive to private capital participation than India’s. According to an 
                                                          
134 CNPC is more akin to ONGC, but OVL is the ONGC’s subsidiary that engages in overseas 
projects. Of course, CNPC and ONGC are not really comparable in the sense that the former is a 
vertically integrated firm but the latter is an upstream oil firm. Since most overseas oil and gas 
investments have been upstream projects, the comparison of these firms are still appropriate.  
135 “2013 Figures – CNPC Publishes Year 2013 Social Responsibility Report,” CNPC news centre 
website [中国石油发布 2013年度社会责任报告数字 2013]. Accessed 15 January 2015, 
http://news.cnpc.com.cn/system/2014/04/21/001483270.shtml.  
136 CNPC Year 2008 Annual Report [中国石油天然气集团公司 2008年度报告], 9. 
137 Ibid. 
138 ONGC Annual Report 2008-09, 3. 
139 CNPC’s overseas investments were estimated to be about 49% of those made by all three major 
Chinese NOCs as of 2011. See Zhao Qingsi, International Cooperation and Chinese Energy 
Diplomacy – Concepts, Mechanisms and Pathways (China: Law Press, 2012), 219. [赵庆寺 国际合
作与中国能源外交—理念，机制与路径华东政法大学出版社] 
140 Using the data in the BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014 to do the calculation, 
China’s was 41.02% and India’s was 23.94% . 
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international law firm report on Chinese energy and natural resources laws, the “Chinese 
government owns all oil and gas resources in China. Exploration and exploitation of oil and 
gas resources are currently only granted to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through set 
procedures.”141 These included the three central-level NOCs, collectively known as the 
“three barrels,” [三桶油] and Yanchang Petroleum Group, an SOE of the Shaanxi Provincial 
Government.142  
This was especially true for the E&P of conventional oil and gas, which offered 
only “very limited participation for private firms, either domestic or and foreign.”143 Only 
the “three barrels,” were authorised to cooperate with foreign companies by entering into 
production sharing contracts (PSC) with them. “Under the PSC structure, the Chinese 
partners hold the exploration and exploitation rights while the foreign partners serve as the 
operator managing the exploration, development and production of the venture.” 144 
Technically, E&P “rights could also be obtained through public bids,” but in practice, this 
rarely happened.145 Private firms appeared to have slightly more leeway to participate in the 
E&P of unconventional oil and gas, such as coalbed methane, oil shale, oil sand and shale 
gas. There are, however, still many uncertainties and ambiguities in the implementation of 
these recent deregulation developments, an issue which is beyond the scope of this study.146 
The Chinese state, therefore, had a much tighter control over who and how Chinese 
hydrocarbon resources were developed as of 2013 and hence adopted a higher level of this 
particular strategic oil supply measure than India. 
 
3.2 Oil Vulnerabilities of China 
The same additional market risk, oil intensity of the economy, and additional 
supply risk, the concentration of the sources of oil supply, are used to verify India and 
China’s OV levels in this comparative study. Again, the Indian economy’s oil intensity in 
2013 was 0.027, while China’s was 0.031, calculated with the same method and sources of 
data as in the first pairwise comparison. This indicates that China’s economy was more oil 
intense than India’s. China, therefore, was almost 15% more vulnerable to increase in oil 
prices than India in 2013 by this additional measure alone. 
                                                          
141 Jin Xiong, Yan Zhao, and George Zhao, “Oil and gas regulation in China: overview,” Energy 
and Natural Resources Jurisdictional Guide 2014. Accessed 10 December 2016, 
http://us.practicallaw.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=
id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1248118002173&ssbinary=true.  
142 See “About YCPC,” website of Yanchang Petroleum. Accessed 10 December 2016, 
http://english.sxycpc.com/list_content.jsp?urltype=tree.TreeTempUrl&wbtreeid=1002.  
143 Xiong et al. 
144 Ibid. 
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146 Ibid. 
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The same modified HHI Index, weighted with the comprehensive risk of 
individual supplying countries, is used to measure the concentration of the sources of oil 
supply to China and India. China’s score in 2013 was 66.89 compared to India’s 87.24. 
China, therefore, had a 23.32 percent lower physical supply risk of oil than India by this 
measure alone.147  
India’s 2013 OV score calculated with the four measures in the preliminary study was 
slightly higher than that of China. The two economies’ OV widens slightly after adding the 
two measures here, but would be still at the same trichotomous level.148  
 
3.3 Strength of Private Capital in China  
The historical-institutional source of the strength of private capital in the overall 
Chinese economy in 2013 is gauged with the same two off-the-shelf indicators. China’s 
combined average 2013 overall economic freedom and openness score was 58.45 versus 
India’s 60.9. Private capital in India, therefore, would have greater historical and 
institutional support against state intervention in their actions according to the criteria 
adopted for the vulnerability-interaction model.  
This comparative study employs the same four-scenario domestic-international-
capital-state balance framework. The conclusion is that domestic private capital in China’s 
petroleum sectors was definitely weaker than international capital in absolute terms, but 
both were much weaker than NOCs within China, even more so than in India. China, like 
India, fits in scenario three of the domestic-international-capital-state balance analytical 
framework. State capital in the Chinese petroleum sectors, however, played a much stronger 
role than international capital did in China’s overall economy. The reverse was true in 
India.149 This seems to suggest the Chinese state has placed great strategic importance on 
these sectors or it has a strong aversion of letting foreign companies operate in these sectors. 
More analysis of the state’s orientation, the determinant factor in scenario three of this 
analytical framework, in the form of trust in the oil markets, is the subject of the next section. 
Adding the actor-specific source of private capital strength appears to slightly widen 
the gap of the overall strength of private capital between China and India. This is especially 
                                                          
147 For details of the calculation of these scores, see Table A13, Appendix C. It should be noted that 
this index does not take transit route risks into account, which has been a major concern of China. 
See Section 3.4.3 below for more discussions. The higher transit route risks for China would narrow 
the gap of the physical supply risk it had with India, and hence the overall OV between China and 
them.   
148 If all these components have the same weight. 
149 The five-year (2009-2013) overall net inbound FDI to China accounted for 3.22% of its GPD 
versus India’s 1.80%. This is calculated with the same World Bank data as in the case of India. While 
no concrete figure is found on FDI in China’s petroleum sectors as a percentage of total inbound FDI, 
it appeared to be smaller than 3% (see discussions in the following sub-section). That figure for India 
was about 3% of petroleum sectors. See section 2.3.1 above. 
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true in their respective petroleum sectors, but the difference does not appear to amount to a 
placing them in differing trichotomous levels.  
 
3.3.1 Strength of Private Capital in Chinese Oil Sectors  
As discussed earlier, in the decade leading to 2013, the Chinese upstream oil sector 
was almost completely dominated by the “three barrels.” China did allow IOCs to participate 
in offshore oil and gas development since the early 1980s, which Chinese NOCs lacked the 
technology or expertise to pursue on their own.150 These invitations were later extended to 
some onshore projects. Since then, for example, “U.S. oil companies have launched dozens 
of joint ventures with Chinese partners to conduct geological surveys and engage in the 
refining sector in China.”151 This push for introducing and eventually reproducing advanced 
foreign energy technologies and equipment in China continued and was codified in energy 
planning directives for the 12th Five-Year-Plan starting in 2011.152 Yet, even the provincial-
level SOE Yanchang Petroleum and a few IOCs only played a very small part in the 
upstream sector, and the opportunity for domestic private oil firms to participate “was 
basically non-existent.”153  
Chinese domestic private oil firms mainly concentrated in the mid- and 
downstream oil sectors. Even there, they were very weak in the years leading to 2013. The 
bottleneck for them was where and how to source crude oil to feed their refineries or oil 
products to fill up their service stations. In 2010, domestic private oil refiners produced 11% 
of oil products sold in China, a 2% increase over the previous year. The oil products private 
refiners produced, however, must be sold to either CNPC or Sinopec for wholesale 
distribution, according to the State Council “Document 38” promulgated in 1999.154 The 
state issued a directive calling for the dismantling of installations with production capacity 
                                                          
150 Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther, China, Oil and Global Politics, 64.  
151  Zha Daojiong, “Energy in Sino-American Relations: Putting Mutual Anxiety in Context,” 
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152 As mentioned earlier, unconventional hydrocarbon E&P technologies are one of the targets of 
acquisition. See National [Chinese] Energy Technology Planning in the 12th Five-Year-Plan (2011-
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153  Zhizhuan Li, “Development Situation and Prospect of Chinese Private Oil Enterprises,” 
International Petroleum Economics 2012-4, 59. [李志传, 中国民营石油企业发展状况和前景展
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154 Ibid, 57. CNOOC traditionally concentrated on offshore oil E&P only, but it began to participate 
in oil refining, product distribution, and setting up its own service stations in the few years leading to 
2013. Another company that also began to engage in these activities in the same period was Sinochem, 
a central-level SOE which traditionally only engaged in oil trading. Ibid。  Also see “Energy 
Business,” Sinochem website. Accessed 1 December 2016, http://www.sinochem.com/en/1437.html . 
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under two million tons per year by 2013. As of the end of 2010, over 80% of local refineries 
were under this capacity. At the end, only seven such refiners met the criterion and continued 
to operate.155 Domestic private firms also tried to engage in oil product distribution. Of the 
over 2,500 sizable oil product wholesaling firms in China in 2012, however, CNPC and 
Sinopec owned over 1,600 of them, and other SOEs owned three hundred. Only six hundred 
were domestic private firms.156 
Private capital, both domestic and international, was the most active in the Chinese 
downstream oil sector. As of 2010, there were a total of 95,740 service stations in China, a 
little less than 19% belonged to CNPC and a little over 31% to Sinopec. Other SOEs and 
foreign companies owned more than 2,000, which was about three percent. The remaining 
47% or about 45,000 of service stations were owned by domestic private firms.157 BP, 
ExxonMobil, and Shell were the three major IOCs that entered the Chinese oil products 
retail market and set up service stations recently in China.158 These numbers, however, belie 
the fact that NOCs, especially CNOC and Sinopec, still covered 85% of the volume of oil 
product sales in all service stations, while domestic private oil firms covered only about 10% 
during the period under reviewed.159 
It was very difficult for domestic private oil companies to compete with NOCs 
and other SOEs engaging in oil supply not only because of laws and regulations that 
favoured the latter. Domestic private oil firms were also much smaller in size and lacked 
capital and other technical attributes. Enterprises, for example, were only qualified to apply 
for the license to sell crude oil in China with a minimum registered capital of RMB100 
million or almost US$16 million. No domestic private oil company was qualified as of 
2012.160 Domestic private oil companies formed a couple of trade groups over the years to 
try to lobby for their interests, such as the repeal of State Council directive that greatly 
reduced the operating space of small, private oil sector enterprises (“Document 38”). The 
more representative of these was the China Chamber of Commerce for Petroleum Industry 
established in 2004.161 According to an analyst at the CNOOC Energy Economics Research 
Institute, however, these groups were ineffective and unstable because the interests of their 
                                                          
155 Ibid., 60. 
156 Ibid, 58. 
157 Li, “Development Situation and Prospect of Chinese Private Oil Enterprises,” 58. 
158 Ibid., 59. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid., 58. The US dollar equivalent amount is calculated with the 1 January 2013 historical 
exchange rate. See Oanda website, accessed 13 December 2016, 
https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/.  
161 Li, “Development Situation and Prospect of Chinese Private Oil Enterprises,” 60. Also see the 
website of China Chamber of Commerce for Petroleum Industry for a brief history of the group (in 
Chinese). Accessed 13 December 2016, 
http://www.cccpi.org/first/firstAction_showShanghuiErJi?kid=14ec1d04-efb6-41d5-93c0-
d54d28c13350. 
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members did not line up.162 Another reason appears to be the tremendous legal, as well as 
political obstacles they must overcome to further their interests.163 
The analysis in the previous paragraphs indicates that domestic private capital was 
weaker than both international capital and NOCs in the Chinese oil sectors in absolute terms 
as of 2013. It is not easy to gauge the relative strength of domestic capital and international 
capital within China. Neither had much room to operate under the legal and de facto 
monopoly of the “three barrels” as well as competition from other SOEs. As of 2013, private 
capital as a whole was nowhere near parity in strength with national-level NOCs within 
China. Yet, they carved out niches according to their different characteristics. With much 
larger capital bases and technical expertise, IOCs have been comparatively more active in 
the upstream sector than domestic private firms. Domestic companies survived in the mid- 
and downstream sectors with their historical and local connections.164     
It is also not easy to compare the strengths of Chinese NOCs with those of IOCs 
in absolute terms. The “three barrels” are not publicly-listed and therefore do not need to 
provide transparent and accurate accounting information. Their publicly-listed subsidiaries 
are quite large by global standards, even if they still lagged behind the biggest IOCs.165 In 
any event, due to various forms of entry barriers and historical factors as discussed earlier, 
within China, Chinese NOCs were without a doubt much stronger than IOCs. The actor-
specific source of the domestic-international-capital-state balance in China in the years 
leading to 2013, therefore, fits in the third scenario or the bottom right quadrant of the 
framework, the same as India.  
 
3.4 China and India’s Overall Trust in Oil Markets 
This section examines each component that is hypothesised to make up China’s 
overall trust level in oil markets’ ability to ensure oil supply security in greater detail. The 
goal is to verify if China and India deserve to receive the same trichotomous overall trust 
level as in the preliminary study. Similar content analyses of NOC annual reports and more 
detailed data related to Chinese NOCs as securitising agents as well as to the pertinence of 
                                                          
162 Zhizhuan Li, “Development Situation and Prospect of Chinese Private Oil Enterprises,” 60. 
163 It is telling that the first “goal” listed in the “Introduction” of the organization’s website is to 
“adhere to the Party line, principles, and policies.” The second was “Educate members to love the 
nation, respect their industry, and be law-abiding.” “Actively protecting the legal rights of members” 
is only listed third. 
164 Many of them were established in the early days of the petroleum sector reform when rules were 
more lax and contributed greatly to the local economy through payment of taxation and creation of 
employment opportunities. 
165 By the measure of stock market capitalization alone, PetroChina, (subsidiary of CNPC), was 
ranked the 2nd in 2012 and the 4th in 2013 on the IHS Energy 50, which the world top 50 energy firms. 
Sinopec Corp., subsidiary of Sinopec Group was ranked the 11th in 2012 and 10th in 2013; and 
CNOOC Ltd., subsidiary of CNOOC Group, was ranked 10th in 2012 and 13th in 2013. “IHS Energy 
50 – The Definitive Annual Ranking of the World’s Largest Listed Energy Firms, January 2014.” 
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the domestic and external securitization contexts serve as the basis of understanding the 
country’s overall trust level around 2013.  
The conclusion is that while China and India both had a low overall level of trust 
in the oil markets, Chinese NOCs appeared to less enthusiastic securitising agents than their 
Indian counterparts. The external context that is hypothesised to be critical to impacting the 
overall trust level, however, was more salient to China and hence more than made up for 
Chinese NOCs “slack” relative to securitisng. Indeed, the salience of the external context 
appeared to engender another group of more enthusiastic securitising agents. 
 
3.4.1 Securitising Agents 
Both China and India receive the lowest trichotomous score for the securitising 
agent component in the preliminary analysis in Chapter Three, which is hypothesised to lead 
to the lowest level of trust in oil markets. This is based on the fact that the two economies 
each have at least one traditional NOC. In this sub-section, the coherence of Chinese NOCs 
as securitising or lobbying agents and evidence of their securitising attempts are examined 
to compare with those by Indian NOCs. The same procedures and terms or their Chinese 
equivalents as detailed in Section 2.4.1 above are used to conduct analysis.  
Like India, China had a number of NOCs, but they had mostly been vertically 
integrated in the years leading to 2013. A content analysis of the annual reports of the “three 
barrels” and their subsidiaries from 2009 to 2013 is presented here to look for evidence that 
they routinely play up their importance in ensuring the oil supply to and distribution within 
the economy.  
Chinese NOCs and their subsidiaries only engaged in slight to moderate securitising 
by analysing the contents of their annual reports alone. The five-year average of the overall 
securitising score of the subsidiaries was 4.07, only about 11% that of Indian NOCs’ overall 
score of the same period.166 The subsidiaries of “the three barrels” were large multinational 
corporations listed in international stock exchanges, even if they were still majority-owned 
and tightly controlled by their parent NOCs.167 It is, therefore, unsurprising that they would 
tone down any securitising effort in their annual reports. The two-year average overall score 
                                                          
166 India’s ONGC and IOCL together receive a five-year average overall score of 37.2. The 2009 – 
2013 English language annual reports of PetroChina, Sinopec Corp., and CNOOC Ltd. were analysed 
to get this overall score. A comparison of the Chinese and English language of the pertinent annual 
reports shows that they are fairly accurate translated versions of each other and so only the English 
language ones were analysed. 
167 As of 2013, CNPC owned 86.5% of PetroChina; Sinopec Group owned 73.96% of Sinopec Corp.; 
and CNOOC Group owned 64.566% of CNOOC Ltd. See pages 15, 16, and 57 of these three 
companies’ 2013 annual reports respectively. Shares of PetroChina were initially offered to the public 
in May 2000; those of Sinopec Corp. in October 2000; and those of the CNOOC Ltd. in February 
2001, all in the New York and Hong Kong stock exchanges. See Kong, China’s International 
Petroleum Policy, 168. Publicly listed Indian NOCs are only listed in the domestic stock exchange 
in Mumbai. 
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of the actual “three barrels,” was considerably higher at 14.168 After all, the Chinese public 
and central-level decision-makers, the target audience of any securitising effort, are unlikely 
to read the English language annual reports of these companies. Still, even this score was 
only 37.41% that of India’s. On the surface, this shows that Chinese NOCs were much less 
forceful or coherent securitising agents.  
This interpretation of these results should be checked against the background of the 
near upstream and midstream monopoly enjoyed by Chinese NOCs in the decade prior to 
2013. The need for Chinese NOCs to lobby for their continued existence was smaller as 
there was not much real competition. As detailed in the last section, there were more 
stringent legal barriers for private firms to enter China’s various petroleum sectors. Besides, 
in the decade leading to 2013, the state had internalised the idea originated by CNPC that 
NOC overseas expansion was needed to ensure China’s oil supply security.169  The Chinese 
state has since acted as a robust resource supplier and a weak veto player for Chinese NOC 
internationalization as Meckling et al and others have pointed out. 170  Under such 
circumstances, Chinese NOCs also did not have much need for powerful lobbying of their 
expansion. Unless there are radical structural or institutional changes that meaningfully 
reduce the overwhelming dominance of NOCs in China, therefore, these companies would 
not need to put too much energy in securitising or lobbying, at least not through the public 
means of what they say in their annual reports. 
In any event, Chinese NOCs did engage in some securitising with the contents of their 
annual reports.171 In line with the reasoning that the more secure a company is relative to its 
dominance, the less the need to securitise or lobby for its activities, the two-year average 
scores of the “three barrels” matched their dominance in the upstream oil sector in China. 
CNPC, which produced over 31% of the oil consumed in China in 2013, scored only 4.172 
CNOOC Group, which produced about 13% of oil consumed, scored 15.5.173 The weakest 
                                                          
168 These are the 2012 and 2011 annual reports of CNPC and the 2013 and 2012 annual reports of 
Sinopec Group and CNOOC Group. The current website of CNPC only provides annual reports of 
itself for years 2014, 2015, and 2001. All the other annual reports provided are those of PetroChina 
(in Chinese). Accessed 12 December 2016, http://www.cnpc.com.cn/cnpc/ndbg/gywm_list.shtml. 
The 2012 and 2011 annual reports of CNPC were obtained from the company’s website in 2014. 
169 According to Kong, the idea was initiated by CNPC in 1991, but was only fully embraced by top 
level political leaders in the late 1990s when oil import to China increased exponentially. See China’s 
International Petroleum Policy, 37-46.  
170 Andrews-Speed and Dannreuther go one step further to say that from the earliest days, the state 
actually played “a key role” in these NOCs’ internationalization. See China, Oil and Global Politics, 
83-85.  
171 This is in comparison to the zero three-year overall score of ExxonMobil got during the same 
period. 
172 The 31.5% is calculated with the consumption data in the BP Review 2014 and the production 
figures in the CNPC 2013 Annual Report (in English), p6.   
173 The 13.17% is calculated also with the BP 2014 Review and the CNOOC Group 2013 Annual 
Report (in English), p6. 
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of the three, Sinopec, scored 22.5.174 CNPC scored very low for the terms that are used to 
detect the general securitising agent role of NOCs compared to the other two companies. 
For the two years of its annual reports analysed, the term “energy security” was only 
mentioned once.175  
By contrast, CNOOC and Sinopec used the general securitising agent terms of 
“strategic” and “security” in a pertinent way more frequently.176 Some interesting examples 
specially related to the offshore hydrocarbon E&P niche of CNOOC read: “The 18th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China has made the strategic deployment of 
building [China] into a maritime power. This has provided a new opportunity for elevating 
the development of a maritime economy as a national strategy, and for the major 
development of the offshore oil industry”; 177  and “We must actively undertake this 
mission…to raise our ocean resource development capability to ensure the nation’s energy 
security…and to make requisite contribution to building a ‘beautiful China’ and a ‘maritime 
power’.”178 
 
3.4.2 Chinese Domestic Context 
China, like Thailand, was more “wealthy” and urbanised than India as of 2013. By 
these two measures, therefore, the objective domestic context should allow decision-makers 
in China to have fewer worries about trusting an unfettered domestic market or relying 
solely on private oil firms to ensure oil supply security. China, however, had a noticeably 
less even income distribution among its citizens than India. 179 As in the case between 
Thailand and India, adding the factor of the evenness of income distribution actually 
narrows the gap in decision-makers’ trust in the domestic market in the two economies than 
the results in the preliminary study suggest. 
In addition, a survey on how differing cultures affect the public perceptions of 
energy security shows that respondents from developing countries including China and India 
                                                          
174 Sinopec Group produced less than 9% of the crude oil consumed in China in 2013. Its production 
figure is obtained from page 6 of its 2013 English annual report. The rest of the crude China consumed 
were produced by the subsidiaries of the three barrels, as well as imported and produced by other 
SOEs.  
175 It was used in the sentence “[the company] has made new contribution to ensuring the nation’s 
energy security and to promoting the continued healthy development of the national economy.” 
CNPC 2012 Annual Report (in Chinese), 3.  
176 As a reminder, when these terms are used in contexts irrelevant to securitising or lobbying, such 
as “social security” or “strategic committee,” they receive the score of zero in the analysis. 
177 CNOOC 2012 Annual Report (in Chinese), 5. 
178 Ibid., 4. 
179 Again, the only GINI index data for India from the World Bank was for 2011 and the reading was 
35.2. See footnote 81 above. In the period studied, data are only available for China in 2008 and 2012. 
The two very similar readings are average to obtain the reading of 42.5, which was also considerably 
higher than Thailand’s five-year average reading of 38.74. See “GINI index (World Bank estimate) 
– China,” the World Bank website. Accessed 15 December 2016, 
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2012&locations=CN&start=2008.  
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“did rate affordability and equitable access to energy services to be of higher importance 
than respondents” from advanced economies. 180  In fact, the results show that Chinese 
respondents, over half of whom had postgraduate education, rated these aspects of energy 
security slightly higher than Indian respondents.181 These results support the propositions of 
the vulnerability-interaction model that different cultures would have an impact on the risk 
preference and belief formation of decision-makers and affordable and equitable access is a 
relevant domestic context for securitising.   
A content analysis of terms pertinent to securitising the domestic oil supply 
context in the annual reports of Chinese NOCs shows that their efforts lagged even further 
behind those of Indian NOCs.182 English language annual reports of NOC subsidiaries 
hardly mentioned serving the oil supply needs of poor or remote rural communities at all. 
Poverty alleviation projects in remote counties were only mentioned twice in CNOOC Ltd.’s 
annual reports. The Chinese language annual reports of the parent companies on the whole 
fare little better. Again, the same inverse relationship between securitising effort and NOC 
dominance in the upstream oil sector is observed. In this case, CNPC annual reports did not 
contain words pertinent to serving the community or even poverty alleviation effort at all in 
the two years analysed in this project.  
One possible reason for Chinese NOCs’ lackadaisical attitude is that many oil 
product retail outlets in low sales volume rural and poor areas might be operated by domestic 
private firms with local connection, not by the “three barrels.” As mentioned in Section 3.3.1 
above, almost half of all oil product retail outlets in China were operated by domestic private 
firms, but these outlets only covered about 10% of the sales volume of the retail market. 
Besides, in the decade leading to 2013, the oil product pricing mechanism in China, although 
not totally liberalised, was linked to international oil prices in a delayed manner.183 On the 
                                                          
180 Benjamin K. Sovacool, “Differing cultures of energy security: An international comparison of 
public perceptions,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 55 (2016), 819. Apart from China 
and India, two other case-study economies from the preliminary study of this thesis, Japan and 
Singapore, are also in this survey. They are grouped under “the advanced economies.”  
181 For the demographic information of Chinese respondents, see ibid., 813. For the ratings given by 
Chinese and Indian respondents, see ibid., figure 4, 819. According to the reasoning of the proposed 
model, respondents of lower socio-economic level may rate these aspects even higher. 
182 The five-year average domestic context score of English language subsidiary annual reports is 
0.13 and the two-year average of this score of Chinese language parent company annual reports is 7.  
The five-year average of Indian NOC domestic context score is 27. This means that even the higher 
of the Chinese score is not much more than a quarter of India’s score.  
183 Zhang and Xie, “China’s oil product pricing mechanism” China Economic Review 38 (2016): 210-
211. In particular, Figure 1 on page 211 shows the difference between the international oil price with 
the domestic oil price between January 2000 and June 2013. There have been a number of changes 
over basically the same system since it was instituted in 1998. They included the products or crude 
oil prices used as benchmarks, and the magnitude of international oil price fluctuations and length of 
time lag of the fluctuation stipulated before domestic oil product prices may be adjusted. In March 
2013, the most recent change shortened the adjustment period to every 10 working days (from the 
141 
 
surface, this pricing mechanism should not deter private firms from serving the poor 
population as much as the artificially low oil product pricing, especially in diesel and 
kerosene, in India would. Chinese NOCs securitising their function of serving the 
underprivileged, therefore, would sound disingenuous.  
An interesting observation is that Chinese NOCs took a much more realistic 
attitude toward the idea of self-sufficiency or self-reliance than Indian or Thai NOCs. These 
terms did not show up in any of the 21 Chinese NOC annual reports analysed, regardless of 
their language or company. China crossed the line to become a net oil importing country in 
1993. Chinese NOCs have been pragmatic about this situation and have assigned emphasis 
on overseas expansion to acquire the resources instead.184 This in turn may be due to the 
fact that they had greater material capability to do so. 
In sum, the domestic economic and cultural contexts that would provide the 
opportunity for NOCs to securitise the role they played in the oil supply within their 
respective economies did not differ too much in China and India in the period studied. This 
is especially true when the additional evidence presented in this sub-section is taken into 
consideration. The survey cited earlier seems to confirm the similar level of importance the 
public in the two countries placed on equitable access of affordable energy. This likely 
engenders similar risk preferences among the two countries’ policymakers in entrusting the 
oil supply within their respective economies to totally free markets without any form of state 
intervention. 
Two of the three major Chinese NOCs did highlight their roles in poverty 
alleviation, but not oil supply activities in remote rural areas in the two years of their annual 
reports analysed in this project. In representing their efforts, however, they were much less 
enthusiastic than Indian NOCs. Yet analysing Chinese NOC annual reports may not be a 
reliable way to understand the true extent of their securitising efforts.  
The stringent entry barriers to the Chinese petroleum sectors and their only 
partially deregulated oil product pricing regime (despite three decades of sectorial reforms) 
seem to be indicative of the government’s limited trust in an unfettered domestic oil market. 
According to Chen Shaofeng, Associate Professor at the Peking University who specialises 
in reviewing these sectors, the Chinese state tried to introduce competition among NOCs 
and elements of the market mechanism to improve the efficiency of the Chinese petroleum 
sectors, and hence the economy’s oil supply security. At the same time, it tried to retain 
                                                          
previous 22 working days with a 4% “floating band”). See “China adjusts oil price mechanism,” 26 
March 2013. China.org. website. Accessed 20 December 2016, 
 http://www.china.org.cn/business/2013-03/26/content_28365275.htm.  
184 Terms like “resource strategy” [资源战略] appear in NOC annual reports to mean employing all 
kinds of methods to deepen the resource bases of the companies, both domestically and more often, 
used in the same breath as internationalization or overseas development. 
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control of the “marketisation process” because of “concerns about the possible destructive 
effects on national security, socio-political stability and economic development resulting 
from disruptions of the oil and gas supply and price fluctuations.”185  
 
3.4.3 External Securitising Context of China 
China is the only case-study economy in the plausibility probe that receives the 
lowest trichotomous score for its relationship with the United States. This denotes a 
relatively negative, or what the vulnerability-interaction model labels a “neutral-conflictual” 
relationship between the two countries in the years leading to 2013. Objectively, such a state 
of affairs should not have any bearing on the effectiveness of the oil supply function of 
international oil markets. As reiterated in the paired comparison between India and Thailand, 
interested parties in net oil importing countries with such as a relationship with the United 
States can easily exploit the situation to securitise the untrustworthiness of the international 
oil markets. A major way to do so is by propagating the aggressive zero-sum strand of 
economic nationalism, which would be less convincing in countries having a positive 
relationship with the United States, which has generally been a promoter of free trade since 
the end of World War II.186   
This sub-section examines Chinese-U.S. relationship more closely to verify if it 
deserves that lowest trichotomous score and if their relationship did result in China having 
a lower level of trust in the international oil markets than India. In this project, only countries 
that are formal or de facto defence allies of the United States receive the highest external 
context score. This is not applicable to either China or India. This paired comparison, 
therefore, only needs to examine whether China’s relationship with the United States is of a 
similar or a lower quality than the Indian-U.S. relationship in the decade leading to 2013. 
There have been a plethora of academic studies and punditries on China-U.S. 
relationship, ranging from very pessimistic or conflict-deterministic187 to more nuanced and 
                                                          
185 “State-Managed Marketization: The Role of the Chinese State in the Petroleum Industry,” The 
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 30-2 (2012): 35. 
186 The first-order effect of this reasoning would facilitate securitization of the untrustworthiness of 
the international oil markets in China since the United States has long been the hegemonic power and 
dominant (international oil) market player. Once this securitization began and caused China to adopt 
more strategic oil supply measures, however, the situation may be exploited by interested parties in 
the United States to securitise any oil supply activities adopted by Chinese NOCs, seen as agents of 
the Chinese state. Increased levels of securitization of oil supply on both sides, therefore, can easily 
spiral into a vicious cycle of mutual distrust and a higher level of strategic oil supply measures 
adopted by both countries, not unlike the dynamics described by the security dilemma theory. 
Whether this downward spiral actually materialises would hinge on the confluence of confirming 
(and enabling) and disconfirming (and disabling) factors at the time.  
187 Selected examples of studies that can be characterised as such include John Mearsheimer, The 
Tragedy of Great Powers (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of 
U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30-2 (Fall 2005): 7-45. 
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balanced188 to anywhere in between. David Shambaugh, one of the foremost American 
Sinologists, coined the term “coopetition” to describe the “competitive coexistence” 
between China and the United States in the period studied. 189  Despite the deeply 
interdependent nature of this relationship and some areas of cooperation between the two 
countries,190 Shambaugh summarises the prognoses of many observers this way:191  
…the U.S.-China relationship has increasingly tended towards 
competition in recent years. This is plainly evident in the economic, 
ideological, normative, security, and geopolitical realms. Divergence 
rather than convergence of interests [emphases original], approaches, and 
policies increasingly characterize the relationship…institutionalized 
efforts [to pursue cooperation and coordination] are increasingly 
ephemeral and episodic, while the deeper competitive forces threaten to 
overwhelm the efforts for cooperation…The sphere of cooperation seems 
to be shrinking while the zone of competition is expanding. 
 
  Even observers with more sanguine views of the state of the China-U.S. 
relationship have no difficulties coming up with conflictual Sino-American national 
interests.192 Furthermore, upon closer inspection, some of the more “optimistic” views of 
China-U.S. relationship can hardly be classified as even” neutral” by most standards. 
Charles Glaser, for example, asserts that “China’s rise need not be nearly as competitive and 
dangerous as the standard realist argument suggests.”193 Yet, the sources of his “optimism” 
are mutually assured destruction provided by nuclear weapons, to be extended to Japan and 
                                                          
188 An example of this category of studies is Rosemary Foot, “Chinese strategies in a US-
hegemonic global order: accommodating and hedging,” International Affairs 82-1 (2006): 77-94; 
and  
189 “Tangled Titans – Conceptualizing the U.S.-China Relationship,” in Tangled Titans, edited by 
David Shambaugh, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,  
 http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.virtual.anu.edu.au/lib/anu/detail.action?docID=1046296.  
190  Examples of their interdependence include: “They were each other’s second largest trading 
partners, the U.S. is the largest source of foreign direct investment in China, while China is the largest 
foreign creditor of the United States.” Ibid. Examples of cooperation include climate talks, anti-
terrorism during Beijing Olympics, and nuclear non-proliferation towards North Korea. See Shirley 
A. Kan “U.S.-China Counterterrorism Cooperation: Issues for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research 
Service, July 15, 2010, 21-22; and nuclear non-proliferation effort over the Korean Peninsula, backing 
UN plan for stability in Sudan in 2006 and initiating naval anti-pirate operations off the Coast of 
Somalia in 2008. See Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding 
to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, 90-2 (March/April 2011):56. 
191 Tangled Titans. 
192 For example, while questioning numerous premises of Yan Xuetong’s “superficial friendship 
theory” which explains the “unstable China-U.S. relationship,” Alastair Iain Johnston points out 
China’s naval development to “prevent/deter the USA from monopolizing Sea Lines of 
Communication” and “China’s efforts to promote certain Confucian values versus US liberalism” as 
may be put on the list of the two countries conflictual interests. At the same time, Johnston, like many 
other observers, points out many “common and complementary interests” or cooperative efforts 
between the two. See “Stability and Instability in Sino-US Relations: A Response to Yan Xuetong’s 
Superficial Friendship Theory” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 4 (2011): 5-29.  
193 “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs 90-
2 (March/April 2011): 80-91 - 81 
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South Korea, a reduced U.S. commitment to the “less-than-vital interest” of Taiwan, and the 
“separation by the Pacific Ocean.”194  
The above analysis shows that China-U.S. relations were at a lower quality than 
that between India and the United States of the same period. If India’s “strategic autonomy” 
prevents it from being a close friend of the United States,195 “strategic distrust” seems to be 
at the heart of the fraught relationship between China and the United States.196 A report on 
the subject by an American think-tank identified the three fundamental sources of this 
distrust as “different political traditions, value systems and cultures; insufficient 
comprehension and appreciation of each others’ policymaking processes… and a perception 
of a narrowing gap in power between the United States and China.”197  
There are parallels between how this distrust developed suggested in that report 
and how a negative relationship with the United States can be securitised to undermine 
China’s trust in the fairness or reliability of the existing international oil markets. First, the 
report says “various sources indicate that the Chinese side thinks in terms of a long-term 
zero-sum game.”198 If this is true, that means Chinese decision-makers are already “primed” 
to be securitised about the untrustworthiness of major international oil exchanges by the 
way suggested by the vulnerability-interaction model. The biggest oil exchanges in the 
world have been owned and operated by American firms. These exchanges may be seen as 
part of economic nationalistic scheme to perpetuate U.S. economic and political pre-
eminence in the world.199  
If it is not true that China elites by and large think in zero-sum terms, it seems to 
suggest American elites project mercantilist intentions onto “the other” partly due to 
different value and cultural systems. In fact, the report goes on to say that “economically, 
the United States worries that China’s mercantilist policies will harm the chances of 
American economic recovery.”200 One way or the other, the situation seems to fit in the oil 
supply securitisation spiral suggested earlier.  It is exactly this kind of zero-sum logic that 
is behind what is listed as one of China’s “challenges” to ensure hydrocarbon supply security 
in an article attributed to the CNPC Economics and Technology Research Institute:201 
                                                          
194 Ibid., 91. 
195 See footnote 95. Madan, “The U.S.-India Relationship and China.” 
196 Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi declare in a report on the subject, “The issue of mutual distrust 
of long-term intentions – termed here ‘strategic distrust’ – has become a central concern in US-China 
relations.” See Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust (Washington D.C.: John L. Thornton China 
Center Brookings, 2012), vi.  
197 Ibid., xi. 
198 Ibid. ix. 
199 See footnote 74 in Chapter Three.  
200 Ibid., ix. 
201  “An analysis and reflection on China’s oil security,” in China’s Energy Security: Current 
Situations and Strategic Choices, ed. By Fan Gang and Ma Weihua (Beijing: China Economic 
145 
 
The increasing energy independence of the United States helps to 
increase the space and flexibility of its global policy manoeuvring…so 
that the geopolitical role of the energy “weapon” can be given greater 
play. This [independence] can also provide it with a greater array of 
strategic tools. By influencing the energy situations in the Middle East 
and Africa, it can restrain the dominant position of the OPEC in the world 
petroleum markets, as well as greatly intimidate large hydrocarbon 
importing countries like China, thus strengthening its control of the 
energy security of the world.  
  
Second, the same report on strategic distrust says “China also views the U.S. as 
taking advantage of the dollar as a reserve currency and adopting various protectionist 
measures to disadvantage the PRC economically.”202 Again, this sentiment seemed to make 
decision-makers receptive of the securitisation about the “unfair advantage” to the United 
States of the dollar-denominated trading in the existing international oil markets. Regardless 
if it was the result of securitisation by interested parties in China, its unhappiness of this 
“advantage” was among the reasons prompted its quest to establish China’s own 
international energy exchange with trading denominated in yuan.203  
In fact, one of the measures to enhance oil supply security suggested in the same 
article attributed to the CNPC Economics and Technology Research Institute calls for the 
establishment of a crude oil futures market and a nationwide oil spot market in China as 
soon as possible “to set benchmark prices for the region and even the whole world to 
increase China’s control over pricing.204 Intriguingly, however, an article from the same 
edited volume authored by Chen Weidong, Chief Energy Researcher of the CNOOC Energy 
Economics Institute, projects a very pro-market posture. He enthusiastically advocates 
Chinese NOCs, private firms, and sovereign fund to participate in oil futures trading as it 
“dominates modern international oil trading.” 205  He also says, “a great power’s 
responsibility is not to ‘get the drums rolling to set up a new shop’ but to actively participate, 
make accomplishments, create harmony, and make developments together.”206  
This divergence of views may be explained by what individual NOCs decided (as 
of 2012) to be the most effective way to engage in securitisation or desecuritisation to further 
                                                          
Publishing House, 2012), 64. [对我国 石油安全问题 的 分析与思考 – 中石油 经济技术研究 在 
范纲，马蔚华主编 中国能源安全现状与战略选择] 
202 Ibid., viii. 
203 Andrew Critchlow, “China’s new oil contract signals shift from Brent and US dollar,” The 
Telegraph, 7 September 2015. Accessed 20 October 2015, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/11848172/Chinas-new-oil-
contract-signals-shift-from-Brent-and-US-dollar.html.  
204 “An analysis and reflection on China’s oil security,” 66. 
205 “China’s oil industry—only reforms and innovation promise a future,” in China’s Energy Security: 
Current Situations and Strategic Choices, ed. Fan Gang Fan and Ma Weihua, 134. [陈 卫东， 中国
石油工业 – 唯改革唯创新才有未来] 
206 Page 134 
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their interests. As explained in Chapter Two, many NOCs in net oil importing countries, 
especially the ones with some form of oil price control in their home countries, have been 
participants in, and at some point also beneficiaries of trading in the existing international 
oil markets. Chinese NOCs and their publicly-listed subsidiaries were no exceptions. In fact, 
they reportedly have been relatively adroit and aggressive traders in recent years.207 The 
analysis earlier in this chapter intimates that the de facto monopoly the “three barrels” 
enjoyed in the Chinese upstream sector was the key to their dominance. In view of the 
Chinese government’s recent move to relax unconventional hydrocarbon E&P in China by 
private firms, desecuritising the importance of that sector would be a worthy attempt by 
NOCs. Sure enough, Chen claims that “focusing on upstream makes little sense…Although 
increased investment could still boost production, it is not a reasonable option in today’s 
market economy…opening the upstream will not bring fundamental changes to the Chinese 
oil industry.”208     
That China was dependent on oil that had to be shipped through sea lanes only the 
United States had naval capability to block and the relatively negative relationship between 
the two countries have made this topic much securitised.209  Top-level Chinese leaders 
already saw these two facts as combining to pose a grave threat to China’s energy security 
as early as 2003.210 In the following decade, various interested parties continued to make 
                                                          
207 Especially compared to Japanese traders. Interview with John van Schaik, New York Bureau Chief, 
Energy Intelligence, New York City, 15 June 2015. In fact, oil trading companies of Chinese NOCs 
or their subsidiaries, seem to have become price-makers in the Asian physical crude oil trading market 
due to the large volume of their trade since the second half of 2014. See Florence Tan and Henning 
Gloystein, “China strengthens hold over oil market as price-maker,” Reuters website 11 August 2015. 
Accessed 2 February 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/china-oil-trading-
idUSL5N10H2GF20150811.  
208 “China’s Oil Industry Enters a New Era With the Trend of Energy Transitions,” NBR Brief for the 
Pacific Energy Summit June 2016, 2. 
209 There are isolated Chinese analysts, such as Zhao Hongtu of the think-tank China Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations, who points out such concerns were overblown. Another one 
is Zha Daojiong. On this subject, he said “there has not been a single known major incident of 
deliberate interruption since the early 1990s, making such issues primarily psychological.” See 
Jonathan D. Pollack, “Energy Insecurity with Chinese and American Characteristics: implications for 
Sino-American relations,” Journal of Contemporary China 17-55 (2008): 234-236.  
210 Then Chinese President Hu Jintao reportedly coined the term the “Malacca Dilemma” to describe 
what the central leadership saw as both an energy and an economic security issue in a Chinese 
Communist Party economic work conference in November 2003. His speech was clear to implicate 
the United States as a major source of the threat: “…certain powers have all along encroached on and 
tried to control navigation through the strait.” See Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Maritime Security and 
the ‘Malacca Dilemma’,” Asian Security 4-2 (2008): 144. Kong discussed the “wake-up call from the 
9/11 terrorism attack and the U.S. invasion of Iraq” as the events that “catalyzed the formation of 
China’s international petroleum policy” while “three groups of agents” within China brought the 
awareness of the country’s petroleum security challenges to the central leaders. These three groups 
include the “policy-making community” such as the three barrels and the various ministries and 
central level academies (think tanks), the academic community, and the mass media. It is very 
plausible that some securitization took place along the way. See China’s International Petroleum 
Policy, 48-56.  
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use of this external context to highlight the fact that relying on international markets alone 
cannot ensure China’s oil supply security.  
In the 2012 CNPC Economics Research Institute article quoted above, two of the 
measures to increase oil supply security discussed are related to this external context. One 
is to develop new “strategic passageways” to correct China’s “over-dependence” on oil from 
the Middle East that has to pass through “the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz.”211 
China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative to improve both overland and maritime 
connectivity between China and the rest of Eurasia makes perfect sense viewed in this light. 
Two is to strengthen “military planning on energy security” such as “the defence capability 
along energy shipping routes.”212 The underlying message is that with all these geostrategic 
complications, NOCs, unlike private firms, can be relied on to take China’s national security 
interests into account even when pursuing but also “foregoing maximum” profits in their 
overseas oil projects if needed.213  
The strong military and geostrategic implications of this external context resulted 
in many in the “policy-making community” other than NOCs to engage in its securitisation. 
Liu Xuecheng of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs think tank, China Institute of International 
Studies, for example, said in 2006:214 
[F]rom China’s perspective, domestic energy strategy is rooted in the 
vulnerability of its access to external energy resources and defensiveness 
against the United States curtailing its energy supplies. Considering the 
[potential] vulnerability of the four-fifths of all Chinese imports that pass 
through the Strait of Malacca, China sees its maritime shipping security 
as a pressing priority. 
 
The defence establishments, especially the navy in this case, are natural 
securitising agents regarding this particular external context. Jonathan D. Pollack 
documented Chinese naval officers’ writings advocating “heightened development of 
maritime capabilities to ensure long-term power and prosperity of the state” in the early to 
mid-2000s.215 This kind of securitising continues to the present day. In an appearance on the 
China Central Television in June 2016, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo [尹卓], Director of the PLA 
Naval Informatization Expert Consultation Committee, opined that the reason behind the 
                                                          
211 “An analysis and reflection on China’s oil security,” 66.  
212 Ibid., 67. 
213 This idea was expressed by a confidential interviewee working in one of the three barrels in 
Beijing in May 2015. Both this and another confidential interviewee working in an NOC, however, 
stressed that profits or economic considerations have been a major, if not the greatest, concern of 
NOC operation. NOC’s active participation in and indeed benefiting from the international markets 
does not mean that they did not also engage in selective securitising or powerful lobbying at the same 
time. 
214 As quoted in Pollack, “Energy Insecurity with Chinese and American Characteristics,” 234. 
215 “Energy Insecurity with Chinese and American Characteristics,” 235. See especially footnote 25 
for all the pertinent articles.  
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United States deploying littoral combat ships in Singapore was to control the Malacca Strait 
and possibly block it because the “Malacca Strait is the lifeline of petroleum shipping, 
foreign trade, and economic development of China.”216 
China’s relatively negative relationship with the United States apparently was 
securitised successfully by proponents of this approach to prompt top Chinese leaders to 
support Chinese NOCs’ overseas expansion and other oil diplomacy effort since the early 
2000s.217 These strategic oil supply measures appear to be evidence that the Chinese state 
was risk averse and lacked trust in the long-term reliability of the international oil markets. 
Not only did India had a better relationship with the United State during the same decade, 
geography also relieves it of any “Malacca Dilemma,” if not concerns about shipping 
security through the Strait of Hormuz or the pirate-ridden coast off Somalia. China, therefore, 
deserves the lower external context trust score it receives in the preliminary study. In fact, 
it is argued here that China’s reaction to this external context seemed so extreme that its 
overall trust level in the oil markets deserves to remain in the lowest trichotomous level (and 
numerically lower than India’s as in the preliminary study) even though Chinese NOCs’ 
displayed less rigorous public securitising effort than Indian NOCs.      
       
3.4 Implementation Capabilities of China  
 China had a considerably higher overall capability to implement strategic oil 
supply measures than India in the years leading to 2013 according to preliminary analysis. 
Similar to the method used in the comparison of India and Thailand, the profitability of 
Chinese NOC and China’s oil diplomacy capability are examined in this section as 
additional measures of its overall implementation capability. As the following analysis 
shows, the conclusion is that China’s capability to implement strategic oil supply measures 
deserves to be a trichotomous level higher than that of India’s.  
    
3.4.1 Chinese NOC Profitability 
The “three barrels” and other minor NOCs operating in China were not publicly 
traded, unlike in India and Thailand. Still, their profitability was an appropriate additional 
measure of their financial capabilities independent of that of the Chinese state. The “three 
barrels’” subsidiaries had been traded in major international stock exchanges for more than 
                                                          
216 Huang Zijuan, “Expert: U.S. Littoral Combat Ships Are of Lower Rank than 054A Frigates,” 
People’s Daily website, 28 June 2016, reposted on Chinese military press website. [黄子娟, 专家：
美濒海战斗舰战力比 054A护卫舰差个档次] 
Accessed 27 December 2016, http://military.china.com.cn/2016-
06/28/content_38762557.htm?f=pad. The rank, current title, and biography of the “expert” Yin Zhuo 
can be found on the same official Chinese military press website. Accessed 27 December 2016, 
http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/51756/185195/.  
217 See footnote 221.  
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a decade prior to 2013. Their profitability greatly impacted that of their parent companies 
which held the majority shares. More importantly, the state had given its NOCs great 
operational autonomy throughout the country’s petroleum sector reforms over the last three 
decades. Even if China’s government were to decide to scale back the robust resource 
supplier role it had been playing either by choice or by necessity, NOCs would still have the 
freedom to determine how to make use of the profits they and their subsidiaries generated.218     
The combined five-year average (2009-2013) of the net profit of PetroChina, 
Sinopec Corp. and CNOOC Ltd. was more than six times higher than that of Indian NOCs 
of the same period.219 Those of their parent companies are not counted in this study since it 
is not entirely clear if the amounts provided in the three-barrel annual reports have already 
included those of their subsidiaries. In any event, six times higher net profits should 
convincingly show that Chinese NOCs are more profitable even though China consumed 
about 2.9 times more oil than India in 2013.220 This means that Chinese NOCs had both 
more capital at their disposal in absolute terms as well as were proportionally more 
profitable. They definitely had a higher capability to finance projects and adopt measures 
they saw fit independent of state support. 
 
3.4.2 Chinese Oil Diplomacy Capability 
Much has been written about China’s vigorous oil diplomacy since top Chinese 
leaders endorsed and indeed demanded NOCs and other SOEs to “go out” and engage in 
overseas oil investments and other energy-security related projects in the early 2000s.221 
                                                          
218 There were indications that the state did try to reduce the moral hazard of wanton overseas 
investments by NOCs and other SOEs, but not in a way that suggests tighter governance, or any 
fundamental change in orientation. In June 2011, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of China (SASAC), the administrator of all central level SOEs, including 
NOCs, promulgated interim measures on the supervision and management of SOEs and their overseas 
assets. The part that is most pertinent to the current discussion stipulates that person(s) in charge of 
SOEs would be held legally liable for losses suffered due to such reasons of not exercising proper 
control of overseas enterprises, serious pitfalls in the internal control and risk-prevention mechanisms, 
or engaging in investments without following proper procedures or authority. See “SASAC Interim 
measures for the administration of overseas property rights of State-Owned Enterprises (Rule 27)” 
[国务院国有资产监督管理委员会令第 27 号《中央企业境外国有产权管理暂行办法》]. 
Accessed 27 December 2016,  
http://www.broadbright.com/pdf/%E4%B8%AD%E5%A4%AE%E4%BC%81%E4%B8%9A%E5
%A2%83%E5%A4%96%E5%9B%BD%E6%9C%89%E4%BA%A7%E6%9D%83%E7%AE%A1
%E7%90%86%E6%9A%82%E8%A1%8C%E5%8A%9E%E6%B3%95.pdf . 
219 These three companies’ combined five-year average net profit is US$39,355.68 million. The 
sources of information are these companies’ annual reports. See Table 14, Appendix C for detailed 
calculation. As noted in footnote 107 above, the figure for Indian NOCs is US$6,352.94 million. 
220 BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014. 
221 The “going-out” (走出去) strategy was formally put forward for the first time in October 2000. 
See Kong, China’s International Petroleum Policy, 46-47. For some other studies on the subject, see 
Andrew-Speeds and Dannreuther, China, Oil and Global Politics, 63-93; Tunsjo, “Hedging Against 
Oil Dependency: New Perspectives on China’s Energy Security Policy”; and Michel Gueldry and 
Wei Liang, “China’s Global Energy Diplomacy: Behavior Normalization Through Economic 
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Some of these efforts were done in concert with the investment projects in which Chinese 
SOEs and their subsidiaries overseas were involved, while others were more general in 
scope. An example of this latter category was efforts to enhance relationships with Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore, the three littoral states of the Strait of Malacca, to prevent “any 
great power, especially the United States and Japan, from extending its military presence” 
to the Strait.222                 
Some studies, such as Meckling et al’s, compare the oil diplomacy efforts of China 
and India. 223  They all seem to agree that the Chinese effort has been more robust. 224 
Displaying more aggressive oil diplomacy and engaging in it more frequently can be 
interpreted either as proof of China adopting a higher level of strategic oil supply measures 
as defined here or as its higher implementation capability of those measures or both. In this 
comparative study, as in the comparison between India and Thailand, the specialty of and 
financial support to pertinent Chinese agencies are examined to investigate China’s oil 
diplomacy capability, which in turn is hypothesised to result in the adoption of strategic oil 
supply measures. 
China spent less to maintain its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) than its Indian 
counterpart in absolute terms and especially as a percentage of its GDP between 2009 and 
2013 according to publicly available official budgets.225 Unlike its Indian counterpart, the 
Chinese MFA did not have a department which name suggests specialisation in energy 
related matters.226 It appears that oil diplomacy functions are scattered over a number of 
subordinate departments, such as the Department of International Economic Affairs 
Department and the Department of West Asian and North African Affairs. The OPEC is one 
of the regional “cooperation organizations” which relationship with China is managed 
through the latter department. The Chinese MFA, however, likely has unpublicised groups 
                                                          
Interdependence or Resource Neo-mercantilism and Power Politics?” Journal of China Politics 21 
(2016): 217-240.  
222 Kong, China’s International Petroleum Policy, 131. Kong lists many other Chinese oil diplomacy 
efforts beyond those directly involving NOCs, such as ports and other infrastructure projects overseas 
that may help secure oil transportation on pages 129 to132. 
223 Some other examples include: Carl, Rai, and Victor, “Energy and India’s Foreign Policy”; 
Powell, “Geo-politics of India’s equity investments in energy.”   
224 This does not mean that the authors think the efforts were necessarily more effective in ensuring 
oil supply security. 
225 The five-year average of the Chinese MFA budgets is US$991.73 million versus Indian MEA’s 
US$1,233.54 million during the same period (already minus the budget of foreign aid and loan). The 
Chinese MFA budget does not include foreign aid, which was listed in the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce (MCOM) budget. The sources for these figures are all from the official websites of the 
respective ministries. This only amounts to 0.013% of Chinese GDP in the same period whereas the 
Indian MEA budget was 0.07% of its GDP. For detailed calculation of the Chinese MFA budgets, 
see Table A15, Appendix C. 
226 For a list of all subordinate divisions, see “Organizational Structure,” Chinese MFA website. 
Accessed 2 January 2017,  http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/.   
151 
 
or personnel that wielded great authority over China’s conduct of oil diplomacy.227 As 
pointed out in the last section, oil supply security had been elevated to a major concern of 
China’s top leaders soon after this century began. 
In addition to the Chinese MFA, the Chinese  (MCOM) also undertakes functions 
that may be considered as oil diplomacy, such as formulating international trade and 
economic cooperation development strategies and policies. 228  It also contributes 
considerable funds to such functions by footing bills incurred by “economic and commercial 
organization personnel stationing in overseas consulates.”229 For these reasons, the part of 
the MCOM budget these functions are assigned is also included in the calculation in this 
comparison. 230  Even after this addition, China still spent less on foreign affairs and 
international trade related functions during the period studied than India.231 In fact, the 
average annual amount China spent as a percentage of its GDP was 4.67 times less than that 
by India. 232 The MCOM, like the MFA, does not have a department with a name that 
suggests specialisation in promoting energy or oil investments or trade. 
How can this lower government spending and apparently greater oil diplomacy 
capability of China be reconciled? There are a number of logical explanations. First, similar 
to the situation of China’s supposedly grossly under-reported official defence budget, the 
budgets of the two Chinese ministries examined here might actually be much larger. Still, 
according to an American think tank report, even the highest outside estimate made was less 
than double the official Chinese defence budget in 2015.233 If we assume the situation 
applies here, China’s spending on the two ministries with obvious oil diplomacy functions 
                                                          
227 For updated accounts and analyses of China’s extensive conduct of oil diplomacy while balancing 
its overall relations with the United States, see David Zweig and Yufan Hao, ed. Sino-U.S. Energy 
Triangles: Resource Diplomacy Under Hegemony (New York: Routledge, 2016), especially Chapters 
3 to 12.  
228 See “Major Functions of MCOM,” MCOM website. Accessed 2 January 2017, [商务部的主要职
责] 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/cwgongzuo/feiyqr/201407/20140700663702.shtml.  
229 This is listed as an explanation of the expenditure under the category of “overseas organizations” 
in the MCOM budget. See “Year 2013 Final Accounting of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China,” MCOM website. Accessed 2 January 2017, [中华人民共和国商务部， 商务
部 2013年度部门决算] 
 http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/cwgongzuo/feiyqr/201407/20140700663702.shtml.  
230 Similar to the exclusion of India’s foreign aid and loans in the Indian MEA budget, the foreign 
aid part of the MCOM budget is not included in the calculation.  
231 The combined annual average of the relevant budget items of these Chinese ministries was 
US$1,125 million versus India’s US$1,233.54 million. See Table 15, Appendix C for detailed 
calculation. 
232 China spent about 0.015% of its GDP versus India’s 0.07%. See Table A15, Appendix C for 
detailed calculation. 
233 The official Chinese defense budget was US$146 billion, while the U.S. Department of Defense 
estimated it to be US$180 billion and the Stockholm International Peace Institute estimated it to be 
US$214 billion. See “What does China really spend on its military?” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies website. Accessed 2 January 2017, http://chinapower.csis.org/military-
spending/.  
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would be slightly higher than India’s in absolute terms, but still much less proportional to 
its GDP.  
A second explanation is that the source of China’s oil diplomacy capability was as 
much from positive support the government provided as from the lack of procedural and 
other restraints it placed on ministry officials as well as NOC and other SOE executives. 
This is the conclusion of Meckling et al’s study as well as anecdotal complaints by Indian 
NOCs when engaged in bidding wars with Chinese NOCs in overseas investment projects. 
Third, China simply derived greater intangible capability that comes with its UNSC 
permanent membership as well as with its larger economy and denser trading relationships 
with foreign countries.  
Fourth, there was other not-so-obvious oil diplomacy related Chinese 
organizations and agencies, most notably banks, that boosted NOCs’ overseas investment 
capability with no comparable counterparts in India. According to Erica Downs’ estimate, 
Chinese state-owned banks made US$74.6 billion “energy-backed loans” to NOCs and 
governments of oil exporting countries between 2005 and 2010.234 This, in turn, speaks to 
the 13 times more foreign exchange reserves China had over India, which has been taken 
into account in the preliminary study.235 Finally, a plausible but not probable factor: China 
actually did not have a higher capability than India, contrary to the conclusion of all known 
studies that examine the two countries’ oil diplomacy activities.  
The truth likely is a mixture of all the above explanations, except possibly the last 
one. When all the sources of capabilities examined in this study and the preliminary analysis 
are viewed in totality, China’s overall implementation capability of strategic oil supply 
measures would still be at a higher trichotomous level than India’s. This would still be true 
if we assume Chinese oil diplomacy capability was actually more or less the same, not vastly 
superior than that of India as commonly assumed.   
 
4. Conclusion 
The in-depth comparison between India and Thailand with data from the years 
leading to 2013 confirms that they adopted a similar level of strategic oil supply measures. 
                                                          
234 Inside China, Inc.: China Development Bank’s Cross-Border Energy Deals (Washington, D.C.: 
John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings, 2011), 39. Also see this study for details of these oil-for-
loans deals financed by the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, and 
executed through CNPC and Sinopec.  
235 Downs stresses that the realisation of these deals does not mean that the Chinese state actively 
tried to push either the banks or NOCs to pursue them all the time and these entities engaged in these 
deals for a variety of reasons, including importantly to pursue profits. This conclusion does not 
diminish the fact that Chinese state-owned banks’ ability to make such large loans is a testament to 
the superior material capability of China in the short to medium term (if not its long-term financial 
health. See more discussion on the historical risks associated with artificially low interest rates to a 
particular sector in footnote 89 in Chapter Three).  
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Their OV levels, the overall strengths of private capital in their economies, their overall trust 
in the oil markets, and implementation capabilities all fell within the same trichotomous 
level during that period. These conditions again match those proposed by H1 of the 
vulnerability-interaction model as in the plausibility probe. Applied in a cross-economy 
situation such as this comparison, H1 suggests a causal pathway in which different net oil 
importing economies would end up adopting very similar levels of strategic oil supply 
measures during the same period. This pathway is that the levels of the four explanatory 
factors hypothesised by the vulnerability-interaction model of the two economies are very 
similar. 
This does not mean that the magnitudes of all the variables of India and Thailand 
were exactly the same. Viewed in totality with the more cursory data examined in the 
preliminary study, India “caught up” in the magnitude of its intervention in its petroleum 
sectors in the form of the country’s more market-displacing oil product pricing regime. This, 
however, began to change with the deregulation of diesel prices in 2014. Private capital, but 
only in the form of international private capital, was even stronger in Thailand, especially 
in the petroleum sectors. There is no sign, however, that state capital in the form of SOEs, 
will be in the retreat any time soon.236 The differences between the two economies in the 
other three variables remained very slight, with India having a little higher OV, a little lower 
trust, and a little higher capability. Considering the great differences between the two 
countries in many other respects such as population, geographical size, political and 
economic systems, I argue that H1 passes the test of the most different research design. 
The in-depth comparison of China and India with data from the same period 
confirms that China adopted a level of strategic oil supply measures and had a capability to 
implement them that were trichotomously higher than India’s. At the same time, their OV 
levels, the overall strengths of private capital in their economies, and their overall trusts in 
the oil markets all fell within the same trichotomous level. These conditions match the 
conditions stipulated and the outcome expected by H2 as in the plausibility probe. Applied 
in a cross-economy situation, H2 suggests one causal pathway that explains the variation in 
the levels of strategic oil supply measures adopted by different net oil importing economies 
during the same period.  
Upon examination of more detailed data in this comparison, China seems to have 
adopted an even higher level of strategic oil supply measures in the form of international oil 
                                                          
236  See Jake Maxwell Watts and Nopparat Chaichalearmmongkol, “In Thailand, a Struggle for 
Control of State Firms,” The Wall Street Journal, 17 June 2014. Accessed 5 April 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-thailand-a-struggle-for-control-of-state-firms-1402930180; “The 
clash of public and private interests,” Thailand’s Sustainable Development website. Accessed 16 
September 2016,  
http://www.thailandsustainabledevelopment.com/topics/state-owned-enterprises/. 
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supply investments through its NOCs and a very restrictive upstream oil sector. China’s 
overall implementation capability was also higher because of its more profitable NOCs. 
While the magnitudes of China and India’s other explanatory variables were similar, China’s 
private capital appeared weaker than India’s, especially in the petroleum sector. China’s OV 
and overall trust in the oil markets were slightly lower. As detailed in Chapter Three, H2 
derives from the most similar research design. The similarity between China and India in 
many aspects in addition to the three hypothesised variables accentuates the explanatory 
power of the variable that was markedly different – their implementation capabilities.     
The two in-depth comparisons presented in this Chapter further support the validity 
of the vulnerability-interaction model. As discussed in Chapter Three, there are not many 
alternative theories that are specified enough that cover the geographic scope of this project. 
Due to the configurations of the variable levels of these particular case studies, the option 
to compare the validity of vulnerability-interaction model with alternatives is further limited.  
The India-Thailand case is a case of no substantial variation in any of their 
variables’ levels. The structural realist/geopolitical perspective would also explain the 
similarity of the levels of strategic oil supply measures they adopted by their similar 
capabilities and OV levels. This perspective would also explain China’s higher DV with its 
higher capability and illuminate our understanding of its slightly lower OV with its much 
higher capability. 
A conclusion that emerges from the data in this Chapter supports the proposition 
in Hughes’ study that when a domestic oil firm has grown to a size that is near parity with 
IOCs, it would behave more like them, meaning calling for a more liberalised governance 
of the country’s petroleum sectors. The sizable Indian private oil firm Reliance has shown 
signs of doing just that.237 While the subsidiaries of Chinese NOCs were even closer to 
parity in strength with IOCs than Reliance, they were still tightly controlled by their parents, 
which enjoyed overwhelming dominance in the domestic market through strict entry barriers. 
It is, therefore, unsurprising that subsidiaries of the “three barrels” have not clamoured for 
further liberalisation of the Chinese oil sectors.    
 
                                                          
237 For an example of Reliance behaving in the way IOCs would, see “RNRL fires fresh salvo, trains 
guns on NELP,” The Economic Times, August 21, 2009. Accessed 25 September 2016, 
 http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-08-21/news/28452334_1_nelp-new-
exploration-licensing-policy-roadshows/2. 
BP bought 30% of Reliance’s interests in the 23 oil and gas blocks Reliance operated and the two 
formed a 50:50 joint venture in November 2011 for “sourcing, marketing and transporting natural 
gas.” See “Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Industries inks $7.2 billion deal with BP,” February 21, 2011, 
Forbes website, http://www.forbes.com/sites/naazneenkarmali/2011/02/21/mukesh-ambans-
reliance-industries-inks-7-2-billion-deal-with-bp/#305cf2c375b0. See the press release of the 
forming of joint venture company at, accessed 25 September 2016, 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp-
country/en_in/documents/JV%20announcement%20press%20release.pdf. 
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Chapter Five 
Taiwan’s Pathway to High-Level State Intervention in Oil Supply 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Why do some net oil importing economies continue to adopt a high level of 
strategic oil supply measures decades after crude oil and oil products began to be freely 
traded in international oil markets? This appears to be especially difficult to explain in 
economies that are generally free and open. To better understand this phenomenon, this 
chapter investigates the case of Taiwan in the years preceding 2013 as a deviant case of H3.  
   As detailed in Chapter Three, H3 of the vulnerability-interaction model proposes 
a causal pathway to the adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply measures by 
economies in which private capital generally have a significant level of strength (three-high 
cases). Specifically, the pathway stipulates a high oil vulnerability (OV), a high level of 
private capital strength, a high implementation capability, and a medium level of trust in the 
oil markets. None of the nine case-study economies, in the preliminary study, however, 
match all these conditions. Taiwan’s conditions circa 2013 appear to be the most promising 
among the initial case studies to offer an answer to the question despite its apparent deviance 
to some stipulations in the vulnerability-interaction model as it is currently formulated.  
Data presented in this Chapter suggest that not having an overall high level of trust 
in the oil markets to ensure uninterrupted and affordable oil supply at all times is the most 
critical condition that makes generally open and free economies continue to adopt a high 
level of strategic oil supply measures. While these economies may have a high financial 
capability to implement a high level of these measures, they may not have a “high capacity,” 
as expounded by Ikenberry, to free themselves from interventionist commitments of an 
earlier era.1 Not having a high level of trust in the oil markets due to securitisation facilitated 
by these polities’ domestic and external contexts makes decision-makers more risk averse. 
They are hence less resolute in pursuing their larger goal of economic liberalisation in the 
supposedly more strategic domain of oil supply. 
The rest of this Chapter proceeds by first presenting a synopsis of the politics of oil 
in Taiwan, then by re-assessing in greater depth the accurate level of each variable of the 
vulnerability-interaction model.  Situations unique to Taiwan are introduced and analysed 
through the prism of the framework of the model. The concluding section synthesises the 
                                                          
1 These may include, for example, long-established NOC(s) and artificially low oil product pricing. 
Ikenberry’s short definition of state capacity is “the differential ability of states to assert control over 
political outcomes.” See, “The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in 
the 1970s.” International Organization 40-1 (1986): 106. 
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information presented to provide a comprehensive understanding of the pathway to 
Taiwan’s adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply measures around 2013. 
 
2. Politics of Oil in Taiwan 
Taiwan’s oil industry was dominated by its NOC for the first four decades after the 
end of the second world war as it had the monopoly to operate in most aspects of the industry. 
Taiwan’s oil sector has gradually liberalised since the late 1980s. The domestic private firm 
Formosa Petrochemical Corporation (FPC) was established in 1992 to participate in the 
newly opened-up oil sector.2 FPC has since formed a duopoly with the NOC in Taiwan’s 
mid- and downstream oil sectors. Oil product prices began to be deregulated in 1993.3 
However, repeated government “stabilisation” of domestic oil prices since and other 
regulatory issues have mostly discouraged international oil companies from entering 
Taiwan’s oil market up to 2013.   
Taiwan’s NOC has continued to be the only player in the economy’s very small 
upstream petroleum sector, even after it theoretically lost the monopoly in oil exploration 
and production (E&P) after 2003. The government’s clearly articulated goal of NOC 
divestment has so far been thwarted by the labour union and other interest groups. It 
remained 100 percent state-owned and simultaneously acted as the industry administrator 
throughout the period studied. Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation and precarious geopolitical 
position have created a more pertinent backdrop for parties with vested interests to securitise 
oil supply to the island.  
All these appear to contribute to continued heavy government footprints in Taiwan’s 
oil supply while private investments have been more unfettered in many other sectors in the 
economy. The conditions of Taiwan did not totally correspond to those stipulated in H3 
which proposes to explain this puzzling phenomenon. Verifying Taiwan indeed adopted a 
high level of strategic oil supply measures during the period studied is the prerequisite for 
unearthing the pathway leading to their adoption and in refining H3. The rest of this section 
endeavours to accomplish this.  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 For a history of how the parent company of FPC, the Formosa Plastic Company, weaved into the 
history of the politics of oil in Taiwan, see Yu Jan, “Interactive Mode Between FPC and the KMT 
Government,” Newtalk website, 13 October 2010. Accessed 15 January 2017 [悠然，台塑集團與
國民黨政府之互動模式, 新頭殼],  
http://newtalk.tw/opinion/view/1573. Also see Chu Wan-Wen, “Import Substitution and Export-Led 
Growth: A Study of Taiwan’s Petrochemical Industry,” World Development Vol. 22-5 (1994): 783-
786. 
3  Jung-Hua Wu, Yi-Lung Huang, and Chang-Chen Liu, “Effect of floating pricing policy: An 
application of system dynamics on oil market after liberalization,” Energy Policy 39 (2011), 4236. 
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2.1 Taiwan’s Strategic Oil Supply Measures 
   
Among the three economies the preliminary study determines to have adopted a 
high level of strategic oil supply measures in 2013, Taiwan has the lowest composite score, 
which is made up of the government’s control of crude oil supply to the economy, typically 
through an NOC, and the size of any petroleum reserves held by government entities.4 These 
two aspects of state intervention in Taiwan’s oil supply, therefore, are appropriate to 
constitute this chapter’s initial analysis. 
 
2.1.1 Government Control of Crude Oil Supply 
The Taiwanese government has been “controlling” crude oil supply to the 
economy through its wholly-owned and vertically-integrated NOC CPC Corporation (CPC) 
for decades.5 The last major aspect of CPC’s monopoly in Taiwan’s oil sectors, that of crude 
oil import, however, ended in 1999 when FPC imported its first load of crude oil to the 
island.6 The gradual liberalisation of the governance and various oil sectors in Taiwan began 
in 1987. At that time, private gas stations were allowed to sell gasoline and diesel.7 In 1996, 
private firms were allowed to “produce, market, and import/export petroleum products.”8 
CPC and FPC have since formed a duopoly in the domestic mid- and downstream oil sectors 
except for a brief “intrusion” of an international firm (Esso) in 2002-2003.9  
Taiwan’s NOC CPC imported about 44 percent of the oil consumed in the economy 
in 2013.10 This was less than half of Indonesia’s 100 and China’s 99 percent respectively, 
and was on par with India’s 45 and Thailand’s 42 percent respectively for the same year.11 
These numbers seem to be an accurate reflection of the hybrid NOC ownership and domestic 
petroleum sector governance and pricing regime of Taiwan among these economies. Like 
Chinese and Indonesian NOCs, CPC was and still is wholly-owned by the government. To 
be precise, it was a subordinate organization of the Republic of China (ROC) Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (MoEA). 12  Despite its name of a “corporation,” it has not been 
                                                          
4 Indonesia scores the highest, followed by China. See Tables 3.4 in Chapter Three.  
5 The name of the same company went from “China Petroleum Corporation” when it was founded in 
Shanghai in 1946 by the Republic of China government to CPC Corporation, Taiwan in 2007. CPC 
was relocated to Taiwan with the nationalist government in 1949. See CPC Corporation, Taiwan 
2014 Annual Report, 4. 
6 The company was formed earlier in the 1990s and the construction of its processing plants ensued. 
See “Our History,” FPC website. Accessed 2 January 2017, http://www.fpcc.com.tw/en/history.html.   
7 Wu et al, “Effect of floating pricing policy,” 4236. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. There is more discussion of this in the Section 4.1 below. 
10 See Table 3.2 in Chapter Three.  “[O]nly an extremely small amount” of crude oil CPC fed its 
refineries was “produced in Taiwan.” CPC Corporation, Taiwan 2014 Annual Report, 12. 
11 See Table 3.2 in Chapter Three. 
12 It is listed as one of the four “National Corporations” under the “Organization,” Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, R.O.C. website. Accessed 2 January 2017,  
https://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/english/introduction/OrganizationList.aspx?menu_id=191.  
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corporatised or listed in the domestic or any other stock markets as in the cases of Indian 
and Thai NOCs. Unlike the Chinese or Indonesian cases, however, CPC formally lost its 
monopoly status in all the oil sectors when the Petroleum Administration Act came into 
effect at the end of 2001.13 CPC did not have any publicly-listed subsidiaries like the 
Chinese “three-barrel” NOCs. 
Also unlike the Chinese and Indonesian cases, CPC was and still is slated for 
privatization. In fact, it was among the first wave of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in 
Taiwan that were chosen to go through the process in 2001.14 The process has stalled for 
reasons that will be explored in Section 4.2 below. Still, in the years leading to and including 
2013, the goal of privatising CPC was repeated in each of the Energy Bureau of MoEA 
annual reports in the context that many of the sector administrative functions would be taken 
over by the bureau when that goal eventually materialises.15  
As it stood in 2013, however, CPC was both a major oil sector operator and the 
petroleum administer tasked with such functions as the management of retail gas stations, 
the general management of the oil market, ensuring the safety of the oil and gas industries, 
and the administration of the petroleum fund and oil subsidies stipulated in the Petroleum 
Administration Act.16 Some of these functions obviously put CPC in apparent conflict-of-
interest situations as it was one of two major oil sector operators in Taiwan. As the 
discussions below reveal, CPC was placed in loss-incurring situations. By contrast, Chinese 
or Indonesian NOC(s) were not saddled with such administrative functions officially during 
the same period.    
Taiwan basically has had a free-floating oil pricing regime, but that regime had been 
“tinkered” with a number of times since the government took the first step of price decontrol 
in 1993.17 The most recent “price stabilisation” effort by the government was gradually and 
haltingly lifted since April 2012, which returned gasoline and diesel prices to be largely 
determined by supply and demand dynamics.18 Even after product prices floated again, 
                                                          
13 Huei-Wen Pao, Hsueh-Liang Wu, and Wei-Hwa Pan, “The road to liberalization: Policy design 
and implementation of Taiwan's privatization” International Economics and Economic Policy, 5-3 
(2008): 330.  
14 Ibid., 335.  
15 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2013 Annual Report [經濟部能源局一 0
一年年報], 35; 2012 Report, 31; 2011 Annual Report, 27; 2010 Annual Report, 27, and 2009 Annual 
Report, 25. One interesting point is that in the reports between 2009 and 2012, the phrasing is “If it 
[CPC] is privatised in the future…” whereas in the 2013 report, the phrase used is “CPC will be 
privatised in the future.”  
16 These functions were listed in the various Bureau of Energy annual reports as ones the Bureau 
would take up when CPC is privatised.  
17 Pao et al, “The road to liberalization,” 4236-4238. 
18  Between December 2010 and March 2012, CPC implemented the government’s oil price 
stabilisation policy in which its gasoline and diesel prices only reflected half of the actual price hike 
in the international markets. The government put forward a gradual “price rationalisation” program 
in April 2012 wherein CPC product prices were supposed to go up the same amount as actual price 
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subsidies given to an array of groups in the Taiwanese society continued. These included 
mass transit operators and taxi drivers, agricultural and fishing sector operators, people with 
disabilities, and people living in aboriginal mountainous areas and outlying islands.19 The 
subsidies were financed with the petroleum fund, levied as fees on oil refiners, importers 
and exporters, as well as distributors across the board.20 Taiwan’s petroleum fund has played 
more extensive roles than Thailand’s oil stabilisation fund, one of which is to create and 
maintain the second strategic oil supply measure examined in the preliminary study – 
stockpiling of oil.21  
 
2.1.2   Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
The Taiwanese government decided to establish a strategic petroleum reserve 
(SPR) in 2001 to “stabilise domestic petroleum supply.”22 The Taiwan Research Institute, a 
“privately-funded” but publicly-oriented think tank “operated by academic elites,” was 
tasked to administer the SPR. 23  The Petroleum Administration Act stipulates that the 
government has to keep 30 days of oil consumption. 24  The government completed 
stockpiling 2,830,000 kiloliters of oil in 2007, which was “no less than the equivalent of 30 
days of the needs of the economy,” about 57% of which was in the form of crude oil and the 
rest in the form of oil products.25 In addition, all oil refiners and importers operating in 
Taiwan must stockpile the equivalent of 60 days of the average amount consumed in the 
economy in the previous 12 months, pro rata to their share of the market. Refiners also have 
to stockpile a minimum of an additional 50,000 kiloliters and importer an additional 10,000 
                                                          
hike, but would only fall halfway when prices came down until it recuperated all the losses previously 
incurred. See Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2012 Annual Report, 33. This 
rationalisation was eventually aborted and was reinstated in October 2013 due to negative public 
comments on the policy. See Huei-Chu Liao and Shi Ting Jhou, “Taiwan’s Severe Energy Security 
Challenges,” Brookings Institute website, September 2013, accessed February 27, 2016, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/09/12-taiwan-energy-security-liao.  
19 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2012 Annual Report, 33-34, 42.  
20 Petroleum Administrative Act 11 October, 2001, Chapter Six, articles 34 and 45 [制定石油管理
法], accessed 5 January 2017,  
http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=84&lctl=view&itemid=2066&ctid=96&q= 
21 In addition to the two functions mentioned, the fund was also tasked to promote oil and gas E&P, 
energy policy research, R&D of oil exploration and alternative energies, and other measures 
“necessary to stabilise oil supply and maintain the order of the oil product market.” Petroleum 
Administrative Act, Chapter Six, article 36. More detailed explanations are given to these functions 
in the three subsequent amendments to the Act, the last of which was in January 2011. See the 
Taiwanese government posting the texts of the amendments in the following official website, 
accessed 5 January 2017, 
http://www.ey.gov.tw/Upload/RelFile/2016/661383/eac9f7af-1522-4b2a-81a2-3c716d37680f.pdf.  
22 “Management Services of Government-Owned Petroleum Reserves,” Taiwan Research Institute 
website, accessed 3 January 2016, http://www.tri.org.tw/english/research_e/research3.php?id=24.  
23 Ibid. For information about the Taiwan Research Institute, see “Mission and Goals,” Taiwan 
Research Institute website, accessed 4 January 2017, http://www.tri.org.tw/english/.  
24 “Management Services of Government-Owned Petroleum Reserves.” 
25 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2013 Annual Report, 36. 
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kiloliters.26 Both the NOC CPC and the private firm FPC must comply with this Act and in 
fact must report their stockpiling amount to the Energy Bureau weekly and be subjected to 
irregular inspections.27  
Taiwan, therefore, maintained a SPR equivalent to at least 90 days of its oil import 
according to the definition of this study and since the government completed its own 
stockpile in 2007.28 It scored the highest among the three economies receiving an overall 
high level of DV in the preliminary study for this more market-conforming strategic oil 
supply measures.29 In fact, Taiwan had the largest SPR size among all nine-case economies 
except South Korea in 2013.30  
 
2.1.3 Overseas Oil Supply Projects 
Apart from these two strategic oil supply measures examined in the preliminary 
study, the Taiwanese government also adopted measures investigated in the comparative 
studies in Chapter Four. CPC, through its subsidiary Overseas Petroleum and Investment 
Company (OPIC), did engage in overseas oil supply investment projects during the period 
under review.31 As of the end of 2013, CPC was engaged in 25 overseas oil and gas E&P 
projects in 10 countries, 13 of which were already hydrocarbon producing.32 Some examples 
include Blocks 16 and 17 in Ecuador, Indonesia’s Sanga, Niger’s Agadem, and the 
Hurricane Creek project in Louisiana, U.S.A., producing 5.45 million barrels, or about 1.7 
percent of the economy’s consumption of oil that year.33 These efforts yielded similar results 
                                                          
26 Ibid. Some commentators have raised doubts of the compliance of these stockpiling stipulations by 
companies, but without concrete proof of otherwise, this project would use these official figures.   
27 Ibid. 
28 Since Taiwan had almost a 100% oil import dependency during the period studied, the amount of 
consumption was basically the same as the amount of import. 
29 China had 17 and Indonesia had 47 days equivalent of SPR in 2013. See Table 3.3 in Chapter Three. 
30 South Korea’s SPR was the equivalent of 122 days of import in 2013. Ibid. 
31 OPIC is a shell company of CPC registered in Panama in 1979 for the purpose of overseas oil and 
gas E&P activities. See “Matters Related U.S. Trip to Assist Handover of OAI/OHI’s Chief Financial 
Officer,” Overseas Business Trip Reports Information Network [ROC] website, accessed 5 January, 
2017 [赴美國 OAI/OHI協助財務長交接事宜, 公務出國報告資訊網], 
 http://report.nat.gov.tw/ReportFront/report_detail.jspx?sysId=C09601582.  
CPC has other affiliates engaging in businesses in different oil sectors and many with names that are 
variants of OPIC, in at least ten countries. For the list of these companies, see “Overseas cooperation 
points of CPC,” [CPC] Corporate Social Responsibility website, accessed 7 January 2017[中油公司
海外合作據點], 
http://cpc.demosite.tw/csr/management/intro-explain-2.aspx.  
32 CPC Corporation, Taiwan 2014 Annual Report, 8.  
33 Ibid. The percentage figure is calculated with the conversion rate between barrel and ton of oil in 
the BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014, 44 and Taiwan’s million ton of oil consumption 
in the same report (page 10). For a detailed introduction to the CPC’s upstream activities in the period 
studied and beyond, see Taiwan Petroleum Exploration 2011-2015 - Volume Eight, 6-39 (Chapter 
One - Introduction), CPC Exploration and Production Business Division website, accessed 5 January 
2017 [台灣石油探勘紀要第八冊，第一章 概述，台灣中油股份有限公司探採事業部], 
http://new.cpc.com.tw/division/epb/information-text.aspx?ID=124.  
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in recent years. In 2008 for example, CPC received 5.89 million barrels of equity crude from 
its overseas projects.34 These results were of a much smaller scale proportionally than the 
overseas hydrocarbon yields of Chinese NOCs,35 but larger than Indonesia’s in 2013,36 the 
other two case studies the preliminary study determined to have adopted a high level of 
strategic oil supply measures.  
 
2.1.4 Preferential Hydrocarbon E&P 
Taiwan has had almost no hydrocarbon resources left within its territories to speak 
of in the last two decades. At first glance, therefore, the measure of preference given to 
NOCs in indigenous oil development does not seem applicable. In fact, it does in a de facto, 
not a legal, way. One of the statutory functions of the Taiwanese petroleum fund mentioned 
earlier is to “encourage domestic [petroleum] sector operators to engage in oil and gas 
exploration and development work domestically and overseas.”37 The maximum subsidy 
was 50 percent for exploration projects and 12 percent for development projects, presumably 
of the project costs.38 These subsidies do not give preference to the NOC, but to all domestic 
operators [國内業者]. This is in line with stipulations in the Mining Act which allows all 
ROC people to apply for the right to explore and produce minerals, including oil and gas, 
“within the territories, special economic zone, and continental shelf of the ROC.”39  
                                                          
34 CPC Corporation, Taiwan 2009 Annual Report, 12 [2009台灣中油股份有限公司年報 ]. For a 
detailed breakdown of all CPC overseas hydrocarbon projects, including the equity shares and 
production amounts of each, see Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs Annual Reports of 
the years studied under the chapter on Petroleum Industry. 
35 As reported in Chapter Four, the largest Chinese NOC CNPC produced 35.5 million tons of equity 
oil and gas in 2013. CPC’s figure would be higher than the 5.45 million barrels (or 0.74338 million 
ton) cited here since it also produced 351 million cubic meters of natural gas in that year according 
to the same annual report. Even generously doubling the CPC figure means it only produced about 
3.5% of Taiwan’s oil consumed whereas the figure of CNPC alone equaled to about 7% of the oil 
China consumed that year. This has not even included the production of the two smaller “barrels.” 
36 The Indonesian NOC Pertamina did not report any overseas hydrocarbon production yield in its 
2013 annual report. The company website lists overseas E&P projects in a number of countries, such 
as offshore Vietnam, Malaysia, and Sudan, but does not specify the yields of these projects. See 
“Overseas Operation,” Pertamina website, accessed 5 January 2017, 
http://www.pertamina.com/en/company-profile/our-networks/overseas-operation/.  
37 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2013 Annual Report, 37.  
38 The texts specifying these percentages were a little ambiguous if these percentages pertain to the 
total project costs. Ibid. These percentages have not changed over the years. They had been the same 
from at least 2007 on. The sources are the same Bureau of Energy annual reports. The Petroleum 
Administration does not specify these percentages. 
39 According to the constitution and the amended ROC Mineral Act of 2003, which covered the period 
studied, the ROC government has ownership of all mineral rights on and off shore of Taiwan, but 
“people of ROC” can apply for the right of exploring and producing almost all minerals, including 
oil and gas. See Meng-yu Hsieh, “Introduction to Our Country’s Mining Laws,” Taiwan Bar Journal 
19-12 (2015), 19. [謝孟羽, 我國礦業法制之初探, 全國律師, 第 19 卷 第 12 期]. The English 
translation of the current version of the Act, amended in 2016, uses the term “natural or juridical 
person of ROC,” which suggests corporations registered in ROC can also apply for mining rights. 
This appears to open up the possibility of foreign-owned parents of ROC corporations to apply for 
oil and gas E&P. The Chinese versions of the current Act as well as the 2003 version simply use the 
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The ROC government established five offshore hydrocarbon mining regions in 
1970.40 At the same time, due to the capital- and especially advanced technology-intensive 
nature of offshore E&P, the government also endowed CPC with the right to exploring and 
producing the resources either by itself or in cooperation with foreign companies.41 After 
the 2003 amendments to the Mining Act, not only on and offshore oil E&P were opened to 
all domestic operators, the government no longer drew up fixed E&P blocks for applicants 
to engage in their business. Instead, applicants could draw up their proposed exploration 
areas and plans for approval.42 Still, this amendment was not retroactive and it contained a 
sunset clause which let CPC receive the priority to apply for hydrocarbon E&P rights in 
projects in which it had already been engaging. These included offshore projects in its first 
offshore petroleum E&P region.43 
The road of CPC’s offshore hydrocarbon exploration was long and torturous, which 
serves as an illustration of the systemic changes and geopolitical situations Taiwan has been 
facing for the last few decades. These circumstances appear to have acted as an explanatory 
variable that impacted on all the other variables and will be explored further later in the 
chapter. For offshore hydrocarbon E&P, CPC has taken on a number of external cooperation 
partners, such as with CNOOC in the Taichao project, with Husky Energy in the Tainan 
Basin, and with CNOOC and Total in the Taiyang deep water project.44  
Between 2007 and 2013, the petroleum fund subsidies were awarded to 26 
hydrocarbon E&P exploration projects to cover on average 40 percent of their costs.45 
Eleven of the approved projects or about 42 percent of them were in fact onshore or offshore 
domestic projects.46 Two of them actually yielded natural gas. The one in Miaoli County 
began production in 2011,47 while the Kuantien well in Tainan City and the Fengshan well 
                                                          
term “people of ROC.” For the official English translation of the current Act, see “Mining Act,” Laws 
& Regulations Database of The Republic of China, accessed 8 January 2017, 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0020001. For the Chinese version of the 
2003 Act, which covered the period studied, see Mining Act (2003) [礦業法 (民國 92年)], accessed 
8 January 2017, 
  https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-
hant/%E7%A4%A6%E6%A5%AD%E6%B3%95_(%E6%B0%91%E5%9C%8B92%E5%B9%B4).  
40 Tseng Hung-Chih, “Establishment of our country’s offshore oil E&P regions and cooperation 
with foreign companies to explore oil,” Mining and Metallurgy 56-3 (2012): 11. [曾弘志, 我國海
域石油礦區之劃立及外資參與合作探油, 鑛冶 第五十六卷 第三期  中華民國一 O一年九月出
版]. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 20.  
43 These projects originated in 1973 and were extended to 2013, could be extended for another 20 
years. Ibid., 18-19. 
44 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2013 Annual Report, 37. 
45 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] Annual Reports 2013-2007, pages 37, 34, 
29, 30, 30, and 28 respectively. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2011 Annual Report, 29. 
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in Kaohisuang City were undergoing production assessment as of 2012.48 FPC, the only 
other crude oil importer in Taiwan during the period studied, received subsidies for two 
projects only. One was for the exploration of the Mowry block in central Wyoming, U.S.A. 
in 2007,49 and the other for the exploration of the Maverick Basin in Texas.50  
The fact that FPC, which had been a mid- to downstream company (refiner, 
distributor, and gas station operator), only set up an upstream subsidiary in the United States 
at the end of 2006, not its private company status, may explain its low rate of receiving the 
E&P subsidies.51 In addition, as the information from the last paragraph shows that whatever 
paltry hydrocarbon resources left on Taiwan seemed to be natural gas, not oil. Up until the 
passage of the Natural Gas Enterprise Act in February 2011, CPC played a monopolistic 
role in natural gas wholesaling and exploration.52 Still, all these factors converge to have 
created a de facto “preference” given to the NOC for E&P. Besides, the language of the law 
seemed to give actual legal preference to domestic oil companies. 
The rationale of these government funded subsidies was made clear by the variants 
of the following sentence in all the Energy Bureau annual reports examined: “To control oil 
and gas at their sources and to increase the rate of self-developed oil and gas.”53 The use of 
the term “self-developed” is very similar to the way it has been used in Japan, another 
advanced economy in Asia almost totally devoid of hydrocarbon resources. Indeed, this 
whole idea of government subsidies to all domestic firms to develop oil and gas was similar 
to the Japanese government-guaranteed credits to finance Japanese oil firms for overseas oil 
and gas projects. The Taiwanese way was more direct and so more market-displacing, both 
in the measure’s administration and its actual execution through a vertically integrated NOC, 
the CPC. In spite of or because of that, the rates of “self-developed” oil by Japanese firms 
were a few times higher during the period studied.54  
In sum, this section shows that the Taiwanese government indeed continued to play 
a large role in the supply of oil to the economy in the years leading to 2013, despite its stated 
                                                          
48 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2012 Annual Report, 34. 
49 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2007 Annual Report, 30. 
50 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2007 Annual Report, 28. 
51 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2007 Annual Report, 29. 
52 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2010 Annual Report, 33. Also see Anton 
Ming-Zhi Gao, Regulating Gas Liberalization: A Comparative Study on Unbundling and Open 
Access Regimes in the US, Europe, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (New York:  International, 2010), 
300. For the full texts of the official translation of the Natural Gas Enterprise Act in Chinese [天然
氣事業法], see “Natural Gas Enterprise Act,” Laws & Regulations Database of the ROC website, 
accessed 5 January 2017, 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0130045.  
53 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2013 Annual Report, 37. 
54 The Japanese average appears to be between 10 to 12 percent (see footnote 49 in Chapter Three for 
details of sources of this figure) while the Taiwanese figure is estimated to be about 2 percent. See 
discussions earlier in this section.  
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goal of and actual steps taken to liberalise the petroleum sectors more than a decade earlier. 
It adopted a high level of strategic oil supply measures, ranging from the most market-
displacing one of complete ownership of a vertically integrated NOC with many sector 
administration functions to the less market-displacing oil product pricing and E&P subsidies 
policies to the more market-conforming, but still government-owned SPR. With the premise 
of Taiwan case study established, the following sections delve into the possible causes of 
this high level of intervention. 
3. Taiwan’s Oil Vulnerability 
The causal pathway leading to the adoption of a high level of strategic oil measures 
as suggested by H3 stipulates an economy to have a high level of OV. This is one of the 
apparently “deviant” explanatory variables of Taiwan. The preliminary study determines 
that Taiwan’s OV only reached a trichotomously medium level in 2013. In this section, 
Taiwan’s OV is investigated to verify its level. The same two additional measures examined 
in the comparative studies in Chapter Four, one for market risk and one for supply risk, are 
calculated for Taiwan.  
Using the same method of calculation, the 2013 oil intensity of Taiwan’s economy 
was 0.047. 55  This was higher than China’s 0.031 and India’s 0.027, but lower than 
Thailand’s 0.050. 56  All three of these economies receive a low level of OV in the 
preliminary study, which did not take oil intensity into consideration. The same modified 
HHI index used in the comparative studies in Chapter Four is used to calculate Taiwan’s oil 
supply risk caused by the concentration and stability of countries of its crude oil supply in 
2013, with the result of 89.57.57 This is slightly higher than India’s 87.24, but considerably 
higher than Thailand’s 68.94 and China’s 66.88 of the same year. Thailand would be able 
to somewhat “offset” the risk associated with its higher oil intensity with its lower crude oil 
source risk while India could do the opposite. Taiwan, however, was stuck with both a higher 
oil intensity and a high crude oil source risk in 2013.   
Taiwan’s OV was certainly at least one level higher than China, India, and 
Thailand’s. The question was whether it was actually as high as the two economies 
                                                          
55 The same BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014 is used as the source of Taiwan’s oil 
consumption. The data source for Taiwan’s 2013 figure is from “Real GDP at Constant National 
Prices for Province of China Taiwan,” Economic Research of [U.S.] Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis website, accessed 3 January 2017,  https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RGDPNATWA666NRU. 
Again, as in Chapter Four, the results represents ton of oil consumed/thousand US$ of GDP. 
56 See Section 2.2 and 3.2 in Chapter Four. 
57 The source of Taiwan’s crude oil supply is from the Excel file titled “Crude Oil Import Sources,” 
Bureau of Energy statistics website, accessed 5 January 2017, [原油進口來源]  
http://web3.moeaboe.gov.tw/ECW/populace/web_book/WebReports.aspx?book=M_CH&menu_id
=142  
The source of the country risks is from the same PRS Group report. 
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determined to have a high OV in the preliminary study, Japan and Singapore. Again, using 
the same method of calculation, Japan’s oil intensity was 0.046 and Singapore’s 0.157,58 
while the concentration risks of sources of their crude oil supplies was 69.81 and 61.44 in 
2013 respectively.59  
Singapore’s unusually high OV, especially oil intensity, as currently formulated, 
was somewhat exaggerated due to its high oil consumption figure relative to its small 
population. 60  Oil trading and refining have been an important part of the Singaporean 
economy61and a large portion of its crude import no doubt was to feed its outsized refining 
capacity relative to its population. With a population of just over five million in 2013, 
Singapore had almost 4.5% of refining capacity in the Asia Pacific, higher than Thailand’s 
4%, which had a population of 67 million.62 The same situation also applied to Taiwan and 
South Korea to a lesser extent. Taiwan had 3.8% of the region’s refining capacity, but less 
than one third of Thailand’s population, while South Korea had 9.2% of the capacity and 
about three quarters of Thailand’s population.63 Thailand was not a country with unusually 
low refining capacity in the region either.64  
The OVs of Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan were only somewhat 
exaggerated because even if a portion of the oil they imported were used as raw materials 
to their export-oriented oil refining or petrochemical industries and not all for the basic 
needs or daily functioning of their populations their economies, these economies were still 
vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruption. The difference is that the burden of the 
risks would be distributed differently than in economies not so heavily dependent on such 
industries.   
                                                          
58 The source of oil consumed is BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014. The source of 
purchasing power parity in 2011 US$ is from the World Bank, accessed 5 January 2017, 
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD.  
59 The same methodology and source of country risk is used. The source of their crude oil supply is 
from the same (as in China, India, and Thailand) MIT Economic Complexity Observatory project 
site. See footnote 38 in Chapter Four for more details. 
60 It has the highest OV score among the nine case-study economies in the preliminary study, which 
is almost 23% higher than the score of Japan, the only other high DV economy. 
61 See “Energy – Industry Background” website, Government of Singapore, accessed 6 January 
2017, https://www.edb.gov.sg/content/edb/en/industries/industries/energy.html.  
62 Refining capacities are calculated with BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014, 16. 
Sources of populations are from the World Bank website, accessed 20 June, 2016, 
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.  
63 Ibid. 
64 Its population to refining capacity ratio in the region (1.95) is higher China’s (0.96), India’s (0.36), 
and Indonesia’s (0.44), but lower than Japan’s (3.34), Singapore’s (26.69), South Korea’s (5.91) and 
Taiwan’s (5.28). This is not a perfect measurement since only the 2013 population of the nine case 
studies, not all economies in the region are used for the calculation. These ratios would be even higher 
if the populations of the other economies are incorporated since their populations collectively would 
make up a higher percentage of the regional total than their collective refining capacity of 5.6%, 
according to BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014.  
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Japan’s OV score in the preliminary study is a little less than 10 percent higher 
than Taiwan’s.65 Its oil intensity was about the same as Taiwan’s, but its crude source 
concentration risk was about 22 percent lower in 2013. This would slightly narrow the gap 
between the two economies’ overall OV, but it does not appear that Taiwan’s OV would 
edge up enough to be classified as high in the Asia Pacific region even if the outlier case of 
Singapore is temporarily put aside. Japan’s higher ratio of oil-to-total primary energy 
consumption (44 versus Taiwan’s 39 percent), and its greater share of total global oil import 
(11 versus Taiwan’s 2 percent), are not likely to change soon.66 These are the two out of the 
four components of OV measures in the preliminary study that result in Japan’s higher OV 
than Taiwan’s.  
Taiwan may, however, be considered an economy with a high OV on a global 
scale as the Asia-Pacific’s 27.7 percent oil self-sufficiency was much lower than any other 
region in the world.67 As Table 5.1 below indicates, the region that had the next lowest rate, 
North America, still produced over 76% of the oil it consumed. With the shale revolution in 
the United States, this rate goes up further in the years immediately after 2013:68 
Year 2013 
Oil Consumption 
(million tonnes) 
Oil Production 
(million tonnes) 
Oil self-
Sufficiency Rate 
Africa 170.90 418.60 244.94% 
Asia Pacific 1,415.00 392.00 27.70% 
Europe & Eurasia 878.60 837.50 95.32% 
Middle East 384.80 1,329.30 345.45% 
North America 1,024.20 781.10 76.26% 
South & Central 
America 311.60 373.40 119.83% 
Table 5.1 Oil Self-Sufficiency Rates in Regions of the World in 2013 
 The measures examined in this section so far suggest that Taiwan’s OV was 
between medium to high in years leading to 2013. Transit route risk, which is different from 
supply concentration risk, however, has not been be taken into account. As in China, this 
risk seemed to loom larger for Taiwan than many other economies in the region. The source 
of Taiwan’s anxiety about its oil transit routes, in contrast to China’s, appeared to originate 
from across the Taiwan Strait instead of across the Pacific Ocean. As in the case of China, 
however, any such worries had yet to be materialised, and so they fall in the realm of trust 
                                                          
65 Japan OV score, calculated with the four measures detailed in Chapter Three, was 38.8 and that of 
Taiwan was 35.36. 
66 The data source of all these calculations is from BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014. 
67 Ibid. 
68 It was 84.7% in 2014 and 87.84% in 2015. The source for the calculation is BP Statistical Review 
of World Energy June 2016, 9-10. 
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or belief, which will be further investigated in the section focusing on trust in the oil markets 
below. 
 
4. Strength of Taiwan’s Private Capital  
 The only explanatory variable level that conforms to the stipulation of H3 for 
Taiwan in the preliminary study is that private capital in the economy is determined to have 
reached a high level of strength versus that of state capital in 2013. This conclusion was 
based on the high combined average economic freedom score Taiwan received. In fact, its 
score is the second highest among the nine case-study economies, 10 percent lower than 
Singapore’s but more than two percent higher than Japan’s,69 the other case-study economy 
that reached a trichotomously high level for this variable.  
In this section, as in the comparative studies in Chapter Four, the historical-
institutional and the actor-specific sources of private capital strength, especially in the 
petroleum sector as whole, are disaggregated and investigated separately to provide a more 
comprehensive and accurate picture of the overall strength of private capital in Taiwan in 
the years leading to 2013.   
 Many of the aspects that reflect the historical and institutional equilibria of the 
strength among international, domestic, and state capitals are already taken into account by 
the two “off-the-shelf” economic freedom indicators, which are also used in gauging the 
overall economic freedom of all the other case-study economies in earlier chapters. The 
following table, reproduced from a MoEA Investment Commission-funded report on 
Taiwan’s effort in attracting inbound foreign direct investments (FDI), provides three-
economy comparisons of the economic freedom and competitiveness among Taiwan, 
Singapore, and South Korea between 2007 and 2013.70  
Evaluation 
Organization 
Evaluative 
Index 
2007 2013 Change in 
Ranking 07-13 
TA SG SK TA SG SK TA SG SK 
IMD World 
Competitiveness 
18 2 29 11 5 22 +7 -3 +7 
WEF Global 
Competitiveness 
14 7 11 12 2 25 +2 +5 -14 
Heritage 
Foundation 
Economic  
Freedom  
29 2 39 20 2 34 +9 - +5 
                                                          
69 Singapore’s score is 86.65, Taiwan’s is 76.15 and Japan’s is 73.70. See Table 3.6 in Chapter 
Three. 
70 Yang Shu-fei et al, Research and Analysis of Investment Trends – Research on Taiwan’s Strategies 
of Attracting Foreign Direct Investments – Final Report 2013, Chung-Hua Institute for Economic 
Research, 189.  Investment Commission, MoEA website, accessed 6 January 2017. [分項計劃主持
人：楊書菲，中華經濟研究院。投資趨勢分析與研究 - 臺灣吸引外人投資策略研究期末報告。
經濟部投資審議委員會 102 年度 專案計畫 期 末 執行成果報告] 
www.moeaic.gov.tw/download-file.jsp;jsessionid...?id=J7g4WQ%2FzysI%3D.  
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BERI Business Risk 
Service 
6 2 21 3 1 13 +3 +1 +8 
World Bank Doing Business 50 1 30 16 1 7 +34 - +23 
WEF=World Economic Forum  BERI=Business Environment Risk Intelligence  
TW=Taiwan  SG=Singapore  SK=South Korea 
Table 5.2 Changes in Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea’s Economic 
Competitiveness or Freedom between 2007 and 2013 
 
 The rankings shown on Table 5.2 suggest that on the whole, Taiwan’s institutional 
support to private capital has consistently improved in the seven years between 2007 and 
2013 and should be in place for robust private economic activities in general in Taiwan by 
2013.  
The same four-scenario framework describing the domestic-international-capital-
state balance developed in Chapter Two and applied in the comparative studies in Chapter 
Four is again used in this chapter to guide the investigation of the actor-specific source of 
private capital strength in Taiwan in the period studied. 
 
4.1 International-Domestic-State Capital Balance in Taiwan 
The strength of international capital was not high in Taiwan although there were 
generally few restrictions on foreign investments by the period studied.71 The ten-year 
(2004-2013) average of FDI inflow only made up of 3.55% of the economy’s gross fixed 
capital formation, a lot lower than the nine case-study average of 13.08%.72 This average is 
skewed by the unusually high percentage of Singapore (74.05%), but Taiwan’s number is 
still lower than 5.46% eight case-study average that excludes Singapore or the Asian average 
of 8.84%. In 2011 that percentage even turned negative, which means the FDI outflow was 
greater than the inflow that year. The only other case-study economy that experienced 
negative FDI inflow in that decade was Japan. Table 5.3 below summarises these findings: 
                                                          
71 The “’negative’ list of industries closed to foreign investment…[were] public utilities, power 
distribution, natural gas, postal service, telecommunications, mass media firms, and air and sea 
transportation.” See “2013 Investment Climate Statement,” U.S. Department of State website, 
February 2013. Accessed 2 February 2017, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204742.htm.  
72 The data source of the calculation is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTD). See “Annex table 06, FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation, 1990-
2015,” UNCTD website, accessed 7 January 2017, 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx.  
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 Table 5.3 FDI inflows as percentage of gross fixed capital formation 2004-2013 
Surveys of foreign enterprises in Taiwan suggest that there has been a 
contradiction of strong institutional potentials for but lacklustre performance of foreign 
investments. This was a manifestation of the government’s active measures courting 
international capital and its simultaneous concern that overdevelopment of foreign firms 
would “squeeze the operation space of domestic firms.”73 In general, respondents of the 
surveys think Taiwan still exhibited a strong protectionist tendency, had a slow pace of 
decision-making and implementation, and too strict or insufficiently transparent laws and 
regulations.74 This is not an uncommon litany of complaints multinational corporations have 
against many host governments. Yet, the contradiction between the Taiwanese 
government’s declared guiding economic principle of liberalisation, including in the 
petroleum sectors, and its countervailing concerns seemed to be equally strong.75 Factors 
contributing to this contradiction are further discussed regarding the government’s 
liberalisation effort below.  
                                                          
73 Yang, et al, Research and Analysis of Investment Trends – Research on Taiwan’s Strategies of 
Attracting Foreign Direct Investments, 134. 
74 Ibid. 
75 In each of the Bureau of Energy annual report since 2007, for example, the goal of the bureau has 
been said to “actively push forward energy enterprise liberalization, privatization, opening up … the 
oil refining industry in response to major changes in energy policies as part of the economic 
development policy of internationalization and liberalization.” See for example page 2 of Bureau of 
Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2013 Annual Report. These goals, however, are not 
explicitly listed in the Petroleum Act of 2001 and its subsequently amended versions. Instead, article 
1, Chapter 1 sounds like more “paternalistic” or “protective”: “The Petroleum Administration Act 
(henceforth the Act) is being instituted to promote the sound development of the oil industry, to 
safeguard the production and sales of oil, to ensure the steady supply of oil, to enhance people's 
livelihoods, and to develop the national economy while at the same time give equal consideration to 
environmental protection.” See “Petroleum Administration Act,” Laws & Regulations Database of 
The Republic of China website. Accessed 12 January 2017, 
  http://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0020019.  
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In the petroleum sectors, CPC and the domestic private firm FPC have been 
functioning as duopolistic operators since 1999. ESSO, a joint venture between ExxonMobil 
and a private Taiwanese oil terminal services company, Pan Overseas Corporation, entered 
the Taiwan oil market in 2002, right after the formal liberalisation of the sector.76 The 
supposedly liberalised domestic oil product pricing, however, was sometimes “tampered 
with” by the government price stabilisation effort via the CPC as discussed in Section 2.1 
above. If private firms fail to match the low pricing of CPC, they would lose market shares.77 
Without the advantage of having its own transportation and gas stations, Esso “phase[d] out 
its Taiwan retail business in gasoline and diesel by the end of 2003.”78 No other foreign oil 
refiner, importer, or retailer was interested in entering the Taiwanese market since up to 
2013.79  
Taiwan’s small upstream oil sector has been dominated by CPC as earlier 
discussions in this chapter has illustrated. Foreign oil firms or international capital were 
brought in as partners of CPC in the technology-intensive offshore E&P, but these projects 
had yet to produce any tangible yields by 2013. International capital was infused in Taiwan’s 
upstream oil sector in a significant way indirectly through joint venture overseas E&P 
projects with OPIC, CPC’s overseas arm.80 Such cooperation dated back to the 1970s in the 
Philippines and then in Indonesia, even before the establishment of OPIC.81 In recent years 
the exploration projects that actually yielded positive results concentrated in the United 
States.82  
This “participation” of international capital in Taiwan upstream sector did not 
bring it into direct competition with domestic private oil firms since there were almost no 
indigenous resources in Taiwan left for development. The hydrocarbon E&P subsidy system 
                                                          
76 Wu et al, “Effect of floating pricing policy: An application of system dynamics on oil market 
after liberalization,” 4236. For the history and businesses of Pan Overseas Corporation, also known 
as Prime Oil Chemical Service Corp, see “Company Overview,” Prime Oil Chemical Service 
Corporation, accessed 7 January 2017, http://www.poc.com.tw/en/about/about.html.  
77 Ibid., 4235-4236. 
78 Ibid., 4236. 
79 Costco Wholesale Corp. of the United States announced in 2016 that it would build a gas station 
in Taiwan, but it appears that it, too, would only buy oil products from CPC or FPC, rather than 
importing its own. See Shu We, Meng-ju Lin, Shu Min Wang, and Frances Huang, “Costco gas 
station seen unlikely to threaten competition,” The Central News Agency website, accessed 7 January 
2017,  
http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201609230007.aspx.  
80 All twelve overseas oil and gas-producing projects of OPIC listed on the Bureau of Energy 2013 
Annual Report are joint ventures, with OPIC owning between five to 31% of the equity shares of 
them. See page 38 of the report.  
81 Taiwan Petroleum Exploration 2011-2015 - Volume Eight, 189. (Chapter Four – Exploration and 
Production of Overseas Exploration Blocks), CPC Exploration and Production Business Division 
website, accessed 8 January 2017 [台灣石油探勘紀要第八冊，第四章 國外礦區之探勘與開發]. 
82 Of CPC’s twelve oil and gas producing overseas blocks at the beginning 2013, nine of them were 
in the United States. See Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2012 Annual Report, 
38. 
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as it was implemented during the period studied and the ambiguity in the Mining Act on 
whether foreign firms were eligible to apply for onshore E&P pitted domestic private firms 
squarely against the NOC. The large capital requirement for upstream operations meant that 
so far only one domestic private firm, FPC, was competitive in this sector. Even without the 
edge CPC accrued from the sunset clause regarding offshore E&P, the huge technical and 
geopolitical complexities associated with hydrocarbon E&P off the coast of Taiwan were 
likely beyond the capability or interest of any domestic private firms.83    
In the mid- and downstream sectors, as mentioned earlier, there were no 
restrictions for foreign participation since 2001. As of 2013, however, there had been scant 
interest in either sector. One reason the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei put 
forward was the energy usage review for energy-guzzling facilitates, including oil refiners, 
required by the Energy Administration Act. 84 There were a relatively large number of 
domestic private firms in these sectors, but unsurprisingly not as refiners. As of the end of 
2013, 204 companies obtained gas and diesel wholesaler licenses in Taiwan.85 None of the 
227 companies on the current Bureau of Energy list appears to be foreign companies, and 
this situation likely has remained the same since Esso’s exit of the Taiwanese market.  
In the retail sector, Taiwan had a total of 2,621 gas stations as of the end of 2013.86 
This number, as the number of oil product wholesalers quoted above, however, suggests 
more competition than there was in reality. Most of these gas stations were either CPC or 
FPC franchises. While CPC directly operated 633 of them, 87  FPC reportedly directly 
managed 133, with 525 affiliated entities. The remaining over 1,300 of service stations were 
CPC franchises.88 The duopoly, therefore, continued.  
The dominant domestic private oil firm FPC had become rather strong by 2013. 
In 2012, it ranked as the third largest “refining and marketing” oil firm in the world on the 
IHS Energy 50 list, only dropping to the fifth in 2013.89 With a market capitalisation valued 
                                                          
83 Taiwan’s offshore hydrocarbon E&P regions include areas of overlapping claims with China, 
South Korea, and Japan and have posed major hurdles in their development over the decades. There 
are more discussions of this issue later in the chapter. 
84 Yang, et al, Research and Analysis of Investment Trends – Research on Taiwan’s Strategies of 
Attracting Foreign Direct Investments, 160. The Act was in the drafting stage in 2012 when the 
interview was conducted. The related stipulations, “Energy Development and Usage Evaluation 
Standards,” [能源開發及使用評估準則] were finalised in 2015. The Chinese full texts of these 
stipulations see be seen on the Bureau of Energy, MoEA website, accessed 8 January 2017,  
https://www.moeaboe.gov.tw/ECW/populace/Law/Content.aspx?menu_id=2969.  
85 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2013 Annual Report, 39. 
86 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2012 Annual Report, 39. 
87 Ibid. 
88 “100 gas stations close on low demand over past year,” The China Post, 31 May 2013. Accessed 
6 January 2017, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-
news/2013/05/31/380009/100-gas.htm.  
89 “IHS Energy 50 – The Definitive Annual Ranking of the World’s Largest Listed Energy Firms, 
January 2014.” 
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at US$26.1 billion, the major criterion of the ranking, FPC did not rank within the world’s 
top 50 energy firms. 90  Yet, it was bigger than a number of major Asian refining and 
marketing oil firms, including NOCs, such as SK Innovation of South Korea (ranked 
seventh), India Oil (ranked eighth), S-Oil of South Korea (ranked 10th), Tonengen Sekiyu 
of Japan (ranked 13th), and Bharat Petroleum of India (ranked 15th).91 FPC was definitely a 
regionally significant petroleum player considering that Reliance of India was the only 
private Asian oil firm that made it on the overall top 50 list in 2013 if the subsidiaries of the 
Chinese “three barrels” are not counted.92  
It is, however, not easy to accurately judge the relative “strength” of FPC versus 
that of CPC. CPC was not on the IHS list of top energy firms because it was not listed in 
any stock exchanges and therefore difficult to independently verify its size and financial 
situations.93 The English version of CPC 2014 and 2013 annual reports do contain sections 
for financial statements which the company claimed to be compiling according to 
international accounting standards. 94  While CPC’s “Total Liabilities and Equity” were 
about 80 percent higher than those of FPC in 2013 and 2012, its profit was less than one 
eighth that of FPC in 2013 and its loss was almost 14 times bigger than FPC’s meagre profit 
in 2012 (all before tax).95 In any event, the fact that the plausibility probe of this study finds 
that CPC controlled a little less than half of the crude oil supply to the economy in 2013 
seems to suggest the two companies were more or less in parity around that time in isolation 
of other not as straightforward yardsticks. 
What is certain is that state capital in the form of the vertically integrated NOC 
CPC was more tenacious and stronger in the petroleum sectors than in many other sectors 
                                                          
90 The 50th on that list, TNK BP, had a market capitalisation of US$29.8 billion. Ibid.  
91 Ibid. 
92 These subsidiaries are categorised as “integrated NOC” on the list. Ibid. 
93 The other energy firms on the list that were classified as some form of “NOC” were traded in at 
least one stock exchange, such as Russia’s Rosneft (in Moscow and London stock exchanges and 
ranked 14th), Colombia’s Ecopetrol (in Bogota, New York, and Frankfurt stock exchanges and ranked 
15th), and Norway’s Statoil (in Oslo and New York exchanges and ranked 16th) in addition to the 
subsidiaries of the “three barrels.” 
94 CPC Corporation Annual Report 2014, 39. In the 2013 annual report, the company only said the 
accounting was maintained “generally in accordance with the accounting laws and regulations 
governing state-owned enterprises [of the ROC].” CPC Corporation Annual Report 2013, 43. 
Interestingly, while this English annual report said if there were any discrepancies of the financial 
statements between the English and the Chinese versions, the latter “shall prevail.” No financial 
statements whatsoever, however, are found in the Chinese annual reports at least between 2009 and 
2013.  
95 CPC’s huge loss and FPC’s very small profit in 2012 apparently was due to the artificially low oil 
product price that year created by the government price stabilization effort that year. The calculation 
was done with figures in their annual reports in NT dollars. See CPC Corporation Annual Report 
2014, 36 and 56; Formosa Petrochemical Corporation and Subsidiaries Consolidated Financial 
Statements For the period from January 1. 2013 to December 31, 2013 and For the Period from 
January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012 Report of Independent Auditors, 4-5. 
173 
 
in the Taiwanese economy by 2013. Table 5.4 below provides important measures of state-
owned enterprises’ (SOEs) contribution to Taiwan’s economy over the decades:96 
Year 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2005 
% share of GDP 5.0 8.2 9.4 12.1 10.3 9.4 7.6 
% share of domestic capital 
formation 
24.2 16.2 20.4 30.1 21.5 12.1 10.2 
Table 5.4 SOE Contribution to Taiwan’s Economy 1951-2005 
The impact of state generated capital to the overall economy has been waning, but 
probably not to the extent the table above seems to suggest.97 After all, private capital in 
general was supposed to receive great institutional support in the last decade as confirmed 
by the high economic freedom and competitiveness scores Taiwan received in the years 
leading to 2013. SOE  
Returning to the four-scenario framework to analyse the actor-specific source of 
Taiwan’s international-domestic-state capital strength, around 2013 domestic private capital 
is stronger than international capital in the domestic market, especially in the petroleum 
sector, but still weaker than integrated IOCs in absolute terms. In any event, the lack of 
indigenous hydrocarbon resources and the intermittent state intervention in oil product 
pricing during the period studied, as well as a complex web of near-term and deep-rooted 
economic, political, and historical factors have mostly taken international capital out of 
picture, except as joint venture partners of state capital in offshore and overseas E&P.  
Domestic private capital, in the form of the large oil refining and marketing firm 
FPC, is financially stronger or at parity with state capital. This would put Taiwan somewhere 
between scenario two of state “capture” and scenario three wherein state orientation counts 
the most. Both of these situations seemed to have played out at different times in different 
aspects of Taiwan’s petroleum sectors in the two decades or so preceding 2013. Overall, 
private capital was strong in the oil refining and downstream sectors, but much less so in 
                                                          
96 This table was simplified from the more detailed Table 1 on page 326 of Pao et al, “The road to 
liberalization: Policy design and implementation of Taiwan's privatization.” 
97 One problem is the shifting definition of what is considered an SOE. By the count of the National 
Development Council, there are still seven wholly-owned SOEs or literally publicly-run enterprises 
[公營事業]. A performance report of SOEs or literally state-run enterprises 國營事業 produced by 
the Executive Yuan [Branch] in 2015, however, examined 17 SOEs, including all seven on the 
National Development Council website, as well as ones not on there, such as the Export-Import Bank 
of ROC and the Taoyuan Airport Corporation. In addition, there is a maze of hundreds of state 
partially but directly owned [直接投資] and “joint venture” [轉投資事業] companies which 
definitions are even murkier. For the Executive Yuan SOE performance report of 2015 [國營事業
104年度工作考成總報告], accessed 10 January 2017, 
 http://www.ndc.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=E075FB75221AFC3A.  
A U.S. International Trade Administration website counted 19 SOEs that were totally controlled by 
the “Taiwan authorities” as of 2015. See “Taiwan Country Commercial Guide,” Export.gov, accessed 
10 January 2017, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Taiwan-competition-from-state-owned-
enterprises.  
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the upstream sector. Given the generally strong institutional and legal support private capital 
have had in the decade before 2013, it is not unreasonable to label domestic private capital 
as having a high strength versus state capital, especially in the petroleum sector. This 
explanatory variable, therefore, remains consistent with the stipulation of H3 upon closer 
scrutiny. 
 
5. Taiwan’s Trust in Oil Markets 
This section explores in more depth Taiwanese decision-makers’ overall level of 
trust in the oil markets’ capability to ensure oil supply security to Taiwan’s economy. This 
level was found to be high in the preliminary study, which is one of the conditions 
incongruent with the level stipulated by H3. This causal pathway to the adoption of a high 
level of strategic oil supply measures, as originally formulated, calls for a medium level of 
trust.  
Initially, the same components of securitising agent and domestic and external 
securitising contexts are examined with content analyses using almost exactly the same 
terms as in the comparative studies in Chapter Four. 98  The sub-sections below, each 
corresponding to one component proposed to make up states’ overall trust level in relying 
on the oil markets for their economies’ oil supply, show that Taiwan’s overall trust level 
only comes to a medium, not high. 
 
5.1 Taiwan’s Securitising Agents 
The “traditional” and vertically integrated NOC of CPC earned a low trust score 
for Taiwan in the preliminary study as it is hypothesised to act as a powerful securitising or 
lobbying agent against solely relying on the market for oil supply. The 2010 to 2014 Chinese 
annual reports of CPC, which provide information of the company from 2009 to 2013, are 
analysed to understand the extent of its securitising. 
CPC engaged in moderate securitising during the five years studied by this 
measure alone. It has an overall five-year average score of 22.8, higher than Chinese NOCs’ 
two-year average Chinese annual reports of 14, but considerably lower than India’s five-
year average of 37.2 and Thailand’s 34.8.99 This is unsurprising considering that CPC had 
both operational as well as sector administration functions. While the company acted as a 
vehicle of implementing the state’s oil supply policies, its executives would have direct 
inputs into the formulation of the policies, even if they were not the final decision-makers.100 
                                                          
98 The Chinese terms used are adjusted slightly to reflect the common language usage in Taiwan 
(versus that in Mainland China), but the substantive meanings of them are the same. 
99 See Table 16, Appendix D for the breakdown of scores of all four economies. 
100 The decision-makers would be officials at the Bureau of Energy at the MoEA, higher officials at 
the Executive Yuan, and ultimately, elected members of the Legislative Yuan.  
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This would reduce the need to engage in securitising via annual reports, at least towards 
decision-makers if not the public.  
In addition, the privatisation of CPC and oil sector liberalisation had been declared 
the ultimate goals by the state at least since 2001. The company is supposed to function as 
efficiently as possible in preparation for the public offering of its shares. 101  As sector 
administrator, the company at least had to pay lip service to these goals. This may explain 
the only pertinent usages of the term “strategic” in the CPC annual reports analysed were 
describing CPC’s continuous overseas E&P effort as part of its “strategic arrangements.”102  
Instead, since encouraging “self-developed” hydrocarbon resources by Taiwanese 
firms has been the official policy, (regardless if they are state- or privately owned), CPC’s 
efforts or achievements in this area were emphasised in the annual reports.103 Emphasis on 
having “self-developed” or “self-owned” oil appears to be a manifestation of a lack of trust 
in the functioning of the market. It is because, as discussed in Chapter Two, many 
economists believe it does not really matter which firms or countries develop the resources 
as they would all go in the big supply pool or “bathtub” that is the international oil market.104 
The sector administrator role of CPC, however, makes it difficult to tease out whether the 
application of these terms in its annual reports is a reflection of its attempt at or a result of 
its securitising. In reality, it is likely to be both and the two would continue to “chase” each 
other in a circle until some exogenous factor breaks it up. 
Since the labour union of CPC has been a major stumbling block for CPC’s 
privatisation, it is reasonable to investigate if the union has acted as an agent securitising oil 
supply to strengthen their argument against CPC’s privatisation.105 A random sampling of 
the publication of the union, Oil Workers [石油勞工], between 2002 and 2013 online shows 
numerous articles in each issue on the various pitfalls of privatisation of SOEs.106 Only one 
article was found to specifically put forward the detrimental effects of privatisation on the 
economy’s oil supply security. This piece appearing in the publication’s first issue predicted 
Taiwan’s economic collapse due to volatile oil prices that would change according to 
                                                          
101 The 2001 “Privatization Plan” proposes to look for strategic investors or to publicly offer shares 
of the company to accomplish CPC’s privatization. See “Achievements of Privatization,” National 
Development Council website. 
102 The same reference was made once in each of the five annual reports analysed. 
103 The terms “self-developed” [自主] or “self-owned” [自有] are searched and analysed in addition 
to “self-sufficiency” or “self-reliance” analysed in economies in the comparative studies since these 
terms are used in other Taiwan government documents and that it had almost no indigenous oil 
resources in the period studied. While the latter terms were not used at all in the annual reports, the 
first two terms score the highest among all the terms analysed.  
104 Nordhaus, “The Economics of an Integrated World Oil Market,” 2. 
105 Although it is the labour union of CPC, it has a deceivingly inclusive name of “Taiwan Petroleum 
Union” [臺灣石油工會].  
106 All issues between March 2002 to December 2016 are available online. Accessed 20 January 2017, 
http://tpwu.org.tw/oil-workers.html.  
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fluctuations in the international oil markets.107 If foreign corporation(s) control CPC after 
the public offering of its shares, FPC could hardly match these corporations’ prowess and 
would soon be squeezed out of the market. This in turn would lead to mass unemployment 
and the domestic oil market will be controlled by outsiders, possibly even foreign 
governments that back the foreign corporations.108   
These scare tactics of the union may be too crude to securitise decision-makers, 
but their impact on the workaday voters in Taiwan is more difficult to gauge. Under 
Taiwan’s democratised political system in the last decade, decision-makers have to take 
voter opinions seriously. The repeated reference to foreign corporations and their possible 
government backers may also hit a nerve of the diplomatically isolated and strategically 
vulnerable Taiwanese people.  
The results of the content analysis presented in this sub-section show that both 
CPC and its labour union did act as securitising agents of Taiwan’s oil supply, if not as 
coherently or powerfully as they could have been. The sector administrator role of CPC 
would have provided it more direct channels of securitisation, while its executives may also 
be walking a tight rope in balancing its securitisation effort with its attractiveness to 
investors when its overdue privatisation finally happens. These two most obvious oil supply 
securitising agents of Taiwan did not lead to a low trust in the oil markets, judging by their 
public effort investigated here. Taiwan, therefore, earns more a middle rather than a low 
score for this component making up its overall trust level.  
 
5.2 Taiwan’s Domestic Context of Trust  
According to the vulnerability-interaction model, Taiwan should have a high level 
of trust in private enterprises supplying oil in the domestic market without any artificial 
price intervention. Taiwan’s per capita GPD in 2013 suggests that its population as a whole 
was sufficiently well-off that fluctuations in oil product prices in a free market should not 
be detrimental to its basic livelihood.109 Taiwan’s populace was also relatively urbanised, 
although not as highly as Singapore, Japan, South Korea or some other economies in the 
                                                          
107 Lin Ching-lang, “Our Country’s Energy Policy,” Oil Workers Vol. 344 (March 2002) [林清朗, 
我國的能源政策 , 石油勞工 ]. Accessed 22 January 2017, http://tpwu.org.tw/oil-workers/193-
article-344/8430-------------------------------------------------------29.html.  
108 Ibid. 
109 It had the second highest per-capita GDP among the nine case-study economies in 2013, after 
Singapore. See Table 3.8 in Chapter Three. It ranked the 30th worldwide and the fourth among Asia-
Pacific economies according to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The three in the region 
ahead of Taiwan are all city-size economies: Macau, Singapore, and Hong Kong. See “Country 
Comparison : GDP Per Capita (PPP),” CIA website, accessed 22 January 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.  
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Asia-Pacific. 110  The reasoning of the vulnerability-interaction model is that the more 
geographically concentrated the population is, the fewer people would be left underserved 
by private oil companies not wanting to extend their supply routes too far due to profit 
consideration.  
As in the comparative studies developed in the Chapter Three, the GINI index 
reading of Taiwan is examined to give a more detailed picture of the evenness of its 
economic development. Taiwan’s GINI Index score was 33.6 in 2014, 111 which is lower 
than China, India, or Thailand’s scores. 112 This means Taiwan’s domestic income was more 
equally distributed than these economies. Against such a domestic context, it is argued that 
it would be more difficult for CPC or other securitising agents to convincingly lobby for 
CPC’s importance in ensuring the basic oil needs of poor and rural residents.  
In reality, while formally “liberalising” the domestic oil market, the Taiwanese 
government also set up a petroleum fund to provide subsidies to cover the difference in 
transportation costs and wages for operators which supply oil products to indigenous 
mountainous areas and outlying islands with the Petroleum Administration Act in 2001113 
Since then, nine amendments to the details of subsidies were promulgated up to 2013.114 
The August 2010 amendment expanded to make residents living in these places eligible for 
subsidies to be supplied with liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders.115 In early 2011, the 
MoEA also added fishing boat operators, farmers, rehabilitation and public transportation 
buses, taxi cabs on the list of eligible subsidy recipients.116  
These subsidies theoretically should take care of the basic oil needs of vulnerable 
and underserved residents without interfering in oil product pricing or even having an NOC. 
All operators may apply for the subsidies as long as they engage in oil supply to the relevant 
                                                          
110 See Table 3.8 in Chapter Three. According to the World Bank data, Taiwan’s 70 urbanization rate 
in 2013 was also lower than Malaysia’s 73 and Brunei’s 76 in the region even if Australia and New 
Zealand or other city-size economies are not counted. 
111 “Country Comparison: Distribution of Family Income – GINI Index,” CIA website, accessed 22 
January 2017, 
  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html.  
112 The scores of China, India, Thailand on the same list are 46.9, 33.6 (same as Taiwan), and 48.4 
respectively. Note that India’s reading from the World Bank is slightly higher than Taiwan. See 
footnote 77 in Chapter Three. 
113 For details of who and what these subsidies cover and how to apply for them, see the latest version 
(promulgated on 29 April 2014) of “Petroleum Fund Reward and Subsidies,” Bureau of Energy, 
MoEA website [經濟部能源局 石油基金補助山地鄉及離島地區石油設施與運輸費用及差價補
貼申請作業要點]. Accessed 22 January 2017, 
 http://web3.moeaboe.gov.tw/ECW/populace/Law/Content.aspx?menu_id=631.   
114 Ibid. 
115 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2011 Annual Report, 35. 
116 “Oil price subsidy in store for underprivileged consumers,” The China Post, 20 April 2011. 
Accessed 15 January 2017, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-
news/2011/04/20/299311/Oil-price.htm.  
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areas or sectors.117 As of the end of 2011, 26,469 households applied for the LPG cylinder 
subsidies, but no operator applied for subsidies to set up new oil supply facilities (such as 
gas station) in indigenous mountainous areas.118 Only one operator applied for subsidy to 
expand facilities in these areas, and the highest number of applications was to cover wage 
difference, but even that only involved 12 gas stations.119 
The less than enthusiastic response to this market-conforming measure may mean 
that the subsidies do not actually cover the additional costs of supplying oil to these areas 
or sectors.120 In reality, there have been only two suppliers at the wholesale level, which is 
not conducive to competitive pricing. In the meantime, the government still felt the need 
from time to time to adopt the market-displacing measure of “stabilising” oil product prices 
across the board by having the CPC selling gasoline and diesel below costs. This appears to 
indicate a very risk-averse attitude in the part of the Taiwanese government. Has the CPC 
been specifically securitising its role in the domestic oil market to contribute to this risk 
aversion?  
The CPC did mention in each of its five annual reports analysed that it was “intent 
on making people’s life more convenient and prosperous,” and it “satisfies the oil product 
needs of civilians and the military in remote areas without regard to the losses incurred.”121 
Other than that, however, it did not seem to go too far beyond the “usual” corporate social 
responsibility speech of “helping underprivileged groups and participating in community 
benefit activities,”122 or “while pursuing profits, still attending to other issues such as social 
justice, underprivileged groups, safety and health, community development, and 
environmental protection.”123 Even this “cosmetic” lobbying, of course, is considerably 
more than what Chinese NOCs said in their annual reports of the same period.124 
If CPC did not trump up the role it played in oil domestic distribution too robustly, 
there must be other factors that contributed to the Taiwanese government’s disproportional 
aversion to oil price fluctuations and affordability. This is especially true considering the 
relatively high objective economic and developmental level Taiwan has achieved in the last 
two decades. The CPC labour union did trumpet the role played by CPC boisterously, but 
                                                          
117 The Bureau of Energy of “Petroleum Fund Reward and Subsidies” website above listed 42 rural 
counties or townships and six outlying islands.  
118 Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs [ROC] 2012 Annual Report, 42. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Different formulae of how to calculate different types of subsidies are listed in the Bureau of 
Energy website cited earlier. 
121 CPC Corporation 2014 Annual Report, 5. 
122 CPC Corporation 2013 Annual Report, 7. 
123 CPC Corporation 2012 Annual Report, 5. 
124 FPC’s 2014 Chinese annual report contains a similar level of this type of CSR speech, such as 
helping underprivileged groups, but FPC did not mention oil supply to remote areas or things like 
social justice. 
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not too frequently. Two established think tanks in Taiwan appear to consistently “defend” 
the role played by the CPC, if not direct state intervention in oil pricing. One of the proposals 
the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research (TIER) put forward to improve the floating oil 
price formulation in 2013, upon the request of the MoEA, emphasised CPC’s social 
responsibility for stabilising domestic fuel prices.125  
In a report titled “Key Report on Floating Oil Price Mechanism,” the CTCI 
Foundation detailed the evolution of Taiwan’s oil pricing system and the controversies of 
its implementation in the last two decades.126 The report was a thinly-veiled endorsement of 
how CPC handled the whole situation under difficult circumstances. It suffered losses in 
executing the government’s oil stabilisation program when the international oil price was 
high and was being unfairly accused of not lowering oil prices enough when international 
oil price was coming down.127  
The TIER and the CTCI both have deep and entangling connections with the KMT 
and hence the CPC. The TIER was founded by the prominent Taiwanese entrepreneur-
diplomat Koo Chen-fu [辜振甫] in 1976 as Taiwan’s “first private independent think 
tank.”128 CTCI was originally set up in 1959 as China Technical Consultants, Inc.129 In 1979, 
CTIC was split into a for-profit engineering service company, which has provided many 
services to CPC, and a non-profit foundation in the areas of energy and environmental 
                                                          
125 The Chinese name of this think tank is 台灣經濟研究院 or more commonly simply known as 台
經院. In English reporting, its English name sometimes is confused with another established, but 
very different think tank, the Taiwan Research Institute, which Chinese name is 臺灣綜合研究院 or 
simply 臺綜院. The following is an example of such mistaken reporting. The English and the Chinese 
names given in the piece do not match. According to numerous Chinese media reports on the same 
event, it was in fact the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research, NOT the Taiwan Research Institute 
that made a proposal that emphasised CPC’s social responsibility in stabilising oil price. See 
“Institute proposes amendment to CPC floating oil price model,” The China Post, 29 March 2013. 
Accessed 20 January 2017, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan-
business/2013/03/29/374515/Institute-proposes.htm.  
126[浮動油價機制的關鍵報告 2016-1]. In fact, although no individual author is listed on the report’s 
cover, the inside cover page said the report was mainly written by retired CPC General Manager Lin 
Mao-wen. The names of three editors were also listed.  
127 Ibid. 
128 “Background,” TIER website. Accessed 22 January 2017,  
http://english.tier.org.tw/eng_about/background.asp. For the deep and tangled relationship between 
Chen-fu Koo, and indeed the whole Koo family and the KMT, see Tsai-man C. Ho, “The case of the 
Koo family in Taiwan,” in Rethinking Social Capital and Entrepreneurship in Greater China – Is 
guanxi still important? Ed.  Jenn-Hwan Wang and Ray-May Hsung (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2016), 
75-94. 
129 “About Us,” CTCI Foundation website. Accessed 24 January 2017,  
http://www.ctci.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=2434&CtNode=526.  
CTCI is allegedly one of the KMT-sponsored companies and has been funded by both the MoEA and 
later profit from CTCI Corporation. See Ouyang Yi, “CTCI Corporation’s biggest Shareholder, CTCI 
Foundation Has Deep Connection With Siew,” Liberty Times, 7 June 2009. Accessed 24 January 
2017 [歐祥義, 中鼎最大股東 中技社與蕭淵源深], 
 http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/309342.  
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policy.130 Yet, these two “pro-CPC” think tanks did not defend state intervention in oil 
prices without reservation. The second proposal TIER submitted to the MoEA called for 
increasing the range of oil price changes by CPC from 80 percent to 100 percent of actual 
fluctuations in international oil prices.131 In its concluding remarks, the CTCI report says 
Taiwan should learn from economies such as United States, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and the Philippines wherein oil product prices are freely determined by various 
oil companies.132  
At the end of the day, it appears to be populist pressure in a newly democratised 
political entity that was the major cause of bouts of direct state intervention in oil product 
pricing in Taiwan up to 2013. CPC began adopting the floating oil mechanism in January 
2007, three months after the MoEA announcement of the pilot scheme. Due to rising prices 
in the international markets, the Executive Yuan (Council), under the leadership of the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) at the time, decreed to lower maximum price increase 
from 15 percent to 12 percent in November of that year.133 This was a critical time in the 
democratic development of Taiwan as the Legislative Yuan election was coming up in 
January 2008 and the fourth openly contested presidential election in the history of Taiwan 
would take place in March. The incumbent DPP president was not doing well and 
suppressing domestic oil price hike would be an easy “electorate pleaser.”134  
With mounting losses due to continuously rising international prices, CPC 
requested to increase the domestic oil prices on 1 January 2008, but the Executive Yuan 
deferred the decision- making to after the elections. Even after the DPP lost both elections 
by the end of March, the Executive Yuan refused to “make such a major decision as it had 
become a caretaker cabinet.” The oil price freeze was finally lifted by the new Premier of 
the Executive Yuan on 27 May after KMT assumed the presidency.135 
Between May 2008 and December 2010, gasoline and diesel prices were mostly 
free-floating, with very brief interference such as a couple of weeks of smaller diesel price 
                                                          
130 “Key Report on Floating Oil Price Mechanism,” inside cover. For some of the major service 
contracts CTCI got from CPC, see “CTIC Corporation Successfully Obtains EPC Turnkey Project of 
CPC Linyuan Petrochemical Plant’s No.6 Naphtha Cracker Plant,” CTCI website, August 2009. 
Accessed 24 January 2017 [中鼎成功取得中油林園石化廠第六輕油裂解工場 EPC統包工程], 
 http://www.ctci.com.tw/WWW/CTCI/news%20database/news-2009-08-2.htm.  
131 See “Institute proposes amendment to CPC floating oil price model，” The China Post. Also see 
Kuo Yi-kun and Hsieh Chin-hui, “Floating Oil Price Formula Revisions Will be Submitted to MoEA 
in May,” Independent Evening Post, 4 April 2013. Accessed 24 January 2017 [郭宜均/謝錦慧, 浮
動油價公式修正 5月報經部, 自立晚報], 
 http://www.idn.com.tw/news/news_content.php?artid=20130404abcd012.  
132 “Key Report on Floating Oil Price Mechanism,” 129. 
133 “Key Report on Floating Oil Price Mechanism,” 15.  
134 For a concise timeline of the 2008 election and its significance, see Kerry Dumbaugh, “Taiwan’s 
2008 Presidential Election,” CRS Report for Congress RS22853, April 2, 2008.  
135 “Key Report on Floating Oil Price Mechanism,” 15; Dumbaugh, “Taiwan’s 2008 Presidential 
Election,” 1. 
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hike in the aftermath of typhoon attacks or price freeze during lunar new-year holidays.136 
Then before campaigning began for the first concurrent legislative and presidential elections 
in January 2012, the CPC adopted the policy of only raising domestic oil prices half that of 
international price hike to “coordinate with the oil and gas price freeze resolution” in the 
Legislative Yuan, controlled by KMT at the time.137 Ostensibly by November 2010, CPC 
had accumulated a surplus that was over the “statutory limit.”138 Almost like clockwork, 
however, the government allowed gasoline and diesel prices to resume hiking more in 
tandem with international prices in April 2012, soon after the KMT-majority legislature and 
the KMT president were reelected.139    
The formula used to calculate the prices in the “floating” oil pricing mechanism 
generated many negative commentaries and public sentiments and so was repeatedly 
adjusted.140 That led the MoEA to ask two different think tanks, TIER and Taiwan Research 
Institute as mentioned earlier, to study and make recommendations to the whole oil price 
pricing mechanism in early 2013. At a symposium related to these studies held in April 2013, 
a number of independent scholars voiced the opinion that unless the CPC is totally privatised 
and more competition entered the domestic market, whatever pricing formula the MoEA 
derived would be criticised and not be accepted by all the people.141  
More surprisingly due to the politicised status of CPC and oil pricing policies, and 
hence probably more convincingly, a legislator from the opposition DPP made the following 
diagnosis at the symposium. “Taiwan [people] has a very low tolerance in high oil 
prices…in the previous few years, CPC and Taipower [state-owned power company] were 
profitable and their prices did not float either, but the people did not complain at the time 
because they had comfortable lives at the time.”142  
                                                          
136 “Key Report on Floating Oil Price Mechanism,” 16. 
137 Ibid. Also see Jacques deLisle, “Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential and Legislative Elections: Winners, 
Losers, and Implications,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, January 2012. Accessed 24 
January 2017, http://www.fpri.org/docs/media/201201.delisle.taiwan.pdf.  
138 “Key Report on Floating Oil Price Mechanism,” 16. No mentioning of any “statutory limit” on 
CPC’s surplus is found in the Petroleum Administrative Act, but it is possible that it is stipulated in 
other administrative documents governing CPC operation. 
139 Ibid. Also see deLisle and CPC Corporation 2012 Annual Report, 4. As detailed in footnote 18, 
the actual policy is rather complicated, which is called “rationalisation,” which tried to let CPC 
recuperate losses incurred in the previous few months. It was met with such strong public 
condemnation that it was suspended very soon and was only resumed in October 2013. 
140 A major point of contention was that CPC was allowed to reduce oil prices by 50% of international 
price fall to recuperate the losses it incurred previously. See footnote 18 for more details for both the 
price “stabilisation” and the subsequent “rationalisation” policies.  
141 Kuo Yi-kun and Hsieh Chin-hui, “Floating Oil Mechanism Experiences Six Adjustments,” 
Independent Evening Post, 4 April 2013. Accessed 24 January 2017, [郭宜均/謝錦慧, 機制經歷六
次調整, 自立晚報], http://www.idn.com.tw/news/news_content.php?artid=20130404abcd012. 
142 Ibid. The legislator is Huang Wei-che [黃偉哲]. See his biography at the Legislature website, 
accessed 24 January 2017, 
http://www.ly.gov.tw/03_leg/0301_main/legIntro.action?lgno=00076&stage=9.  
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This low tolerance to high oil prices was made more problematic “against the 
backdrop of bitter partisan battles, ideological polarisation and shaky governance” while 
Taiwan was still undergoing the transition to a mature democracy.143 Its electorate was 
“highly engaged, with a ‘vibrant election culture’ manifest in high levels of citizen interest, 
knowledge and participation” compared to those in consolidated democracies.144 Taiwan’s 
equally vibrant media also helped fan the flames of populist demands on low oil prices. Two 
decades after the lifting of martial law in 1987,145 the Taiwanese media was described as 
transforming from a “lapdog to mad dog.”146 
At the same time, while still more equal than some other Asian economies as 
shown earlier, “economic inequalities increased markedly” in the period between 2008 and 
2011 when the KMT government allowed oil prices to run free. 147  During the 2012 
presidential campaign, the DPP exploited quality of life issues such as income disparity and 
unemployment. There is little wonder that the incumbent KMT government (both the 
legislative and the executive branches) adopted the defensive tactic of temporarily freezing 
oil prices during the campaign season.  
Some may understand the Taiwanese government’s interference in oil pricing in 
the years leading to 2013 as a rational political move which had nothing to do with trust in 
the domestic oil market’s capability to reliably supply affordable oil to the economy. Yet, 
the concern that high oil prices would have a sufficiently negative impact on the lives of the 
electorate to sway election results is a manifestation of decision-makers’ risk preference 
being lowered probably from “risk neutral” to “risk averse.” As discussed in Chapter Two, 
this study adopts a behavioural definition of trust which involves both the belief of the 
trustworthiness of the object of trust and the willingness to accept the risks of performing 
the trusting act. Taiwan decision-makers apparently did not trust the free market enough (or 
was risk averse) to perform the trusting act of letting domestic oil product prices float in a 
                                                          
This low tolerance might be “nurtured” by the fact that Taiwan had had the lowest oil product 
prices among a number of neighbouring economies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong. 
See “Key Report on Floating Oil Price Mechanism,”19 and 29. 
143 Jonathan Sullivan, “Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential Election,” Political Studies Review Vol. 11 
(2013), 66. Although the wave of populism that has swept through the so-called “consolidated 
democracies” in Europe and the United States since 2013 shows that the distinction is debatable. 
144 Ibid. 
145 The martial law was in imposed by Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 and it banned political parties other 
than the KMT, imposed heavy censorship, and empowered military courts to convict civilians of 
“sedition and other crimes.” See “Taiwan Ends 4 Decades of Martial Law,” The New York Times, 
15 July 1987. Accessed 1 March 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/15/world/taiwan-ends-4-
decades-of-martial-law.html.  
146 Mark Magnier, “They Can’t Handle the Truth,” Los Angeles Times, 28 February 2005. Accessed 
1 February 2017, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/28/world/fg-hounds28.  
147 Ibid., 69. 
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totally unfettered at all times in the years leading to 2013, regardless of the degree of the 
decision being rational calculation. 
The declared objectives of privatising CPC and liberalising oil pricing by decision-
makers of both major political parties suggest that most of them believed that a domestic oil 
market with minimal state intervention was ultimately correct policy direction. The same 
decision-makers, however, seemed to be unwilling to accept the risks of trusting the 
domestic market to supply affordable enough oil to the people in the high oil price years 
leading to 2013, especially during the critical election season. The existing duopolistic 
domestic oil market and the low tolerance of high oil prices by the people in Taiwan, 
therefore, more than Taiwan’s highly developed economy, served as the pertinent domestic 
context. This situation lowered the state’s willingness to accept the risk of fluctuating 
availability and prices that would come with the open market system. Indeed, the concern 
of stable supply of oil products and natural gas in the domestic market after CPC 
privatisation was raised in the National Development Council report on the SOE 
privatisation, which appears to be bipartisan.148 The most pertinent domestic context to 
Taiwan’s decision-makers, therefore, at best led to a medium trust in a totally free domestic 
oil market circa 2013.  
 
5.3 Taiwan’s External Securitising Context 
In this category, Taiwan receives a high score for its relationship with the United 
States in the preliminary study. The vulnerability-interaction model hypothesises that such 
an external context can hardly be exploited to securitise the untrustworthiness of the 
international oil markets. The United States had the capability to underwrite the stability of 
the system upon these markets have rested, especially the freedom of navigation in 
international waters along major maritime oil shipping routes to the Asia- Pacific. Up to 
2013, it also appeared to have the willingness to take actions when the need arose, such as 
when Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz in 2012.149  Being an ally of the United 
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States, a polity would expect that the powerful American capability is unlikely be used 
against its own core interests while it enjoys the public goods of unimpeded shipping and 
transactions associated with oil and other types of international trade.  
The high trichotomous score is generally given to a formal and, in the case of 
Taiwan, de facto U.S. ally in the preliminary study. This section investigates the extent 
Taiwan’s relationship with the United States in the decade leading to 2013 would make 
securitising solely relying on private firms and the international oil markets for Taiwan’s oil 
supply largely irrelevant. It also examines if there were other pertinent external factors that 
could easily be exploited by interested parties to securitise the role the Taiwanese 
government could or should play in the oil supply to the economy.  
Taiwan has not been a formal ally of the United States since 1979 and the U.S. 
commitment of protection against coercion and arms sales to the island has been conditioned 
and ambiguous.150 The commitment has been contingent on “no unilateral statements or 
actions” that change the status quo of Taiwan by either Taiwan or China.151 This ambiguity 
not only stems from what constitutes “status quo” as defined by the United States,152  but 
also what actions exactly it would perform. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph 
Nye reportedly responded to Chinese queries on hypothetical attack on the island during the 
1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis by observing that, “we don’t know what we would do, 
because it’s going to depend on the circumstances, and you don’t know what we would 
do.”153  
One would expect this strategic ambiguity pursued by the United States and the 
increasing economic and military capabilities of China over the last two few decades to 
heighten Taiwan’s threat perceptions. If that was the case, it would be an external context 
that facilitates interested parties’ efforts to securitise oil supply to Taiwan since oil has 
traditionally been portrayed as a strategic resource, critically needed during wartime. 
Besides, most of the oil supply to Taiwan had to be shipped past the coast of Southern China 
before reaching Taiwan. In the event of a Chinese blockade of the Taiwan Strait, oil supply 
to the island would be interrupted, if not completely severed.  
                                                          
150 After the termination of the 1954 mutual defense treaty in 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act and the 
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In reality, Taiwan’s threat perceptions, while somewhat fluctuating, generally 
trended downward in the last two decades.154 According to polls by various organizations 
over recent years, most Taiwanese were mindful of the military might of China and lacked 
confidence in their own defence capability at the same time.155  Yet, the majority of those 
polled did not think China would launch attacks against the island in the near future, 
especially if Taiwan does not declare independence from China.156 The softening of China’s 
posture towards Taiwan after the U.S. and Taiwanese politico-strategic blowback resulting 
from its belligerence during the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and an improved 
understanding on the part of Taiwanese leaders of “China’s red-lines” relative to limiting 
Taiwan’s prerogative to declare its independence may partially explain this apparent 
paradox.157  
The real reason of the lowering threat perceptions, however, seems to lie in the 
Taiwanese public’s increasing confidence that the United States would come to Taiwan’s 
rescue against unprovoked Chinese attacks, or even if Taiwan were to declare its 
independence.158 Forty-seven point five percent of survey respondents in 2003 and 56.4% 
in 2011 said “yes” to this hypothetical question on a Taiwanese declaration of independence. 
This confidence shot up to 73.5 percent in 2011 “if the attack is unprovoked,” meaning 
Taiwan maintaining the status quo. 159  Regardless whether or not this confidence was 
misplaced, it appears that the United States sending two aircraft carrier groups to the Taiwan 
Strait during the 1995-96 crisis was the turning point in Taiwanese public perceptions.160 
Independent observers have not reached a consensus over whether Taiwan’s 
political elites and decision-makers shared this lowered threat perception with the general 
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public.161 In any event, Taiwanese public opinion is “malleable and constantly shifting.”162 
Taiwanese leaders, moreover, understood that as long as China did not renounce the use of 
force as an option to eventually “reunite” with Taiwan, the threat to Taiwan’s long-term 
security remained. Arthur S. Ding and Paul A. Huang describe this situation as “a major 
contrast between long-term threat and short-term stability in cross-Strait relations.”163  
This long-term strategic threat always loomed at least in the background. The 
thawing of U.S.-China relationship in the early 1970s, eventually leading to the “status quo” 
of Taiwan seriously restricted Taiwan’s international manoeuvring space. China continued 
(and still continues beyond 2013) to block or manipulate Taiwan’s participation in 
international meetings or organizations, apparently in accordance with the level of 
“obeisance” by Taiwanese leaders. The saga of China blocking Taiwan’s participation in 
the World Health Organization (WHO) activities during the pro-independence DPP 
presidency years (2000 – 2008) and “letting” Taiwan attending the annual World Health 
Assembly of the WHO in 2009, after the KMT president was elected was a recent prominent 
example of Beijing’s carrot-or-stick strategy directed towards Taipei.164 
The only international energy organization Taiwan was able to participate in was 
the APEC Energy Working Group, comprising of 21 Asian Pacific economies, including 
China and the United States, as long as it was being referred to as “Chinese Taipei” and an 
“economy” rather than a country.165 China used such nomenclatures to rein in Taiwan’s 
independence aspirations, as well as to pressure other states not to have any dealings with a 
Taiwanese “state” on a pro forma basis even in domains not traditionally associated with 
high politics, such as health care and energy cooperation. The United States, eager to 
maintain its posture of strategic ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait, often complied with the 
rules of this Chinese-induced naming game.166 
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 Apart from constricting Taiwan’s manoeuvring space in the international arena, 
China has also become a major player in Taiwan’s economic well-being in the last two 
decades. By 2002, China had replaced the United States as Taiwan’s number one export 
market,167 and absorbed between 21 (excluding Hong Kong) and 40 percent of Taiwan’s 
export in 2012.168 Taiwan’s petrochemical industry, with surplus capacity for the domestic 
market resulting from transformation of the island’s economy from one dominated by labour 
intensive light industries to technology products, exported 55% of its products to China.169  
China also became the top destination of Taiwan’s outbound FDI and production 
base for many of Taiwan’s information technology product exports, including the infamous 
Foxconn factory for Apple products.170 Taiwan restricted Chinese investments on the island 
due to security concerns, which have only been gradually eased since 2009.171 This partly 
explains the over 100 times larger amount of Taiwanese investments in China than the other 
way round during the period studied.172 In short, as much as the Taiwanese government tried 
to “strike a balance between growth and security,” the economy inevitably developed an 
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“asymmetric interdependence” with the Chinese economy, with Taiwan being the more 
vulnerable partner.173 
Admittedly, as Murray Scot Tanner points out, Chinese economic coercion against 
Taiwan would be a “tricky weapon to use.”174 Such a weapon would also hurt China’s 
economy, although proportionally to a smaller degree. More importantly, it would not be 
easy for China to translate “economic influence into political leverage,” especially on the 
“sovereignty issues.” 175 The Taiwanese public’s confidence in U.S. commitment to defend 
the island would make any such translation even harder. In a democratised Taiwan with a 
rambunctious media, decision-makers became very sensitive to public opinions, whatever 
their own judgement on the situation may be. Beijing’s frustration with the effectiveness of 
this “softer” approach, however, would only make cross-Strait relations more volatile.176   
So how does Taiwan’s external context of living with U.S. strategic ambiguity and 
under the shadow or Damocles’ sword of Chinese economic, military and diplomatic might 
relate to securitising Taiwan’s quest for oil supply security? While Taiwan’s relatively 
positive relationship with the United States would make securitising about the instability of 
the international oil markets difficult, Taiwan’s overall precarious geopolitical situation 
seemed to colour every aspect of its policymaking, including oil supply policies.   
First, Taiwan would be compelled to have a sizeable oil stockpile so that it would 
stand a chance to defend itself in a military contingency before help arrived, even with great 
confidence that the Americans would come to its rescue in case of a China’s military attack. 
One think-tank report suggested that Taiwan’s military jet fuel daily consumption to defend 
the island would be four times higher than its civilian consumption.177 Calculating Taiwan’s 
total government and commercial oil stockpile and refining capacities up to 2013, the report 
estimates that Taiwan was able to meet its “combined military and civilian jet fuel needs in 
an air war for five months” if Taiwan could protect its oil facilities from being damaged.178 
This was about three times longer than China could sustain its combined jet fuel needs with 
its oil facilities up to 2013 estimates.179 
Such a scenario can easily be securitised to lobby for the continued existence of 
an NOC since it can be argued that the military can requisition and reconfigure NOC 
                                                          
173 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan – A Tricky Weapon to Use, xiii to xiv. 
Tanner’s monograph Taiwan’s economy also has numerous other major vulnerabilities that China 
may target, such as its stock markets, bonds, and foreign exchange markets, information networks.  
174 Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan – A Tricky Weapon to Use, 135. 
175 Ibid., 142. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Rosemary A. Kelanic, “Oil Security and Conventional War – Lessons From a China-Taiwan Air 
Scenario,” Council on Foreign Relations Energy Report, October 2013, 12. 
178 Admittedly, whether Taiwan could successfully protect its oil stockpiling and refining facilities 
from air attacks by China is a big if. Ibid.  
179 Ibid. 
189 
 
facilities to produce jet fuel and other needed oil products more swiftly and directly. The 
same report also surmises that “the potential strain on both countries’ [China and Taiwan] 
fuel supplies may encourage them to pursue policies that would bolster oil access in a worst-
case conflict scenario.”180 Regardless of the extent Taiwanese decision-makers already had 
“strategic oil reserves with military contingencies in mind” as the report writer asserts, the 
importance of CPC’s overseas hydrocarbon E&P efforts can easily be inflated in view of 
FPC’s much smaller existing upstream business and the diplomatic isolation of Taiwan.181  
Besides, the waters Taiwan tried to explore offshore hydrocarbon have been 
disputed by numerous countries in the region. The complexity of the geopolitics involved 
can easily be securitised as a domain only an NOC is capable of handling. By the time the 
Taiwanese government set up five offshore petroleum E&P regions in 1970,182 the United 
States had already begun its soon-to-be-public diplomatic coup de grace against Taiwan. As 
a result, Taiwan or the ROC lost its seat in the UN in 1971, then the diplomatic recognition 
by the United States in 1979. In 1971, the United States also gave Japan the administrative 
power over the Ryukyu/Liuqiu Islands and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, thus altering the legal 
maritime territorial boundaries among nations.183 Not counting China’s claims, four of the 
five original Taiwanese offshore petroleum E&P regions overlapped with claims by Japan 
or South Korea.184  
CPC partnered up with at least six U.S. companies, such as Amoco, Gulf, and 
Conoco Phillips, to explore hydrocarbon potentials in these locales in the early 1970s.185 By 
the late 1970s, all of them requested to withdraw from the contracts by exercising the force 
majeure clause in their contracts.186 Although the United States officially asserted that it 
took a neutral position regarding sovereign claims in the region, the changing geopolitical 
situation initiated by the U.S. actions likely contributed to the premature withdrawal of U.S. 
oil firms.187  
In 2011, the Taiwanese government issued a license for CPC to explore 
hydrocarbons in the first offshore petroleum E&P region, centering on Taiping Island/Itu 
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Abu,188 a feature of the much disputed Spratly Group.189 Since the Taiwanese claims in the 
East and South China Seas have been similar to those of China, partnering up with the 
Chinese NOC specialising in offshore hydrocarbon E&P, CNOOC, might eliminate one 
obstacle to Taiwan’s quest for “self-developed” oil supply from its surrounding waters.190  
China reportedly invited CPC to participate in the bidding for E&P in the East 
China Sea in 1993, but Taiwan did not respond, supposedly out of security and political 
concerns.191 After some more secret and abortive attempts of cooperation, CNOOC and 
OPIC finally signed an agreement to jointly explore the hydrocarbon potentials in the Tainan 
Basin in 1996.192 In fact, apart from minimising possible liabilities, the whole purpose of 
setting up and using the shell company OPIC instead of the name China Petroleum 
Corporation in CPC’s overseas oil E&P was to sidestep thorny political and diplomatic 
issues discussed earlier.193 CNOOC and OPIC engaged in a few more joint projects over the 
years, as listed in Section 2.4.194 
This sub-section has maintained that Taiwan’s quasi-alliance with the United 
States in isolation would make securitising about the international oil markets difficult. It 
was, however, exactly the external context that led to the pursuit of this relationship outside 
normal diplomatic channels and the ramifications of such a quest that have necessitated the 
Taiwanese government to juggle volatile and high-stake factors to keep the island 
diplomatically, politically, and economically viable. I argue that these factors have caused 
successive Taiwanese governments, even the more pro-independence, pro-liberalisation 
DPP, to be more risk averse in the pace of NOC privatisation and oil supply policies in 
general.  The Tainan Chaoshan Petroleum Operating Company Limited [台南潮汕石油作
業公司], the first 50-50 joint venture between OPIC and CNOOC for the E&P in the Tainan 
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Basin and the Chaoshan Trough, for example, was established in 2003, during the DPP 
presidency.195 Taiwan’s overall external context, therefore, is not conducive to a high level 
of trust in solely relying on the open markets for its oil supply. While Taiwan’s relatively 
positive relationship with the United States did offer it some reassurance, the Taiwanese 
government is risk neutral at best. This would lead to a medium level of trust in relying on 
the international oil markets alone and hence the great emphasis on “self-developed” oil. 
The more in-depth investigation in this section shows that Taiwan scored a 
medium in each of the components making up the overall trust in the oil markets. Its 
traditional and vertically-integrated NOC did not securitise its role too strongly, probably 
because it was also the administrator in a sector decision-makers had set a clear goal of 
liberalisation. Taiwan’s domestic context of a high level of economic development was not 
as salient as demands generated by its populist politics. Its external context of having a 
quasi-alliance with the United States was overshadowed by its precarious geopolitical 
situation represented by its relationship with China. Taiwan’s overall trust level in the 
markets’ capability of ensuring reliable and affordable oil supply, therefore, should more 
accurately be described as “medium.” All these factors at best made the state risk neutral 
about the long-term savings but probably short-term volatility that may accompany total 
reliance on open markets.  
 
6. Taiwan’s Implementation Capability 
 Taiwan only had a medium, not high, overall capability to implement strategic oil 
supply measures according to the preliminary study, which is another condition incongruent 
with the pathway to the adoption of a high level of such measures formulated by H3. This 
section examines in greater details the components making up the overall capability of 
Taiwan in the period studied to re-assess the accuracy of the preliminary result. The section 
also investigates if there is any empirical link between these capabilities and the level of 
strategic oil supply measures adopted. 
Taiwan’s overall medium implementation capability is made up of a high financial 
capability score, a low diplomatic capability score and a medium centralization score. After 
more in-depth investigation of these three components, this overall capability appears to 
straddle between a medium and high level by global standards. The key is the relative 
importance of financial capability and diplomatic capability in the actual implementation of 
strategic oil supply measures. 196  Taiwan has a high financial capability but a medium 
diplomatic capability by global standards. Further, its diplomatic capability was derived 
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mostly from its financial capability and had a tenuous diplomatic basis, due to its awkward 
diplomatic position in the international arena. 
 
6.1 Taiwanese Financial Capability 
The high financial capability of Taiwan in 2013 was made up of its high level of 
foreign reserves and credit worthiness, and medium GDP. It had the third highest foreign 
exchange reserves among the nine case-study economies, after China and Japan.197 Even on 
a global scale, its US$423.9 billion reserves still makes Taiwan among the top five reserve-
holding economies.198 Its 2013 credit worthiness shared the same highest score on with 
China and Japan among the case-study economies.199 In a quick counting with the S&P 
rating only for about 130 economies globally, Taiwan was still among the top 30, so it 
justifiably retains its high trichotomous level.200 As to its GDP, Taiwan ranked the fifth 
among the case-study economies.201 By one account, it ranked 22 out of 230 economies in 
the world around 2016 on a U.S. dollar purchasing power parity basis.202 Even compared by 
per capita GDP, Taiwan still ranked 30th among the same economies.203 Its GDP, therefore, 
would move up to be among those having a high trichotomous level by global standards. 
Overall, Taiwan indeed had a high financial capability to implement strategic oil supply 
measures if it so inclined, even by global standards. 
 In the comparative studies in Chapter Four, NOC profitability is investigated as an 
additional source of capability. Taiwan’s relatively recent and uneven implementation of oil 
price liberalisation is reflected in the widely fluctuating profit or loss of CPC in the years 
preceding 2013. Huge losses were incurred in the years CPC was instructed to “stabilise” 
domestic gas and diesel prices while the international prices were rising. The result was that 
it had a modest five-year (2013-2009) average loss and a large six-year average (2013-2008) 
loss and corresponding negative profit-to-equity ratios. As a comparison, the five-year ratio 
of both India and Thailand’s NOCs of the same period are over 10 percent. Table 5.5 below 
illustrates the situation: 
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http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/apr/30/credit-ratings-country-fitch-moodys-
standard. 
201 After China, Japan, India, and South Korea’s. See Table 3.12 in Chapter Three. 
202 “Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity),” CIA website. Accessed 3 February 
2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html#tw.  
203  “Country Comparison: GDP Per Capita (PPP),” CIA website. Accessed 3 February 2017,   
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html#tw  
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Year net 
profit/loss 
(1,000 
NT$)204 
net 
profit/loss  
(1,000 
US$)205 
Owner's 
equity (1,000 
NT$) 
profit/equit
y ratio (%) 
Oil Pricing 
Adjustments 
2013 
3,292,244 $113,500 227,102,848 1.45 
MoEA initiates think-
tank review of pricing 
formulae 
2012 
-33,728,183 -$1,122,860 222,073,545 -15.19 
Floating pricing 
resumed in April  
2011 
-32,449,832 -$1,112,630 273,593,428 -11.86 
Halving of 
international price hike 
continued 
2010 
16,074,346 $503,109 267,989,508 6.00 
Halving of int’l price 
hike began in 
December  
2009 37,652,597 $1,147,260 253,225,695 14.87 Largely floating 
2008 
-120,058,736 -$3,658,150 213,867,151 -56.14 
Capping price hike at 
12% between Dec 07 to 
May 08 
five-year average 
 (2013-2009) 
-$94,324 
five-year 
average 
(2013-2009) -0.95  
six-year average 
 (2013-2008) 
-$688,295 
six-year 
average 
(2013-2008) -10.14  
Table 5.5 CPC Profitability 2013 – 2008 
 
The situation summarised in the table above suggests that CPC did not have much 
financial capability to pursue oil E&P projects or other strategic oil supply measures 
independent of that endowed by the Taiwanese government. As discussed in Section 2.1 
above, the Petroleum Administration Act did provide partial E&P subsidies to domestic oil 
firms, but the Bureau of Energy was still responsible for approving the applications. The 
maximum subsidy was only 50 percent for exploration projects and 12 percent for 
development projects. In short, the Taiwanese government had high financial capability to 
implement strategic oil supply measures, such as the various types of oil supply related 
subsidies stipulated in the Petroleum Administration Act, including the more market-
conforming subsidies provided to operators in remote areas. However, the financial situation 
of CPC did not add much to this capability. The oil pricing adjustments shown in Table 5.5 
suggest that financial capability in the form of profit or loss by CPC did contribute to the 
                                                          
204 Net profit/loss and owner’s equity figures are extracted from CPC English language annual reports 
of various years. It is interesting to note that these figures are not available in the Chinese language 
annual reports. 
205 Calculation is made using figures from the left hand column and historical exchange rates of 
respective years. Historical exchange rates are obtained from “Oanda Currency Converter,” accessed 
3 February 2017, https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/.  
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level of strategic oil supply measures adopted in the form of how much or how long pricing 
adjustments could be sustained in addition to political considerations as discussed in Section 
5.2 above.  
 
6.2 Taiwanese Diplomatic Capability 
Taiwan received the lowest score for diplomatic capability in the plausibility probe 
of this study because it was not even a UN member. Various types of UN memberships are 
the only criterion used there to gauge this capability as they have different potentials to 
generate quid pro quo that may be sought by oil supplying nations. In the comparative 
studies, the expenditures of government ministries and departments that likely have oil 
diplomacy functions are examined to expand the evaluation of respective countries’ 
implementation capability. Similar procedures are followed in the case of Taiwan. 
Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) deals with political entities, 
international organizations and activities Taiwan received formal recognition as well as 
those it does not. Still, MoFA publications hardly mention its goals, activities or 
expenditures related to oil or even energy, let alone oil diplomacy.206 A few mentioned the 
development of “green” or renewable energy, such as helping the Solomon Islands develop 
solar power,207 or promoting green energy products during the APEC meetings in Taiwan.208 
The fact that only a couple of the twenty odd countries Taiwan had diplomatic relationships 
with throughout the period studied were oil producing partially explains the rare 
appearances of oil diplomacy related terms.209 It was also likely that oil diplomacy related 
activities have been the domain of OPIC and its many affiliates, and for a long time, also 
                                                          
206 The publications examined are The Foreign Relations Yearbook of ROC [中華民國外交年鑑] 
and the MoFA Units Annual Final Accounting Reports [年度外交部單位決算] between 2009 and 
2013. Both can be accessed via the ROC MoFA website. The former accessed 10 February 2017, 
 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/NewsNoHeadOnlyTitle.aspx?n=19C2F1F943CBD946&sms=3769C374A
22343F0.  
The latter accessed 9 February 2017, 
  
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/NewsNoHeadOnlyTitle.aspx?n=5AEE5471C1A1C223&sms=7286F69C9
C4DFC22.  
207 In Chapter Two “External Relations,” 2010 Foreign Relations Yearbook of ROC. Accessed 10 
February 2017, http://multilingual.mofa.gov.tw/web/web_UTF-8/almanac/almanac2009/html/08-1-
1.htm.  
208 MoFA Units 2012 Annual Final Accounting Reports, 12. 
209 In 2000, Taiwan had diplomatic relationships with 29 countries. Among these countries, oil had 
already been or would soon be discovered in Chad, Costa Rica, and Gambia. Costa Rica would be 
the only one among the three that were already producing oil before breaking diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan in 2007. The other two countries were likely only at the exploration stage when they 
maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. For the list of the countries mostly have severed 
relationships with ROC since 2000, see Czeslaw Tubilewicz and Alain Guilloux, “Does size matter? 
Foreign aid in Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy, 2000-8,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 
65:3 (2011):323.  
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KMT-owned or sponsored enterprises. 210  Taiwan’s diplomatic dilemma nurtured the 
“corporate emissary” function of KMT affiliated companies and even after the separation of 
the state from the party in the late 1980s.211 The KMT most likely still “has not given up its 
habit of utilising its own stable firms to carry out strategic goals.”212 
This caveat notwithstanding, this study does conduct an analysis of Taiwanese 
MoFA’s expenditures between 2009 and 2013. The ministry’s five year (2013-2009) total 
expenditure to GDP ratio is 0.16, which is more than double the same ratio of counterpart 
ministries and other relevant departments for the same period in all the other three 
economies examined so far.213 This ratio drops to 0.09 if the items related to foreign aid, 
“international care and rescue” [國際關懷與救助] and “international cooperation” [國際合
作], are taken out.214 That it is still higher than India, Thailand, or China’s official relevant 
departments to GDP ratio.  
If we add this factor to the likelihood that many oil diplomacy functions would be 
carried out by other entities (as stated earlier), Taiwan’s oil diplomacy capability does not 
seem so low. Due to Taiwan’s structurally awkward international position, which makes it 
difficult to offer any substantive diplomatic support freely to oil producing nations or 
international oil or energy organizations, however, its oil diplomacy capability could not 
elevate to a trichotomously high level any time soon. A middle level would be more befitting 
during the period studied. 
Taiwan received the medium centralization score as a democracy in the 
preliminary study since democratic states are hypothesised to be generally less efficient in 
implementing policies they want in the short and medium term than autocracies, but are 
more stable and efficient than anocracies. The 2008 elections were the second largely 
peaceful change of power through free and fair elections in Taiwan.215 The existence of a 
“no-holds-barred” Taiwanese media in this century is another signpost that this polity had 
                                                          
210Ten overseas OPIC affiliates in various countries are listed on one CPC website. See footnote 31. 
211 Fields, “KMT, Inc. Party Capitalism in a Development State,” 6. 
212 Ibid. KMT controlled both the Executive and Legislative Branches between 2008 to 2016. 
213 India’s ratio was 0.07, Thailand’s 0.06, and China’s was 0.011. See Chapter Four. Taiwan’s ratio 
does not change even if its expenditures for the item “international care and rescue” [國際關懷與救
助] is deducted. Sources of these expenditures are from the MoFA Units Annual Final Accounting 
Reports. See footnote 204 for details. 
214 Supposedly, the MoFA used the sizeable “international cooperation” budget as a “confidential 
budget” for foreign aid in addition to the official aid budget from the Overseas Economic Cooperation 
and Development Fund. See Tubilewicz and Czeslaw, “Does size matter? Foreign aid in Taiwan’s 
diplomatic strategy, 2000-8,” 326-329. 
215 The first time was from KMT to DPP in the 2000-2001 presidential and legislature elections and 
the second time from DPP to KMT in the 2008 elections.  
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transitioned from an anocracy to a democracy in the period studied.216 The sensitivities 
Taiwanese decision-makers exhibited towards possible negative consequences of oil price 
hikes during election seasons despite their near consensus of the long-term direction of 
sector liberalisation illustrates the brake democracy may put on liberalisation. In fact, it 
reveals an inverse trend: the executive branch can only implement strategic oil supply 
measures either with the agreement of or be ready to fight with opposition politicians, 
especially if they control the legislature. Taiwan’s middle centralisation score, therefore, 
seems appropriate in its impact on the overall capability to implement strategic oil supply 
measures.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The data presented in this chapter show that the pathway that led Taiwan to adopt 
a high level of strategic oil supply measures around 2013 does not diverge as much from 
that of H3 as implied in the preliminary study. Yet, the two causal paths still do not 
completely overlap with the way variables are currently operationalised.  
Taiwan’s OV did not reach a high level among major net oil importing economies 
in the Asia Pacific region. It, however, almost certainly reached a trichotomously high level 
by global standards due to the exceptionally high OV of the region compared to other 
regions of the world. The overall strength of Taiwan’s private capital remained high, 
including in the petroleum sector, but international capital was still relatively weak in the 
island’s economy. Taiwanese decision-makers’ trust in the oil markets was best described 
as medium due to their neutral risk tolerance created by securitising contexts most pertinent 
to these individuals. The Taiwanese government probably still only had an overall medium 
capability to implement strategic oil supply measures due to its delicate diplomatic position 
in the international arena. Nonetheless, it had a high financial capability to implement these 
measures even by global standards and its high financial capability clearly enabled the 
government to implement a high level of such measures. Table 5.6 below summarises these 
results and the divergences with the stipulations of H3 and results in the preliminary study. 
 
DV 
Level OV (IV) Level 
Strength 
of Private 
Capital 
Overall 
Trust in Oil 
Markets 
Overall 
Implementation 
Capability 
Perfect Fit 
(Three-High Cases) High High High Medium High 
Taiwan 2013 
In-depth results High Medium/High High Medium Medium/High 
Taiwan 2013 
preliminary results High Medium High High Medium 
Table 5.6 Taiwan’s 2013 Variable Levels compared to H3 Stipulations 
                                                          
216 Taiwan earned a “democracy” score by the mid-1990s (between six and nine) and a full or 
consolidated democracy score (10) by the mid-2000s. See “Polity IV Country Report2010: Taiwan.”  
Accessed 2 February 2016, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Taiwan2010.pdf. 
197 
 
 
The pathways the vulnerability-interaction model hypothesises to lead to the 
adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply measures are based on two a priori conditions: 
having a high implementation capability and NOT a high level of trust in the markets. 
Taiwan’s case seems to suggest that the two a priori conditions are not equal in importance. 
Not having a high level of trust in the markets seems to be more important than having an 
overall high implementation capability in causing the adoption of a high level of strategic 
oil supply measures, especially in economies that are generally open and free. This study of 
Taiwan also suggests that financial capability is a more important component to the overall 
implementation capability than diplomatic capability.217 Taiwan clearly qualifies to have a 
high financial capability both by regional as well as global standards, but at best a medium 
diplomatic capability. Most of the strategic oil supply measures the Taiwanese government 
continued to adopt were sustained by its high financially capability.  
If Taiwan’s OV is viewed by global, not regional, standards and that its overall 
implementation capability may be considered high with financial capability given greater 
weight, then Taiwan’s conditions as of 2013 would fit the stipulations of H3. These two “ifs” 
do not stray far from the facts. Instead, the former expands the scope of the study beyond 
the Asia Pacific to possibly make it more generalisable. The latter appears to be a reasonable 
refinement to the measurement of the variable. The stipulations of H3, therefore, are not 
amended at this point and its validity is conditionally confirmed pending further testing with 
more cases in future research, especially with financial capability being given a greater 
weight.  
The apparent hierarchy among the two a priori conditions to the adoption of a high 
level of strategic oil supply measures relates to the trivialness or relevance of necessary and 
sufficient conditions in their causal roles in any particular event. In an extreme example, the 
presence of oxygen is also a necessary condition for decision-makers of a net oil importing 
economy to adopt strategic oil supply measures. This is obviously an infinitely less relevant 
necessary condition. 218  The second level of the vulnerability-interaction model as it is 
currently formulated implies two of the four explanatory variables hypothesised by the 
model, the two a priori conditions, have greater importance in causing the adoption of a 
high level of strategic oil supply measures than the remaining two. It does not, however, 
differentiate the significance among the two a prior conditions. This in-depth study of 
Taiwan suggests that NOT having a high level of trust in the oil markets is a more relevant 
                                                          
217 In the plausibility probe, the two were basically given the same weight.  
218 In the language of set-theoretic ideas that underlie the proposed model, adopting a high level of 
strategic oil supply measures (Y) is a minute subset of the necessary condition of the presence of 
oxygen (X1) and a larger subset in the necessary condition of having a high level of trust (X2).  
198 
 
necessary cause to the adoption of high level of strategic oil supply measures than having a 
high overall implementation capability.  
The high level of strategic oil measures adopted by Taiwan in the decade leading to 
2013 resulted more from the state not having a high capacity, as expounded by Ikenberry, 
to wield market instrument decisively than from the state actively trying to control oil supply 
to the economy.219 The Taiwanese government clearly recognised the value of economic 
liberalisation and tried to privatise its NOC and let oil product prices float by this century, 
but it ran into stiff resistance from the trade union. Taiwanese decision-makers were also 
very sensitive to the pressure of populist demand for artificially low oil prices. Taiwan’s 
precarious geopolitical situation facilitated securitising the island’s oil supply, enabled the 
government at times to be “captured” by an oligopolistic private oil firm, and generally 
made decision-makers more risk averse. All these situations combined to lowed decision-
makers’ overall trust in relying solely on the market to supply oil to the economy. 
 
                                                          
219 Ikenberry, “The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in the 
1970s.” International Organization 40-1 (1986): 132. 
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Chapter Six 
Oil Sector Liberalisation, Fast and Slow1 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
This thesis has evaluated the puzzling phenomenon that many governments of net 
oil importing economies continued to intervene in their economies’ oil supply well after oil 
began trading in open international markets. This was the case even though many domestic 
oil markets have been liberalised to varying degrees during the same period. State-sponsored 
oil supply activities re-emerged as an important issue in international political economics in 
the first decade or so of this century due to rising oil prices. The focus of related commentary 
and research has been the overseas hydrocarbon exploration and production (E&P) activities 
of Chinese national oil companies (NOCs). Upon closer examination, however, many other 
Asian net oil importing economies also adopted different levels and types of what this study 
labels strategic oil supply measures.   
Neither neoliberal economists nor Realist/geopolitical theorists seem to have 
satisfactorily answered the two key research questions generated from this puzzle. These are 
(1) What explains variations in the levels of strategic oil supply measures adopted by Asian 
net oil importing economies between 1994 and 2013; and (2) what explains the adoption of 
a high level of such measures by at least some of those economies during this period?  
The goal of this study has been to delineate and assess the circumstances that 
resulted in continuing but differing levels of state intervention in the oil sectors of Asian net 
oil importing economies. The puzzle of the study embodies at least two implicit assumptions. 
First, the open market is generally a more efficient way of obtaining oil supplies. Second, 
states aim to adopt the most efficient measures to obtain oil supplies to underwrite their 
economies. As discussed further below, a more nuanced understanding of these assumptions 
has emerged during the investigations undertaken in the previous chapters to unlock the 
apparently puzzling phenomenon that motivated this thesis.    
Without assigning prescriptions of what states should or should not do to their oil 
sector governance, what would be the contribution of studying the causes for oil dependent 
states to intervene in the oil marketplace to international relations? First, it may highlight 
misconceptions of what underwrites the motives of state actions in the oil sector. Such 
misunderstandings would otherwise have a damaging effect on international and regional 
relationships given the relative prominence of the zero-sum (neorealist) narrative of resource 
acquisition policy calculations.   
                                                          
1 The title of this chapter is homage to the book by the Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, 
Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011). 
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Second, despite the many worthy studies on more sustainable and renewable 
energy sources that have been developed in recent years, oil is - and likely will remain - an 
important energy source of the world in the coming decades.2 In the Asia Pacific, oil 
consumption as a percentage of primary energy was a little lower than the global average in 
the decade preceding 2013.3 As the only region where coal accounts for a larger share of 
primary energy source than oil, 4  however, it may be relatively better for the global 
environment if Asia increases the use of natural gas and oil, in lieu of coal. Although China 
has aggressive plans to increase its nuclear capacity to lower its overwhelming reliance on 
coal, the low base it started from means that there should be simultaneous room for increase 
in oil and gas and renewable energy usage.5 Besides, nuclear energy is not a ready substitute 
of oil or even natural gas in the transportation sector in the foreseeable future, judging by 
the current state of technological developments.6 The determinants of the level and mode of 
state intervention in oil supply, therefore, would still be a consequential issue, especially in 
the Asia-Pacific.  
This study employs a deductive “vulnerability-interaction model” to address the 
two research questions about the causes to variations in the levels of strategic oil supply 
measures adopted by Asian net oil importing economies. This model provides a clear and 
potentially generalisable framework for analysing the causes of continued state intervention 
in the Asian Pacific oil sector which has so far been lacking in the relevant existing literature. 
The model proposes that a polity having a noticeable level of oil vulnerability (OV) is a 
                                                          
2 In 2015, it accounted for about 33% of the world’s primary energy consumption according to data 
on BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016, 41. Accessed 2 February 2017,  
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2016/bp-statistical-
review-of-world-energy-2016-full-report.pdf.  
3 In 2004, oil accounted for about 34% of the Asia-Pacific’s and 37% of the world’s primary energy 
consumption, while that figure for the Asia Pacific in 2015 was about 27%. For the 2015 data, see 
above. For the 2004 data, see BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2006, 41. 
4 Same data source as in footnote 3. 
5 In 2010, nuclear energy accounted for 0.69 percent of China’s primary energy consumption and that 
figure increased to 1.28 percent in 2015, while coal accounted for almost 64 percent of the country’s 
primary energy consumption in 2015 and about 70 percent its power generation around 2016. Sources 
of data for the calculation are from BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016, 41 and BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011, 41. China reportedly tries to triple its nuclear capacity 
by 2026. See Stephen Stapczynski, “China’s Nuclear Power Capacity to Overtake U.S. Within 
Decade,” Bloomberg News, 31 January 2017. Accessed 20 February 2017,  
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-31/china-s-nuclear-power-fleet-seen-
overtaking-u-s-within-decade.   
6 There have been research on using “synergistic energy carriers” such as hydrogen, electricity, or 
liquid fuels to incorporate nuclear energy to power vehicles, but actual nuclear-powered cars for the 
retail market do not seem to be a viable option in the foreseeable future. See Masao Hori, “Nuclear 
energy for transportation: Paths through electricity, hydrogen and liquid fuels,” Progress in Nuclear 
Energy 50 (2008): 411-416. Also see Sebastian Anthony, “Where are all the clean, infinite-range 
nuclear-powered cars, ships, and plans?” Extreme Tech website, 25 July, 2014. Accessed 30 March 
2017, https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/186907-where-are-all-the-clean-infinite-range-
nuclear-powered-cars-ships-and-planes.  
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sufficient but not necessary cause for its decision-makers to desire to adopt strategic oil 
supply measures. The actual level of these measures adopted at any given time - the 
dependent variable (DV) - is the result of interaction among the economy’s OV and three 
other factors within a given polity: (1) the level of decision-makers’ trust that oil markets 
can supply reliable and affordable oil to the economy, (2) the economy’s overall 
implementation capability of strategic supply measures; and (3) the overall strength of 
private capital versus that of state capital in the economy.  
The vulnerability-interaction model specifies the result of the interaction of these 
explanatory variables in four cases. The two hypothetical “extreme cases” according to the 
reasoning of the model are: (1) a net oil importing economy with a low OV, high trust, low 
capability, and high strength of private capital would adopt a low level of interventionist or 
strategic oil supply measures or none at all; or (2) one with a high OV, low trust, high 
capability, and low strength of private capital would adopt a high level of such measures. 
Each of these extreme cases or the groupings of explanatory variables as a whole forms an 
unnecessary but sufficient pathway to the adoption of respectively a low and a high level of 
strategic oil supply measures.  
Short of these extreme cases, the model hypothesises two pathways or INUS 
causes for the adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply measures.7 These are: (1) net 
oil importing economies with high OV, medium trust in oil markets, high capability, and 
high-strength private capital versus that of the state (H3 or Three-High cases); and (2) ones 
with a noticeable level of OV, high capability, NOT having high trust in oil markets, nor 
high-strength private capital (H4 or Non-Three-High cases). 
In response to the first research question of what causes the variations in strategic 
oil supply measures adopted, the vulnerability-interaction model predicts the comparative 
levels of strategic oil supply measures adopted by two net oil importing economies at the 
same period or by the same economy in two distinct periods under two situations. They are 
encapsulated in the following two hypotheses. H1 states that if the levels of all four 
explanatory factors are similar, the value of the DV should be similar. H2 contends that if 
the levels of three factors are similar in two cases, their DV levels should be congruent with 
the result caused by the difference in their fourth factor as predicted by the proposed model. 
If the only difference among the explanatory variables between two economies is that one 
has a higher trust in oil markets, for example, H2 predicts that the one with a higher trust 
would adopt a lower level of strategic oil supply measures. 
                                                          
7 INUS is the acronym of “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary 
but sufficient for the result.” James Mahoney, “Toward a Unified Theory of Causality,” Comparative 
Political Studies 42:4/5 (2008), 418. 
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Due to the previously untested nature of the model, this thesis conducts a 
plausibility probe in Chapter Three with relatively uniform and simpler data of nine Asian 
net oil importing economies to gauge if the model’s premise is credible. The results show 
the vulnerability-interaction model offers a plausible explanation for variation in the level 
of the state intervention in oil supply of net importing economies. Out of the 36 pairs of 
cross-case comparisons generated from the nine economies’ 2013 data, one pair, India and 
Thailand, matches the parameters of H1, meaning the levels of all their four explanatory 
variables were the same. Both also adopted the same trichotomous level of strategic oil 
supply measures in 2013, congruent with the expectation of H1. Five pairs of these 
comparisons emerge with parameters of H2, meaning the levels of three out of their four 
explanatory variables were the same in 2013. Three out of these five pairs, or 60 percent of 
the pertinent cases, have DV levels that conform to the expectation of H2. The only 
substantive difference between the four explanatory variable levels between China and India 
was China’s markedly higher implementation capability and China had a higher DV as 
predicted by H2. The same is true for China and Thailand. The only substantive difference 
in the four explanatory variable levels between Japan and Singapore again was Japan’s 
higher implementation capability. Japan also had a higher DV as predicted by H2.   
Chapter Three also examines the cross-temporal validity of the vulnerability-
interaction model by comparing the 2013 data of the nine economies with commensurate 
2003 data. These two data points represent roughly the end of one decade of high and low 
oil prices in the international markets respectively. Four of these nine within-case studies 
emerged with no change in the levels of any of their four explanatory variables over the 
decade. Among the four, two are congruent with the predictions of H1, meaning no change 
was evident in the level of the strategic oil supply measures they adopted, as expected. Two 
of the cases match the parameters of H2. Judged by a adherence to the letters of the 
hypothesis only, neither’s DV level changed in the direction predicted by the change of the 
one explanatory variable having a trichotomously different level over the decade. As 
detailed in Chapter Three, however, both conform to the reasoning of the proposed model.   
The findings of the levels of the variables of the nine economies in the preliminary 
study are used to gauge the initial plausibility of the two pathways hypothesised to explain 
the adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply measures, H3 and H4. Taiwan’s situation 
was the most appropriate for further investigation of the pathway resulting in the adoption 
of a high level of strategic oil supply measures by a generally open and free economy. On 
the other hand, China’s 2013 data match all the stipulations of H4.  
Chapter Four presents more detailed data to investigate the cross-case validity of 
H1 and H2.  India and Thailand are selected as the country pair for examining H1 because 
all their explanatory variables are identified as having the same levels in the plausibility 
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probe. After more detailed and country-specific data are taken into account, the 
trichotomous levels of all their variables remain the same. The cross-case validity of H1, 
therefore, passes the test of the most different research design considering the great 
differences between the two countries. These include many respects other than the 
explanatory variables, such as population, geographical size, political and economic systems. 
Future research may investigate if the specific configuration of these two countries’ four 
explanatory variables in 2013 is a reliable causal pathway to the adoption of a medium level 
of strategic oil measures: medium implementation capability and low level of the remaining 
three explanatory variables. 
Among the three pairs of cases preliminarily congruent with the predictions of H2, 
China and India are chosen to further investigate the hypothesis’ validity. Their respective 
explanatory and dependent variable levels in the plausibility probe withstand the scrutiny of 
more detailed data in the second half of Chapter Four. China’s markedly higher 
implementation capability continues to be the determining factor that explains the higher 
level of strategic oil supply measures it adopted in the years leading to 2013. While the 
values of the other three explanatory variables change slightly after more data are analysed, 
they do not warrant changes in trichotomous levels. The cross-case validity of H2, therefore, 
is also confirmed. Since China’s configuration match that of H4, this comparative study also 
serves as a confirmation of the causal pathway to the adoption of a high level of state 
intervention in the oil sector suggested by H4 – those of the non-three-high cases. 
Chapter Five investigates Taiwan’s pathway to the adoption of a high level of 
strategic oil supply measure in an effort to further investigate and refine H3. Under closer 
examination, Taiwan’s conditions in the decade preceding 2013 still did not conform totally, 
but moved closer to, the stipulations of H3. Most importantly, the polity’s overall trust in 
the oil markets was lowered to a trichotomously medium, not high, level as in the 
preliminary study. The vulnerability-interaction model conceptualises the level of trust in 
oil markets as the central explanatory variable that “binds” all the others together. Not 
having a high level of trust, therefore, is hypothesised as one of the two a priori conditions 
that leads net oil importing economies to adopt a high level of strategic oil supply measures.  
Having a high implementation capability was originally deduced to be the other a 
priori condition. Taiwan’s capability as of 2013 still did not reach an overall high level, 
despite its high financial capability even by global standards. This was mainly due to its 
ambiguous sovereign status in the international arena and its diplomatic isolation. Future 
research may test the idea that having at least a medium overall capability is a more 
appropriate a priori condition. Alternatively, diplomatic capability probably contributes less 
to the overall implementation capability than is currently formulated. The findings on 
Taiwan as well as those on other case studies gleaned from both the plausibility probe and 
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the in-depth paired comparisons suggest that implementation capability is of secondary 
importance compared to trust in oil markets and possibly path dependency. In the parlance 
of the set-theoretic method of social sciences that underpins this thesis, implementation 
capability is a less relevant necessary pre-condition for the adoption of a high level of 
strategic oil supply measures than is trust.8   
Of the four economies in the plausibility probe that receive a low trust level score 
in oil markets in this study - China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand - none of them had a low 
DV level in 2013. On the other hand, of the two polities that had high capabilities, only 
China - (also having a low trust level) - implemented a high level of strategic oil supply 
measures in 2013. Japan, the other high-capability economy, had a higher trust in oil markets. 
Even with a high OV, it only had a medium, not high, level of DV. 
The case of Taiwan shows that once a national oil company (NOC) was 
established, it becomes very “sticky,” meaning the divestment process tends to be long and 
arduous. Of the nine cases studied in this thesis, only Singapore’s NOC was totally divested. 
All the other eight began some sort of divestment or corporatisation process about two 
decades earlier, but none of the NOCs has become minority government-owned yet. NOCs 
tend to justify their existence by exaggerating their importance in ensuring reliable and 
affordable oil supply to decision-makers and the public of their host economies. They also 
sometimes unduly link oil supply with national and international security concerns. All these 
tend to lower decision-makers’ trust in the oil markets. NOCs are also competitors of private 
capital in the oil sectors. These two situations form a feedback loop that reinforces both 
factors.  
 
Overall Implications of Thesis 
In the meantime, a broader understanding of the apparent tension between the drive 
for greater oil sector liberalisation and the continued intervention in the sector emerges from 
the analysis presented in this study. First, oil governance globally has generally been moving 
towards being more transparent and supply-and-demand-driven with the establishment of 
the open international oil markets in the last three decades than in previous eras. This was 
not only true in advanced industrial economies,9 but also in the Asia-Pacific, including 
China and India. The cross-temporal study in this thesis shows that seven out of the nine 
case studies adopted either the same or a lower level of strategic oil supply measures over a 
                                                          
8 For a discussion of the relevance or trivialness of necessary and sufficient conditions, see Carsten 
Q. Schneider and Claudius Wagemann, Set-Theoretic Methods for Social Sciences (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), Chapter 9, Kindle Edition. 
9 See Hughes, Globalizing Oil.  
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decade of rising oil prices.10 The marketisation and later financialisation of the international 
oil markets was facilitated by the increasing number of non-OPEC oil exporting countries 
and advancements in oil E&P and information technologies. This process is analogous to a 
long-term “evolution” towards the equilibrium of a more efficient mode of exchange at the 
global or “population of states” level.11 
Decision-makers in individual net oil importing states, while also striving for 
efficient oil supply to their economies are nevertheless akin to managers confronted with 
the subjective costs associated with the unique conditions of their respective economies 
(firms) at a particular point in time. To them, “[e]conomic costs are inherently subjective, 
because different decision makers sacrifice different alternatives at the moment of choice 
based on different perceptions of and preferences for the alternative opportunities in a world 
of uncertainty.”12 Figuratively, decision-makers’ political imperative to live to fight another 
day or serve another term is mostly predicated on issues that have shorter time horizons. 
Energy or oil supply security and efficiency is only one of the many issues on their policy 
plates, and under most circumstances, the issue of reliable oil supplies is not raised to the 
highest level of urgency or importance. Sometimes, strategic oil supply measures are 
adopted because of reasons not related to oil supply security or efficiency, such as to serve 
more urgent political or diplomatic objectives. Again, as with individual firms, “in the short 
run, disequilibrium prevails, and both efficient and inefficient forms [of governance] will 
be observed to coexist.”13 
Taiwan and China, for example, both adopted a high level of strategic oil supply 
measures up to 2013 by global standards. Decision-makers in both economies, however, 
appeared to agree that a liberalised oil sector is more efficient to fuel their respective 
economies. Still, they did not or could not liberalise their oil sectors at a faster pace. This 
was due to many competing objective demands and restraints in their own polity, as well as 
decision-makers’ perceptions of the polities’ domestic and external environments, which in 
turn determined their risk preferences.  
The vulnerability-interaction model suggests that the narrative of the aggressive 
zero-sum form of economic nationalism is the major “tool” securitising agents such as 
NOCs use to lower decision-makers’ risk preference regarding their polities’ external 
environment. This is especially true in conducting their relations with the existing 
                                                          
10 The Philippines and South Korea are the only two exceptions. As detailed in Chapter Three, the 
Philippines’ level of DV went up but its oil sector was actually more market-oriented over the decade. 
11  The insight for the analysis in the non-synchronous speed of oil sector liberalisation at the 
population (of states) and individual states levels originates from the discussions of the two different 
levels of transaction cost economics by Chiles and McMackin in “Integrating Variable Risk 
Preferences, Trust, and Transaction Cost Economics.”  
12 Chiles and McMackin, 77. 
13 Ibid., 76, 
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hegemonic power of the United States. China was the one case-study polity that had a 
neutral-conflictual relationship with the United States in 2013, which has since deteriorated 
further. In the meantime, the zero-sum form of economic nationalism has been crescendoing 
in some parts of the world, not the least in the United States. This does not seem to bode 
well for expedited oil sector liberalisation in China, even with the lowering of oil prices in 
the international markets since 2014.  
The cross-temporal study in this thesis also suggests that oil price changes by 
themselves seem to have a less prominent effect on the level of strategic oil supply measures 
adopted than both changes in oil self-sufficiency rates and trust in the oil markets.14 China’s 
oil self-sufficiency rate is likely to keep declining unless there are major breakthroughs in 
oil E&P and/or transport fuelling technologies, or if its economy significantly worsens and 
hence curbing the demand for cars by its expanding middle class. If the latter happens, it 
would likely make the zero-sum form of economic nationalism more marketable and so 
erode decision-makers’ trust in the international oil markets. Therefore, there seems to be 
no easy way to hasten China’s oil sector liberalisation, but quite a few ways to slow it down.  
The same observation of the relative importance of oil-sufficiency rate should have 
the opposite effect on the United States and other economies that can significantly enhance 
their oil self-sufficiency rates with technologies associated with the shale revolution. These 
technologies enabled the United States to increase its oil sufficiency rate from just shy of 
40% in 2010 to 65% in 2015.15 If everything remains equal, the United States should adopt 
a lower level of strategic oil supply measures. This was true in the form of the lifting of its 
four-decade export ban on crude oil in December 2015. Everything does not remain equal, 
however. Somehow the rhetoric of a more or less zero-sum form of economic nationalism 
has moved into mainstream politics in the United States, if not particularly in the oil sector. 
This simultaneous objective increase in oil supply security and subjective increase in general 
“paranoia” of U.S. decision-makers is likely to generate greater risk aversion of “managers” 
of polities not having friendly relations with the United States. In their estimation, the 
“prophecy” of the zero-sum economic nationalistic narrative is being fulfilled.  
Whether the course of actions chosen by managers of individual firms or economies 
according to the subjective costs confronting them in the short run are sufficiently viable to 
ensure a long-term existence or even prosperity can only be known ex post. This is especially 
true when the economy in question is very large and hence has great market power. In this 
                                                          
14 This is not to suggest that oil price itself has no effect on the level of strategic oil supply measures 
adopted by governments of net oil importing economies at all. It definitely does. For example, the 
Indian government has further relaxed oil product control since the drop of oil prices in the second 
half of 2014. Floating oil prices did not appear to be as politicised during the Taiwanese presidential 
election in 2016 as in the previous few elections when oil prices were high.   
15 Calculated with the data on the BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016, 8-9.   
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study, these are China, Japan, or India. One major factor that would contribute to where the 
population-of-states level long-term equilibrium of oil sector governance would be is how 
uniformly and quickly other oil importing economies around the world liberalise their oil 
sectors. Another factor is the pace of innovation and dissemination of cost-saving 
technologies and modes of exchange, including alternative energy technologies. The 
prevalence or change in dominant global economic-political ideas, such as being free-trade-
oriented or protectionist, would also be pivotal.16   
A more nuanced understanding of the two implicit assumptions underlying the 
puzzle of this thesis emerges after the research was carried out to explain it. The open market 
is indeed generally more efficient, but only in a long-term evolutionary sense and comparing 
to the modes of exchange of oil in previous eras. For the second assumption, states do 
generally aim at using the most efficient way to obtain oil supplies, especially in the long 
run, due to the pressure of trying to remain competitive at the global level. Most decision-
makers, however, operate in a short to medium horizon. They are confronted with short-
term subjective costs and risk perceptions, which may diverge at least temporarily from the 
states’ long-term objectives.  
The timeframe embodied within this study’s research questions targets the medium-
term and the geographic scope can also be described as “medium” – between the global 
population-of-states level and the level of individual economies. The operationalisation of 
the research, however, is at the individual economy level and the relatively short time of 10 
years in each period. The reasoning of the vulnerability-interaction model also fits into the 
short to medium time horizon of typical decision-makers as trust and risk preference is 
hypothesised as the central explanatory variable through which all the other explanatory 
variables flow.  
The puzzle that motivated this study can be unlocked by viewing it through the 
lenses of the two overlapping horizons and levels of analysis explained here. The increasing 
trading volume and sophistication of the international oil markets is a manifestation of the 
long-term “evolution” towards a more efficient mode of exchange in oil internationally and 
oil sector liberalisation domestically for the last four decades. The simultaneous adoption of 
various levels of strategic oil supply measures by different net oil importing states can be 
explained by the inherently subjective cost calculations of decision-makers of these states 
in the short to medium term. The vulnerability-interaction model projects the most important 
factors that feature in the decision-makers’ calculation of what degree such measures should 
be adopted at any given time.  
                                                          
16 For the first 80 years or so years of oil as a global commodity, for example, the “equilibrium” was 
intra-company transfers among “private” firms of colonial and dominant powers of the day. 
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Roughly analogous to Daniel Kahneman’s assertion of the necessity of both the fast 
and slow modes of thinking for human decision-making and survival in Thinking, Fast and 
Slow, the two timeframes and speeds of oil sector liberalisation co-existed in the last 40 
years. In the Asia Pacific, a region where multinational institutions have been relatively 
weak, cooperation among net oil importing states to optimise their market power and to 
establish stability of supply (reaping long-term benefits) was repeatedly countered by the 
instinct to compete and survive (dealing with short-term subjective costs and risk 
perceptions).17 Yet, major regional conflicts over the acquisition of oil resources have been 
avoided in the region. With continued good fortunate, these asynchronous oil sector 
liberalisations will persist in moving towards a long-term equilibrium of ever greater 
efficiency and benefit to that region and to the world, perhaps even until the obsolescence 
of oil as a form of energy is reached. 
 
Agenda for Future Research 
 With the understanding of the timeframe and level of analysis applicable to the 
vulnerability-interaction model as stated above, future research may further test its validity. 
Data from more net oil importing economies should be gathered first inside and then outside 
of the Asia Pacific in distinct periods after the establishment of the international oil market. 
The proportion of the economies which adopted a high, medium, or low level of strategic 
oil supply measures would provide better insights to the prevalence of these measures. Any 
temporal trend(s) and geographic pattern of state intervention in oil supply, if any, would 
become more discernible if enough cases are studied. The relatively small sample in this 
study shows that in the Asia Pacific, state intervention oil supply was still significant as of 
2013 (33% of the cases at a high, 44% at a medium, and 22% at a low level or none at all).  
The factors or combination of factors that led to the adoption of a high level of 
strategic oil supply measures in the new cases should be carefully analysed and compared 
to those stipulated in H3 and H4 of the vulnerability-interaction model to refine, modify, or 
refute these hypotheses. Any commonalities emerge as a result may augment the typologies 
of intervention in oil supply by net oil importing economies started in this study.  
Last but not least, the validity of the underlying logic of the vulnerability-
interaction model, namely the proposed causal relationships between the four explanatory 
factors with the level of strategic oil supply measures adopted, may be tested with the new 
                                                          
17  A good example of these two countervailing forces at work in Asia is the sometimes-on-and-
sometimes-off Five-Country Energy Ministerial China initiated in 2006 and the torturous paths of 
other energy initiatives in Northeast Asia. See Gaye Christoffersen, “Pathways to a Northeast Asian 
Energy Regime,” in China’s Rise and Changing Order in East Asia, ed. David Arase (New York: 
Palgrave, 2016), 173-196. 
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cases. One way to achieve this is to analyse pairs of cases that fit the parameters of H1 and 
H2. 
The slump in oil prices since 2014 and the almost simultaneous rise in economic 
nationalism rhetoric in many parts of the world offer a great opportunity to study the cross-
temporal validity of the logic of the vulnerability-interaction model. In particular, the 
preliminary insight of this study that change in oil prices only has a relatively small effect 
on the level of state intervention in oil supply compared to change in oil self-sufficiency rate 
and securitisation-induced lower trust in the oil market may be tested in the same net oil 
importing economies before and after these two benchmark events. 
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Appendix A 
Typologising Adoption of High-Level State Intervention in Oil Supply 
___________________________________________________________ 
With four explanatory variables at trichotomous levels, the vulnerability-interaction 
model would have generated 81 mathematically possible pathways or configurations of arriving 
at the adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply measures (34=81). The proposed model 
then specifies two a prior conditions for such a result. This shrinks the possible pathways or 
cells to 18 as presented in Figure 2.4 in Chapter Two. After applying the logical compression 
technique in Section 4.3, five more pathways or cells are deleted (See Figure 2.5). Thirteen 
pathways leading to a high level of DV remains with trichotomous variables. Each one of these 
pathways is hypothesised as an INUS cause of the adoption of a high level of strategic oil supply 
measures by an oil importing economy. These pathways are:  
1. high capability + low trust + low private capital strength + low OV 
2. high capability + low trust + low private capital strength + medium OV 
3. high capability + low trust + low private capital strength + high OV 
4. high capability + low trust + medium private capital strength + low OV 
5. high capability + low trust + medium private capital strength + medium OV 
6. high capability + low trust + medium private capital strength + high OV 
7. high capability + medium trust + low private capital strength + low OV 
8. high capability + medium trust + low private capital strength + medium OV 
9. high capability + medium trust + low private capital strength + high OV 
10. high capability + medium trust + medium private capital strength + low OV 
11. high capability + medium trust + medium private capital strength + medium OV 
12. high capability + medium trust + medium private capital strength + high OV 
13. high capability + medium trust + high private capital strength + high OV  
 
Then the technique of pragmatic compression is applied as explained in Chapter Two. 
This combines the components or “solution terms” of these pathways1 if doing so does not 
change the essence of the model. A careful examination of the solution terms of the 13 pathways 
above shows that the first three pathways or solutions only differ in the level of their last 
component, which is OV. Therefore, the property space or cell of these three pathways can be 
pragmatically compressed as follows: 
                                                          
1 In research using set-theoretic methods, each component in a pathway leading to the phenomenon of 
interest is called a solution term. See Schneider and Wagemann. 
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A. high capability + low trust + low private capital strength + noticeable level of OV 
The same procedure can be carried out for pathways 4 to 6; 7 to 9; and 10 to 12. Each of 
these groups also only differs in the level of their last component, again the OV. This will result 
in the following collapsed pathways for each group respectively: 
B. high capability + low trust + medium private capital strength + noticeable level of OV 
C. high capability + medium trust + low private capital strength + noticeable OV  
D. high capability + medium trust + medium private capital strength + noticeable OV  
 
Now if we look at A to D more closely, we can see that the same pragmatic compression 
principle can be used to merge them into a single pathway as follows: 
 
E. high capability + NOT high trust + NOT high private capital strength + noticeable OV 
 
At the end, two final pathways or INUS causes to a high level of DV emerge with 
trichotomous variables after all the compression is done: pathway 13 and pathway E. They also 
become H3 and H4 respectively: 
 
H3:  high capability + medium trust + high private capital strength + high OV 
H4: high capability + NOT high level of trust + NOT high private capital strength + 
noticeable level of OV  
 
Figure A1 below is a graphic representation of the INUS causes for the adoption of a high 
level of strategic oil supply measures by net oil importing economies with trichotomous 
variables. The greyed out cells are logically compressed (equivalent to cell group 2 in Figure 
2.5): 
 
Figure A1 Typology of Adoption of High Level of Strategic Oil Supply Measures 
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Appendix B 
Calculations for Plausibility Probe 
___________________________________________________________ 
Table A1 below shows different strategic oil supply indicator scores resulting from different 
aggregation of its two components methods with and without capping the SPR score and 
weighting given to it: 
  
Table A1     2013 DV scores of nine case-study economies with different aggregation 
methods and weightings   
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Table A2 below shows different trichotomous DV levels of all case studies in 2013 resulting 
from different aggregation and weighting methods of the two components of the strategic oil 
supply indicators. As a rule, for all weighting methods, DV scores within one standard deviation 
of the average (falling within 0.5 above and 0.5 below the mean DV score of the weighting 
method in question) are considered having a medium level. DV scores more than 0.5 standard 
deviation above the average are considered having a high level and those 0.5 or more below are 
considered having a low level. 
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Table A2 Different trichotomous levels DV of nine case-study economies in 2013 with 
different aggregation and weighting methods 
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Table A3 in the next page shows the calculation of the oil vulnerability of all nine case-study 
economies in 2013. The sources of oil production, consumption, and primary energy 
consumption data are from BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014 except stated 
otherwise. The Philippines’ oil production amount is the from U.S. Energy Information 
Administration database online. Population and per capita income data are from the World Bank 
except for Taiwan, which is from the Central Intelligence Agency “The World Factbook.”  
Table A3   Calculation of 2013 OV  
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Figure A4 below lays out overall implementation scores and levels of nine case-study 
economies in 2013 with Singapore coded as anocracy, autocracy, or democracy. Singapore’s 
overall implementation level does not change in these three scenarios, but Thailand’s overall 
capability level would be downgraded to “low” instead of “medium” in the two scenarios not 
adopted in this study (Singapore being either an autocracy or democracy). 
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Table A4 Overall implementation capability of nine economies in 2013, with different 
centralization scores 
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Table A5 below shows all 36 pairs of comparison of the variable levels among the nine case-
study economies with 2013 data. The pairs with conditions fitting either H1 or H2 are 
highlighted. The rest have differences in more than one explanatory factor. The vulnerability-
interaction model as is currently formulated cannot specify the interaction effect such situations 
would be on the DV level. 
 
Table A5 36 paired-comparisons of variable levels of nine case-study economies in 
2013  
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Table A6 below shows the average government ownership shareholding in 15 advanced 
industrialised economies by 2005. Source of the information is mainly from “Appendix: Oil 
market liberalization in the advanced industrialised states” in Llewelyn Hughes, Globalizing 
Oil: Firms and Oil Market Governance in France, Japan, and the United States. I use the state 
control of crude oil supply figure in this study for Japan since Japan’s “NOC” is more a 
government agency facilitating loans for private oil firms to develop oil.  
 
Table A6 Government shareholding in NOCs in 15 advanced industrialised countries 
by 2005 
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Table A7 below shows the calculation of the oil vulnerability of all nine case-study economies 
in 2003. The sources of oil production, consumption, and primary energy consumption data are 
from BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2004 except stated otherwise. The Philippines’ 
oil production amount is the from U.S. Energy Information Administration database online. 
Population and per capita income data are from the World Bank except for Taiwan, which is 
from the Central Intelligence Agency “The World Factbook.” 
Table A7   Oil Vulnerability of Nine Case Studies in 2003  
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Table A8 below shows the DV calculation and sources for the nine case-study economies in 
2003. 
 
Table A8 DV calculation of nine case studies 2003
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Table A9 below shows the calculation of the levels of all the variables of nine case studies in 
2003. 
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Table A9 Calculation of levels of variables of nine case studies in 2003 
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Appendix C 
Calculations for Paired Comparisons 
_________________________________________________________ 
Table A10 below shows the sources of crude oil supply of India in 2013 and the calculation 
of the supply concentration risk associated with it: 
 
Table A10  India’s crude oil source concentration risk in 2013  
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Table A11 below shows the sources of crude oil supply of Thailand in 2013 and the 
calculation of the supply concentration risk associated with it: 
 
Table A11 Thailand’s crude oil source concentration risk in 2013 
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Table A12 below compares the profitability between Indian and Thai NOCs between 2009 
and 2013: 
 
Table A12 Indian and Thai NOC profitability between 2009 and 2013 
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Table A13 below shows the sources of crude oil supply of China in 2013 and the calculation 
of the supply concentration risk associated with it: 
 
Table A13 China’s crude oil source concentration risk in 2013  
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Table A14 below shows the calculation of the net profits of the publicly-listed subsidiaries 
of the three major Chinese NOCs between 2009 and 2013: 
Table A14 Chinese NOC profitability 2009-2013  
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Table A15 below shows the calculation of China’s official diplomatic spending between 
2009 and 2013: 
 
Table A15  China’s Official Diplomatic Spending 2009 to 2013 
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Appendix D 
Oil Supply Securitisation Score Tally 
___________________________________________________________ 
Table A16 below shows distribution of scores of various terms used in the annual reports to 
securitise oil supply by all the oil companies content analysis have been conducted. 
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Table A16 Securitising score tally of oil companies 
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